9 found
  1.  95
    Propositions and Judgments in Locke and Arnauld: A Monstrous and Unholy Union?Jennifer Smalligan Marušić - 2014 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 52 (2):255-280.
    Philosophers have accused locke of holding a view about propositions that simply conflates the formation of a propositional thought with the judgment that a proposition is true, and charged that this has obviously absurd consequences.1 Worse, this account appears not to be unique to Locke: it bears a striking resemblance to one found in both the Port-Royal Logic (the Logic, for short) and the Port-Royal Grammar. In the Logic, this account forms part of the backbone of the traditional logic expounded (...)
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  2. Berkeley on the Objects of Perception.Jennifer Smalligan Marušić - 2018 - In Stefan Storrie (ed.), Berkeley's Three Dialogues: New Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 40-60.
  3. Does Hume Hold a Dispositional Account of Belief?Jennifer Smalligan Marušić - 2010 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 40 (2):155-183.
    Philosophical theories about the nature of belief can be roughly classified into two groups: those that treat beliefs as occurrent mental states or episodes and those that treat beliefs as dispositions. David Hume's A Treatise of Human Nature seems to contain a classic example of an occurrence theory of belief as he defines 'belief' as 'a lively idea related to or associated with a present impression' (Treatise 96). This definition suggests that believing is an occurrent mental state, such as (...)
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  4.  42
    Refuting The Whole System? Hume's Attack on Popular Religion in The Natural History of Religion.Jennifer Smalligan Marušić - 2012 - Philosophical Quarterly 62 (249):715-736.
    There is reason for genuine puzzlement about Hume's aim in ‘The Natural History of Religion’. Some commentators take the work to be merely a causal investigation into the psychological processes and environmental conditions that are likely to give rise to the first religions, an investigation that has no significant or straightforward implications for the rationality or justification of religious belief. Others take the work to constitute an attack on the rationality and justification of religious belief in general. In contrast to (...)
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  5.  67
    Hume on the Projection of Causal Necessity.Jennifer Smalligan Marušić - 2014 - Philosophy Compass 9 (4):263-273.
    A characteristically Humean pattern of explanation starts by claiming that we have a certain kind of feeling in response to some objects and then takes our having such feelings to provide an explanation of how we come to think of those objects as having some feature that we would not otherwise be able to think of them as having. This core pattern of explanation is what leads Simon Blackburn to dub Hume ‘the first great projectivist.’ This paper critically examines the (...)
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  6.  52
    Comments on Michael Jacovides “How Berkeley Corrupted His Capacity to Conceive”.Jennifer Smalligan Marusic - 2009 - Philosophia 37 (3):431-436.
    The manuscript includes comments on Michael Jacovides’s paper, “How Berkeley Corrupted His Capacity to Conceive.” The paper and comments were delivered at the conference “Meaning and Modern Empiricism” held at Virginia Tech in April 2008. I consider Jacovides’s treatment of Berkeley’s Resemblance Argument and his interpretation of the Master Argument. In particular, I distinguish several ways of understanding the disagreement between Jacovides and Kenneth Winkler over the right way to read the Master Argument.
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  7.  36
    Belief and Introspective Knowledge in Treatise 1.3.7.Jennifer Smalligan Marušić - 2011 - Hume Studies 37 (1):99-122.
    Hume argues that the difference between belief and mere conception consists in a difference in the manner of conception. His argument assumes that the difference between belief and mere conception must be a function of either the content conceived or of the manner of conception; however, it is unclear what justifies this assumption. I argue that the assumption depends on Hume’s confidence that we can know immediately that we believe when we believe, and that we can only have such knowledge (...)
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  8.  28
    Reflection and the Stability of Belief: Essays on Descartes, Hume and Reid.Jennifer Smalligan Marušić - 2013 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 21 (4):800-803.
  9.  14
    Dugald Stewart on Conjectural History and Human Nature.Jennifer Smalligan Marušić - 2017 - Journal of Scottish Philosophy 15 (3):261-274.
    Dugald Stewart claims that conjectural history is ‘the peculiar glory of the latter half of the eighteenth century’. Yet it is hard to see why, in his view, conjectural histories are not merely confabulated just-so stories. This paper examines Stewart's views about the epistemic and moral value of conjectural history.
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