9 found
Order:
See also
Jason Megill
Bentley College
  1. On the Unimportance of Theistic Belief.Jason L. Megill & Daniel Linford - 2017 - Essays in the Philosophy of Humanism ; Vol 25, No 2 25 (2):187-207.
    We first argue that there are cases of “blameless non-belief.” That is, some people—through no fault of their own—fail to enter into a conscious relationship with God. But if so, then it would be unjust of God to make certain particular goods depend upon one having a conscious relationship with God. So, given that God is just, then despite what some theists believe, a relationship with God cannot be a necessary condition for the attainment of these goods; there might, e.g., (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  2. A Modest Modal Ontological Argument.Jason L. Megill & Joshua M. Mitchell - 2009 - Ratio 22 (3):338-349.
    We formulate a new modal ontological argument; specifically, we show that there is a possible world in which an entity that has at least the property of omnipotence exists. Then we argue that if such an entity is possible, it is necessary as well.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  3. On Some Properties of Humanly Known and Humanly Knowable Mathematics.Jason L. Megill, Tim Melvin & Alex Beal - 2014 - Axiomathes 24 (1):81-88.
    We argue that the set of humanly known mathematical truths (at any given moment in human history) is finite and so recursive. But if so, then given various fundamental results in mathematical logic and the theory of computation (such as Craig’s in J Symb Log 18(1): 30–32(1953) theorem), the set of humanly known mathematical truths is axiomatizable. Furthermore, given Godel’s (Monash Math Phys 38: 173–198, 1931) First Incompleteness Theorem, then (at any given moment in human history) humanly known mathematics must (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  4. Locke's Mysterianism: On the Unsolvability of the Mind-Body Problem.Jason L. Megill - 2005 - Locke Studies 5:119-147.
  5. What Role Do the Emotions Play in Cognition? Towards a New Alternative to Cognitive Theories of Emotion.Jason L. Megill - 2003 - Consciousness and Emotion 4 (1):81-100.
    This paper has two aims: (1) to point the way towards a novel alternative to cognitive theories of emotion, and (2) to delineate a number of different functions that the emotions play in cognition, functions that become visible from outside the framework of cognitive theories. First, I hold that the Higher Order Representational (HOR) theories of consciousness — as generally formulated — are inadequate insofar as they fail to account for selective attention. After posing this dilemma, I resolve it in (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  6. Are We Paraconsistent? On the Lucas-Penrose Argument and the Computational Theory of Mind.Jason L. Megill - 2004 - Auslegung 27 (1):23-30.
  7. Are We Paraconsistent? On the Luca-Penrose Argument and the Computational Theory of Mind.Jason L. Megill - 2004 - Auslegung 27 (1):23-30.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  8.  41
    On the Unimportance of Theistic Belief.Jason L. Megill & Daniel Linford - 2017 - Essays in the Philosophy of Humanism 25 (2):187-207.
    We first argue that there are cases of “blameless non-belief.” That is, some people—through no fault of their own—fail to enter into a conscious relationship with God. But if so, then it would be unjust of God to make certain particular goods depend upon one having a conscious relationship with God. So, given that God is just, then despite what some theists believe, a relationship with God cannot be a necessary condition for the attainment of these goods; there might, e.g., (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  9. Cosmological Argument: A Pragmatic Defense.Evan Sandsmark & Jason L. Megill - 2010 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 2 (1):127 - 142.
    We formulate a sort of "generic" cosmological argument, i.e., a cosmological argument that shares premises (e.g., "contingent, concretely existing entities have a cause") with numerous versions of the argument. We then defend each of the premises by offering pragmatic arguments for them. We show that an endorsement of each premise will lead to an increase in expected utility; so in the absence of strong evidence that the premises are false, it is rational to endorse them. Therefore, it is rational to (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark