Grafting the Marxian idea that private property is coercive onto the liberal imperative of individual liberty, this new thesis from one of America's foremost intellectuals conceives a revised definition of justice that recognizes the harm inflicted by capitalism's hidden coercive structures. Maps a new frontier in moral philosophy and political theory Distills a new concept of justice that recognizes the iniquities of capitalism Synthesis of elements of Marxism and Liberalism will interest readers in both camps Direct and jargon-free style opens (...) these complex ideas to a wide readership. (shrink)
Two distinguished social and political philosophers take opposing positions in this highly engaging work. Louis P. Pojman justifies the practice of execution by appealing to the principle of retribution while Jeffrey Reiman argues that although the death penalty is a just punishment for murder, we are not morally obliged to execute murderers.
The justice of racial profiling is addressed in the original position first for a society without racism, then for a society marked by racism. In the first case, the practice is argued to be just if carried out respectfully and expeditiously and likely to contribute to effective crime control. Thus it is not intrinsically racist. Addressing the second case, the idea that the harms of racial profiling are modest because expressive is critiqued. The practice is shown to carry the danger (...) of producing rights-violations by increasing the incidence of racist attitudes and practices. It is argued to be just in a society marked by racism if done under special supervision, and only to aid in apprehending dangerous criminals. (shrink)
In Abortion and the Ways We Value Human Life, Jeffrey Reiman argues that an overlooked clue to the solution of the moral problem of abortion lies in the unusual way in which we value the lives of individual human beings_namely, that we value them irreplaceably. We think it is not only wrong to kill an innocent child or adult, but that it would not be made right by replacing the dead one with another living one, or even several. Reiman argues (...) that there are only a limited number of facts that could justify such valuing, with the result that human children and adults have the fullest right to protection of their lives, infants have a lesser but substantial right to such protection, and fetuses do not qualify at all. Leading up to this argument, Reiman presents a survey of Western attitudes and laws about abortion from Hammurabi's Code to Roe v. Wade, and a critical analysis of all the major philosophical arguments on the issue, pro and con. The book is written in straightforward, jargon-free language that makes it accessible to college students at all levels and to the educated lay reader as well. (shrink)
As one of the most important ethicists to emerge since the Second World War, Alan Gewirth continues to influence philosophical debates concerning morality. In this ground-breaking book, Gewirth's neo-Kantianism, and the communitarian problems discussed, form a dialogue on the foundation of moral theory. Themes of agent-centered constraints, the formal structure of theories, and the relationship between freedom and duty are examined along with such new perspectives as feminism, the Stoics, and Sartre. Gewirth offers a picture of the philosopher's theory and (...) its applications, providing a richer, more complete critical assessement than any which has occurred to date. (shrink)
In Zadig , published in 1748, Voltaire wrote of “the great principle that it is better to run the risk of sparing the guilty than to condemn the innocent.” At about the same time, Blackstone noted approvingly that “the law holds that it is better that ten guilty persons escape, than that one innocent suffer.” In 1824, Thomas Fielding cited the principle as an Italian proverb and a maxim of English law. John Stuart Mill endorsed it in an address to (...) Parliament in 1868. General acceptance of this maxim continues into our own period, yet it is difficult to find systematic attempts to defend the maxim. It is treated as a truism in no need of defense. But the principle within it is not at all obvious; and since it undergirds many of our criminal justice policies, we should be sure that it is justifiable. First, however, we must clarify what the principle means. (shrink)
In Zadig, published in 1748, Voltaire wrote of “the great principle that it is better to run the risk of sparing the guilty than to condemn the innocent.” At about the same time, Blackstone noted approvingly that “the law holds that it is better that ten guilty persons escape, than that one innocent suffer.” In 1824, Thomas Fielding cited the principle as an Italian proverb and a maxim of English law. John Stuart Mill endorsed it in an address to Parliament (...) in 1868. General acceptance of this maxim continues into our own period, yet it is difficult to find systematic attempts to defend the maxim. It is treated as a truism in no need of defense. But the principle within it is not at all obvious; and since it undergirds many of our criminal justice policies, we should be sure that it is justifiable. First, however, we must clarify what the principle means. (shrink)
In Zadig, published in 1748, Voltaire wrote of “the great principle that it is better to run the risk of sparing the guilty than to condemn the innocent.” At about the same time, Blackstone noted approvingly that “the law holds that it is better that ten guilty persons escape, than that one innocent suffer.” In 1824, Thomas Fielding cited the principle as an Italian proverb and a maxim of English law. John Stuart Mill endorsed it in an address to Parliament (...) in 1868. General acceptance of this maxim continues into our own period, yet it is difficult to find systematic attempts to defend the maxim. It is treated as a truism in no need of defense. But the principle within it is not at all obvious; and since it undergirds many of our criminal justice policies, we should be sure that it is justifiable. First, however, we must clarify what the principle means. (shrink)
Though genuine (voluntary, deliberate) consent of the governed does not occur in modern states, political legitimacy still requires something that does what consent does. Dereification of the state (recognizing that citizens continually create their state), combined with a defensible notion of moral responsibility, entails citizens' moral responsibility for their state. This implies that we may treat citizens morally as if they consented to their state, yielding a moral equivalent of consent of the governed, and a conception of political legitimacy applicable (...) to modern states thought legitimate. It implies that legitimate states have a moral right to rule, and their citizens have a prima facie moral obligation to obey the law. (shrink)
Jan Narveson presents a lengthy critique of my book, As Free and as Just as Possible: The Theory of Marxian Liberalism. Central to the disagreement between Narveson and myself is the Marxian notion, endorsed by me and rejected by Narveson, that private property is coercive, in particular, that capitalist ownership of productive resources coerces workers to work for capitalists. In As Free and as Just as Possible, I hold that people have a natural right to liberty understood as freedom from (...) unwanted coercion. Thus, I contend that, to be justified, a regime of private property must be agreed to by all who might be affected by it because of the threat it poses to their liberty. Since that amounts to agreement among virtually all people living now and in the future, that agreement cannot be actual. It must be a theoretical agreement, such as takes place in John Rawls’s original position. I present a Marxian-Liberal version of the original position, and argue that, in it, parties wou .. (shrink)
