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Jeanette Kennett
Macquarie University
  1. Autism, empathy and moral agency.Jeanette Kennett - 2002 - Philosophical Quarterly 52 (208):340-357.
    Psychopaths have long been of interest to moral philosophers, since a careful examination of their peculiar deficiencies may reveal what features are normally critical to the development of moral agency. What underlies the psychopath's amoralism? A common and plausible answer to this question is that the psychopath lacks empathy. Lack of empathy is also claimed to be a critical impairment in autism, yet it is not at all clear that autistic individuals share the psychopath's amoralism. How is empathy characterized in (...)
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  2. Friendship and the self.Dean Cocking & Jeanette Kennett - 1998 - Ethics 108 (3):502-527.
    We argue that companion friendship is not importantly marked by self-disclosure as understood in either of these two ways. One's close friends need not be markedly similar to oneself, as is claimed by the mirror account, nor is the role of private information in establishing and maintaining intimacy important in the way claimed by the secrets view. Our claim will be that the mirror and secrets views not only fail to identify features that are in part constitutive of close or (...)
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  3. Will the Real Moral Judgment Please Stand Up?: The Implications of Social Intuitionist Models of Cognition for Meta-ethics and Moral Psychology.Jeanette Kennett & Cordelia Fine - 2009 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (1):77-96.
    The recent, influential Social Intuitionist Model of moral judgment (Haidt, Psychological Review 108, 814–834, 2001) proposes a primary role for fast, automatic and affectively charged moral intuitions in the formation of moral judgments. Haidt’s research challenges our normative conception of ourselves as agents capable of grasping and responding to reasons. We argue that there can be no ‘real’ moral judgments in the absence of a capacity for reflective shaping and endorsement of moral judgments. However, we suggest that the empirical literature (...)
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  4.  89
    Agency and Responsibility: A Common-Sense Moral Psychology.Jeanette Kennett - 2001 - Oxford University Press.
    Is it ever possible for people to act freely and intentionally against their better judgement? Is it ever possible to act in opposition to one's strongest desire? If either of these questions are answered in the negative, the common-sense distinctions between recklessness, weakness of will and compulsion collapse. This would threaten our ordinary notion of self-control and undermine our practice of holding each other responsible for moral failure. So a clear and plausible account of how weakness of will and self-control (...)
  5. Friendship and moral danger.Dean Cocking & Jeanette Kennett - 2000 - Journal of Philosophy 97 (5):278-296.
    We focus here on some familiar kinds of cases of conflict between friendship and morality, and, on the basis of our account of the nature of friendship, argue for the following two claims: first, that in some cases where we are led morally astray by virtue of a relationship that makes its own demands on us, the relationship in question is properly called a friendship; second, that relationships of this kind are valuable in their own right.
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  6. Do psychopaths really threaten moral rationalism?Jeanette Kennett - 2006 - Philosophical Explorations 9 (1):69 – 82.
    It is often claimed that the existence of psychopaths undermines moral rationalism. I examine a recent empirically based argument for this claim and conclude that rationalist accounts of moral judgement and moral reasoning are perfectly compatible with the evidence cited.
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  7. Neurosentimentalism and Moral Agency.Philip Gerrans & Jeanette Kennett - 2010 - Mind 119 (475):585-614.
    Metaethics has recently been confronted by evidence from cognitive neuroscience that tacit emotional processes play an essential causal role in moral judgement. Most neuroscientists, and some metaethicists, take this evidence to vindicate a version of metaethical sentimentalism. In this paper we argue that the ‘dual process’ model of cognition that frames the discussion within and without philosophy does not do justice to an important constraint on any theory of deliberation and judgement. Namely, decision-making is the exercise of a capacity for (...)
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  8. Mental impairment, moral understanding and criminal responsibility: Psychopathy and the purposes of punishment.Cordelia Fine & Jeanette Kennett - 2004 - International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 27 (5):425-443.
    We have argued here that to attribute criminal responsibility to psychopathic individuals is to ignore substantial and growing evidence that psychopathic individuals are significantly impaired in moral understanding. They do not appear to know why moral transgressions are wrong in the full sense required by the law. As morally blameless offenders, punishment as a basis for detention cannot be justified. Moreover, as there are currently no successful treatment programs for psychopathy, nor can detention be justified on grounds of treatment. Instead, (...)
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  9.  23
    Friendship and Moral Danger.Dean Cocking & Jeanette Kennett - 2000 - Journal of Philosophy 97 (5):278.
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  10.  88
    Mental time travel, agency and responsibility.Jeanette Kennett & Steve Matthews - 2009 - In Matthew Broome & Lisa Bortolotti (eds.), Psychiatry as Cognitive Neuroscience: Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press.
    We have argued elsewhere that moral responsibility over time depends in part upon the having of psychological connections which facilitate forms of self-control. In this chapter we explore the importance of mental time travel - our ordinary ability to mentally travel to temporal locations outside the present, involving both memory of our personal past and the ability to imagine ourselves in the future - to our agential capacities for planning and control. We suggest that in many individuals with dissociative disorders, (...)
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  11. Frog and toad lose control.Jeanette Kennett & Michael Smith - 1996 - Analysis 56 (2):63–73.
    It seems to be a truism that whenever we do something - and so, given the omnipresence of trying (Hornsby 1980), whenever we try to do something - we want to do that thing more than we want to do anything else we can do (Davidson 1970). However, according to Frog, when we have will power we are able to try not to do something that we ‘really want to do’. In context the idea is clearly meant to be that (...)
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  12.  79
    Just Say No? Addiction and the Elements of Self-control.Jeanette Kennett - 2013 - In Neil Levy (ed.), Addiction and Self-Control: Perspectives from Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 144-164.
    In this chapter I argue that there is a normative aspect to self-control that is not captured by the purely procedural account to be drawn from dual process theories of cognition – which we only uncover when we consider what self-control is for and why it is valuable. For at least a significant sub-group of addicts their loss of control over their drug use may not be due to a lack or depletion of cognitive resources. Rather it may be that (...)
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  13. Mental disorder, moral agency, and the self.Jeanette Kennett - 2007 - In Bonnie Steinbock (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Bioethics. Oxford University Press. pp. 90-113.
    A person suffering a mental illness or disorder may differ dramatically from his or her previous well self. Family and close friends who knew the person before the onset of illness tend to regard the illness as obscuring their loved one's true self and see the goal of treatment as the restoration of that self. ‘He is not really like this,’ they will say with increasing desperation. Treatment teams and others, who have no acquaintance with the person when well, respond (...)
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  14.  88
    Self Control and Moral Security.Jessica Wolfendale & Jeanette Kennett - 2019 - In David Shoemaker (ed.), Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility Volume 6. New York, NY, USA: pp. 33-63.
    Self-control is integral to successful human agency. Without it we cannot extend our agency across time and secure central social, moral, and personal goods. But self-control is not a unitary capacity. In the first part of this paper we provide a taxonomy of self-control and trace its connections to agency and the self. In part two, we turn our attention to the external conditions that support successful agency and the exercise of self-control. We argue that what we call moral security (...)
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  15.  57
    Explaining Addiction: How Far Does the Reward Account of Motivation Take Us?Jeanette Kennett & Doug McConnell - 2013 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 56 (5):470 - 489.
    ABSTRACT Choice theorists such as George Ainslie and Gene Heyman argue that the drug-seeking behaviour of addicts is best understood in the same terms that explain everyday choices. Everyday choices, they claim, aim to maximise the reward from available incentives. Continuing drug-use is, therefore, what addicts most want given the incentives they are aware of but they will change their behaviour if and when better incentives become available. This model might explain many typical cases of addiction, but there are hard (...)
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  16.  61
    Drug addiction and criminal responsibility.Jeanette Kennett, Nicole A. Vincent & Anke Snoek - 2014 - In Neil Levy & Jens Clausen (eds.), Handbook on Neuroethics. Dordrecht: Springer. pp. 1065-1083.
    Recent studies reveal some of the neurophysiological mechanisms involved in drug addiction. This prompts some theorists to claim that drug addiction diminishes responsibility. Stephen Morse however rejects this claim. Morse argues that these studies show that drug addiction involves neither compulsion, coercion, nor irrationality. He also adds that addicted people are responsible for becoming addicted and for failing to take measures to manage their addiction. After summarizing relevant neuroscience of addiction literature, this chapter engages critically with Morse to argue that (...)
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  17.  48
    The Cost of Conscience.Jeanette Kennett - 2017 - Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 26 (1):69-81.
    :The spread of demands by physicians and allied health professionals for accommodation of their private ethical, usually religiously based, objections to providing care of a particular type, or to a particular class of persons, suggests the need for a re-evaluation of conscientious objection in healthcare and how it should be regulated. I argue on Kantian grounds that respect for conscience and protection of freedom of conscience is consistent with fairly stringent limitations and regulations governing refusal of service in healthcare settings. (...)
