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Jeremy Randel Koons [16]Jeremy Koons [7]Jeremy R. Koons [2]
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Jeremy Koons
Georgetown University
  1. Can God’s Goodness Save the Divine Command Theory From Euthyphro?Jeremy Koons - 2012 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 4 (1):177-195.
    Recent defenders of the divine command theory like Adams and Alston have confronted the Euthyphro dilemma by arguing that although God’s commands make right actions right, God is morally perfect and hence would never issue unjust or immoral commandments. On their view, God’s nature is the standard of moral goodness, and God’s commands are the source of all obligation. I argue that this view of divine goodness fails because it strips God’s nature of any features that would make His goodness (...)
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  2.  3
    The Ethics of Wilfrid Sellars.Jeremy Koons - 2019 - New York, USA: Routledge.
    Wilfrid Sellars’s ethical theory was rich and deeply innovative. On Sellars’s view, moral judgments express a special kind of shared intention. Thus, we should see Sellars as an early advocate of an expressivism of plans and intentions, and an early theorist of collective intentionality. He supplemented this theory with a sophisticated logic of intentions, a robust theory of the categorical validity of normative expressions, a subtle way of reconciling the cognitive and motivating aspects of moral judgment, and much more— all (...)
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  3. Plantinga on Properly Basic Belief in God: Lessons From the Epistemology of Perception.Jeremy Randel Koons - 2011 - Philosophical Quarterly 61 (245):839-850.
    Plantinga famously argues against evidentialism that belief in God can be properly basic. But the epistemology of cognitive faculties such as perception and memory which produce psychologically non-inferential beliefs shows that various inferentially justified theoretical beliefs are epistemically prior to our memory and perceptual beliefs, preventing the latter from being epistemically basic. Plantinga's analogy between the sensus divinitatis and these cognitive faculties suggests that the deliverances of the sensus divinitatis cannot be properly basic either. Objections by and on behalf of (...)
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  4.  81
    Theism and the Criminalization of Sin.Jeremy Koons - 2018 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 10 (1):163-187.
    The free will theodicy places significant value on free will: free will is of such substantial value, that God’s gift of free will to humans was justified, even though this gift foreseeably results in the most monstrous of evils. I will argue that when a state criminalizes sin, it can restrict or eliminate citizens’ exercise of metaphysical free will with respect to choosing to partake in or refrain from these activities. Given the value placed on free will in the free (...)
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  5.  99
    Why Response-Dependence Theories of Morality Are False.Jeremy Randel Koons - 2003 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 6 (3):275-294.
    Many response-dependence theorists equate moral truth with the generation of some affective psychological response: what makes this action wrong, as opposed to right, is that it would cause (or merit) affective response of type R (perhaps under ideal conditions). Since our affective nature is purely contingent, and not necessarily shared by all rational creatures (or even by all humans), response-dependence threatens to lead to relativism. In this paper, I will argue that emotional responses and moral features do not align in (...)
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  6.  93
    Disenchanting the World: McDowell, Sellars, and Rational Constraint by Perception.Jeremy Randel Koons - 2004 - Journal of Philosophical Research 29 (February):125-152.
    In his book Mind and World, John McDowell grapples with the problem that the world must and yet seemingly cannot constrain our empirical thought. I first argue that McDowell’s proposed solution to the problem throws him onto the horns of his own, intractable dilemma, and thus fails to solve the problem of rational constraint by the world. Next, I will argue that Wilfrid Sellars, in a series of articles written in the 1950s and 60s, provides the tools to solve the (...)
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  7. Is Hard Determinism a Form of Compatibilism?Jeremy Randel Koons - 2002 - Philosophical Forum 33 (1):81-99.
    Most philosophers now concede that libertarianism has failed as an account of free will. Assuming the correctness of this concession, that leaves compatibilism and hard determinism as the only remaining choices in the free will debate. In this paper, I will argue that hard determinism turns out to be a form of compatibilism, and therefore, compatibilism is the only remaining position in the free will debate. I will attempt to establish this conclusion by arguing that hard determinists will end up (...)
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  8. Conservatism, Basic Beliefs, and the Diachronic and Social Nature of Epistemic Justification.Jeremy Koons - 2006 - Episteme 2 (3):203-218.
    Discussions of conservatism in epistemology often fail to demonstrate that the principle of conservatism is supported by epistemic considerations. In this paper, I hope to show two things. First, there is a defensible version of the principle of conservatism, a version that applies only to what I will call our basic beliefs. Those who deny that conservatism is supported by epistemic considerations do so because they fail to take into account the necessarily social, diachronic and self-correcting nature of our epistemic (...)
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  9.  51
    Emotions and Incommensurable Moral Concepts.Jeremy Randel Koons - 2001 - Philosophy 76 (4):585-604.
    Many authors have argued that emotions serve an epistemic role in our moral practice. Some argue that this epistemic connection is so strong that creatures who do not share our affective nature will be unable to grasp our moral concepts. I argue that even if this sort of incommensurability does result from the role of affect in morality, incommensurability does not in itself entail relativism. In any case, there is no reason to suppose that one must share our emotions and (...)
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  10. Sellars, Givenness, and Epistemic Priority.Jeremy Koons - 2007 - Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 92:147-172.
    Recent critics of Sellars's argument against the Given attack Sellars's conclusion that sensations cannot play a role in the justification of observation beliefs. I maintain that Sellars can concede that sensations play a role in justifying observation reports without being forced to concede that they have the foundational status of an epistemic Given. However, Sellars's own arguments that observation reports rest, in some sense, on other empirical beliefs are not sufficiently well-developed; nor are his comments concerning internalism, which is crucial (...)
