The posthumous Pourquoi Philosopher? collects Jean-Fran ç ois Lyotard’s previously unpublished four-part introductory course in philosophy, delivered to students of the Sorbonne in 1964. The interest of this text is both historical (appearing at an important juncture in French thought) and meta-philosophical (answering the question "why philosophize?" in such a way that a philosophy of philosophy - or rather several - is offered for consideration). The text will be of interest to readers of various levels of philosophical sophistication.
The most accessible expression of François Laruelles non-philosophical, or non-standard, thought, _General Theory of Victims_ forges a new role for contemporary philosophers and intellectuals by rethinking their relation to victims. A key text in recent continental philosophy, it is indispensable for anyone interested in the debates surrounding materialism, philosophy of religion, and ethics. Transforming Joseph de Maistres adage that the executioner is the cornerstone of society, _General Theory of Victims_ instead proposes the victim as the cornerstone of humanity and the (...) key figure for contemporary thought. Laruelle condemns philosophy for participating in and legitimating the great persecutions of the twentieth century, and lays out a new vision of victim-oriented ethics. To do this, he engages the resources of both quantum physics and theology in order to adapt a key concept of non-philosophy, Man-in-person, for a new understanding of the victim. As Man-in-person, the victim is no longer exclusively defined by suffering, but has the capacity to rise up against the worlds persecution. Based on this, Laruelle develops a new ethical role for the intellectual in which he does not merely represent the victim, but imitates or clones it, thereby assisting the victims uprising within thought. (shrink)
Janicaud clarifies the project of “overcoming” metaphysics, a project that Heidegger himself recognized as open to innumerable misunderstandings, and Mattei inquires into the major Heideggerian texts produced between 1935 and 1969 to detect the cosmic figure of the Geviert, the initial Fourfold where “earth and sky, the divine ones and the mortals” gather.
The utterance of a negative statement invites the pragmatic inference that some reason exists for the proposition it negates to be true; this pragmatic inference paves the way for the logically unexpected Modus Shmollens inference: “If p then q ; not- q ; therefore, p .” Experiment 1 shows that a majority of reasoners endorse Modus Shmollens from an explicit major conditional premise and a negative utterance as a minor premise: e.g., reasoners conclude that “the soup tastes like garlic” from (...) the premises “If a soup tastes like garlic, then there is garlic in the soup; Carole tells Didier that there is no garlic in the soup they are eating.” Experiment 2 shows that this effect is mediated by the derivation of a pragmatic inference from negation. We discuss how theories of conditional reasoning can integrate such a pragmatic effect. (shrink)
Using a latent variable modelling strategy we study individual differences in patterns of answers to the selection task and to the truth table task. Specifically we investigate the prediction of mental model theory according to which the individual tendency to select the false consequent card (in the selection task) is negatively correlated with the tendency to judge the false antecedent cases as irrelevant (in the truth table task). We fit a psychometric model to two large samples ( N = 486, (...) twice), and find no evidence for this negative correlation. We examine which of the assumptions of the model theory must be amended to accommodate our findings. (shrink)
Using the Chinese Ring Puzzle, we studied the effect on rule discovery of having to plan actions or not in order to reach a goal state. This was done by asking participants to predict legal moves as in implicit learning tasks and by asking participants to make legal moves as in problem-solving tasks. Our hypothesis was that having a specific goal state to reach has a dual effect on rule discovery. The first effect is positive and related to feedback from (...) moves done in order to attain the goal: generalising the results of action and associating them to the conditions in which they were obtained allows discovery of the rule and learning it. The second effect is negative. In attempting to reach a specific goal, participants first tend to reduce the distance that separates the current state from the goal state and so neglect the kind of exploration that facilitates rule and procedure discovery because this would seem to be a detour from the goal. Results show that having to plan actions improved performance in implicit learning tasks, yet it impaired performance in problem-solving tasks. Although implicit learning and problem solving are based on rule discovery, and entail noticing regularities in the material, in both cases, rule discovery processes appear to be task-dependent. (shrink)
Une somme sur l'étude de "la genèse de l'idéalisme transcendantal phénoménologique". "Il y a un problème de la phénoménologie transcendantale. Non plus au sens immédiat du problème philosophique qu'elle se propose de résoudre et que Husserl définit comme son problème directeur, mais au sens second, réflexif, de l'interprétation qu'il y a lieu de faire de la première élucidation phénoménologique de l'être : celle que Husserl élabore à partir de l'idée de la constitution transcendantale de tout objet dans la vie intentionnelle (...) subjective.". (shrink)
Le colloque international de Montpellier - " Michel Henry. Phénoménologie de la vie et culture contemporaine " - a tenu à rendre hommage à cette œuvre novatrice qui a ouvert de nombreux horizons de recherche.
