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Jean Moritz Müller
University Of Bonn
  1. How (Not) to Think of Emotions as Evaluative Attitudes.Jean Moritz Müller - 2017 - Dialectica 71 (2):281-308.
    It is popular to hold that emotions are evaluative. On the standard account, the evaluative character of emotion is understood in epistemic terms: emotions apprehend or make us aware of value properties. As this account is commonly elaborated, emotions are experiences with evaluative intentional content. In this paper, I am concerned with a recent alternative proposal on how emotions afford awareness of value. This proposal does not ascribe evaluative content to emotions, but instead conceives of them as evaluative at the (...)
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  2. Dietrich von Hildebrand.Jean Moritz Müller - 2020 - In Thomas Szanto & Hilge Landweer (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Phenomenology of Emotion. London, UK: Routledge. pp. 114-122.
    It is sometimes alleged that the study of emotion and the study of value are currently pursued as relatively autonomous disciplines. As Kevin Mulligan notes, “the philosophy and psychology of emotions pays little attention to the philosophy of value and the latter pays only a little more attention to the former.” (2010b, 475). Arguably, the last decade has seen more of a rapprochement between these two domains than used to be the norm (cf. e.g. Roeser & Todd 2014). But there (...)
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  3.  21
    Motivierende Gründe: Aktuelle Probleme und Kontroversen.Jean Moritz Müller - 2019 - Information Philosophie 2019 (4):16-28.
    Dieser Forschungsbericht gibt einen Überblick über die aktuelle Debatte über motivierende Gründe in der Handlungs- und Erkenntnistheorie. Folgende drei Fragen werden schwerpunktmäßig behandelt: a) Was für eine Art von Entität sind motivierende Gründe? b) Welche Beziehung besteht zwischen einer Handlung oder Einstellung und ihren motivierenden Gründen? c) Welche kognitiven Bedingungen gelten für die Zuschreibung motivierender Gründe?
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  4.  70
    Emotion, Wahrnehmung, evaluative Erkenntnis.Jean Moritz Müller - 2011 - In Achim Stephan, Jan Slaby, Henrik Walter & Sven Walter (eds.), Affektive Intentionalität: Beiträge zur welterschließenden Funktion der menschlichen Gefühle. Paderborn, Deutschland: pp. 110-127.
    This paper explores a currently popular view in the philosophy of emotion, according to which emotions constitute a specific form of evaluative aspect-perception (cf. esp. Roberts 2003, Döring 2004, Slaby 2008). On this view, adequate or fitting emotions play an important epistemic roe vis à vis evaluative knowledge. The paper specifically asks how to conceive of the adequacy or fittingness conditions of emotion. Considering the specific, relational nature of the evaluative properties disclosed by emotions, it is argued that a suitable (...)
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  5.  5
    Emotions, Values and Agency.Jean Moritz Müller - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (280):647-650.
    Emotions, Values and Agency. By Tappolet Christine.
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  6.  67
    Which Emotional Behaviors Are Actions?Jean Moritz Müller & Hong Yu Wong - forthcoming - In Andrea Scarantino (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Emotion Theory. New York City, New York, USA:
    There is a wide range of things we do out of emotion. For example, we smile with pleasure, our voices drop when we are sad, we recoil in shock or jump for joy, we apologize to others out of remorse. It is uncontroversial that some of these behaviors are actions. Clearly, apologizing is an action if anything is. Things seem less clear in the case of other emotional behaviors. Intuitively, the drop in a sad person’s voice is something that happens (...)
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  7.  21
    Christine Tappolet: Emotions, Value and Agency (New York: Oxford University Press 2016). [REVIEW]Jean Moritz Müller - forthcoming - The Philosophical Quarterly.
  8.  22
    Response-Dependent Normative Properties and the Epistemic Account of Emotion.Jean Moritz Müller - forthcoming - Journal of Value Inquiry:1-10.
    It is popular to hold that our primary epistemic access to specific response-dependent properties like the fearsome or admirable (or so-called ‘affective properties’) is constituted by the corresponding emotion. I argue that this view is incompatible with a widely held meta-ethical view, according to which affective properties have deontic force. More specifically, I argue that this view cannot accommodate for the requirement that deontic entities provide guidance. If affective properties are to guide the formation of the corresponding emotion, our primary (...)
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  9.  23
    The World-Directedness of Emotional Feeling: On Affect and Intentionality.Jean Moritz Müller - 2019 - Cham, Schweiz: Palgrave Macmillan.
    This book engages with what are widely recognized as the two core dimensions of emotion. When we are afraid, glad or disappointed, we feel a certain way; moreover, our emotion is intentional or directed at something: we are afraid of something, glad or disappointed about something. Connecting with a vital strand of recent philosophical thinking, I conceive of these two aspects of emotion as unified. Examining different possible ways of developing the view that the feeling dimension of emotion is itself (...)
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