Results for 'JeongAe You'

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  1. Cultivating Curious and Creative Minds: The Role of Teachers and Teacher Educators, Part I.Annette D. Digby, Gadi Alexander, Carole G. Basile, Kevin Cloninger, F. Michael Connelly, Jessica T. DeCuir-Gunby, John P. Gaa, Herbert P. Ginsburg, Angela McNeal Haynes, Ming Fang He, Terri R. Hebert, Sharon Johnson, Patricia L. Marshall, Joan V. Mast, Allison W. McCulloch, Christina Mengert, Christy M. Moroye, F. Richard Olenchak, Wynnetta Scott-Simmons, Merrie Snow, Derrick M. Tennial, P. Bruce Uhrmacher, Shijing Xu & JeongAe You (eds.) - 2010 - R&L Education.
    Presents a plethora of approaches to developing human potential in areas not conventionally addressed. Organized in two parts, this international collection of essays provides viable educational alternatives to those currently holding sway in an era of high-stakes accountability.
     
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  2. Why You Should Vote to Change the Outcome.Zach Barnett - 2020 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 48 (4):422-446.
    Prevailing opinion—defended by Jason Brennan and others—is that voting to change the outcome is irrational, since although the payoffs of tipping an election can be quite large, the probability of doing so is extraordinarily small. This paper argues that prevailing opinion is incorrect. Voting is shown to be rational so long as two conditions are satisfied: First, the average social benefit of electing the better candidate must be at least twice as great as the individual cost of voting, and second, (...)
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  3. You Just Believe That Because….Roger White - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):573-615.
    I believe that Tom is the proud father of a baby boy. Why do I think his child is a boy? A natural answer might be that I remember that his name is ‘Owen’ which is usually a boy’s name. Here I’ve given information that might be part of a causal explanation of my believing that Tom’s baby is a boy. I do have such a memory and it is largely what sustains my conviction. But I haven’t given you just (...)
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  4. Xin Bu Xin You Ni: Cong Zhe Xue Kan Zong Jiao.Zongqi You - 2006 - San Min Shu Ju.
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  5. If You Justifiably Believe That You Ought to Φ, You Ought to Φ.Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (7):1873-1895.
    In this paper, we claim that, if you justifiably believe that you ought to perform some act, it follows that you ought to perform that act. In the first half, we argue for this claim by reflection on what makes for correct reasoning from beliefs about what you ought to do. In the second half, we consider a number of objections to this argument and its conclusion. In doing so, we arrive at another argument for the view that justified beliefs (...)
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  6. How You Can Help, Without Making a Difference.Julia Nefsky - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (11):2743-2767.
    There are many cases in which people collectively cause some morally significant outcome (such as a harmful or beneficial outcome) but no individual act seems to make a difference. The problem in such cases is that it seems each person can argue, ‘it makes no difference whether or not I do X, so I have no reason to do it.’ The challenge is to say where this argument goes wrong. My approach begins from the observation that underlying the problem and (...)
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  7. You Can Fool Some of the People All of the Time, Everything Else Being Equal: Hedged Laws and Psychological Explanation.Jerry A. Fodor - 1991 - Mind 100 (397):19-34.
  8.  25
    You, Me, and We: The Sharing of Emotional Experiences.D. Zahavi - 2015 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 22 (1-2):84-101.
    When surveying recent philosophical work on the nature and status of collective intentionality and we-intentions, it is striking how much effort is spent on analysing the structure of joint action and on establishing whether or not the intention to, say, go for a walk or paint a house together is reducible to some form of I-intentionality. Much less work has been devoted to an analysis of shared affects and emotions. This is regrettable, not only because emotional sharing in all likelihood (...)
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  9. Why You Can’T Make a Computer That Feels Pain.Daniel C. Dennett - 1978 - Synthese 38 (3):415-449.
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  10. What You Don’T Know Can’T Hurt You: Realism and the Unconceived.Anjan Chakravartty - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 137 (1):149-158.