Henry?s concept of transcendence is highly paradoxical. Most often it seems as though he had simply borrowed Husserl?s classical description of intentionality, as the act of aiming?at?something as an independent object, at something given or posited by consciousness outside itself, in the status of a worldly outwardness. This determination of transcendence belongs to Henry?s usual critique of what he calls the ?ontological monism? of classical metaphysics and ?historical phenomenology?. Nevertheless, when Henry endeavours to define the ontological difference between life itself (...) and the living incarnate ego within the sphere of radically subjective immanence, particularly in his last works on truth and on Christianity, he cannot but refer to another concept of transcendence, the theological and metaphysical one. This is a transcendence which claims absolute ontological exteriority, as the being?in?itself of the ?substance?, altogether free of any intentional dependence on the transcendental activity of consciousness. And he uses this last concept to assert, of course, that divine transcendence, as true to the Absolute, is none other than the most radical and deep immanence: the immanence of life itself. (shrink)
Le premier volume des Idées directrices pour une phénoménologie pure et une philosophie phénoménologique est le traité fondamental de la phénoménologie de Husserl. Il s’y propose d’introduire le lecteur à la nouvelle attitude méthodique de la phénoménologie – la réduction transcendantale – pour révéler la subjectivité comme vie intentionnelle constituant en soi toute réalité objective sans exception : comme subjectivité transcendantale.La réduction apparaît ainsi liée d’emblée à une thèse métaphysique, l’idéalisme transcendantal, que Husserl revendiquera dans les Méditations cartésiennes comme l’« (...) unique interprétation possible » du sens du monde.Fonder la phénoménologie sur cet idéalisme de la subjectivité absolue implique un passage continu de l’attitude d’esprit naturelle à l’attitude transcendantale. Mais comment valider l’idéalisme transcendantal à partir de l’attitude naturelle sans la reconduire au cœur même de l’attitude phénoménologique?Et si, à l’inverse, la réduction se présuppose elle-même, que vaut l’idée d’un « accès » au transcendantal? Qu’est-ce alors que ce « transcendantal », auquel on prétend ainsi accéder? (shrink)
Le recueil qu’on va lire est le fruit d’un travail collectif de réflexion conduit à l’initiative de l’axe de recherches « Phénoménologie, Ontologie » du Centre de Recherches d’Histoire des Idées de l’université de Nice, dans le cadre du Séminaire annuel du Centre, organisé par J.-F. Lavigne pour l’année universitaire 2006-2007. L’organisation et la tenue régulière de ce séminaire relevaient un double défi : briser les anciennes habitudes de cloisonnement disciplinaire, et prouver par l’action...
The double expansion that Husserl’s phenomenology imposed on subjective experience posed, among other difficulties, a new and particularly difficult problem for Husserl; that of the trans-temporal identity of the transcendental subject, the “ego.” This problem involves also, and still more fundamentally, the question of the ontological status of the ego. Beginning with his descriptivepsychological understanding of consciousness and its intentional acts in the 1901 Logical Investigations, Husserl had first identified the subjective ego with the empirical person, and considered it sufficient (...) to determine the flow of acts experienced by consciousness as a “bundle” of subjective phenomena devoid of altogether devoid of any internal principle of unity, except a mere formal synthesis. (shrink)
Pourquoi s’interroger, en philosophes, en historiens, en sociologues, en psychologues ou en théologiens même, sur l’affectivité? À quelle nécessité objective peut bien répondre le choix d’un tel thème, pour ce nouveau Séminaire annuel du Centre de Recherches d’Histoire des Idées? Il me semblerait, en vérité, plus justifié de poser plutôt la question inverse : comment pourrions-nous, aujourd’hui, éviter de nous interroger sur les phénomènes affectifs? Plusieurs données font pour nous de la...