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  18.  43
    Reasons, emotion, and moral judgment in the psychopath.Jeanette Kennett - 2010 - In Luca Malatesti & John McMillan (eds.), Responsibility and Psychopathy: Interfacing Law, Psychiatry and Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
  19. Synchronic self-control is always non-actional.Jeanette Kennett & Michael Smith - 1997 - Analysis 57 (2):123–131.
  20. Identity, control and responsibility: The case of Dissociative Identity Disorder.Jeanette Kennett & Steve Matthews - 2002 - Philosophical Psychology 15 (4):509-526.
    Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID) (formerly known as Multiple Personality Disorder) is a condition in which a person appears to possess more than one personality, and sometimes very many. Some recent criminal cases involving defendants with DID have resulted in "not guilty" verdicts, though the defense is not always successful in this regard. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Stephen Behnke have argued that we should excuse DID sufferers from responsibility, only if at the time of the act the person was insane (typically delusional); (...)
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  21.  76
    Truth, Lies, and the Narrative Self.Steve Matthews & Jeanette Kennett - 2012 - American Philosophical Quarterly 49 (4):301-316.
    Social persons routinely tell themselves and others richly elaborated autobiographical stories filled with details about deeds, plans, roles, motivations, values, and character. Saul, let us imagine, is someone who once sailed the world as a young adventurer, going from port to port and living a gypsy existence. In telling his new acquaintance, Jess, of his former exotic life, he shines a light on his present character and this may guide to some extent their interaction here and now. Perhaps Jess also (...)
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  22.  26
    Normative agency.Jeanette Kennett & Steve Matthews - 2008 - In Catriona MacKenzie Kim Atkins (ed.), Practical Identity and Narrative Agency. New York: Routledge.
  23.  84
    True and proper selves: Velleman on love.Jeanette Kennett - 2008 - Ethics 118 (2):213-227.
  24.  85
    Imagining Reasons.Jeanette Kennett - 2011 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (s1):181-192.
    In this article, I explore the implications of Karsten Stueber's account of imaginative resistance, particularly as it relates to the phenomenon of moral dumbfounding described by Jonathan Haidt and colleagues. I suggest that Stueber's account allows us to redescribe the phenomenon as a failure of the folk psychological project of interpretation and so to challenge Haidt's metaethical conclusions. I close by considering some implications for moral deliberation and judgment in those, such as autistic people, whose interpretive capacities are impaired.
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  25.  35
    Philosophy and commonsense: The case of weakness of will.Jeanette Kennett & Michael Smith - 1994 - In John O'Leary-Hawthorne & Michaelis Michael (eds.), Philosophy in Mind. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 141--157.
  26. Delusion, dissociation and identity.Jeanette Kennett & Steve Matthews - 2003 - Philosophical Explorations 6 (1):31-49.
    The condition known as Multiple Personality Disorder (MPD) or Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID) is metaphysically strange. Can there really be several distinct persons operating in a single body? Our view is that DID sufferers are single persons with a severe mental disorder. In this paper we compare the phenomenology of dissociation between personality states in DID with certain delusional disorders. We argue both that the burden of proof must lie with those who defend the metaphysically extravagant Multiple Persons view and (...)
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  27. The unity and disunity of agency.Jeanette Kennett & Steve Matthews - 2003 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 10 (4):308-312.
    Effective agency, according to contemporary Kantians, requires a unity of purpose both at a time, in order that we may eliminate conflict among our motives, and over time, because many of the things we do form part of longer-term projects and make sense only in the light of these projects and life plans. Call this the unity of agency thesis. This thesis can be regarded as a normative constraint on accounts of personal identity and indeed on accounts of what it (...)
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  28.  27
    Pleasure and addiction.Jeanette Kennett, Steve Matthews & Anke Snoek - 2013 - Frontiers in Psychiatry 4.
    What is the role and value of pleasure in addiction? Foddy and Savulescu have claimed that substance use is just pleasure-oriented behavior. They describe addiction as "strong appetites toward pleasure" and argue that addicts suffer in significant part because of strong social and moral disapproval of lives dominated by pleasure seeking. But such lives, they claim, can be autonomous and rational. The view they offer is largely in line with the choice model and opposed to a disease model of addiction. (...)