    Two of the most potent challenges faced by scientific realism are the underdetermination of theories by data, and the pessimistic induction based on theories previously held to be true, but subsequently acknowledged as false. Recently, Stanford (2006, Exceeding our grasp: Science, history, and the problem of unconceived alternatives. Oxford: Oxford University Press) has formulated what he calls the problem of unconceived alternatives: a version of the underdetermination thesis combined with a historical argument of the same form as the pessimistic induction. (...)
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  11. You Are Simple.David Barnett - 2010 - In Robert C. Koons & George Bealer (eds.), The Waning of Materialism. Oxford University Press. pp. 161--174.
    I argue that, unlike your brain, you are not composed of other things: you are simple. My argument centers on what I take to be an uncontroversial datum: for any pair of conscious beings, it is impossible for the pair itself to be conscious. Consider, for instance, the pair comprising you and me. You might pinch your arm and feel a pain. I might simultaneously pinch my arm and feel a qualitatively identical pain. But the pair we form would not (...)
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  12. What You Can't Expect When You're Expecting'.L. A. Paul - 2015 - Res Philosophica 92 (2):1-23.
    It seems natural to choose whether to have a child by reflecting on what it would be like to actually have a child. I argue that this natural approach fails. If you choose to become a parent, and your choice is based on projections about what you think it would be like for you to have a child, your choice is not rational. If you choose to remain childless, and your choice is based upon projections about what you think it (...)
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  13. If You Like It, Does It Matter If It’s Real?Felipe De Brigard - 2010 - Philosophical Psychology 23 (1):43-57.
    Most people's intuitive reaction after considering Nozick's experience machine thought-experiment seems to be just like his: we feel very little inclination to plug in to a virtual reality machine capable of providing us with pleasurable experiences. Many philosophers take this empirical fact as sufficient reason to believe that, more than pleasurable experiences, people care about “living in contact with reality.” Such claim, however, assumes that people's reaction to the experience machine thought-experiment is due to the fact that they value reality (...)
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  14. You’Ve Come a Long Way, Bayesians.Jonathan Weisberg - 2015 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 44 (6):817-834.
    Forty years ago, Bayesian philosophers were just catching a new wave of technical innovation, ushering in an era of scoring rules, imprecise credences, and infinitesimal probabilities. Meanwhile, down the hall, Gettier’s 1963 paper [28] was shaping a literature with little obvious interest in the formal programs of Reichenbach, Hempel, and Carnap, or their successors like Jeffrey, Levi, Skyrms, van Fraassen, and Lewis. And how Bayesians might accommodate the discourses of full belief and knowledge was but a glimmer in the eye (...)
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  15. You Ought to Φ Only If You May Believe That You Ought to Φ.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly 66 (265):760-82.
    In this paper I present an argument for the claim that you ought to do something only if you may believe that you ought to do it. More exactly, I defend the following principle about normative reasons: An agent A has decisive reason to φ only if she also has sufficient reason to believe that she has decisive reason to φ. I argue that this principle follows from the plausible assumption that it must be possible for an agent to respond (...)
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  16. Everything You Always Wanted to Know About Structural Realism but Were Afraid to Ask.Roman Frigg & Ioannis Votsis - 2011 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 1 (2):227-276.
    Everything you always wanted to know about structural realism but were afraid to ask Content Type Journal Article Pages 227-276 DOI 10.1007/s13194-011-0025-7 Authors Roman Frigg, Department of Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method, London School of Economics and Political Science, Houghton Street, London, WC2A 2AE UK Ioannis Votsis, Philosophisches Institut, Heinrich-Heine-Universität Düsseldorf, Universitätsstraße 1, Geb. 23.21/04.86, 40225 Düsseldorf, Germany Journal European Journal for Philosophy of Science Online ISSN 1879-4920 Print ISSN 1879-4912 Journal Volume Volume 1 Journal Issue Volume 1, Number 2.
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  17. You're Probably Not Really A Speciesist.Travis Timmerman - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (4):683-701.
