Incommensurability between successive scientific theories—the impossibility of empirical evidence dictating the choice between them—was Thomas Kuhn's most controversial proposal. Toward defending it, he directed much effort over his last 30 years into formulating precise conditions under which two theories would be undeniably incommensurable with one another. His first step, in the late 1960s, was to argue that incommensurability must result when two theories involve incompatible taxonomies. The problem he then struggled with, never obtaining a solution that he found entirely satisfactory, (...) was how to extend this initial line of thought to sciences like physics in which taxonomy is not so transparently dominant as it is, for example, in chemistry. This paper reconsiders incommensurability in the light of examples in which evidence historically did and did not carry over continuously from old laws and theories to new ones. The transition from ray to wave optics early in the nineteenth century, we argue, is especially informative in this regard. The evidence for the theory of polarization within ray optics did not carry over to wave optics, so that this transition can be regarded as a prototypical case of discontinuity of evidence, and hence of incommensurability in the way Kuhn wanted. Yet the evidence for classic geometric optics did carry over to wave optics, notwithstanding the fundamental conceptual readjustment that Fresnel's wave theory required. (shrink)

Summary Descartes's model for the invisible world has long seemed confined to explanations of known phenomena, with little if anything to offer concerning the empirical investigation of novel processes. Although he did perform experiments, the links between them and the Cartesian model remain difficult to pin down, not least because there are so very few. Indeed, the only account that Descartes ever developed which invokes his model in relation to both quantitative implications and to experiments is the one that he (...) provided for the rainbow. There he described in considerable detail the appearances of colours generated by means of prisms in specific circumstances. We have reproduced these experiments with careful attention to Descartes's requirements. The results provide considerable insight into the otherwise fractured character of his printed discovery narrative. By combining reproduction with attention to the rhetorical structure of Descartes's presentation, we can show that he worked his model in conjunction with experiments to reach a fully quantitative account of the rainbow, including its colours as well as its geometry. In this one instance at least, Descartes produced just the sort of explanatory novelties that the young Newton later did in optics. That Descartes's results in respect to colour are in hindsight specious is of course irrelevant. (shrink)

Most recent work on the nature of experiment in physics has focused on "big science"--the large-scale research addressed in Andrew Pickering's Constructing Quarks and Peter Galison's How Experiments End. This book examines small-scale experiment in physics, in particular the relation between theory and practice. The contributors focus on interactions among the people, materials, and ideas involved in experiments--factors that have been relatively neglected in science studies. The first half of the book is primarily philosophical, with contributions from Andrew Pickering, Peter (...) Galison, Hans Radder, Brian Baigrie, and Yves Gingras. Among the issues they address are the resources deployed by theoreticians and experimenters, the boundaries that constrain theory and practice, the limits of objectivity, the reproducibility of results, and the intentions of researchers. The second half is devoted to historical case studies in the practice of physics from the early nineteenth to the early twentieth century. These chapters address failed as well as successful experimental work ranging from Victorian astronomy through Hertz's investigation of cathode rays to Trouton's attempt to harness the ether. Contributors to this section are Jed Z. Buchwald, Giora Hon, Margaret Morrison, Simon Schaffer, and Andrew Warwick. With a lucid introduction by Ian Hacking, and original articles by noted scholars in the history and philosophy of science, this book is poised to become a significant source on the nature of small-scale experiment in physics. (shrink)

part. I. Physics and the new science -- part. II. The long eighteenth century -- part III. Fashioning the discipline : from natural philosophy to physics -- part IV. Modern physics.

Despite the substantial and important differences between Achinstein and Laudan, many historians of science would see little distinction between them. Both of these philosophers believe and strongly maintain that argumentation was a central aspect of the historical events involved in the establishment of wave optics. Contemporary historians would prefer to ask whether argumentation did much work at all - whether, that is, anyone ever actually persuaded anyone else to change a belief. I will attempt briefly to show that issues of (...) skilled knowledge, tacit understanding, and novel instrumentation, rather than straightforward assertions based on the overt structure of the contending theories, offer a better way to understand what took place. (shrink)

In the fall of 1967 I entered Princeton as a Freshman intending to major in physics but interested as well in history. The catalog listed a course on the history of science, taught by a Professor Thomas Kuhn with the assistance of Michael Mahoney that seemed nicely to fit both interests. The course proved to be peculiarly intense for something about what was, after all, obsolete science as, each week, hundreds of pages of arcana from the distant past had to (...) be absorbed. Professor Kuhn would pace back and forth in lecture, smoking intensely and talking rapidly to an elaborate outline drawn on the board at the beginning of each class. In tutorial, Mahoney (who passed away in 2009) developed Kuhn's points, forcing .. (shrink)

Debate among scientists is frequently hampered by intense difficulties in communicating and translating their viewpoints. This well-known fact illustrates the role of unarticulated core knowledge in the activities of sientific communities. But it has been little noticed that the issue afficts not just written science, but especially traditions of experimental activity and their products, including instruments and techniques. The question is addressed on the basis of examples from the history of optics and electromagnetism - Fresnel and Brewster, Maxwell and Hertz (...) - and texts from Kuhn's Structure. Particular attention is paid to interrelations between succeeding theories, and to the notorious problem of theory-choice. (shrink)

The cipher of the zodiac Content Type Journal Article Category Book Symposium Pages 1-22 DOI 10.1007/s11016-012-9674-1 Authors Robert Fox, Faculty of History, Oxford University, George Street, Oxford, OX1 2RL UK Charles C. Gillispie, Program in History of Science, Department of History, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08544, USA Theresa Levitt, Department of History, University of Mississippi, 310 Bishop Hall, University, MS 38677, USA David Aubin, Institut de Mathématiques de Jussieu, Histoire des sciences mathématique, UPMC - case postale 247, 4, place Jussieu, (...) 75252 Paris cedex 05, France Jed Z. Buchwald, Humanities and Social Sciences 101-40, Caltech, 1200 East California Blvd., Pasadena, CA 91125, USA Diane Greco Josefowicz, Writing Program, College of Arts and Sciences, Boston University, 730 Commonwealth Ave., Rm. 301, Boston, MA 02215, USA Journal Metascience Online ISSN 1467-9981 Print ISSN 0815-0796. (shrink)