Mereological nihilism is the philosophical position that there are no items that have parts. If there are no items with parts then the only items that exist are partless fundamental particles, such as the true atoms (also called philosophical atoms) theorized to exist by some ancient philosophers, some contemporary physicists, and some contemporary philosophers. With several novel arguments I show that mereological nihilism is the correct theory of reality. I will also discuss strong similarities that mereological nihilism has with empirical (...) results in quantum physics. And I will discuss how mereological nihilism vindicates a few other theories, such as a very specific theory of philosophical atomism, which I will call quantum abstract atomism. I will show that mereological nihilism also is an interpretation of quantum mechanics that avoids the problems of other interpretations, such as the widely known, metaphysically generated, quantum paradoxes of quantum physics, which ironically are typically accepted as facts about reality. I will also show why it is very surprising that mereological nihilism is not a widely held theory, and not the premier theory in philosophy. (shrink)
I introduce the implantation argument, a new argument for the existence of God. Spatiotemporal extensions believed to exist outside of the mind, composing an external physical reality, cannot be composed of either atomlessness, or of Democritean atoms, and therefore the inner experience of an external reality containing spatiotemporal extensions believed to exist outside of the mind does not represent the external reality, the mind is a mere cinematic-like mindscreen, implanted into the mind by a creator-God. It will be shown that (...) only a creator-God can be the implanting creator of the mindscreen simulation, and other simulation theories, such as Bostrom’s famous account, that do not involve a creator-God as the mindscreen simulation creator, involve a reification fallacy. (shrink)
I argue that relations between non-collocated spatial entities, between non-identical topological spaces, and between non-identical basic building blocks of space, do not exist. If any spatially located entities are not at the same spatial location, or if any topological spaces or basic building blocks of space are non-identical, I will argue that there are no relations between or among them. The arguments I present are arguments that I have not seen in the literature.
RÉSUMÉ: Selon une ontologie platonicienne, il faut qu’une exemplification platonicienne lie des particuliers physiques et un universel non localisé pour qu’i! y ait connexion entre propriété et choses. Dans cet article, je discute du lien d’exemplification platonicien, lequel a l’intéressante faculté de lier des entités localisées à une entité non localisée et donc, pour reprendre les mots d’Armstrong, la faculté de traverser le domaine du non spatialement localisé et celui du spatialement localisé. La littérature ne contient à peu près aucune (...) discussion de l’exemplification. J’en discute et signale une nouveau problème relatif à la connexion entre un universel platonicien et des particuliers physiques. (shrink)
An analysis of Scripture uncovers a new model of God’s election and predestination of souls, which fits under the umbrella of the Calvinist theologies, but where this model involves an answer to the long-standing question of why God chose some, rather than all. It will be explored how before souls were elected (or condemned), God looked at them and knew them in a pre-election state, which God used to predestine each soul in physical reality. This analysis reveals why it could (...) be no other way but where God only would choose some, rather than all souls during the physical embodiment stage of the soul, and the vexing centuries-old Calvinist question of why God elected some not all has an answer. (shrink)
I argue that relations between non-identical times, such as the relations, earlier than, later than, or 10 seconds apart, involve contradiction, and only co-temporal relations are non-contradictory, which would leave presentism the only non-contradictory theory of time. The arguments I present are arguments that I have not seen in the literature.
I discuss the relations between God and spatial entities, such as the universe. An example of a relation between God and a spatial entity is the relation,causes. Such relations are, in D.M. Armstrong’s words, ‘realm crossing’ relations: relations between or among spatial entities and entities in the realm of the spatially unlocated. I discuss an apparent problem with such realm crossing relations. If this problem is serious enough, as I will argue it is, it implies that God cannot be the (...) creator of the universe I also discuss that if God cannot be the creator of the universe, then God does not exist. (shrink)
I gave the name “R theory of time " to the Buddhist philosophy of time in my 2005 article in The 'Indian International Journal of Buddhist Studies because after studying the currently discussed non Buddhist philosophies of time that have been offered to us by many physicists and analytic philosophers, I found that they seemed to not agree as much as I thought theories of time should with the findings of quantum physicists. Rather, the non Buddhist philosophies of time seemed (...) to only be in agreement with relativistic physics, but not at all in agreement with quantum physics. But on the other hand, it seemed to me that the Buddhist philosophy of time agreed best with quantum theory, and thus I published an article about the Buddhist philosophy of time in order to try to show why. (shrink)
quantum particles (electrons, gluons, etc.). Blob theory is the philosophical position that properties of things, such as the properties we experience in our empirical life (colors, solidity of objects, etc.) do not..
A connection between things and properties is required to hold things and properties together. Exemplification is such a connection. Exemplification is usually considered primitive, and therefore analysis of exemplification is nearly absent from the literature. I maintain that exemplification might not be primitive; and in giving a description of exemplification, I point out a new problem having to do with the issue of how things are tied to properties.
My research in metaphysical realism and analytic metaphysics consists mainly in attacks on analytic metaphysics. My reason for this is a result of the fact that I am a mereological nihilis t, a blob theorist , an atomist (philosophic atomist), and a specific sort of conceptualist (see below). The variety atomism I argue for is similar to the traditional atomism of some of the ancient Greek and ancient..
Specifically, "A New Argument Against talk is a section of an upcoming article of Brahman Extended Philosophical Atoms" is mine about Mereological Nihilism and Anti-metaphysics concerned with only the following: Quantum Atomism . The article is going Radical Empiricism..
atomism involves point-sized philosophical atoms that are indistinguishable from one another, and that are nonphysical bits of energy that flash in and out of existence. In other words, they are nonphysical particles (hence the word "abstract"): they are not nonphysical in the way that some philosophers might believe a mind or number to be alleged to be nonphysical, but rather they are nonphysical merely because, I argue in an article, that they are ultimate building blocks that in no way can (...) be considered physical items. If that is the case, it indicates that reality is not physical (if, that is. (shrink)
Relations pervade the theories of analytic metaphysics: philosophy of mind, philosophy of region, philosophy of causation, philosophy of math, philosophy of space and time, philosophy of physics, and theories of objects (bundle and substance theories). Many of the sorts of relations that (are alleged to) exist, according to these theories, are relations between or among non-collocated spatial entities (entities that do not occupy the same spatial region or regions), and between or among non-identical basic units of space. I argue that (...) relations between or among any non-collocated spatial entities, and between or among non-identical basic units of space, do not exist: if any entities in space are not at the same.. (shrink)
I argue that relations between non identical times, such as the relations, earlier than , later than , or 10 seconds apart , involve contraction, and only co temporal relations are non contradictory, which would leave presentism the only non contradictory theory of time. The arguments I present are arguments that I have not seen in the literature.
Discussion of, and reference to, properties pervades contemporary metaphysics, physics (e.g., the electron has charge), and ordinary language (the lion is sublime). But only a specialized group of a few hundred philosophers discuss the very specific details of what is involved in..