    I defend the bold claim that self-described speciesists are not really speciesists. Of course, I do not deny that self-described speciesists would assent to generic speciesist claims (e.g. Humans matter more than animals). The conclusion I draw is more nuanced. My claim is that such generic speciesist beliefs are inconsistent with other, more deeply held, beliefs of self-described speciesists. Crucially, once these inconsistencies are made apparent, speciesists will reject the generic speciesist beliefs because they are absurd by the speciesists’ own (...)
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  18.  19
    In “You're Not in Kansas Anymore,” Canadian Author Ivan E. Coyote Prepares to Change Her Legal Name and Writes About the Anxieties That This Creates.Who Do You ThinkYou Are - 2009 - In Laurie J. Shrage (ed.), You've Changed: Sex Reassignment and Personal Identity. Oup Usa.
  19. If You Can’T Make One, You Don’T Know How It Works.Fred I. Dretske - 1994 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1):468-482.
  20. Would You Believe It? The King of France is Back! (Presuppositions and Truth-Value Intuitions).Kai von Fintel - 2004 - In Marga Reimer & Anne Bezuidenhout (eds.), Descriptions and Beyond. Clarendon Press.
     
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  21. Do You Have Constant Tactile Experience of Your Feet in Your Shoes? Or Is Experience Limited to What’s in Attention?Eric Schwitzgebel - 2007 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (3):5-35.
    According to rich views of consciousness (e.g., James, Searle), we have a constant, complex flow of experience (or 'phenomenology') in multiple modalities simultaneously. According to thin views (e.g., Dennett, Mack and Rock), conscious experience is limited to one or a few topics, regions, objects, or modalities at a time. Existing introspective and empirical arguments on this issue (including arguments from 'inattentional blindness') generally beg the question. Participants in the present experiment wore beepers during everyday activity. When a beep sounded, they (...)
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  22.  17
    Can You Perceive Ensembles Without Perceiving Individuals?: The Role of Statistical Perception in Determining Whether Awareness Overflows Access.Emily J. Ward, Adam Bear & Brian J. Scholl - 2016 - Cognition 152:78-86.
    Do we see more than we can report? Psychologists and philosophers have been hotly debating this question, in part because both possibilities are supported by suggestive evidence. On one hand, phenomena such as inattentional blindness and change blindness suggest that visual awareness is especially sparse. On the other hand, experiments relating to iconic memory suggest that our in-the-moment awareness of the world is much richer than can be reported. Recent research has attempted to resolve this debate by showing that observers (...)
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  23. You’Ve Changed: Sex Reassignment and Personal Identity.Laurie J. Shrage (ed.) - 2009 - Oup Usa.
    Is sex identity a feature of one's mind or body, and is it a relational or intrinsic property? Who is in the best position to know a person's sex, do we each have a true sex, and is a person's sex an alterable characteristic? When a person's sex assignment changes, has the old self disappeared and a new one emerged; or, has only the public presentation of one's self changed? "You've Changed" examines the philosophical questions raised by the phenomenon of (...)
     
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  24. You, Robot.Brian Fiala, Adam Arico & Shaun Nichols - 2014 - In Edouard Machery (ed.), Current Controversies in Experimental Philosophy. Routledge. pp. 31-47.
    How do people think about the mental states of robots? Experimental philosophers have developed various models aiming to specify the factors that drive people's attributions of mental states to robots. Here we report on a new experiment involving robots, the results of which tell against competing models. We advocate a view on which attributions of mental states to robots are driven by the same dual-process architecture that subserves attributions of mental states more generally. In support of this view, we leverage (...)
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  25.  63
    What You See is What You Need.Jochen Triesch, Dana Ballard, Mary Hayhoe & Brian Sullivan - 2003 - Journal of Vision 3 (1):86-94.
  26.  18
    “You Hoped We Would Sleep Walk Into Accepting the Collection of Our Data”: Controversies Surrounding the UK Care.Data Scheme and Their Wider Relevance for Biomedical Research.Sigrid Sterckx, Vojin Rakic, Julian Cockbain & Pascal Borry - 2016 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 19 (2):177-190.
