When I reflect on reading Bryan Warnick's Imitation and Education, I am appreciative that I was given the opportunity not only to read it but also to think about its issues as thoroughly as I have in the process of writing this essay. I share Warnick's surprise that, prior to his book, no one had attempted to explore the relationship between imitation and education in a philosophically meaningful manner. Before reading his book, I did not realize that imitation was such (...) a philosophically rich topic, especially once you consider its educational implications. In particular, I was oblivious to the connection between various conceptions of the self and imitation. I had no idea that different interpretations of the .. (shrink)
Kierkegaard’s work Purity of Heart is To Will One Thing, signed in his own name, was meant as a private preparation for public confession. To be pure of heart meant to have a single-minded dedication to the will of God, a dedication from which all other foreign motives had been filtered out. A pure heart does good not out of fear of punishment or the hope of a reward but solely because it is God’s will. There is thus a Kantian (...) rigorism in this work: every overt or concealed form of self-love must be purged in order that an act be truly moral. Jeremy Walker, who has also written a book on Frege, and whose book reads faintly like a work in analytic ethics, has written not an exhaustive commentary on Purity of Heart but a set of "reflections" on some philosophical themes that run through the work. He takes up the question of Kierkegaard’s Kantian conception of morality and argues that the dynamic of Kierkegaard’s notion of ethical choice leads straight to an absolute commitment to the absolute good, God. Thus purity of heart is only possible if the will is directed towards an absolute good. Kierkegaard’s true view is a Christian synthesis of Kant and Plato. It also follows that the opposition of the ethical and the religious is false. Such a view, which belongs to the doctrine of the three stages, is not Kierkegaard’s but that of the pseudonymous authors. It is actually opposed to the view that Kierkegaard signs in his own name. Walker’s book is brief, clear and addressed to an important point, not only for Kierkegaardian scholarship, but also for ethics.—J.D.C. (shrink)
Peter G. Brown and Jeremy J. Smith (eds): Water Ethics: Foundational Readings for Students and Professionals Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-3 DOI 10.1007/s10806-011-9310-x Authors Neelke Doorn, Department of Technology Policy and Management, Section of Philosophy, 3TU. Centre of Ethics and Technology/Delft University of Technology, PO Box 5015, 2600 GA Delft, The Netherlands Journal Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics Online ISSN 1573-322X Print ISSN 1187-7863.
This article develops an unconventional perspective on the utilitarianism of Bentham and Mill in at least four areas. First, it is shown that both authors conceived of utility as irreducibly multi-dimensional, and that Bentham in particular was very much aware of the ambiguity that multi-dimensionality imposes upon optimal choice under the greatest happiness principle. Secondly, I argue that any attribution of intrinsic worth to any form of human behaviour violates the first principles of Bentham's and Mill's utilitarianism, and that this (...) renders both authors immune to the claim by G. E. Moore that they committed a ‘naturalistic fallacy’. Thirdly, in light of these contentions, I find no flaw in Mill's ‘proof of utility’. Fourthly, I use the notion of intrapersonal utility weights to provide an interpretation of Mill's qualitative hedonism that is entirely consistent with his value monism. (shrink)
v. 1. 1752-76.--v. 2. 1777-80.--v. 3. January 1781 to October 1788.--v. 4. 1788-1793.--v. 5. 1794-1797.--v. 6. January 1798 to December 1801.--v. 7. January 1802 to December 1808.--v. 8. January 1809 to December 1816.--v. 9. January 1817 to June 1820.-- v. 10. July 1820 to December 1821.--v. 11. January 1822 to June 1824.--v. 12. July 1824-June 1828.
Mill, J. S. Bentham.--Whewell, W. Bentham.--Watson, J. Bentham.--Hart, H. L. A. Bentham.--Parekh, B. Bentham's justification of the principle of utility.--Peardon, T. Bentham's ideal republic.--Hart, H. L. A. Bentham on sovereignty.--Burns, J. H. Bentham's critique of political fallacies.--Mitchell, W. C. Bentham's felicific calculus.--Roberts, D. Jeremy Bentham and the Victorian administrative state.
The new critical edition of the works and correspondence of Jeremy Bentham is being prepared and published under the supervision of the Bentham Committee of University College London. In spite of his importance as jurist, philosopher, and social scientist, and leader of the Utilitarian reformers, the only previous edition of his works was a poorly edited and incomplete one brought out within a decade or so of his death. Eight volumes of the new Collected Works, five of correspondence, and (...) three of writings on jurisprudence, appeared between 1968 and 1981, published by the Athlone Press. Further volumes in the series since then are published by Oxford University Press. The overall plan and principles of the edition are set out in the General Preface to The Correspondence of Jeremy Bentham, vol. 1, which was the first volume of the Collected Works to be published.An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, Jeremy Bentham's best-known work, is a classic text in modern philosophy and jurisprudence. First published in 1789, it contains the important statement of the foundations of utilitarian philosophy and a pioneering study of crime and punishment, both of which remain at the heart of contemporary debates in moral and political philosophy, economics, and legal theory. Printed here in full is the definitive edition, edited by the distinguished scholars J. H. Burns and H. L. A. Hart. An introductory essay by Hart, first published in 1982 and a widely acknowledged classic in its own right, is reprinted here. It contains an important analysis of Bentham's principle of utility, theory of action, and an account of the relationship between law and morality.A new introduction by the leading Bentham scholar F. Rosen, specially written for this Clarendon Paperback edition, provides students with a helpful survey of Bentham's main ideas and an extensive bibliographical study of recent critical work on Bentham. Professor Rosen's essay also contains a new analysis of the principle of utility in Bentham's philosophy which is compared with its use in Hume and J. S. Mill. (shrink)
Has human nature been essentially the same since the evolution of Homo sapiens? If we could observe tribal forest dwellers from the Paleolithic period, would we notice more similarities than differences compared with contemporary men and women? Or has human nature itself undergone such radical changes over the course of evolution that we would have trouble finding anything in common with our distant ancestors? Political scientist Jeremy J. Millett tackles these tough questions and more in this sweeping overview of (...) society and human nature past, present, and future. Combining philosophy, political theory, and the evidence of evolution, Millett argues that people today are very different from human beings of the distant past. He notes research suggesting that our genetic natures have been changing since the dawn of our species. Hence, the human nature of the 21st century is not the same as that of the 100th century BCE. Nor will humans of some distant future era be the same as us. Both the continuously developing genetic basis of human nature and the many differences of environment and culture have produced and will continue to produce people unlike us. Millett examines successive periods of human development—tribal, feudal, maritime, urban, and today's emerging global society, showing in each case how distinctive human nature was in each time period. He concludes by projecting into the future, forecasting an age of "autonomous people" who have largely escaped the need for government and for whom cooperation is the norm. A work of great erudition and fascinating speculation, People Unlike Us raises profound questions about human nature and the future of our species. (shrink)
This article contributes to the ongoing debate initiated by Bernard Williams’ claim that, due to the non-contingent finitude of the categorical desires that give meaning to our lives, an immortal life would necessarily become intolerably boring. Jeremy Wisnewski has argued that even if immortality involves periods in which our categorical desires have been exhausted, this need not divest life of meaning since some categorical desires are revivable. I argue that careful reflection upon the thought-experiments adduced by Wisnewski reveals that (...) they do not substantiate his proposal, and hence that a plausible reason for rejecting Williams’ position has not been provided. (shrink)