18 found
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Jennifer Wright [8]Jennifer Cole Wright [7]Jennifer C. Wright [3]
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Jennifer H. Wright
King's College London
Jennifer Collett Wright
University of Central Lancashire
  1. Folk Moral Relativism.Hagop Sarkissian, John Park, David Tien, Jennifer Wright & Joshua Knobe - 2011 - Mind and Language 26 (4):482-505.
    It has often been suggested that people's ordinary understanding of morality involves a belief in objective moral truths and a rejection of moral relativism. The results of six studies call this claim into question. Participants did offer apparently objectivist moral intuitions when considering individuals from their own culture, but they offered increasingly relativist intuitions considering individuals from increasingly different cultures or ways of life. The authors hypothesize that people do not have a fixed commitment to moral objectivism but instead tend (...)
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  2. On Intuitional Stability: The Clear, the Strong, and the Paradigmatic.Jennifer Cole Wright - 2010 - Cognition 115 (3):491-503.
    Skepticism about the epistemic value of intuition in theoretical and philosophical inquiry has recently been bolstered by empirical research suggesting that people’s concrete-case intuitions are vulnerable to irrational biases (e.g., the order effect). What is more, skeptics argue that we have no way to ‘‘calibrate” our intuitions against these biases and no way of anticipating intuitional instability. This paper challenges the skeptical position, introducing data from two studies that suggest not only that people’s concrete-case intuitions are often stable, but also (...)
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  3. The Folk on Knowing How.John Bengson, Marc A. Moffett & Jennifer C. Wright - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 142 (3):387–401.
    It has been claimed that the attempt to analyze know-how in terms of propositional knowledge over-intellectualizes the mind. Exploiting the methods of so-called “experimental philosophy”, we show that the charge of over-intellectualization is baseless. Contra neo-Ryleans, who analyze know-how in terms of ability, the concrete-case judgments of ordinary folk are most consistent with the view that there exists a set of correct necessary and sufficient conditions for know-how that does not invoke ability, but rather a certain sort of propositional knowledge. (...)
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  4.  62
    The Meta-Ethical Grounding of Our Moral Beliefs: Evidence for Meta-Ethical Pluralism.Jennifer C. Wright, Piper T. Grandjean & Cullen B. McWhite - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology 26 (3):336-361.
    Recent scholarship (Goodwin & Darley, 2008) on the meta-ethical debate between objectivism and relativism has found people to be mixed: they are objectivists about some issues, but relativists about others. The studies discussed here sought to explore this further. Study 1 explored whether giving people the ability to identify moral issues for themselves would reveal them to be more globally objectivist. Study 2 explored people's meta-ethical commitments more deeply, asking them to provide verbal explanations for their judgments. This revealed that (...)
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  5. Asymmetries in Judgments of Responsibility and Intentional Action.Jennifer Cole Wright & John Bengson - 2009 - Mind and Language 24 (1):24-50.
    Abstract: Recent experimental research on the 'Knobe effect' suggests, somewhat surprisingly, that there is a bi-directional relation between attributions of intentional action and evaluative considerations. We defend a novel account of this phenomenon that exploits two factors: (i) an intuitive asymmetry in judgments of responsibility (e.g. praise/blame) and (ii) the fact that intentionality commonly connects the evaluative status of actions to the responsibility of actors. We present the results of several new studies that provide empirical evidence in support of this (...)
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  6.  7
    Folk Moral Relativism.Hagop Sarkissian, John J. Park, David Tien, Jennifer Wright & Joshua Knobe - 2014 - In Joshua Knobe & Shaun Nichols (eds.), Experimental Philosophy: Volume 2. New York, NY, USA: pp. 169-192.
    It has often been suggested that people’s ordinary folk understanding of morality involves a rejection of moral relativism and a belief in objective moral truths. The results of six studies call this claim into question. Participants did offer apparently objectivist intuitions when confronted with questions about individuals from their own culture, but they offered increasingly relativist intuitions as they were confronted with questions about individuals from increasingly different cultures or ways of life. In light of these data, the authors hypothesize (...)
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  7.  55
    Tracking Instability in Our Philosophical Judgments: Is It Intuitive?Jennifer Wright - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology 26 (4):485-501.
    Skepticism about the epistemic value of intuition in theoretical and philosophical inquiry fueled by the empirical discovery of irrational bias (e.g., the order effect) in people's judgments has recently been challenged by research suggesting that people can introspectively track intuitional instability. The two studies reported here build upon this, the first by demonstrating that people are able to introspectively track instability that was experimentally induced by introducing conflicting expert opinion about certain cases, and the second by demonstrating that it was (...)
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  8.  34
    Some Varieties of Humility Worth Wanting.Thomas Nadelhoffer, Jennifer Cole Wright, Matthew Echols, Tyler Perini & Kelly Venezia - 2017 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 14 (1):168-200.
