7 found
Order:
See also
Jens Gillessen
University of Marburg
  1. Do Intentions Set Up Rational Defaults? Commitments, Reasons, and the Diachronic Dimension of Rationality.Jens Gillessen - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (1):29-64.
    Suppose that you do not do what you have previously decided to do. Are you to be charged with irrationality? A number of otherwise divergent theories of practical rationality hold that by default, you are; there are rational pressures, it is claimed, that favor the long-term stability and eventual execution of distal intentions. The article challenges this view by examining how these purported pressures can be spelled out. Is intention a normative commitment to act? Are intentions reasons for action – (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  2.  49
    Reasoning with Unconditional Intention in Advance.Jens Gillessen - forthcoming - Journal of Philosophical Research.
    Suppose that you intend to go to the theater. Are you therein intending the unconditional proposition that you go to the theater? That would seem to be deeply irrational; after all, you surely do not intend to go if, for instance, in the next instant an earthquake is going to devastate the city. What we intend we do not intend ‘no matter what,’ it is often said. But if so—how can anyone ever rationally intend simply to perform an action of (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  3.  4
    Reasoning with Unconditional Intention.Jens Gillessen - 2017 - Journal of Philosophical Research 42:177-201.
    Suppose that you intend to go to the theater. Are you therein intending the unconditional proposition that you go to the theater? That would seem to be deeply irrational; after all, you surely do not intend to go if, for instance, in the next instant an earthquake is going to devastate the city. What we intend we do not intend ‘no matter what,’ it is often said. But if so—how can anyone ever rationally intend simply to perform an action of (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  4.  16
    Reza Mosayebi: Das Minimum der reinen praktischen Vernunft. Vom kategorischen Imperativ zum allgemeinen Rechtsprinzip bei Kant (Kantstudien-Ergänzungshefte Bd. 173), De Gruyter, Berlin/Boston 2013, ISBN 978-3-11-032392-4, 274 S. [REVIEW]Jens Gillessen - 2016 - Methodus. International Journal for Modern Philosophy 8:96-112.
  5.  19
    Flat Intentions – Crazy Dispositions?Jens Gillessen - 2017 - Philosophical Explorations 20 (1):54-69.
    Future-directed intentions, it is widely held, involve behavioral dispositions. But of what kind? Suppose you now intend to Φ at future time t. Are you thereby now disposed to Φ at t no matter what? If so, your intention disposes you to Φ even if around t you will come to believe that Φ-ing would be crazy. And would not that be a crazy intention to have? – Like considerations have led Luca Ferrero and others to believe that only intentions (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  6.  9
    Kants ethischer Kohärentismus.Jens Gillessen - 2016 - Kant-Studien 107 (4):651-680.
    In ethics, deductivism strives for self-evident premises as a foundation for normative claims, whereas coherentism seeks moral justification in relations between abstract normative claims and moral judgments. While Immanuel Kant is still widely believed to have pursued a deductivist project, the article contends that he endeavored to justify his moral philosophy in general as well as the Categorical Imperative in particular in the coherentist manner that has later on been advocated by John Rawls. First, the characteristics of Rawls’ method of (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  7.  24
    Was, wenn jeder...? Ethische Verallgemeinerung seit Kant. Eine Kritik.Jens Gillessen - 2014 - Verlag Karl Alber.
    Moral criticism sometimes takes the form of asking: What if everyone acted the way you do? Such criticism seems to be grounded in some form of moral reasoning, which has in the past been the aim of various efforts of clarification, refutation and defense, in the guise of interpretations of Kant's Categorical Imperative as well as in Analytic Ethics. The book forms the first monographic attempt since decades to establish systematic order among contributions to the field. It examines a wide (...)
    Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography