The emergentist position that R. Keith Sawyer has formulated, nonreductive individualism, contains three propositions. First, that social characteristics must always be realized in individuals; second, that it is nevertheless possible to understand social properties as irreducible; and third, that therefore it is possible to demonstrate how social properties are able to exercise independent causal influences on individuals and their properties. It is demonstrated that Sawyer is not able to meet an objection that Kim has formulated against the analogous position in (...) the philosophy of mind. In his defense of the claim of irreducibility Sawyer refers to Fodor’s argument about multiple realizability, but this line of argument cannot preserve the claim for downward causation because Fodor’s claim for irreducibility rests on assumptions that are not compatible with a systematic formulation of downward causation. The article proposes a reading of Fodor’s argument that is consistent with individualism but not with nonreductive individualism. (shrink)

Die Einleitung unseres Kapitels bietet eine grundsäzliche Charakterisierung der Soziologie und zeichnet einige wichtige historische Entwicklungslinien der Philosophie der Soziologie (PdS) nach. Im Hauptteil werden zentrale ontologische sowie ausgewählte explanatorische Themen der PdS vorgestellt. Im Schlussteil sollen einige aktuelle Diskussionen umrissen werden.

Collective intentionality (CI) designates a form of intentionality that cannot be understood in a summative way. For example, two persons who make a walk together do not simply intend individually to go their own way. Therefore, the question arises to what extent intentionality has to be understood as a concept that has to be extended beyond individual mental states. In this chapter, different approaches to CI are presented. According to the “reductive” analysis, CI can be analyzed in terms of individual (...) mental states. In contrast to this approach, John Searle holds that the content of CI cannot be understood by an analysis based on an individual mode. Nevertheless, he holds that the bearers of CI can even be brains in a vat. This position is criticized, first, by those who argue that CI presupposes the idea of a collective subject and, second, by those who argue that an alternative to “individualistic” and “holistic” approaches can be seen in a relational understanding of CI. Nevertheless, in the chapter, it is argued that relational approaches do not necessarily contradict an individualistic understanding of CI. (shrink)

R. Keith Sawyer rightly claimed that the formulation of several cross-level regularities does not disprove the “autonomy” of sciences. Nevertheless, first, this autonomy becomes gradual because cross-level regularities narrow the scope for strong emergence and, second, these examples do not disprove the metaphysical premises of Kim’s critique. Sawyer and I concur on the thesis according to which the proof of strong emergence is in part an empirical question. However, it also depends on the concept of individualism applied whether a description (...) or explanation can count as reducible or not. Even if some of the examples given might leave open the possibility of strong emergence, to generalize, to consider relations or to point to the unpredictability of social processes do not prove the existence of irreducible multiple realization. (shrink)

Eine der maßgeblichsten Kritiken an Heideggers Wahrheitskonzeption stammt von Ernst Tugendhat. Ihm zufolge gelangt Heidegger in Sein und Zeit zu einer Definition der Aussagewahrheit bzw. einem Wahrheitsbegriff, der das Spezifische des Wahrheitsphänomens zum Verschwinden bringt. Dieser Interpretation hat Carl Friedrich Gethmann wiederholt widersprochen. Heidegger halte an Husserls Begriff der Aussagewahrheit fest und da, wo Tugendhat eine unberechtigte Erweiterung des Wahrheitsbegriffs ausmache, gehe es Heidegger nicht mehr um den Begriff der Aussagewahrheit, sondern um die Voraussetzungen des Wahrheitsbegriffs. Demnach liege keine Erweiterung, (...) sondern ein äquivoker Gebrauch des Begriffs vor. Wie der Beitrag erstens zeigt, kann Gethmanns Lesart als eine konsistente Alternative vertreten werden. Zweitens wird aber auch gezeigt, daß es für Tugendhat naheliegt, die Äquivokation als Erweiterung zu betrachten, da er nach ihrem sachlichen Gehalt fragt. Anhand der Diskussion der These von der Abkünftigkeit des apophantischen aus dem hermeneutischen Als und Gethmanns Deutung dieses Zusammenhangs wird schließlich deutlich, warum Tugendhat zu Recht davon ausgeht, das Spezifische des Wahrheitsbegriffs könne aus der Konzeption der Erschlossenheit nicht hergeleitet werden. (shrink)

This paper considers Habermas’ model of a post‐secular political order in the light of the debate on male circumcision that arose in Germany after a court ruled that male circumcision was an unjustifiable act of bodily harm. Central to this model is the idea that religious reasons can only become effective in central legal institutions when they are translated into secular reasons. My paper demonstrates that there are two distinguishable readings of this proviso. On the one hand, there is a (...) broad reading according to which it is only necessary to reach a conclusion that is in line with the democratic principle stating that all citizens can be regarded as co‐legislators even if non‐generalizable value orientations might then shape the interpretation of fundamental rights (in the case of circumcision, the right to bodily integrity). On the other hand, a truly secular (narrow) reading would avoid the inclusion of non‐generalizable value orientations. The debate on circumcision demonstrates that these two interpretations lead to different and conflicting modes of justification. The broad reading allows for a justification of male circumcision, whereas the narrow reading makes such a justification unlikely. In addition, the filtering function of the proviso is weakened in a broad reading. (shrink)