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Jennifer Hornsby
Birkbeck College
  1. Actions.Jennifer Hornsby - 1980 - Routledge and Kegan Paul.
    This book presents an events-based view of human action somewhat different from that of what is known as "standard story". A thesis about trying-to-do-something is distinguished from various volitionist theses. It is argued then that given a correct conception of action's antecedents, actions will be identified not with bodily movements but with causes of such movements.
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  2. Free speech and illocution.Rae Langton & Jennifer Hornsby - 1998 - Legal Theory 4 (1):21-37.
    We defend the view of some feminist writers that the notion of silencing has to be taken seriously in discussions of free speech. We assume that what ought to be meant by ‘speech’, in the context ‘free speech’, is whatever it is that a correct justification of the right to free speech justifies one in protecting. And we argue that what one ought to mean includes illocution, in the sense of J.L. Austin.
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  3.  48
    On Action.Jennifer Hornsby - 1991 - Philosophical Quarterly 41 (165):498-500.
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  4. Essays on Anscombe's Intention.Anton Ford, Jennifer Hornsby & Frederick Stoutland (eds.) - 2011 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
    This collection of ten essays elucidates some of the more challenging aspects of Anscombe’s work and affirms her reputation as one of our most original ...
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  5.  38
    Simple Mindedness: In Defense of Naive Naturalism in the Philosophy of Mind.Jennifer Hornsby - 2001 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
    Jennifer Hornsby offers here detailed discussions of ontology, human agency, and everyday psychological explanation. In her distinctive view of questions about the mind's place in nature she argues for a particular position in philosophy of mind: naive naturalism.
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  6. Simple Mindedness: In Defense of Naive Naturalism in the Philosophy of Mind.Jennifer Hornsby - 1996 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
    These questions provide the impetus for the detailed discussions of ontology, human agency, and everyday psychological explanation presented in this book.
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  7. A disjunctivist conception of acting for reasons.Jennifer Hornsby - 2008 - In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. Oxford University Press.
    A disjunctivist conception of acting for reasons is introduced by way of showing that a view of acting for reasons must give a place to knowledge. Two principal claims are made. 1. This conception has a rôle analogous to that of the disjunctive conception that John McDowell recommends in thinking about perception; and when the two disjunctivist conceptions are treated as counterparts, they can be shown to have work to do in combination. 2. This conception of acting for reasons safeguards (...)
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  8. Disempowered Speech.Jennifer Hornsby - 1995 - Philosophical Topics 23 (2):127-147.
  9. Agency and Actions.Jennifer Hornsby - 2004 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 55:1-23.
    Among philosophical questions about human agency, one can distinguish in a rough and ready way between those that arise in philosophy of mind and those that arise in ethics. In philosophy of mind, one central aim has been to account for the place of agents in a world whose operations are supposedly ‘physical’. In ethics, one central aim has been to account for the connexion between ethical species of normativity and the distinctive deliberative and practical capacities of human beings. Ethics (...)
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  10. Actions and activity.Jennifer Hornsby - 2012 - Philosophical Issues 22 (1):233-245.
    Contemporary literature in philosophy of action seems to be divided overthe place of action in the natural causal world. I think that a disagreementabout ontology underlies the division. I argue here that human action isproperly understood only by reference to a category of process or activity,where this is not a category of particulars.
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  11. Intending, knowing how, infinitives.Jennifer Hornsby - 2016 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46 (1):1-17.
    Intellectualists tell us that a person who knows how to do something therein knows a proposition. Along with others, they may say that a person who intends to do something intends a proposition. I argue against them. I do so by way of considering ‘know how ——’ and ‘intend ——’ together. When the two are considered together, a realistic conception of human agency can inform the understanding of some infinitives: the argument need not turn on what semanticists have had to (...)
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  12. Meaning and uselessness: How to think about derogatory words.Jennifer Hornsby - 2001 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 25 (1):128–141.
    Williams explains why there might have been some point to a linguistic approach in ethics. I suggest that there might be some point to paying attention to an ethical dimension in philosophy of language. I shall consider words that I label ‘derogatory’, and questions they raise about linguistic meaning.
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  13. Hornsby on the phenomenology of speech.Jennifer Hornsby & Jason Stanley - 2005 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 79 (1):131–145.
    The central claim is that the semantic knowledge exercised by people when they speak is practical knowledge. The relevant idea of practical knowledge is explicated, applied to the case of speaking, and connected with an idea of agents’ knowledge. Some defence of the claim is provided.
