Two of the terms in the title are from Vidyānandin’s Tattvārtha-śloka-vārttika, which is his commentary on Umāsvāti’s Tattvārtha-sūtra. Sūtra 6 of the TAS states the following: pramāṇa-nayair adhigamaḥ, ‘knowledge—of the seven categories—is obtained through the pramāṇas and the nayas’). Vidyānandin’s commentary on this sūtra 6 entails a total of 56 ślokas, with his own prose vārttika on each of them in varying lengths. TAŚV 1, 6, 1–8 deal with particulars and universals, for which he uses the synonymous pairs aṃśa/aṃśin and (...) avayava/avayavin. That he is attacking the Buddhist position regarding this age old theme in Indian philosophy, is evident also in that he quotes Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇa-vārttika. By the time he comes to his TAŚV 1, 6, 6, he establishes that an object as a whole is open to perception and that the Buddhist also accepts perception as a valid means of knowledge, but does not accept the perception of an object as a whole. From TAŚV 1, 6, 11 onwards Vidyānandin continues with the same theme, elaborating his attack of the Buddhist view even further, doing so in terms of svasaṃvedana, pratyakṣa and pramāṇa. The presentation will attempt to deal with these concepts in order to see how Vidyānandin vindicates the Jaina position vis-à-vis the Buddhist one. This presentation will continue from my previous study of Vidyānandin’s TAŚV 1, 6, 1–10. (shrink)
We applaud Ram Frost for highlighting the need for multicultural perspectives while developing universal models of visual word recognition. We second Frost's proposal that factors like lexical morphology should be incorporated besides purely orthographic features in modeling word recognition. In support, we provide fresh evidence from Hindi, an example of hitherto under-represented alphasyllabic orthographies, in which flexible encoding of akṣara position is constrained by the morphological structure of words.
The contributors to this focus issue participated in a unique gathering of over sixty scholars in Lukenya, Kenya in January 2009, organized by Globethics.net. The three contributions here by Sumner B. Twiss, Shanta Premawardhana, and Ariane Hentsch Cisneros are not the outcome of the deliberations and discussions there; however, they led to the idea of this focus issue. Each essay incorporates major aspects of the general themes discussed in different groups at the Lukenya meeting: (1) defining global ethics; (2) ensuring (...) a successful interreligious dialogue on ethics; (3) integrating means and methods of sharing values in a human to human approach; (4) balancing power relations, inducing a real transformation; and (5) sharing values in the Kenyan and East-African contexts. (shrink)
The first time Umāsvāti uses the word manas in his Tattvārtha-sūtra, the standard work for matters concerning Jaina philosophy, is when he lists the means of knowledge: mati, śruta, avadhi, manaḥ-paryāya and kevala. These are the pramāṇas. In TAS 1, 14 mati or sense perception is said to be caused by indriya and aninindriya; Pūjyapāda’s commentary says that anindriya, antaḥ-karaṇa and manas are synonyms. This obviously raises questions about the specific role and function of the manas/anindriya in mati, manaḥ-paryāya and (...) śruta, and how these retain their exclusivity without reducing the function of any of them to another means of cognition. In the Sāṅkhya system manas is seen as both an organ of cognition and an organ of action. It is interesting for a better understanding of the role of manas in Jaina thought to compare some aspects of it with the Sāṅkhya system. (shrink)
It is shown that Jaina epistemology has its own history, with differences in certain respects depending on the thinker, and it is demonstrated that the Jainas did not lag behind the mainstream concerns in Indian philosophy. After dealing with the beginnings of epistemology in India, the basic Jaina epistemology is outlined based on selected aspects of the problem in the original words of selected early thinkers such as Kundakunda, Umāsvāti, and Māṇikyanandin.
