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Jennifer M. Saul [13]Jennifer Mather Saul [8]
  1. Lying, misleading, and what is said: an exploration in philosophy of language and in ethics.Jennifer Mather Saul - 2012 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    1. Lying -- 2. The problem of what is said -- 3. What is said -- 4. Is lying worse than merely misleading? -- 5. Some interesting cases.
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  2. Racial Figleaves, the Shifting Boundaries of the Permissible, and the Rise of Donald Trump.Jennifer M. Saul - 2017 - Philosophical Topics 45 (2):97-116.
    The rise to power of Donald Trump has been shocking in many ways. One of these was that it disrupted the preexisting consensus that overt racism would be death to a national political campaign. In this paper, I argue that Trump made use of what I call “racial figleaves”—additional utterances that provide just enough cover to give reassurance to voters who are racially resentful but don’t wish to see themselves as racist. These figleaves also, I argue, play a key role (...)
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  3.  61
    Implicit Bias and Philosophy, Volume 1: Metaphysics and Epistemology.Michael Brownstein & Jennifer Mather Saul (eds.) - 2016 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.
    At the University of Sheffield during 2011 and 2012, a leading group of philosophers, psychologists, and others gathered to explore the nature and significance of implicit bias. The two volumes of Implicit Bias and Philosophy emerge from these workshops. Each volume philosophically examines core areas of psychological research on implicit bias as well as the ramifications of implicit bias for core areas of philosophy. Volume I: Metaphysics and Epistemology is comprised of two parts: “The Nature of Implicit Attitudes, Implicit Bias, (...)
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  4.  37
    Implicit Bias and Philosophy, Volumes 2: Moral Responsibility, Structural Injustice, and Ethics.Michael S. Brownstein & Jennifer Mather Saul (eds.) - 2016 - Oxford University Press UK.
    At the University of Sheffield between 2011 and 2012, a leading group of philosophers, psychologists, and others gathered to explore the nature and significance of implicit bias. The two volumes of Implicit Bias and Philosophy emerge from these workshops. Each volume philosophically examines core areas of psychological research on implicit bias as well as the ramifications of implicit bias for core areas of philosophy. Volume II: Moral Responsibility, Structural Injustice, and Ethics is comprised of three parts. “Moral Responsibility for Implicit (...)
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  5. Substitution and simple sentences.Jennifer M. Saul - 1997 - Analysis 57 (2):102–108.
  6. Speaker meaning, what is said, and what is implicated.Jennifer M. Saul - 2002 - Noûs 36 (2):228–248.
    [First Paragraph] Unlike so many other distinctions in philosophy, H P Grice's distinction between what is said and what is implicated has an immediate appeal: undergraduate students readily grasp that one who says 'someone shot my parents' has merely implicated rather than said that he was not the shooter [2]. It seems to capture things that we all really pay attention to in everyday conversation'this is why there are so many people whose entire sense of humour consists of deliberately ignoring (...)
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  7.  98
    Simple sentences, substitution, and intuitions.Jennifer Mather Saul - 2007 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    Substitution and simple sentences -- Simple sentences and semantics -- Simple sentences and implicatures -- The enlightenment problem and a common assumption -- Abandoning (EOI) -- Beyond matching propositions -- App. A : extending the account -- App. B : belief reporting.
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  8. The pragmatics of attitude ascription.Jennifer M. Saul - 1998 - Philosophical Studies 92 (3):363-389.
  9. What is said and psychological reality; Grice's project and relevance theorists' criticisms.Jennifer M. Saul - 2002 - Linguistics and Philosophy 25 (3):347-372.
    One of the most important aspects of Grice’s theory of conversation is the drawing of a borderline between what is said and what is implic- ated. Grice’s views concerning this borderline have been strongly and influentially criticised by relevance theorists. In particular, it has become increasingly widely accepted that Grice’s notion of what is said is too lim- ited, and that pragmatics has a far larger role to play in determining what is said than Grice would have allowed. (See for (...)