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  14. Basic Activity.Jennifer Hornsby - 2013 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 87 (1):1-18.
    I present a view of activity, taking it that an agent is engaged in activity so long as an action of hers is occurring. I suggest that this view (a) helps in understanding what goes wrong in an argument in Thompson (2008) known sometimes as the ‘initial segment argument’, and (b) enables us to see that there could be an intelligible conception of what is basic when agents' knowledge is allowed into an account of that.
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  15. Semantic Knowledge and Practical Knowledge.Jennifer Hornsby & Jason Stanley - 2005 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 79 (1):107-145.
    The central claim is that the semantic knowledge exercised aby people when they speak is practical knowledge. The relevant idea of practical knowledge is explicated, applied to the case of speaking, and connected with an idea of agents' knowledge. Some defence of the claim is provided.
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  16. Speech Acts and Pornography.Jennifer Hornsby - 1993 - Women’s Philosophy Review 10:38-45.
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  17. Personal and sub‐personal; A defence of Dennett's early distinction.Jennifer Hornsby - 2000 - Philosophical Explorations 3 (1):6-24.
    Since 1969, when Dennett introduced a distinction between personal and sub- personal levels of explanation, many philosophers have used 'sub- personal ' very loosely, and Dennett himself has abandoned a view of the personal level as genuinely autonomous. I recommend a position in which Dennett's original distinction is crucial, by arguing that the phenomenon called mental causation is on view only at the properly personal level. If one retains the commit-' ments incurred by Dennett's early distinction, then one has a (...)
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  18. Truth without truthmaking entities.Jennifer Hornsby - 2005 - In Helen Beebee & Julian Dodd (eds.), Truthmakers: The Contemporary Debate. Clarendon Press. pp. 33.
    This chapter replies to arguments, advanced by Gonzalo Rodriguez–Pereyra, for thinking that the intuitions that have inspired theories of truthmaking cannot be accommodated without commitment to truth-making entities. It contains a suggestion about why, even if there are no entities that make propositions true, we should nonetheless be apt to think of truth as grounded. The advocates of truthmakers engage sometimes in a specifically ontological enquiry of a wide-ranging sort, sometimes in the project of understanding truth. Inasmuch as Rodriguez–Pereyra's manner (...)
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  19. Ryle's Knowing how and knowing how to act.Jennifer Hornsby - 2011 - In John Bengson & Marc A. Moffett (eds.), Knowing How: Essays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action. Oxford University Press, Usa. pp. 80.
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  20.  69
    Intending and Acting.Jennifer Hornsby & Myles Brand - 1986 - Philosophical Review 95 (2):261.
  21. Truth: the identity theory.Jennifer Hornsby - 1997 - In .
    Book synopsis: "What is truth?" has long been the philosophical question par excellence. The Nature of Truth collects in one volume the twentieth century's most influential philosophical work on the subject. The coverage strikes a balance between classic works and the leading edge of current philosophical research. The essays center around two questions: Does truth have an underlying nature? And if so, what sort of nature does it have? Thus the book discusses both traditional and deflationary theories of truth, as (...)
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  22. The Cambridge Companion to Feminism in Philosophy.Miranda Fricker & Jennifer Hornsby (eds.) - 2000 - Cambridge University Press.
    The thirteen specially-commissioned essays in this volume are written by philosophers at the forefront of feminist scholarship, and are designed to provide an accessible and stimulating guide to a philosophical literature that has seen massive expansion in recent years. Ranging from history of philosophy through metaphysics to philosophy of science, they encompass all the core subject areas commonly taught in anglophone undergraduate and graduate philosophy courses, offering both an overview of and a contribution to the relevant debates. Together they testify (...)
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  23. The presidential address: Truth: The identity theory.Jennifer Hornsby - 1997 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 97 (1):1–24.
    I want to promote what I shall call ‘the identity theory of truth’. I suggest that other accounts put forward as theories of truth are genuine rivals to it, but are unacceptable. A certain conception of thinkables belongs with the identity theory’s conception of truth. I introduce these conceptions in Part I, by reference to John McDowell’s Mind and World; and I show why they have a place in an identity theory, which I introduce by reference to Frege. In Part (...)
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  24. Illocution and its significance.Jennifer Hornsby - 1995 - In Savas L. Tsohatzidis (ed.), Foundations of Speech Act Theory: Philosophical and Linguistic Perspectives. Abingdon: Routledge. pp. 187-207.
