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Jennifer Nado [16]Jennifer Ellen Nado [6]
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Jennifer Nado
University of Hong Kong
  1. Philosophical Expertise.Jennifer Nado - 2014 - Philosophy Compass 9 (9):631-641.
    Recent work in experimental philosophy has indicated that intuitions may be subject to several forms of bias, thereby casting doubt on the viability of intuition as an evidential source in philosophy. A common reply to these findings is the ‘expertise defense’ – the claim that although biases may be found in the intuitions of non-philosophers, persons with expertise in philosophy will be resistant to these biases. Much debate over the expertise defense has centered over the question of the burden of (...)
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  2. Why Intuition?Jennifer Nado - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (1):15-41.
    In this paper I will argue that this entire dialectic is somewhat misguided. The mental states which are generally assumed to fall under the category of ‘intuition’ likely comprise a highly heterogeneous group; from the point of view of psychology or of neuroscience, in fact, ‘intuitions’ appear to be generated by several fundamentally different sorts of mental processes. If this is correct, then the term ‘intuition’ may simply carve things too broadly. I will argue that it is a mistake to (...)
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  3. The Intuition Deniers.Jennifer Nado - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (3):781-800.
    ‘Intuition deniers’ are those who—like Timothy Williamson, Max Deutsch, Herman Cappelen and a few others—reject the claim that philosophers centrally rely on intuitions as evidence. This ‘Centrality’ hypothesis, as Cappelen terms it, is standardly endorsed both by traditionalists and by experimental philosophers. Yet the intuition deniers claim that Centrality is false—and they generally also suggest that this undermines the significance of experimental philosophy. Three primary types of anti-Centrality argument have cross-cut the literature thus far. These arguments, I’ll claim, have differing (...)
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  4.  99
    Philosophical Expertise and Scientific Expertise.Jennifer Nado - 2015 - Philosophical Psychology 28 (7):1026-1044.
    The “expertise defense” is the claim that philosophers have special expertise that allows them to resist the biases suggested by the findings of experimental philosophers. Typically, this defense is backed up by an analogy with expertise in science or other academic fields. Recently, however, studies have begun to suggest that philosophers' intuitions may be just as subject to inappropriate variation as those of the folk. Should we conclude that the expertise defense has been debunked? I'll argue that the analogy with (...)
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  5.  15
    Philosophical Expertise and Scientific Expertise.Jennifer Nado - 2015 - Philosophical Psychology 28 (7):1026-1044.
    The “expertise defense” is the claim that philosophers have special expertise that allows them to resist the biases suggested by the findings of experimental philosophers. Typically, this defense is backed up by an analogy with expertise in science or other academic fields. Recently, however, studies have begun to suggest that philosophers' intuitions may be just as subject to inappropriate variation as those of the folk. Should we conclude that the expertise defense has been debunked? I'll argue that the analogy with (...)
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  6. Conceptual Engineering, Truth, and Efficacy.Jennifer Nado - forthcoming - Synthese:1-21.
    Traditional views on philosophical methodology characterize our primary philosophical goal as production of a successful conceptual analysis. The notion of conceptual analysis, however, faces several challenges—from experimental philosophy to more traditional worries such as the paradox of analysis. This paper explores an alternate approach, commonly called conceptual engineering, which aims at recommending conceptual revisions. An important question for the conceptual engineer is as follows: what counts as a case of successful conceptual engineering? What sorts of revisions are permitted, and what (...)
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  7. Moral Judgment.Jennifer Ellen Nado, Daniel Kelly & Stephen Stich - 2009 - In John Symons & Paco Calvo (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Psychology. Routledge.
    Questions regarding the nature of moral judgment loom large in moral philosophy. Perhaps the most basic of these questions asks how, exactly, moral judgments and moral rules are to be defined; what features distinguish them from other sorts of rules and judgments? A related question concerns the extent to which emotion and reason guide moral judgment. Are moral judgments made mainly on the basis of reason, or are they primarily the products of emotion? As an example of the former view, (...)
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  8. Effects of Moral Cognition on Judgments of Intentionality.Jennifer Ellen Nado - 2008 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (4):709-731.
    Several recent articles on the concept of intentional action center on experimental findings suggesting that intentionality ascription can be affected by moral factors. I argue that the explanation for these phenomena lies in the workings of a tacit moral judgment mechanism, capable under certain circumstances of altering normal intentionality ascriptions. This view contrasts with that of Knobe ([2006]), who argues that the findings show that the concept of intentional action invokes evaluative notions. I discuss and reject possible objections to the (...)
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  9.  18
    Moderate Intuitionism.Michael Johnson & Jennifer Ellen Nado - 2014 - In Booth Anthony Robert & P. Rowbottom Darrell (eds.), Intuitions. Oxford University Press.
    Recent empirical work suggests that intuitions may be less reliable than previously assumed. However, given the ubiquity of intuition in philosophical reasoning, it is tempting to give intuitions some evidential weight. This chapter develops an account called ‘moderate intuitionism’, a view whereby intuitions are generally reliable, but nonetheless capable of substantial degrees of error. Believing that the general reliability of intuition emerges from the nature of language, the chapter develops an outline for a disposition-based metasemantic theory which can ground the (...)
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  10.  43
    Conceptual Engineering Via Experimental Philosophy.Jennifer Nado - forthcoming - Tandf: Inquiry:1-21.
