6 found
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  1. Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility in Bargaining: Evidence From a Transcontinental Ultimatum Game.Romina Boarini, Jean-François Laslier & Stéphane Robin - 2009 - Theory and Decision 67 (4):341-373.
    This paper presents the experimental results of a “Transcontinental Ultimatum Game” implemented between India and France. We use a standard ultimatum game, but in one treatment Indian subjects made offers to French subjects (ItoF treatment) and, in another treatment, French subjects made offers to Indian subjects (FtoI treatment). We observed that FtoI treatment bargaining mostly ended up with unequal splits of money in favor of French, while nearly equal splits were the most frequent outcome in ItoF treatment interactions. The experimental (...)
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  2.  31
    K–Player Additive Extension of Two-Player Games with an Application to the Borda Electoral Competition Game.Gilbert Laffond, Jean-François Laslier & Michel Le Breton - 2000 - Theory and Decision 48 (2):129-137.
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    K–Player Additive Extension of Two-Player Games with an Application to the Borda Electoral Competition Game.Gilbert Laffond, Jean-François Laslier & Michel Le Breton - 2000 - Theory and Decision 48 (2):129-137.
    In this note we introduce the notion of K–player additive extension of a symmetric two-player game and prove a result relating the equilibria in mixed strategies in the two games. Then we apply the result to the Borda electoral competition game.
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    Estimation of a Bernouilli Parameter: A Normative Approach to Replace the Bayesian One.Jean-franÇois Laslier - 1989 - Theory and Decision 26 (3):253.
  5.  19
    Stubborn Learning.Jean-François Laslier & Bernard Walliser - 2015 - Theory and Decision 79 (1):51-93.
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    L'homo œconomicus et l'analyse politique.Jean-François Laslier - 2004 - Cités 19 (3):133.
    Expliciter un comportement, c’est spécifier les motifs de l’action. Ces motifs peuvent être rationnels ou non, conscients ou non, justes ou non, ce qui importe est non pas que soit spécifiée directement l’action effectuée par l’agent mais que soit explicitée la cause du choix de cette action, et donc, indirectement, que le soient les actions que..
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