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  29.  41
    What's required for motivation by principle?Jeanette Kennett - unknown
    Kant claimed both that "moral feeling is the capacity to be affected by a moral judgment" and that moral motivation is motivation by principle. What are the psychological mechanism that could enable principles to motivate? This chapter develops in more detail a suggestion made elsewhere by the author that posits a connection between susceptibility to the discomfort of cognitive dissonance and moral motivation of a broadly Kantian kind. The chapter argues that the possession of principles is constitutively connected to one’s (...)
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  30.  40
    Introduction: Is cognitive penetrability the mark of the moral?Philip Gerrans & Jeanette Kennett - 2006 - Philosophical Explorations 9 (1):3 – 12.
  31. Addiction, choice, and disease : how voluntary is voluntary action in addiction?Jeanette Kennett - unknown
  32.  28
    Living With One's Choices Moral Reasoning In Vitro and In Vivo.Jeanette Kennett - 2012 - In Robyn Langdon & Catriona Mackenzie (eds.), Emotions, Imagination, and Moral Reasoning. New York: Psychology Press. pp. 257.
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  33.  70
    Mental Time Travel, Dynamic Evaluation, and Moral Agency.Philip Gerrans & Jeanette Kennett - 2017 - Mind 126 (501):259-268.
    Mental time travel is the ability to simulate alternative pasts and futures. It is often described as the ability to project a sense of self in the service of diachronic agency. It requires not only semantic representation but affective sampling of alternative futures. If people lose this ability for affective sampling their sense of self is diminished. They have less of a self to project hence are compromised as agents. If they cannot “feel the future” they cannot imaginatively inhabit it (...)
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  34. Decision Theory and Weakness of Will.Jeanette Kennett - 1991 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 72 (2):113-130.
     
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  35. Reasons, reflection, and repugnance.Doug McConnell & Jeanette Kennett - 2016 - In Alberto Giubilini & Steve Clarke (eds.), The Ethics of Human Enhancement: Understanding the Debate. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
    In this chapter we draw comparisons between Kass’ views on the normative authority of repugnance and social intuitionist accounts of moral judgement which are similarly sceptical about the role of reasoned reflection in moral judgement. We survey the empirical claims made in support of giving moral primacy to intuitions generated by emotions such as repugnance, as well as some common objections. We then examine accounts which integrate intuition and reflection, and argue that plausible accounts of wisdom are in tension with (...)
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  36. Reactive attitudes, relationships, and addiction.Jeanette Kennett, Doug McConnell & Anke Snoek - forthcoming - In S. Ahmed & Hanna Pickard (eds.), Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy and Science of Addiction. London, UK: Routledge.
    In this chapter we focus on the structure of close personal relations and diagnose how these relationships are disrupted by addiction. We draw upon Peter Strawson’s landmark paper ‘Freedom and Resentment’ (2008, first published 1962) to argue that loved ones of those with addiction veer between, (1) reactive attitudes of blame and resentment generated by disappointed expectations of goodwill and reciprocity, and (2) the detached objective stance from which the addicted person is seen as less blameworthy but also as less (...)
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  37.  63
    Managing shame and guilt in addiction: A pathway to recovery.Anke Snoek, Victoria McGeer, Daphne Brandenburg & Jeanette Kennett - 2021 - Addictive Behaviors 120.
    A dominant view of guilt and shame is that they have opposing action tendencies: guilt- prone people are more likely to avoid or overcome dysfunctional patterns of behaviour, making amends for past misdoings, whereas shame-prone people are more likely to persist in dysfunctional patterns of behaviour, avoiding responsibility for past misdoings and/or lashing out in defensive aggression. Some have suggested that addiction treatment should make use of these insights, tailoring therapy according to people’s degree of guilt-proneness versus shame-proneness. In this (...)
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  38.  31
    Science and normative authority.Jeanette Kennett - 2011 - Philosophical Explorations 14 (3):229-235.
    Philosophical Explorations, Volume 14, Issue 3, Page 229-235, September 2011.
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  39. Ethics of implicit persuasion in pharmaceutical advertising.Paul Biegler, Jeanette Kennett, Justin Oakley & Patrick Vargas - unknown
     
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  40.  16
    Respecting Agency in Dementia Care: When Should Truthfulness Give Way?Steve Matthews & Jeanette Kennett - 2022 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 39 (1):117-131.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy, EarlyView.
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  41.  94
    Regard for Reason in the Moral Mind: by May, Joshua, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018, pp. xv + 264, £45. [REVIEW]Jeanette Kennett - 2020 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (1):199-201.
    Volume 98, Issue 1, March 2020, Page 199-201.