This chapter tries to show that there is indubitable evidence for the claim that the Yoga philosophy of Patañjali can be said to be a philosophy as therapeia. For this reference will be made particularly to the Sāṅkhya school, whose ontology and metaphysics are presupposed by Yoga philosophy. The Sāṅkhya school begins with the question about overcoming three kinds of ‘suffering’ that torment human beings, and Patañjali himself says that the implementation of yoga, is, among other things, for the sake (...) of minimising the afflictions. The second part of the chapter will be concerned with the philosophical activity referred to in Yoga itself, namely the active yoga, or yoga in the form of action, in order to show how this can be seen as advancing the case for Yoga as therapeia. (shrink)
Individualism: The Cultural Logic of Modernity is an edited collection of sixteen essays on the idea of the modern sovereign individual in the western cultural tradition. Reconsidering the eighteenth-century realist novel, twentieth-century modernism, and underappreciated topics on individualism and literature, this volume provocatively revises and enriches our understanding of individualism as the generative premise of modernity itself.
Solon's cryptic injunction : "Call no man happy until dead" -- A mourning happiness : the Athenian funeral oration -- Difficult happiness : the case of tragedy -- Aristotle's hermeneutic of happiness : the first forgetting -- The trial narrative in Richardson's Pamela : suspending the hermeneutic of happiness -- Effects of the trial narrative on the concept of happiness -- Marriage plot -- The tragedies of sentimentalism -- Kantian ethics and the discourses of modernity -- Happiness in revolution : (...) erasing the political concept of happiness. (shrink)
Inhalt: I. Logik, Methodologie und Hermeneutik der Interkulturalität. Ram ADHAR MALL: Einheit angesichts der Vielfalt. Bernhard WALDENFELS: Kulturelle und soziale Fremdheit. Gerhard PASTERNACK: Hermeneutik als Daseinsanalytik. Intrakulturelle Explikationen des interkulturellen Verstehens. Franz WIMMER: Identität und Kulturbrüche. Hans P. STURM: Die vierfache Negationslogik im östlichen und westlichen Denken. Jayandra SONI: Einheit und Vielfalt aus der Sicht der siebenstufigen Prädikationslogik. Gregor PAUL: Logik, Verstehen und Kulturen. Michael KRAUSZ: Two Aims of Cultural Interpretation: Explaining and Healing. Thierry LENAIN: Understanding the Past: History (...) as an Intercultural Process. Ryosuke OHASHI: Womit muß der Vergleich in der vergleichenden Ästhetik gemacht werden? Georg STENGER: Phänomenologische Methode und Interkulturelle Philosophie. Douwe TIEMERSMA: On the concepts of energy in Western and Indian traditions and the methodology of intercultural investigation. Dieter LOHMAR: Intersubjectivity and the meeting of cultures. A critique of the hermeneutics of the 'strict analogy'. Morteza GHASEMPOUR: Philosophie und Bildung. Notker SCHNEIDER: Verbindlichkeit zwischen Einheit und Vielfalt - Versuch über die normative Kraft eines 'basalen Essentialismus'. II. Erkennen und Handeln. Gibt es eine Differenz der Geschlechter? Tanella BONI: Das Geschlecht und die Macht. Bettina DAUSIEN: Die biographische Konstruktion von Geschlecht. Yacouba KONATÉ: Mythen und Wirklichkeiten der afrikanischen Frau. Hans Jörg SANDKÜHLER: Pluralismus - Geschlechterdifferenzen und andere mögliche Welten. Martina PLÜMACHER: Geschlechterdifferenz als Symbolsystem. Ilse N. BULHOF: Epistemology and Gender: the Question of Alterity. An Intercultural Reflection. Atsuko ONUKI: Vom Nutzen und Nachteil der Geschlechterdiskurse. Nausikaa SCHIRILLA: Einheit und Vielfalt - Konstruktionen von Weiblichkeit interkulturell. Michael MEUSER: Kulturelle Deutungsmuster von Männlichkeit. Veränderungen und Kontinuitäten. III. Philosophie und interkulturelle Bildung. Jürgen HENGELBROCK: Möglichkeiten und Grenzen philosophischer Kommunikation in der Schule. Peter GRAF: Interkulturelle Pädagogik als Schule der Wahrnehmung. (shrink)