    An ‘Information Centre’ has recently been established by law which has the power to collect, collate and provide access to the medical information forall patients treated by the National Health Service in England, whether in hospitals or by General Practitioners. This so-called ‘care.data’ scheme has given rise to major and ongoing controversies. We will sketch the background of the scheme and look at the responses it has elicited from citizens and medical professionals. In Autumn 2013, NHS England set up a (...)
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  27.  50
    You Can Trust the Ladder, But You Shouldn't.Jonathan Tallant - 2019 - Theoria 85 (2):102-118.
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  28.  30
    Can You Tickle Yourself If You Swap Bodies with Someone Else?George Van Doorn, Jakob Hohwy & Mark Symmons - 2014 - Consciousness and Cognition 23:1-11.
    The effect of the body transfer illusion on the perceived strength of self- and externally-generated “tickle” sensations was investigated. As expected, externally generated movement produced significantly higher ratings of tickliness than those associated with self-generated movements. Surprisingly, the body transfer illusion had no influence on the ratings of tickliness, suggesting that highly surprising, and therefore hard to predict, experiences of body image and first-person perspective do not abolish the attenuation of tickle sensations. In addition, evidence was found that a version (...)
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  29.  15
    Are You Satisfied With Your Pay When You Compare? It Depends on Your Love of Money, Pay Comparison Standards, and Culture.Thomas Li-Ping Tang & Roberto Luna-Arocas - 2015 - Journal of Business Ethics 128 (2):279-289.
    We develop a theoretical model of income and pay comparison satisfaction with two mediators, examine the direct and the indirect paths of our model, and treat culture as a moderator. Based on 311 professors in the US and Spain, we demonstrate a positive direct path and a negative indirect path. Our subsequent multi-group analysis illustrates: For American professors, their direct path shows that income is directly related to high pay comparison satisfaction. Their indirect path reveals the following new insights: Professors (...)
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  30. Would You Believe It? The King of France is Back! Presuppositions and Truth-Value Intuitions.Kai Von Fintel - 2004 - In Anne Bezuidenhout & Marga Reimer (eds.), Descriptions and Beyond. Oxford University Press.
     
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  31. If You're an Egalitarian, How Come You're so Rich.G. A. Cohen - 2000 - The Journal of Ethics 4 (1-2):1-26.
    Many people, including many egalitarian political philosophers, professa belief in equality while enjoying high incomes of which they devotevery little to egalitarian purposes. The article critically examinesways of resolving the putative inconsistency in the stance of thesepeople, in particular, that favouring an egalitarian society has noimplications for behaviour in an unequal one; that what''s bad aboutinequality is a social division that philanthropy cannot reduce; thatprivate action cannot ensure that others have good lives; that privateaction can only achieve a ``drop in (...)
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  32. Do You Know More When It Matters Less?Adam Feltz & Chris Zarpentine - 2010 - Philosophical Psychology 23 (5):683–706.
    According to intellectualism, what a person knows is solely a function of the evidential features of the person's situation. Anti-intellectualism is the view that what a person knows is more than simply a function of the evidential features of the person's situation. Jason Stanley (2005) argues that, in addition to “traditional factors,” our ordinary practice of knowledge ascription is sensitive to the practical facts of a subject's situation. In this paper, we investigate this question empirically. Our results indicate that Stanley's (...)
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  33. You Can Call Me 'Stupid', ... Just Don't Call Me Stupid.Delia Graff Fara - 2011 - Analysis 71 (3):492-501.
    In this paper I argue that names are predicates when they occur in the appellation position of 'called'-predications. This includes not only proper names, but all names -- including quote-names of proper names and quote-names of other words or phrases. Thus in "You can call me Al", the proper name 'Al' is a predicate. And in "You can call me 'Al'," the quote-name of 'Al' -- namely ' 'Al' ' -- is also a predicate.
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  34.  39
    Have You Benefitted From Carbon Emissions? You May Be a “Morally Objectionable Free Rider”.J. Spencer Atkins - 2018 - Environmental Ethics 40 (3):283-296.