    Book synopsis: Foundations of Speech Act Theory investigates the importance of speech act theory to the problem of meaning in linguistics and philosophy. The papers in this volume, written by respected philosophers and linguists, significantly advance standards of debate in this area. Beginning with a detailed introduction to the individual contributors, this collection demonstrates the relevance of speech acts to semantic theory. It includes essays unified by the assumption that current pragmatic theories are not well equipped to analyse speech acts (...)
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  25.  96
    Proper names: A defence of Burge.Jennifer Hornsby - 1976 - Philosophical Studies 30 (4):227 - 234.
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  26. Jennifer Hornsby.Jennifer Hornsby - 2005 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 79 (1):107-130.
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  27. Agency and causal explanation.Jennifer Hornsby - 1993 - In John Heil & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation. Oxford University Press.
    I. There are two points of view: ___ From the personal point of view, an action is a person's doing something for a reason, and her doing it is found intelligible when we know the reason that led her to it. ___ From the impersonal point of view, an action would be a link in a causal chain that could be viewed without paying any attention to people, the links being understood by reference to the world's causal workings.
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  28. Actions in their circumstances.Jennifer Hornsby - 2011 - In Anton Ford, Jennifer Hornsby & Frederick Stoutland (eds.), Essays on Anscombe's Intention. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
  29. Theory of Action.Lawrence Davis & Jennifer Hornsby - 1979 - Ethics 92 (2):343-345.
     
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  30. Knowledge How in Philosophy of Action.Jennifer Hornsby - 2017 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 80:87-104.
    I maintain that an account of knowledge how to do something – an account which might be supposed to uncover ‘the nature’ of such knowledge – can't be got by considering what linguists tell us is expressed in ascriptions of knowing how. Attention must be paid to the knowledge that is actually being exercised when someone is doing something. I criticize some claims about ascriptions of knowledge-how which derive from contemporary syntactic and semantic theory. I argue that these claims can (...)
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  31. Feminism in philosophy of language: Communicative speech acts.Jennifer Hornsby - 2000 - In Miranda Fricker & Jennifer Hornsby (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Feminism in Philosophy. Cambridge University Press. pp. 87--106.
    Book synopsis: The thirteen specially-commissioned essays in this volume are written by philosophers at the forefront of feminist scholarship, and are designed to provide an accessible and stimulating guide to a philosophical literature that has seen massive expansion in recent years. Ranging from history of philosophy through metaphysics to philosophy of science, they encompass all the core subject areas commonly taught in anglophone undergraduate and graduate philosophy courses, offering both an overview of and a contribution to the relevant debates. Together (...)
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  32. V*—Which Physical Events are Mental Events?Jennifer Hornsby - 1981 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 81 (1):73-92.
    Jennifer Hornsby; V*—Which Physical Events are Mental Events?, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 81, Issue 1, 1 June 1981, Pages 73–92, https://do.
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  33. Physicalist thinking and conceptions of behaviour.Jennifer Hornsby - 1986 - In Philip Pettit (ed.), Subject, Thought, And Context. NY: Clarendon Press.
  34. Agency and Alienation.Jennifer Hornsby - 2004 - In Mario De Caro & David Macarthur (eds.), Naturalism In Question. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. pp. 173-87.
    It is argued that the standard story of human action, as it is standardly naturalistically understood, should be rejected. Rather than seeking an agent amidst the workings of the mind (as in Velleman's "What Happens When Someone Acts"), we need to recognize an agent’s place in the world she inhabits. And in order to do so we have to resist the naturalistic assumptions of the standard causal story.
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  35. Singular terms in contexts of propositional attitude.Jennifer Hornsby - 1977 - Mind 86 (341):31-48.
  36. Trying to Act.Jennifer Hornsby - 2010 - In Timothy O'Connor & Constantine Sandis (eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Action. Oxford, UK: Wiley‐Blackwell. pp. 18–25.
    This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction The Extent of Trying Trying to Move the Body Trying and Intending References Further reading.
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  37. Causality and “the mental”.Jennifer Hornsby - 2015 - Humana Mente 8 (29).
    Many analytic philosophers of mind take for granted a certain conception of causality. Assumptions deriving from that conception are in place when they problematize what they call mental causation or argue for physicalism in respect of the mental. I claim that a different conception of causality is needed for understanding many ordinary causal truths about things which act, including truths about human, minded beings — sc. rational beings who lead lives.
