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Jennifer Hornsby
Birkbeck College
  1. A Disjunctivist Conception of Acting for Reasons.Jennifer Hornsby - 2008 - In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. Oxford University Press.
     
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  2. Intending, Knowing How, Infinitives.Jennifer Hornsby - 2016 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46 (1):1-17.
    Intellectualists tell us that a person who knows how to do something therein knows a proposition. Along with others, they may say that a person who intends to do something intends a proposition. I argue against them. I do so by way of considering ‘know how ——’ and ‘intend ——’ together. When the two are considered together, a realistic conception of human agency can inform the understanding of some infinitives: the argument need not turn on what semanticists have had to (...)
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  3. Actions.Jennifer Hornsby - 1980 - Routledge and Kegan Paul.
    This book presents an events-based view of human action somewhat different from that of what is known as "standard story". A thesis about trying-to-do-something is distinguished from various volitionist theses. It is argued then that given a correct conception of action's antecedents, actions will be identified not with bodily movements but with causes of such movements.
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  4. Basic Activity.Jennifer Hornsby - 2013 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 87 (1):1-18.
    I present a view of activity, taking it that an agent is engaged in activity so long as an action of hers is occurring. I suggest that this view (a) helps in understanding what goes wrong in an argument in Thompson (2008) known sometimes as the ‘initial segment argument’, and (b) enables us to see that there could be an intelligible conception of what is basic when agents' knowledge is allowed into an account of that.
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  5. Actions and Activity.Jennifer Hornsby - 2012 - Philosophical Issues 22 (1):233-245.
    Contemporary literature in philosophy of action seems to be divided overthe place of action in the natural causal world. I think that a disagreementabout ontology underlies the division. I argue here that human action isproperly understood only by reference to a category of process or activity,where this is not a category of particulars.
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  6. Free Speech and Illocution.Rae Langton & Jennifer Hornsby - 1998 - Legal Theory 4 (1):21-37.
    We defend the view of some feminist writers that the notion of silencing has to be taken seriously in discussions of free speech. We assume that what ought to be meant by ‘speech’, in the context ‘free speech’, is whatever it is that a correct justification of the right to free speech justifies one in protecting. And we argue that what one ought to mean includes illocution, in the sense of J.L. Austin.
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  7.  17
    Agency Time and Naturalism.Jennifer Hornsby - 2017 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 91:137-153.
    I look critically at accounts of human action which help themselves to a certain conception of the causal order when they treat actions as effects of mental states. Donald Davidson introduced such accounts in the shape of the “belief-desire theory.” By way of examining Davidson’s ideas about events, I undertake to show what conceptions of time and of causality are needed for understanding agency, and for a viable naturalism.
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  8.  36
    Knowledge How in Philosophy of Action.Jennifer Hornsby - 2017 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 80:87-104.
    I maintain that an account of knowledge how to do something – an account which might be supposed to uncover ‘the nature’ of such knowledge – can't be got by considering what linguists tell us is expressed in ascriptions of knowing how. Attention must be paid to the knowledge that is actually being exercised when someone is doing something. I criticize some claims about ascriptions of knowledge-how which derive from contemporary syntactic and semantic theory. I argue that these claims can (...)
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  9. Semantic Knowledge and Practical Knowledge.Jennifer Hornsby & Jason Stanley - 2005 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 79 (1):107-145.
    The central claim is that the semantic knowledge exercised aby people when they speak is practical knowledge. The relevant idea of practical knowledge is explicated, applied to the case of speaking, and connected with an idea of agents' knowledge. Some defence of the claim is provided.
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  10. Truth Without Truthmaking Entities.Jennifer Hornsby - 2005 - In Helen Beebee & Julian Dodd (eds.), Truthmakers: The Contemporary Debate. Clarendon Press. pp. 33.
  11. The Cambridge Companion to Feminism in Philosophy.Miranda Fricker & Jennifer Hornsby (eds.) - 2000 - Cambridge University Press.
    The thirteen specially-commissioned essays in this volume are written by philosophers at the forefront of feminist scholarship, and are designed to provide an accessible and stimulating guide to a philosophical literature that has seen massive expansion in recent years. Ranging from history of philosophy through metaphysics to philosophy of science, they encompass all the core subject areas commonly taught in anglophone undergraduate and graduate philosophy courses, offering both an overview of and a contribution to the relevant debates. Together they testify (...)
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  12. Disempowered Speech.Jennifer Hornsby - 1995 - Philosophical Topics 23 (2):127-147.
  13. Essays on Anscombe's Intention.Anton Ford, Jennifer Hornsby & Frederick Stoutland (eds.) - 2011 - Harvard University Press.
    This collection of ten essays elucidates some of the more challenging aspects of Anscombe’s work and affirms her reputation as one of our most original ...
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  14. Personal and Sub-Personal: A Defence of Dennett's Early Distinction.Jennifer Hornsby - 2000 - Philosophical Explorations 3 (1):6-24.