    _ Source: _Page Count 32 In this paper we first set the stage with a brief overview of the tangled history of humility in theology and philosophy—beginning with its treatment in the Bible and ending with the more recent work that has been done in contemporary philosophy. Our two-fold goal at this early stage of the paper is to explore some of the different accounts of humility that have traditionally been developed and highlight some of the key debates in the (...)
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  9.  63
    Towards an Intuitionist Account of Moral Development.Karen Bartsch & Jennifer Cole Wright - 2005 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (4):546-547.
    Sunstein's characterization of moral blunders jointly indicts an intuitive process and the structure of heuristics. But intuitions need not lead to error, and the problems with moral heuristics apply also to moral principles. Accordingly, moral development may well involve more, rather than less, intuitive responsiveness. This suggests a novel trajectory for future research into the development of appropriate moral judgments.
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  10.  15
    Understanding the Role of Dispositional and Situational Threat Sensitivity in Our Moral Judgments.Jennifer Cole Wright & Galen L. Baril - 2013 - Journal of Moral Education 42 (3):383-397.
    Previous research has identified different moral judgments in liberals and conservatives. While both care about harm/fairness (?individualizing? foundations), conservatives emphasize in-group/authority/purity (?binding? foundations) more than liberals. Thus, some argue that conservatives have a more complex morality. We suggest an alternative view?that consistent with conservatism as ?motivated social cognition?, binding foundation activation satisfies psychological needs for social structure/security/certainty. Accordingly, we found that students who were dispositionally threat-sensitive showed stronger binding foundation activation, and that conservatives are more dispositionally threat-sensitive than liberals. We (...)
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  11.  2
    Experimental Moral Psychology: An Introduction.Hagop Sarkissian & Jennifer Wright - 2014 - In Advances in Experimental Moral Psychology. London, UK: pp. 1-17.
    An introduction to the volume bearing the same name, tracing the recent history of experimental moral psychology and summarizing the contributions to the volume.
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  12.  5
    The Social Cost of Atheism: How Perceived Religiosity Influences Moral Appraisal.Jennifer Wright & Ryan Nichols - 2014 - Journal of Cognition and Culture 14 (1-2):93-115.
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  13.  16
    Meta-Ethical Pluralism: A Cautionary Tale About Cohesive Moral Communities.Jennifer Cole Wright - 2015 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 38.
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  14.  17
    Causal Mechanisms Generating Writing Competency Discourses in a Radiography Curriculum in Higher Education: A Critical Realist Perspective.Jennifer Wright - 2011 - Journal of Critical Realism 10 (2):163-191.
    When education is jointly managed by a workplace and academia, causal mechanisms in the culture, structure and agency of these two contexts may unintentionally generate discourse that conveys conflicting messages for learners regarding some of the priorities of the profession. Using the concepts of culture, structure and agency as they are used in critical realism to analyse the discourse generated in two teaching and learning contexts (a radiography division in a university and a radiography workplace in a large state tertiary (...)
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  15.  4
    Experiments in Ethics. [REVIEW]Jennifer Wright - 2009 - Journal of Moral Education 38 (1):118-120.
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  16.  3
    Located in the Thin of It: Young Children’s Use of Thin Moral Concepts.Jennifer Cole Wright, Trisha Sedlock, Jenny West, Kelly Saulpaugh & Michelle Hopkins - 2016 - Journal of Moral Education 45 (3):308-323.
    One important socio-cultural medium through which young children’s moral understanding is cultivated is parent/child discourse. Of particular interest to us was young children’s use of basic evaluative concepts, which are ubiquitous in everyday discourse and serve as a potential bridge from the non-moral to the moral domain. We investigated 14 2–5-year-old children’s use of thin evaluative concepts and found that while they frequently used good and bad to morally evaluate other people’s and their own psychological/dispositional states and behaviors—as well as, (...)
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  17. Advances in Experimental Moral Psychology.Hagop Sarkissian & Jennifer Wright - 2014 - Bloomsbury Academic.
    Advances in Experimental Moral Psychology brings together leading scholars in the field to provide fresh theoretical perspectives on research in philosophy and psychology. Reflecting a diverse and active field of study, contributors are drawn from across both subjects to pursue central questions concerning moral psychology. Covering a wide-ranging selection of arguments, issues and debates, topics includes the role of emotion in moral judgment (both at a general theoretical level and with regards to specific topics); the moral psychology behind political orientation; (...)
     
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  18. The Cognitive Mechanisms of Intolerance.Jennifer C. Wright, Cullen B. McWhite & Piper T. Grandjean - 2014 - In Joshua Knobe, Tania Lombrozo & Shaun Nichols (eds.), Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy, Volume 1. Oxford.
    The new field of experimental philosophy has emerged as the methods of psychological science have been brought to bear on traditional philosophical issues. Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy will be the place to go to see outstanding new work in the field. It will feature papers by philosophers, papers by psychologists, and papers co-authored by people in both disciplines. The series heralds the emergence of a truly interdisciplinary field in which people from different disciplines are working together to address a (...)
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