If the physical constants, initial conditions, or laws of nature in our universe had been even slightly different, then the evolution of life would have been impossible. This observation has led many philosophers and scientists to ask the natural next question: why is our universe so "fine-tuned" for life? The debates around this question are wide-ranging, multi-disciplinary, complicated, technical, and heated. This study is a comprehensive investigation of these debates and the many metaphysical and epistemological questions raised by cosmological fine-tuning. (...) Waller's study reaches two significant and controversial conclusions. First, he concludes that the criticisms directed at the "multiverse hypothesis" by theists and at the "theistic hypothesis" by naturalists are largely unsuccessful. Neither of these options can plausibly be excluded. Choosing between them seems to turn on primitive metaphysical intuitions. Second, in order to break the philosophical deadlock, Waller moves the debate from the level of universes to the level of possible worlds. Arguing that possible worlds are also "fine-tuned" in an important and interesting sense, Waller concludes that the only plausible explanation for the fine-tuning of the actual world is to posit the existence of some kind of "God-like-thing.". (shrink)

This book concerns the nature of time and ordinary cases of persistence in Spinoza. The author argues for three major interpretive claims. First, that Spinoza is committed to an eternalist theory of time whereby all things (whether they seem to be past, present, or future) are equally real. Second, that a mode’s conatus or essence is a self-maintaining activity (not an inertial force or disposition.) Third, that modes persist through time in Spinoza’s metaphysics by having temporal parts (that is, different (...) parts at different times.) If this is correct, then a significant reinterpretation of Spinoza’s modal metaphysics is required. The book also puts Spinoza into dialogue with some recent work in analytic metaphysics. (shrink)

Baruch Spinoza is one of the most influential and controversial political philosophers of the early modern period. Though best-known for his contributions to metaphysics, Spinoza’s _Theological-Political Treatise_ and his unfinished _Political Treatise_ were widely debated and helped to shape the political writings of philosophers as diverse as Rousseau, Kant, Marx, Nietzsche, and even Locke. In addition to its enormous historical importance, Spinoza’s political philosophy is also strikingly contemporary in its advocacy of toleration of unpopular religious and political views and his (...) concern with stabilizing religiously diverse democratic societies. The first Guidebook to Spinoza’s political writings, _The Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Spinoza on Politics_ covers the following key points: Spinoza’s life and the background to his philosophy the key themes and arguments of the _Theological-Political-Treatis_e and _Political Treatise _ the continuing importance of Spinoza’s work to philosophy. This book is an ideal starting point for anyone new to Spinoza and essential reading for students of political philosophy and seventeenth-century philosophy. (shrink)

This chapter focuses on one of the common fallacies in Western philosophy called “composition”. The fallacy of composition occurs when one incorrectly infers that the characteristics, attributes, or features of individuals comprising some group will also be found in the group as a whole. Inferences from a part to a whole can be made if additional assumptions are added to guarantee that the whole will have the property if the parts do. The easiest way to avoid this fallacy is never (...) to assume that the characteristics, attributes, or features of individuals comprising some group will also be found in the group as a whole. One must inspect and evaluate the characteristics, attributes, or features of the whole separately from the parts of which the whole is comprised. (shrink)

This chapter focuses on one of the common fallacies in Western philosophy called 'division'. The fallacy of division occurs when one incorrectly infers that the characteristics, attributes, or features of the group as a whole will also be found in the individuals comprising the group. The easiest way to avoid this fallacy is never to assume that the characteristics, attributes, or features of the group as a whole will also be found in the individuals comprising the group. One must inspect (...) and evaluate the characteristics, attributes, or features of the whole separately from the parts of which the whole is comprised. Inferences from a whole to a part can be made, however, if additional assumptions are added to the argument that link together the property had by the whole with the property had by the part. (shrink)

In this exhaustively researched and thoughtful study of Leibniz’s neglected theological writings, Maria Rosa Antognazza presents a strong case that Leibniz held original and highly developed views on the relation between faith and reason, the theology of the Trinity, and the nature of Christ. Furthermore, she argues convincingly that Leibniz’s views were consistently maintained throughout his life and “coexist comfortably” with his distinctive metaphysics; “perhaps,” she suggests in the introduction, Leibniz’s metaphysics and theology are even “reinforcing one another” . In (...) fact, her book proves this suggestion correct, revealing the importance of Leibniz’s theology to the understanding of his metaphysics.The book is structured into four parts: “Early Writings 1663–1671”; “Fragments of a System 1672–1692”; “English Trinitarian Polemics 1693–1705”; and “The Last Years 1706–1716.” Leibniz argues for three major theological positions. On the relation of faith and reason, he contends that the authority of scripture and theological tradition give the Christian mysteries a presumption of truth. The proper role of reason in theological matters is to distinguish authentic revelations from false. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that the "mysterious" distinction which separates Spinoza's attributes might be a Scholastic "intermediate" distinction similar to Henry of Ghent's intentional distinction. My argument for this conclusion takes place in three sections. In section one, I contrast the nature of Henry's intentional distinction with Scotus's formal distinction. In section two, I deduce the nature of Spinoza's "mysterious" distinction from Descartes's real and conceptual distinctions and recast the problem concerning the nature of the attributes. In section three, (...) I argue that the attributes are likely intentionally distinct. (shrink)

This paper concerns Spinoza’s theory of conatus and an important consequence of this theory concerning how bodies persist through time. I first argue that a conatus is the self-maintaining activity of a mode and not a tendency toward self-preservation or some kind of force. I then argue that it follows from this theory of conatus that bodies persist through time by having temporal parts. I conclude the paper by arguing that attributing a temporal parts metaphysic to Spinoza is not as (...) implausible or anachronistic as it might first seem to be. (shrink)

This paper concerns Spinoza’s theory of conatus and an important consequence of this theory concerning how bodies persist through time. I first argue that a conatus is the self-maintaining activity of a mode and not (as many scholars maintain) a tendency toward self-preservation or some kind of force. I then argue that it follows from this theory of conatus that bodies persist through time by having temporal parts. I conclude the paper by arguing that attributing a temporal parts (or ‘four-dimensional’) (...) metaphysic to Spinoza is not as implausible or anachronistic as it might first seem to be. (shrink)