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  42.  11
    Reasons, reverence, and value.Jeanette Kennett - unknown
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  43. Friendship and role morality.Dean Cocking & Jeanette Kennett - 2003 - In Kim Chong Chong, Sor-Hoon Tan & C. L. Ten (eds.), The Moral Circle and the Self: Chinese and Western Approaches. Open Court.
     
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  44.  42
    Beyond dualism : a plea for an extended taxonomy of agency impairment in addiction.Anke Snoek, Jeanette Kennett & Craig Fry - 2012 - American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 3 (2):56-57.
    Pickard (2012) claims that the neurobiological or disease model of addiction hinders the recovery of people because it undermines their feeling of self-efficacy and agency. Sub- stance users are “not aided by being treated as victims of a neurobiological disease, as opposed to agents of their own recovery” (40).Although Pickard acknowledges that claims of powerlessness or loss of agency can have a functional role in the self-narratives of substance users in excusing them from blame, she primarily focuses on the negative (...)
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  45.  47
    Mixed motives.Jeanette Kennett - 1993 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 71 (3):256 – 269.
    My aim in this paper is, by process of elimination, to elucidate and defend an account of how ordinary people act on their values. I will be making both a descriptive claim about our psychology and a further claim about its effectiveness and rational status. I want to suggest that the way in which most of us in fact put our values into practice is, over time, preferable to the ways which initially seem required or at least desirable.
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  46. Fashion - Philosophy for Everyone: Thinking with Style.Fritz Allhoff, Jessica Wolfendale & Jeanette Kennett (eds.) - 2011 - Wiley.
    If you just can't decide what to wear, this enlightening guide will lead you through the diverse and sometimes contradictory aspects of fashion in a series of lively, entertaining and thoughtful essays from prominent philosophers and writers. A unique and enlightening insight into the underlying philosophy behind the power of fashion Contributions address issues in fashion from a variety of viewpoints, including aesthetics, the nature of fashion and fashionability, ethics, gender and identity politics, and design Includes a foreword by Jennifer (...)
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  47.  12
    Striving to Make Sense: The Duty of Respect for Persons with Psychosis.Jeanette Kennett - 2021 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 28 (3):251-253.
    In her wonderfully rich and insightful article, Sofia Jeppsson argues that, although a person with psychosis may seem to be strange and unintelligible to us, we nevertheless have duties of intelligibility toward them. And she draws upon her own experience to show that psychotic experiences and reasoning are more intelligible than we might have thought.In this brief commentary, I focus on why the assumption of hypothetical intelligibility is a duty of respect owed to those experiencing psychosis. In everyday human interaction (...)
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  48.  12
    The Impact of Dementia on the Self: Do We Consider Ourselves the Same as Others?Sophia A. Harris, Amee Baird, Steve Matthews, Jeanette Kennett, Rebecca Gelding & Celia B. Harris - 2021 - Neuroethics 14 (3):281-294.
    The decline in autobiographical memory function in people with Alzheimer’s dementia has been argued to cause a loss of self-identity. Prior research suggests that people perceive changes in moral traits and loss of memories with a “social-moral core” as most impactful to the maintenance of identity. However, such research has so far asked people to rate from a third-person perspective, considering the extent to which hypothetical others maintain their identity in the face of various impairments. In the current study, we (...)
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  49.  13
    Intimate relations: friends and lovers.Dirk Baltzly & Jeanette Kennett - 2017 - In E. Kroeker and K. Schaubroek (ed.), Love, Reason and Morality. New York, NY, USA: pp. 110–124.
    In this paper we look at two kinds of relations that give rise to reasons for action of a distinctive sort: friendship and erotic love. We argue that what is common to these different relations of affection is that the people in them exhibit dispositions toward mutual direction by one another and interpretation of one another (in a sense that we describe in detail below). This mutual responsiveness is, in part, a matter of responding to reasons that arise from the (...)
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  50.  27
    Neuroscience and Punishment: From Theory to Practice.Allan McCay & Jeanette Kennett - 2019 - Neuroethics 14 (Suppl 3):269-280.
    In a 2004 paper, Greene and Cohen predicted that neuroscience would revolutionise criminal justice by presenting a mechanistic view of human agency that would change people’s intuitions about retributive punishment. According to their theory, this change in intuitions would in turn lead to the demise of retributivism within criminal justice systems. Their influential paper has been challenged, most notably by Morse, who has argued that it is unlikely that there will be major changes to criminal justice systems in response to (...)
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