    Since 1969, when Dennett introduced a distinction between personal and sub- personal levels of explanation, many philosophers have used 'sub- personal ' very loosely, and Dennett himself has abandoned a view of the personal level as genuinely autonomous. I recommend a position in which Dennett's original distinction is crucial, by arguing that the phenomenon called mental causation is on view only at the properly personal level. If one retains the commit-' ments incurred by Dennett's early distinction, then one has a (...)
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  15. Meaning and Uselessness: How to Think About Derogatory Words.Jennifer Hornsby - 2001 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 25 (1):128–141.
  16.  51
    Ryle's Knowing How and Knowing How to Act.Jennifer Hornsby - 2011 - In John Bengson & Marc A. Moffett (eds.), Knowing How: Essays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action. Oxford University Press, Usa. pp. 80.
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  17. Hornsby on the Phenomenology of Speech.Jennifer Hornsby & Jason Stanley - 2005 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 79 (1):131–145.
    The central claim is that the semantic knowledge exercised by people when they speak is practical knowledge. The relevant idea of practical knowledge is explicated, applied to the case of speaking, and connected with an idea of agents’ knowledge. Some defence of the claim is provided.
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  18.  60
    Simple Mindedness: In Defense of Naive Naturalism in the Philosophy of Mind.Jennifer Hornsby - 1996 - Harvard University Press.
    These questions provide the impetus for the detailed discussions of ontology, human agency, and everyday psychological explanation presented in this book.
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  19.  16
    Agency and Actions.Jennifer Hornsby - 2004 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 55:1-23.
    Among philosophical questions about human agency, one can distinguish in a rough and ready way between those that arise in philosophy of mind and those that arise in ethics. In philosophy of mind, one central aim has been to account for the place of agents in a world whose operations are supposedly ‘physical’. In ethics, one central aim has been to account for the connexion between ethical species of normativity and the distinctive deliberative and practical capacities of human beings. Ethics (...)
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  20.  46
    Simple Mindedness: In Defense of Naive Naturalism in the Philosophy of Mind.Katalin Balog & Jennifer Hornsby - 1999 - Philosophical Review 108 (4):562.
    Hornsby is a defender of a position in the philosophy of mind she calls “naïve naturalism”. She argues that current discussions of the mind-body problem have been informed by an overly scientistic view of nature and a futile attempt by scientific naturalists to see mental processes as part of the physical universe. In her view, if naïve naturalism were adopted, the mind-body problem would disappear. I argue that her brand of anti-physicalist naturalism runs into difficulties with the problem of mental (...)
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  21. Agency and Actions.Jennifer Hornsby - 2004 - In Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. Cambridge University Press. pp. 1-23.
    Among philosophical questions about human agency, one can distinguish in a rough and ready way between those that arise in philosophy of mind and those that arise in ethics. In philosophy of mind, one central aim has been to account for the place of agents in a world whose operations are supposedly ‘physical’. In ethics, one central aim has been to account for the connexion between ethical species of normativity and the distinctive deliberative and practical capacities of human beings. Ethics (...)
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  22.  22
    Acts According to Hyman.Jennifer Hornsby - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (1):238-242.
    I take issue with whether Hyman's conception of acts is compatible with a good account of the progressive tense.
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  23.  20
    Jennifer Hornsby.Jennifer Hornsby - 2005 - Supplement to the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 79 (1):107-130.
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  24.  75
    The Presidential Address: Truth: The Identity Theory.Jennifer Hornsby - 1997 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 97 (1):1–24.
  25.  54
    Truth: The Identity Theory.Jennifer Hornsby - 1997 - In .
    Book synopsis: "What is truth?" has long been the philosophical question par excellence. The Nature of Truth collects in one volume the twentieth century's most influential philosophical work on the subject. The coverage strikes a balance between classic works and the leading edge of current philosophical research. The essays center around two questions: Does truth have an underlying nature? And if so, what sort of nature does it have? Thus the book discusses both traditional and deflationary theories of truth, as (...)
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  26.  6
    Actions.Carl Ginet & Jennifer Hornsby - 1984 - Philosophical Review 93 (1):120.
  27. Agency and Causal Explanation.Jennifer Hornsby - 1993 - In John Heil & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation. Oxford University Press.
    I. There are two points of view: ___ From the personal point of view, an action is a person's doing something for a reason, and her doing it is found intelligible when we know the reason that led her to it. ___ From the impersonal point of view, an action would be a link in a causal chain that could be viewed without paying any attention to people, the links being understood by reference to the world's causal workings.
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  28. Physicalism, Conceptual Analysis, and Acts of Faith.Jennifer Hornsby - 2009 - In Ian Ravenscroft (ed.), Minds, Ethics, and Conditionals: Themes From the Philosophy of Frank Jackson. Oxford University Press. pp. 43.
    Frank Jackson and the author each take the other to hold a position in philosophy of mind that it is extremely difficult to sustain. This chapter tries to say something about how that can be. It seeks to demonstrate the sanity of Jackson's opponents and the fragility of his own position than to hold out for the truth of any particular doctrine. It wants to bring to the surface an assumption in ontology, which is seen as a crucial part of (...)
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  29. Causality and “the Mental”.Jennifer Hornsby - 2015 - Humana Mente 8 (29).