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  10. Feminism: Issues and Arguments.Jennifer Mather Saul - 2003 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    A stimulating and accessible introduction to feminist philosophy. The chapters are organised around key issues of practical significance. Clear arguments are provided for a variety of feminist positions, drawing upon up-to-date empirical research. No background in feminism or philosophy is needed, and the clarity of the narrative ensures that Feminism: Issues and Arguments will appeal to a wide audience.
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  11. Substitution, simple sentences, and sex scandals.Jennifer M. Saul - 1999 - Analysis 59 (2):106-112.
  12. On Treating Things as People: Objectifi cation, Pornography, and the History of the Vibrator.Jennifer Mather Saul - 2006 - Hypatia 21 (2):45-61.
    This article discusses recent feminist arguments for the possible existence of an interesting link between treating things as people and treating people as things. It argues, by way of a historical case study, that the connection is more complicated than these arguments have supposed. In addition, the essay suggests some possible general links between treatment of things and treatment of people.
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  13. Still an attitude problem.Jennifer M. Saul - 1993 - Linguistics and Philosophy 16 (4):423 - 435.
  14. Reply to Forbes.Jennifer M. Saul - 1997 - Analysis 57 (2):114–118.
  15. The Problem with Attitudes.Jennifer Mather Saul - 1996 - Dissertation, Princeton University
    In this dissertation, I argue that no account of propositional attitude reporting which does not include a significant degree of context-sensitivity can succeed in accommodating our intuitions about the truth conditions of such reports. Next, I argue that there are two general problems to be faced by any context-sensitive theory of attitude ascription, whether semantic or pragmatic. First, any theory which preserves our intuitions about which inference schemas are valid will violate our intuitions about truth conditions of particular attitude reports. (...)
     
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  16. The road to hell: Intentions and propositional attitude ascription.Jennifer M. Saul - 1999 - Mind and Language 14 (3):356–375.
    Accounts of propositional attitude reporting which invoke contextual variation in semantic content have become increasingly popular, with good reason: our intuitions about the truth conditions of such reports vary with context. This paper poses a problem for such accounts, arguing that any reasonable candidate source for this contextual variation will yield very counterintuitive results. The accounts, then, cannot achieve their goal of accommodating our truth conditional intuitions. This leaves us with a serious puzzle. Theorists must either give up on the (...)
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  17. Intensionality: What are intensional transitives?Jennifer M. Saul - 2002 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 76 (1):101–119.
    [Graeme Forbes] In I, I summarize the semantics for the relational/notional distinction for intensional transitives developed in Forbes. In II-V I pursue issues about logical consequence which were either unsatisfactorily dealt with in that paper or, more often, not raised at all. I argue that weakening inferences, such as 'Perseus seeks a mortal gorgon, therefore Perseus seeks a gorgon', are valid, but that disjunction inferences, such as 'Perseus seeks a mortal gorgon, therefore Perseus seeks a mortal gorgon or an immortal (...)
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  18.  80
    II—Jennifer Saul: What are Intensional Transitives?Jennifer M. Saul - 2002 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 76 (1):101-119.
  19. Wayne A. Davis, Implicature: Intention, convention, and principle in the failure of Gricean theory. [REVIEW]Jennifer M. Saul - 2001 - Noûs 35 (4):631-641.
  20.  18
    Implicit Bias and Philosophy, Volumes 1 and 2: Metaphysics and Epistemology; Moral Responsibility, Structural Injustice, and Ethics.Michael S. Brownstein & Jennifer Mather Saul (eds.) - 2016 - Oxford University Press.
    Most people show unconscious bias in their evaluations of social groups, in ways that may run counter to their conscious beliefs. Volume 1 addresses key metaphysical and epistemological questions on this kind of implicit bias, while Volume 2 turns to the themes of moral responsibility and injustice.
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