Behavioural evidence suggests that cephalopod molluscs may have a form of primary consciousness. First, the linkage of brain to behaviour seen in lateralization, sleep and through a developmental context is similar to that of mammals and birds. Second, cephalopods, especially octopuses, are heavily dependent on learning in response to both visual and tactile cues, and may have domain generality and form simple concepts. Third, these animals are aware of their position, both within themselves and in larger space, including having a (...) working memory of foraging areas in the recent past. Thus if using a ‘global workspace’ which evaluates memory input and focuses attention is the criterion, cephalopods appear to have primary consciousness. (shrink)

Kammerer and Frankish (this issue) suggest we evaluate introspection of mental states to examine consciousness, but in cephalopods we can only judge internal actions by behaviour output. We can look for mental states — perceptions, beliefs, and intentions — where the tight input–action linkage that is true for reflexes, instincts, and well-learned actions is discontinuous. Here the animal is internally evaluating the sensory input from previous information and making a decision before acting. Perceptions: the octopus motion parallax head bob and (...) wound tending. Beliefs: the cuttlefish delay of gratification. Intentions: use of previous information for future strategies in octopus win-switch foraging and carrying a coconut for future shelter. Intentions are also used in skin displays, their widespread directional lateralization, the octopus 'passing cloud' to startle an immobile prey, the cuttlefish eyespot dot production to repel only visual predators, and the cuttlefish males' deceptive use of the female skin display. These examples allow us to assume in what situations introspection might be used but tell us little about the process of these actions. However, the quantitative variation, laterality, and combination of different displays suggest that cephalopod sexual skin displays are a special case of linkage of internal evaluation to external output that needs further behavioural and neurophysiological assessment. (shrink)

This book is devoted to the welfare of invertebrates, which make up 99% of animal species on earth. Addressing animal welfare, we do not often think of invertebrates; in fact we seldom consider them to be deserving of welfare evaluation. And yet we should. Welfare is a broad concern for any animal that we house, control or utilize – and we utilize invertebrates a lot. The Authors start with an emphasis on the values of non-vertebrate animals and discuss the need (...) for a book on the present topic. The following chapters focus on specific taxa, tackling questions that are most appropriate to each one. What is pain in crustaceans, and how might we prevent it? How do we ensure that octopuses are not bored? What do bees need to thrive, pollinate our plants and give us honey? Since invertebrates have distinct personalities and some social animals have group personalities, how do we consider this? And, as in the European Union’s application of welfare consideration to cephalopods, how do the practical regulatory issues play out? We have previously relegated invertebrates to the category ‘things’ and did not worry about their treatment. New research suggest that some invertebrates such as cephalopods and crustaceans can have pain and suffering, might also have consciousness and awareness. Also, good welfare is going to mean different things to spiders, bees, corals, etc. This book is taking animal welfare in a very different direction. Academics and students of animal welfare science, those who keep invertebrates for scientific research or in service to the goals of humans, as well as philosophers will find this work thought-provoking, instructive and informative. (shrink)