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  11.  61
    Demythologizing Intuition.Jennifer Nado - 2017 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 60 (4):386-402.
    Max Deutsch’s new book argues against the commonly held ‘myth’ that philosophical methodology characteristically employs intuitions as evidence. While I am sympathetic to the general claim that philosophical methodology has been grossly oversimplified in the intuition literature, the particular claim that it is a myth that philosophers rely on intuitions as evidence is open to several very different interpretations. The plausibility and consequences of a rejection of the ‘myth’ will depend on the notion of evidence one employs, the notion of (...)
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  12.  15
    Intuition, Philosophical Theorising, and the Threat of Scepticism.Jennifer Ellen Nado - unknown
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  13.  33
    Actual Vs. Counterfactual Dispositional Metasemantics : A Reply to Andow.Michael Johnson & Jennifer Ellen Nado - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (2):717-734.
    In previous work we proposed a sketch of a disposition-based metasemantictheory, which has recently been criticized by James Andow. Andow claims, first, that our dispositionalmetasemantics threatens to render the meanings of our words indeterminate, and second, that our viewrisks a 'semantic apocalypse' according to which most of our terms fail to refer. We respond to Andow'scriticism by modifying and expanding our orignial, underspecified view. In particular, we propose that a viewthat appeals to actual dispositions rather than counterfactual dispositions avoids many (...)
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  14.  69
    Experimental Philosophy 2.0.Jennifer Nado - 2016 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 5 (3):159-168.
    I recommend three revisions to experimental philosophy's ‘self-image’ which I suggest will enable experimentalist critics of intuition to evade several important objections to the 'negative' strand of the experimental philosophy research project. First, experimentalists should avoid broad criticisms of ‘intuition’ as a whole, instead drawing a variety of conclusions about a variety of much narrower categories of mental state. Second, experimentalists should state said conclusions in terms of epistemic norms particular to philosophical inquiry, rather than attempting to, for example, deny (...)
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  15.  16
    Intuition and Inquiry.Jennifer Nado - unknown
    My dissertation examines prominent arguments for and against the use of intuition in philosophical theorizing. Many of the concerns I raise involve areas of oversimplification - particularly concerning the relationship between the reliability of our intuitions and their evidential status. Specifically, I argue that there are two primary barriers to framing the intuition debate as a simple question about whether intuitions are either unreliable and therefore wholly unsuitable for use in philosophy, or reliable and therefore always suitable for philosophical use. (...)
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  16.  3
    Who Wants to Know?Jennifer Nado - 2019 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 6.
    This chapter argues that professional inquirers, including professional philosophers, are subject to special epistemic obligations which require them to meet higher standards than those that are required for knowing. Perhaps the most obvious examples come from the experimental sciences, where professionals are required to employ rigorous methodological procedures to reduce the risk of error and bias; procedures such as double-blinding are obligatory in many experimental contexts, but no parallel bias-reducing measures are generally expected in ordinary epistemic activity. To expect such (...)
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  17.  41
    Knowledge Is Not Enough.Jennifer Nado - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (4):658-672.
    Discussions of the role of intuition in philosophical methodology typically proceed within the knowledge-centred framework of mainstream analytic epistemology. Either implicitly or explicitly, the primary questions in metaphilosophy frequently seem to revolve around whether or not intuition is a source of justification, evidence, or knowledge. I argue that this Standard Framework is inappropriate for methodological purposes: the epistemic standards that govern inquiry in philosophy are more stringent than the standards that govern everyday cognition. The experimentalist should instead view her criticisms (...)
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  18.  27
    The Role of Intuition.Jennifer Ellen Nado - 2014 - In Justin Sytsma (ed.), Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Mind. London: Bloomsbury. pp. 11-44.
  19.  22
    Intuitions and the Theory of Reference.Jennifer Nado & Michael Johnson - unknown
    In this paper, we will examine the role that intuitions and responses to thought experiments play in confirming or disconfirming theories of reference, using insights from both debates as our starting point. Our view is that experimental evidence of the type elicited by MMNS does play a central role in the construction of theories of reference. This, however, is not because such theory construction is accurately characterized by "the method of cases." First, experimental philosophy does not directly collect data about (...)
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  20.  10
    How To Think About Philosophical Methodology.Jennifer Nado - 2017 - Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research 34 (3):447-463.
    Experimental philosophy, at least in its ‘negative’ variety, has standardly been portrayed as presenting a dramatic challenge to traditional philosophical methodology. As such, it has prompted a large variety of counter-arguments and defenses of intuition. In this paper, I argue that many of these objections to experimental philosophy rest on various oversimplifications that both experimental philosophers and their opponents have made regarding intuitions and philosophical methodology. Once these oversimplifications are abandoned, I argue that the experimentalist critique of current philosophical methods (...)
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  21.  9
    Introduction.Jennifer Nado - unknown
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  22.  38
    Advances in Experimental Philosophy & Philosophical Methodology.Jennifer Nado (ed.) - 2016 - Bloomsbury Academic.
    The rise of experimental philosophy is generating pressing methodological questions for philosophers. Can findings from experimental studies hold any significance for philosophy as a discipline? Can philosophical theorizing be improved through consideration of such studies? Do these studies threaten traditional philosophical methodology?
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