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Jeanine Weekes Schroer
University of Minnesota, Duluth
  1. Getting the Story Right: A Reductionist Narrative Account of Personal Identity.Jeanine Weekes Schroer & Robert Schroer - 2014 - Philosophical Studies (3):1-25.
    A popular “Reductionist” account of personal identity unifies person stages into persons in virtue of their psychological continuity with one another. One objection to psychological continuity accounts is that there is more to our personal identity than just mere psychological continuity: there is also an active process of self-interpretation and self-creation. This criticism can be used to motivate a rival account of personal identity that appeals to the notion of a narrative. To the extent that they comment upon the issue, (...)
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  2. Giving Them Something They Can Feel: On the Strategy of Scientizing the Phenomenology of Race and Racism.Jeanine Weekes Schroer - 2015 - Knowledge Cultures 3 (1):91-110.
    There is an expansion of empirical research that at its core is an attempt to quantify the "feely" aspects of living in raced (and other stigmatized) bodies. This research is offered as part concession, part insistence on the reality of the "special" circumstances of living in raced bodies. While this move has the potential of making headway in debates about the character of racism and the unique nature of the harms of contemporary racism--through an analysis of stereotype threat research, microaggression (...)
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  3. Fighting Imperviousness With Vulnerability: Teaching in a Climate of Conservatism.Jeanine Weekes Schroer - 2007 - Teaching Philosophy 30 (2):185-200.
  4. Two Potential Problems with Philosophical Intuitions: Muddled Intuitions and Biased Intuitions.Jeanine Weekes Schroer & Robert Schroer - 2013 - Philosophia 41 (4):1263-1281.
    One critique of experimental philosophy is that the intuitions of the philosophically untutored should be accorded little to no weight; instead, only the intuitions of professional philosophers should matter. In response to this critique, “experimentalists” often claim that the intuitions of professional philosophers are biased. In this paper, we explore this question of whose intuitions should be disqualified and why. Much of the literature on this issue focuses on the question of whether the intuitions of professional philosophers are reliable. In (...)
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  5. Purposeful Nonsense, Intersectionality, and the Mission to Save Black Babies.Melissa M. Kozma & Jeanine Weekes Schroer - 2014 - In Namita Goswami, Maeve O'Donavan & Lisa Yount (eds.), Why Race and Gender Still Matter: An Intersectional Approach. Pickering & Chatto. pp. 101-116.
    The competing expressions of ideology flooding the contemporary political landscape have taken a turn toward the absurd. The Radiance Foundation’s recent anti-abortion campaign targeting African-American women, including a series of billboards bearing the slogan “The most dangerous place for an African-American child is in the womb”, is just one example of political "discourse" that is both infuriating and confounding. Discourse with these features – problematic intelligibility, disinterest in the truth, and inflammatory rhetoric – has become increasingly common in politics, the (...)
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    The Terrifying Tale of the Philosophical Mammy.Jeanine Weekes Schroer - 2013 - The Black Scholar 43 (4):101-107.
    Recently I’ve been reflecting on the possibility that choices I’ve made and commitments I’ve accepted — choices and commitments like being part of the academy and treating philosophy as a productive way to pursue truths about race and racism — may have made me into Philosophy’s mammy. Confronted with a crystal-clear specter of myself as mammy, I stubbornly hold fast to the belief that my intellectual identity can be defended to all of my intellectual ancestors: my ancestors in the canon (...)
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  7.  28
    Putting Psychology Before Metaphysics in Moral Responsibility: Reactive Attitudes and a “Gut Feeling” That Can Trigger and Justify Them.Robert Schroer & Jeanine Weekes Schroer - 2019 - Philosophical Psychology 32 (3):357-387.
    In "Freedom and Resentment," P.F. Strawson argues that since the reactive attitudes are psychologically unavoidable, they do not stand in need of justification from philosophical theorizing about the metaphysical conditions necessary for free action. After reviewing and criticizing this line of argument, we develop an alternative account of how the reactive attitudes can be justified through a feature of our psychology. This new account focuses upon a collection of cognitive mechanisms identified by cognitive neuroscience, which recognize human beings (and other (...)
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  8.  47
    Fighting Imperviousness With Vulnerability.Jeanine Weekes Schroer - 2007 - Teaching Philosophy 30 (2):185-200.