    Much of the climate ethics discussion centers on considerations of compensatory justice and historical accountability. However, little attention is given to supporting and defending the Beneficiary Pays Principle as a guide for policymaking. This principle states that those who have benefitted from an instance of harm have an obligation to compensate those who have been harmed. Thus, this principle implies that those benefitted by industrialization and carbon emission owe compensation to those who have been harmed by climate change. Beneficiary Pays (...)
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  35. Are You a Sim?Brian Weatherson - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (212):425–431.
    Nick Bostrom argues that if we accept some plausible assumptions about how the future will unfold, we should believe we are probably not humans. The argument appeals crucially to an indifference principle whose precise content is a little unclear. I set out four possible interpretations of the principle, none of which can be used to support Bostrom’s argument. On the first two interpretations the principle is false, on the third it does not entail the conclusion, and on the fourth it (...)
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  36. “Screw You!” & “Thank You”.Coleen Macnamara - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (3):893-914.
    If I do you a good turn, you may respond with gratitude and express that gratitude by saying “Thank you.” Similarly, if I insult you, you may react with resentment which you express by shouting, “Screw you!” or something of the sort. Broadly put, when confronted with another’s morally significant conduct, we are inclined to respond with a reactive attitude and to express that reactive attitude in speech. A number of familiar speech acts have a call-and-response structure. Questions, demands and (...)
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  37. What You Know When You Know an Answer to a Question.Rowland Stout - 2010 - Noûs 44 (2):392 - 402.
    A significant argument for the claim that knowing-wh is knowing-that, implicit in much of the literature, including Stanley and Williamson (2001), is spelt out and challenged. The argument includes the assumption that a subject's state of knowing-wh is constituted by their involvement in a relation with an answer to a question. And it involves the assumption that answers to questions are propositions or facts. One of Lawrence Powers' counterexamples to the conjunction of these two assumptions is developed, responses to it (...)
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  38. What You’Re Rationally Required to Do and What You Ought to Do.Errol Lord - 2017 - Mind 126 (504):1109-1154.
    It is a truism that we ought to be rational. Despite this, it has become popular to think that it is not the case that we ought to be rational. In this paper I argue for a view about rationality—the view that what one is rationally required to do is determined by the normative reasons one possesses—by showing that it can vindicate that one ought to be rational. I do this by showing that it is independently very plausible that what (...)
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  39.  4
    Spatiotemporal Evolution of Population in Northeast China During 2012–2017: A Nighttime Light Approach.Haolin You, Cui Jin & Wei Sun - 2020 - Complexity 2020:1-12.
    Population is one of the key problematic factors that are restricting China’s economic and social development. Previous studies have used nighttime light imagery to calculate population density. This study analyzes the spatiotemporal evolution of the population in Northeast China based on linear regression analyses of NPP-VIIRS NTL imagery and statistical population data from 36 cities in Northeast China from 2012 to 2017. Based on a comparison of the estimation results in different years, we observed the following. The population of Northeast (...)
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  40. Can You Believe It? Illusionism and the Illusion Meta-Problem.François Kammerer - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (1):44-67.
    Illusionism about consciousness is the thesis that phenomenal consciousness does not exist, but merely seems to exist. Embracing illusionism presents the theoretical advantage that one does not need to explain how consciousness arises from purely physical brains anymore, but only to explain why consciousness seems to exist while it does not. As Keith Frankish puts it, illusionism replaces the “hard problem of consciousness” with the “illusion problem.” However, a satisfying version of illusionism has to explain not only why the illusion (...)
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  41.  22
    Caught You: Threats to Confidentiality Due to the Public Release of Large-Scale Genetic Data Sets. [REVIEW]Matthias Wjst - 2010 - BMC Medical Ethics 11 (1):1-4.
    BackgroundLarge-scale genetic data sets are frequently shared with other research groups and even released on the Internet to allow for secondary analysis. Study participants are usually not informed about such data sharing because data sets are assumed to be anonymous after stripping off personal identifiers.DiscussionThe assumption of anonymity of genetic data sets, however, is tenuous because genetic data are intrinsically self-identifying. Two types of re-identification are possible: the "Netflix" type and the "profiling" type. The "Netflix" type needs another small genetic (...)