    Many analytic philosophers of mind take for granted a certain conception of causality. Assumptions deriving from that conception are in place when they problematize what they call mental causation or argue for physicalism in respect of the mental. I claim that a different conception of causality is needed for understanding many ordinary causal truths about things which act, including truths about human, minded beings — sc. rational beings who lead lives.
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  30.  14
    Physicalist Thinking and Conceptions of Behaviour.Jennifer Hornsby - 1986 - In Philip Pettit & John McDowell (eds.), Subject, Thought, and Context. Oxford University Press.
  31. Subordination, Silencing, and Two Ideas of Illocution.Jennifer Hornsby, Louise Antony, Jennifer Saul, Natalie Stoljar, Nellie Wieland & Rae Langton - 2011 - Jurisprudence 2 (2):379-440.
    This section gathers together five reviews of Rae Langton?s book Sexual Solipsism: Philosophical Essays on Pornography and Objectification followed by a response from the author.
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  32. Agency and Alienation.Jennifer Hornsby - 2004 - Ch. In _Naturalism in Question_. Eds. M. De Caro and D. Macarthur (Harvard UP):173-87.
    It is argued that the standard story of human action, as it is standardly naturalistically understood, should be rejected. Rather than seeking an agent amidst the workings of the mind (as in Velleman's "What Happens When Someone Acts"), we need to recognize an agent’s place in the world she inhabits. And in order to do so we have to resist the naturalistic assumptions of the standard causal story.
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  33. Singular Terms in Contexts of Propositional Attitude.Jennifer Hornsby - 1977 - Mind 86 (341):31-48.
  34. Feminism in Philosophy of Language: Communicative Speech Acts.Jennifer Hornsby - 2000 - In Miranda Fricker & Jennifer Hornsby (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Feminism in Philosophy. Cambridge University Press. pp. 87--106.
  35.  2
    Actions.Jennifer Hornsby - 1980 - Journal of Philosophy 79 (8):464-469.
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  36.  5
    II—Jason Stanley.Jennifer Hornsby - 2005 - Supplement to the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 79 (1):131-145.
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  37.  30
    Illocution and its Significance.Jennifer Hornsby - 1995 - In .
    Book synopsis: Foundations of Speech Act Theory investigates the importance of speech act theory to the problem of meaning in linguistics and philosophy. The papers in this volume, written by respected philosophers and linguists, significantly advance standards of debate in this area. Beginning with a detailed introduction to the individual contributors, this collection demonstrates the relevance of speech acts to semantic theory. It includes essays unified by the assumption that current pragmatic theories are not well equipped to analyse speech acts (...)
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  38.  94
    Reasons for Trying.Jennifer Hornsby - 1995 - Journal of Philosophical Research 20:525-539.
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  39. Collectives and Intentionality.Jennifer Hornsby - 1997 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (2):429-434.
  40. Dealing with Facts.Jennifer Hornsby - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    This is a contribution to a symposium on Stephen Neale's Facing Facts. I bring to the discussion a different theory of facts from any Neale considers, and argue that it avoids flaws in Russell’s theory.
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  41.  53
    Which Physical Events Are Mental Events?Jennifer Hornsby - 1981 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 55:73-92.
  42. Know How, by Jason Stanley,(Oxford University Press), $45/£ 25.Jennifer Hornsby - 2012 - The Philosophers' Magazine 57 (57):120-121.
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  43. Saying Of.Jennifer Hornsby - 1977 - Analysis 37 (4):177 - 185.
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  44.  5
    Ethics: A Feminist Reader.Elizabeth Frazer, Jennifer Hornsby & Sabina Lovibond (eds.) - 1992 - Blackwell.
    Book synopsis: The feminist movement has challenged many of the unstated assumptions on which ethics as a branch of philosophy has always rested - assumptions about human nature, moral agency, citizenship and kinship. The twenty-six readings in this book express the discontent of a succession of fiercely articulate women writers, from Mary Wollstonecraft to the present day, with the masculine bias of `morality'. The editors have contributed an overall introduction, which discusses ethics, feminism and feminist themes in ethics, and have (...)
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  45.  55
    Proper Names: A Defence of Burge.Jennifer Hornsby - 1976 - Philosophical Studies 30 (4):227 - 234.
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  46.  52
    Speech Acts and Performatives.Jennifer Hornsby - 2008 - In Ernest Lepore & Barry C. Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language. Oxford University Press.
    This article aims to connect Austin's seminal notion of a speech act with developments in philosophy of language over the last forty odd years. It starts by considering how speech acts might be conceived in Austin's general theory. Then it turns to the illocutionary acts with which much philosophical writing on speech acts has been concerned, and finally to the performatives which Austin's own treatment of speech as action took off from.
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  47.  61
    Book Review: Knowing How and Knowing That. [REVIEW]Jennifer Hornsby - unknown
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  48.  69
    The Identity Theory of Truth: Reply to Baldwin.Julian Dodd & Jennifer Hornsby - 1992 - Mind 101 (402):319-322.
  49. Review: Causing Actions. [REVIEW]Jennifer Hornsby - 2002 - Mind 111 (441):159-161.
  50. Free Speech and Hate Speech: Language and Rights.Jennifer Hornsby - unknown
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