Comment la vérité, dans Sein und Zeit, peut-elle être à la fois phénomène et phénoménalité? L'examen de l'analyse de l'Ausweisung de l'énoncé, au § 44 a), permet de mettre à jour la présupposition cachée de l'interprétation existentiale de la vérité. How can truth, in Sein und Zeit, be understood both as a phenomenon and as phenomenality itself? A careful examination of the analysis of Ausweisung in § 44 a) shows on what major presupposition the existential interpretation of truth is based.
Le projet d'E. Lévinas — manifester l'intelligibilité de la transcendance — le conduit à rencontrer, comme une figure exemplaire, l'expression cartésienne de l'extérionté, le thème de l'idée de l'infini. Jusqu'où va cette similitude ? Selon Lévinas, la responsabilité — pour autrui — inscrit déjà la transcendance, comme relation avec un au-delà, dans l'immanence à soi de la conscience, en tant que son en deçà, sa condition. « Par suite, l'idée de l'infini est le mode d'être, l'infinition même de l'infini ». (...) Ici apparaît la divergence : le substantialisme cartésien ne permet pas d'affirmer avec Lévinas que : « Il n'y a pas d'idée de Dieu ou Dieu est sa propre idée ». E. Lévinas' philosophical attempt to make clear the intelligibility of transcendence leads him to Descartes' version of the concept of metaphysical exteriority, i.e. to his theme of the idea of the infinite. How far does this resemblance reach ? According to Lévinas, the responsibility — for — others already places transcendence, as a relation with a beyond, within the immanence in oneself which characterizes consciousness, as its condition. Consequently, « the idea of infinite is the mode, of existence, the infinition itself of the infinite ». Here, the difference points out : cartesian substantialism does not allow to assert, as Lévinas does, that « either there is no idea of God, or God is the idea of himself ». (shrink)
Claire Katz & Lara Trout, Emmanuel Levinas. Critical Assessments of Leading Philosophers ; Thomas Bedorf, Andreas Cremonini, Verfehlte Begegnung. Levinas und Sartre als philosophische Zeitgenossen ; Samuel Moyn, Origins of the Other: Emmanuel Levinas between Revelation and Ethics ; Pascal Delhom & Alfred Hirsch, Im Angesicht der Anderen. Levinas’ Philosophie des Politischen ; Sharon Todd, Learning from the other: Levinas, psychoanalysis and ethical possibilities in education ; Michel Henry, Le bonheur de Spinoza, suivi de: Etude sur le spinozisme de Michel (...) Henry, par Jean-Michel Longneaux ; Jean-François Lavigne, Husserl et la naissance de la phénoménologie. Des Recherches logiques aux Ideen: la genèse de l’idéalisme transcendantal phénoménologique ; Denis Seron, Objet et signification ; Dan Zahavi, Sara Heinämaa and Hans Ruin, Metaphysics, Facticity, Interpretation. Phenomenology in The Nordic Countries ; Dimitri Ginev, Entre anthropologie et herméneutique ; Magdalena Mărculescu-Cojocea, Critica metafizicii la Kant şi Heidegger. Problema subiectivităţii: raţiunea între autonomie şi deconstrucţie. (shrink)
Flow is a gratifying state of deep involvement and absorption that individuals report when facing a challenging activity and they perceive adequate abilities to cope with it. The flow concept was introduced by Csikszentmihalyi in 1975, and interest in flow research is growing. However, to our best knowledge, no scoping review exists that takes a systematic look at studies on flow which were published between the years 2000 and 2016. Overall, 252 studies have been included in this review. Our review (...) provides a framework to cluster flow research, gives a systematic overview about existing studies and their findings, and provides an overview about implications for future research. The provided framework consists of three levels of flow research. In the first “Individual” level are the categories for personality, motivation, physiology, emotion, cognition, and behavior. The second “Contextual” level contains the categories for contextual and interindividual factors and the third “Cultural” level contains cultural factors that relate to flow. Using our framework, we systematically present the findings for each category. While flow research has made progress in understanding flow, in the future, more experimental and longitudinal studies are needed to gain deeper insights into the causal structure of flow and its antecedents and consequences. (shrink)