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  42.  20
    You Didn’T Have to Do That: Belief in Free Will Promotes Gratitude.Michael J. Mackenzie, Kathleen D. Vohs & Roy Baumeister - 2014 - Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 40 (11):1423-1434.
    Four studies tested the hypothesis that a weaker belief in free will would be related to feeling less gratitude. In Studies 1a and 1b, a trait measure of free will belief was positively correlated with a measure of dispositional gratitude. In Study 2, participants whose free will belief was weakened (vs. unchanged or bolstered) reported feeling less grateful for events in their past. Study 3 used a laboratory induction of gratitude. Participants with an experimentally reduced (vs. increased) belief in free (...)
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  43.  5
    Can You Tickle Yourself If You Swap Bodies with Someone Else?George Van Doorn, Jakob Hohwy & Mark Symmons - 2013 - Consciousness and Cognition 22 (4):1-11.
    The effect of the body transfer illusion on the perceived strength of self- and externally-generated “tickle” sensations was investigated. As expected, externally generated movement produced significantly higher ratings of tickliness than those associated with self-generated movements. Surprisingly, the body transfer illusion had no influence on the ratings of tickliness, suggesting that highly surprising, and therefore hard to predict, experiences of body image and first-person perspective do not abolish the attenuation of tickle sensations. In addition, evidence was found that a version (...)
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  44.  22
    Can You Visualize Theory? On the Use of Visual Thinking in Theory Pictures, Theorizing Diagrams, and Visual Sketches.Richard Swedberg - 2016 - Sociological Theory 34 (3):250-275.
    Although the visualization of data is on the agenda for sociologists today, thanks to big data, the author raises the question of whether it may not also be possible to visualize theory and, especially, to improve it through visual thinking. The main purpose of this article, more precisely, is to open up a discussion of how visualization and visual thinking can be used as a tool for theorizing in sociology and thereby help produce new and creative theories. Three different types (...)
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  45. You Don't Say?Kent Bach - 2001 - Synthese 128 (1):15-44.
    This paper defends a purely semantic notion of what is said against various recent objections. The objections each cite some sort of linguistic, psychological, or epistemological fact that is supposed to show that on any viable notion of what a speaker says in uttering a sentence, there is pragmatic intrusion into what is said. Relying on a modified version of Grice's notion, on which what is said must be a projection of the syntax of the uttered sentence, I argue that (...)
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  46. You Really Do Imagine It: Against Error Theories of Imagination.Peter Kung - 2016 - Noûs 50 (1):90-120.
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  47.  9
    You Can’T Recognize Two Words Simultaneously.Alex L. White, Geoffrey M. Boynton & Jason D. Yeatman - 2019 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 23 (10):812-814.
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  48. Now You Know Who Hong Oak Yun Is.David Braun - 2006 - Philosophical Issues 16 (1):24-42.
    Hong Oak Yun is a person who is over three inches tall. And now you know who Hong Oak Yun is. For if someone were to ask you ‘Who is Hong Oak Yun?’, you could answer that Hong Oak Yun is a person who is over three inches tall, and you would know what you were saying. So you know an answer to the question ‘Who is Hong Oak Yun?’, and that is sufficient for knowing who Hong Oak Yun is. (...)
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  49.  4
    «If You Give Them Your Little Finger, They’Ll Tear Off Your Entire Arm»: Losing Trust in Biobank Research.Lars Ursin, Borgunn Ytterhus, Erik Christensen & John-Arne Skolbekken - 2020 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 23 (4):565-576.
    Why do some people withdraw from biobank studies? To our knowledge, very few studies have been done on the reflections of biobank ex-participants. In this article, we report from such a study. 16 years ago, we did focus group interviews with biobank participants and ex-participants. We found that the two groups interestingly shared worries concerning the risks involved in possible novel uses of their biobank material, even though they drew opposite conclusions from their worries. Revisiting these interviews today reveals a (...)
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  50.  20
    Ouch.... You Just Dropped the Ashes.Chuck Summers - 2007 - Journal of the Philosophy of Sport 34 (1):68-76.
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