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Jeff Kasser [13]Jeffrey L. Kasser [2]Jeffrey Kasser [1]Jeffrey Lee Kasser [1]
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Jeff Kasser
Colorado State University
  1. How Settled Are Settled Beliefs in “The Fixation of Belief”?Jeff Kasser - 2011 - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 47 (2):226.
    Despite its prominence in Peirce’s best-known works, the notion of fixed, stable, or settled belief (I will follow Peirce in using these terms more or less interchangeably) has received relatively little explicit attention. Need a belief be permanently stable in order to count as fixed? Or, to take the other extreme, does a belief count as fixed as long as it is currently stable? More fundamentally, what is involved in predicating stability of a belief? Talk of stability suggests a disposition (...)
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  2.  50
    Two Conceptions of Weight of Evidence in Peirce’s Illustrations of the Logic of Science.Jeff Kasser - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (3):629-648.
    Weight of evidence continues to be a powerful metaphor within formal approaches to epistemology. But attempts to construe the metaphor in precise and useful ways have encountered formidable obstacles. This paper shows that two quite different understandings of evidential weight can be traced back to one 1878 article by C.S. Peirce. One conception, often associated with I.J. Good, measures the balance or net weight of evidence, while the other, generally associated with J.M. Keynes, measures the gross weight of evidence. Conflations (...)
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  3.  3
    Normativity and Naturalism in “The Fixation of Belief”.Jeff Kasser - 2019 - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 55 (1):1.
    In a number of brief discussions, Cheryl Misak has presented a reading of Peirce's "The Fixation of Belief " that preserves both the essay's ambitious naturalism and its sensible normativism. This essay fleshes out Misak's proposal, formulates some challenges to it, and articulates an alternative. Misak's argument rests on the plausible claim that "it is very hard really to settle beliefs". As she interprets this claim, it could also be expressed as "it is very hard really to settle beliefs." She (...)
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  4.  32
    Peirce's Supposed Psychologism.Jeff Kasser - 1999 - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 35 (3):501 - 526.
  5.  50
    Structure and Content in “The Will to Believe”.Jeff Kasser - 2015 - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 51 (3):320.
    This paper argues that sustained attention to the highlighted structure of William James's “The Will to Believe” yields surprising insights into the essay. “Highlighted structure” includes James's announcements of his intentions, his section breaks, and, especially, patterns of repetition and contrast within the work. Particular attention is paid to a criticism to which James frequently returns, viz. that evidentialists are driven by their passions to adopt evidentialism. I argue that James does not take this to constitute an objection to evidentialism (...)
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  6.  15
    Genuine Belief and Genuine Doubt in Peirce.Jeff Kasser - 2018 - European Journal of Philosophy 26 (2):840-853.
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  7.  37
    Confidence, Evidential Weight, and the Theory-Practice Divide in Peirce.Jeff Kasser - 2016 - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 52 (2):285.
    Through the work of Isaac Levi and others, a tension that lies at the heart of Peirce’s doubt-belief theory of inquiry has received significant attention in recent years. Scholars have struggled to explain on Peirce’s behalf how inquirers are to strike an appropriate balance between believing and doubting. We must acknowledge the breadth and depth of our fallibility without countenancing paper doubts that are at best idle and at worst pernicious. We must rely on our beliefs in inquiry while nevertheless (...)
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  8. The Metaethics of Belief: An Expressivist Reading of “The Will to Believe”.Nishi Shah & Jeffrey Kasser - 2006 - Social Epistemology 20 (1):1-17.
  9.  30
    Putnam, Truth and Informal Logic.Jeffrey L. Kasser & Daniel Cohen - 2002 - Philosophica 70:85-108.
  10. The Metaethics of Belief: An Expressivist Reading of "the Will to Believe".Jeff Kasser & Nishi Shah - 2006 - Social Epistemology 20 (1):1 – 17.
    We argue that an expressivist interpretation of "The Will to Believe" provides a fruitful way of understanding this widely-read but perplexing document. James approaches questions about our intellectual obligations from two quite different standpoints. He first defends an expressivist interpretation of judgments of intellectual obligation; they are "only expressions of our passional life". Only then does James argue against evidentialism, and both his criticisms of Clifford and his defense of a more flexible ethics of belief presuppose this independently-defended expressivism. James (...)
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  11.  36
    The Problem of Evil, by Daniel Speak. [REVIEW]Jeff Kasser - 2015 - Teaching Philosophy 38 (3):350-353.
  12. Prospects for a Jamesian Expressivism.Jeff Kasser - 2013 - William James Studies 10.
     
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  13.  17
    An Inferentialist Theory of Causation. [REVIEW]Jeff Kasser - 2016 - Metascience 25 (3):447-450.
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  14.  16
    Peirce on God, Reality and Personality.Jeffrey L. Kasser - 2013 - In Jeanine Diller & Asa Kasher (eds.), Models of God and Alternative Ultimate Realities. Springer. pp. 431--440.
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  15.  7
    Adler's Belief's Own Ethics.Jeff Kasser - 2003 - Informal Logic 23 (3).
  16. Belief's Own Ethics. [REVIEW]Jeff Kasser - 2003 - Informal Logic 23 (3):293-297.
     
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