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  38.  16
    9 Agency and Alienation.Jennifer Hornsby - 2004 - In Mario De Caro & David Macarthur (eds.), Naturalism in Question. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. pp. 173-187.
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  39.  87
    Knowledge, belief and reasons for acting.Jennifer Hornsby - 2007 - In .
    Book synopsis: The aim of this collection of papers is to present different philosophical perspectives on the mental, exploring questions about how to define, explain and understand the various kinds of mental acts and processes, and exhibiting, in particular, the contrast between naturalistic and non-naturalistic approaches. There is a long tradition in philosophy of clarifying concepts such as those of thinking, knowing and believing. The task of clarifying these concepts has become ever more important with the major developments that have (...)
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  40.  49
    On Action.Explaining Human Action.The Philosophy of Action: An Introduction.Jennifer Hornsby, Carl Ginet, Kathleen Lennon & Carlos J. Moya - 1991 - Philosophical Quarterly 41 (165):498.
  41.  37
    Ethics: a feminist reader.Elizabeth Frazer, Jennifer Hornsby & Sabina Lovibond (eds.) - 1992 - Cambridge, Mass., USA: Blackwell.
    Book synopsis: The feminist movement has challenged many of the unstated assumptions on which ethics as a branch of philosophy has always rested - assumptions about human nature, moral agency, citizenship and kinship. The twenty-six readings in this book express the discontent of a succession of fiercely articulate women writers, from Mary Wollstonecraft to the present day, with the masculine bias of `morality'. The editors have contributed an overall introduction, which discusses ethics, feminism and feminist themes in ethics, and have (...)
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  42. The identity theory of truth: Reply to Baldwin.Julian Dodd & Jennifer Hornsby - 1992 - Mind 101 (402):319-322.
  43.  15
    II—Jason Stanley: Hornsby on the Phenomenology of Speech.Jennifer Hornsby - 2005 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 79 (1):131-145.
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  44.  21
    Knowledge in action.Jennifer Hornsby - 2007 - In .
    Book synopsis: The book illustrates the concept of action in three different contexts - the justification of actions, people's life history, and pragmatism. The special feature of this book is that a comprehensive view of this kind marks a departure from the atomistic approach of action theory, which in itself raises a number of questions. If actions are not justified by mental states, how can persons then act for reasons? How can persons' actions over time be described, and what is (...)
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  45. Reasons for Trying.Jennifer Hornsby - 1995 - Journal of Philosophical Research 20:525-539.
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  46. Collectives and intentionality.Jennifer Hornsby - 1997 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (2):429-434.
  47.  75
    Facts in Question: A Response to Dodd and to Candlish.Jennifer Hornsby - 1999 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 99 (1):241-246.
    Jennifer Homsby; The Facts in Question: A Response to Dodd and to Candlish, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 99, Issue 1, 1 June 1999, Pages 241–.
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  48.  86
    Things done with words.Jennifer Hornsby - 1988 - In .
    Book synopsis: The essays in this volume explore current work in central areas of philosophy, work unified by attention to salient questions of human action and human agency. They ask what it is for humans to act knowledgeably, to use language, to be friends, to act heroically, to be mortally fortunate, and to produce as well as to appreciate art.
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  49. The standard story of action: an exchange.Jennifer Hornsby - 2010 - In J. H. Aguilar & A. A. Buckareff (eds.), Causing Human Actions: New Perspectives on the Causal Theory of Action. MIT Press. pp. 57-68.
    Book synopsis: The causal theory of action is widely recognized in the literature of the philosophy of action as the "standard story" of human action and agency—the nearest approximation in the field to a theoretical orthodoxy. This volume brings together leading figures working in action theory today to discuss issues relating to the CTA and its applications, which range from experimental philosophy to moral psychology. Some of the contributors defend the theory while others criticize it; some draw from historical sources (...)
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  50. Dualism in action.Jennifer Hornsby - 1993 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 43:377-401.
    We know what one dualist account of human action looks like, because Descartes gave us one. I want to explore the extent ot which presnet-day accounts of physical action are vulnerable to the charges that may be made against Descartes's dualist account. I once put forward an account of human action, and I have always maintained that my view about the basic shape of a correct ‘theory of aciton’ can be combined with a thoroughgoing opposition to dualism. But the possibility (...)
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