     
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  11. Natural Evil as a Test of Faith in the Abrahamic Traditions.Jeremy Koons - 2010 - Sophia 49 (1):15-28.
    This paper critically examines what I call the ‘testing theodicy,’ the widely held idea that natural evil exists in order to test our faith in God. This theodicy appears numerous times in the scriptures of all three Abrahamic faiths. After examining some of these scriptural passages, we will argue that in light of these texts, the notion of faith is best understood as some type of commitment such as trust, loyalty or piety, rather than as merely a belief in God’s (...)
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  12. Do Normative Facts Need to Explain?Jeremy Randel Koons - 2000 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 81 (3):246–272.
    Much moral skepticism stems from the charge that moral facts do not figure in causal explanations. However, philosophers committed to normative epistemological discourse (by which I mean our practice of evaluating beliefs as justified or unjustified, and so forth) are in no position to demand that normative facts serve such a role, since epistemic facts are causally impotent as well. I argue instead that pragmatic reasons can justify our continued participation in practices which, like morality and epistemology, do not serve (...)
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  13.  92
    An Argument Against Reduction in Morality and Epistemology.Jeremy Randel Koons - 2006 - Philosophical Investigations 29 (3):250–274.
    Many naturalistically-minded philosophers want to accomplish a naturalistic reduction of normative (e.g. moral and epistemic) claims. Mindful of avoiding the naturalistic fallacy, such philosophers claim that they are not reducing moral and epistemic concepts or definitions. Rather, they are only reducing the extension of these normative terms, while admitting that the concepts possess a normative content that cannot be naturalistically reduced. But these philosophers run into a serious problem. I will argue that normative claims possess two dimensions of normativity. I (...)
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  14.  37
    A Myth Resurgent: Classical Foundationalism and the New Sellarsian Critique.Jeremy Koons - 2017 - Synthese 194 (10):4155-4169.
    One important strand of Sellars’s attack on classical foundationalism from Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind is his thesis about the priority of is-talk over looks-talk. This thesis has been criticized extensively in recent years, and classical foundationalism has found several contemporary defenders. I revisit Sellars’s thesis and argue that is-talk is epistemically prior to looks-talk in a way that undermines classical foundationalism. The classical foundationalist claims that epistemic foundations are constituted by the agent’s set of looks-judgments. However, I argue (...)
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  15.  18
    The Ordinary Language Case for Contextualism and the Relevance of Radical Doubt.Michael P. Wolf & Jeremy Randel Koons - 2018 - Contemporary Pragmatism 15 (1):66-94.
    Many contextualist accounts in epistemology appeal to ordinary language and everyday practice as grounds for positing a low-standards knowledge (knowledgeL) that contrasts with high-standards prevalent in epistemology (knowledgeH). We compare these arguments to arguments from the height of “ordinary language” philosophy in the mid 20th century and find that all such arguments face great difficulties. We find a powerful argument for the legitimacy and necessity of knowledgeL (but not of knowledgeH). These appeals to practice leave us with reasons to accept (...)
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  16.  32
    Consensus and Excellence of Reasons.Jeremy Randel Koons - 2003 - Journal of Philosophical Research 28:83-103.
    It is plausible to suppose that the normativity of evaluative (e.g., moral and epistemic) judgments arises out of and is, in some sense, dependent on our actual evaluative practice. At the same time, though, it seems likely that the correctness of evaluative judgments is not merely a matter of what the underlying practice endorses and condemns; denial of this leads one into a rather objectionable form of relativism. In this paper, I will explore a social practice account of normativity according (...)
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  17.  25
    Sellars, Givenness, and Epistemic Priority.Jeremy Randel Koons - 2006 - In Michael P. Wolf (ed.), Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities. pp. 147-172.
    Recent critics of Sellars's argument against the Given attack Sellars's conclusion that sensations cannot play a role in the justification of observation beliefs. I maintain that Sellars can concede that sensations play a role in justifying observation reports without being forced to concede that they have the foundational status of an epistemic Given. However, Sellars's own arguments that observation reports rest, in some sense, on other empirical beliefs are not sufficiently well-developed; nor are his comments concerning internalism, which is crucial (...)
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  18.  15
    Do Normative Facts Need to Explain?Jeremy Randel Koons - 2000 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 81 (3):246-272.
    Much moral skepticism stems from the charge that moral facts do not figure in causal explanations. However, philosophers committed to normative epistemological discourse are in no position to demand that normative facts serve such a role, since epistemic facts are causally impotentas well. I argue instead that pragmatic reasons can justify our continued participation in practices which, like morality and epistemology, do not servethe function of causal explanation.
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  19.  20
    A Fatal Dilemma For Direct Realist Foundationalism.Jeremy Randel Koons - 2015 - Journal of Philosophical Research 40:405-440.
    Direct realist versions of foundationalism have recently been advocated by Pryor, Huemer, Alston, and Plantinga. DRF can hold either that our foundational observation beliefs are about the simple perceptible qualities of objects, or that our foundational observation beliefs are more complex ones about objects in the world. I will show that whether our observational beliefs are simple or complex, the agent must possess other epistemically significant states in order for these observational beliefs to be justified. These other states are therefore (...)
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  20.  11
    Reasons From Within: Desires and Values, by Alan H. Goldman.: Book Reviews. [REVIEW]Jeremy Randel Koons - 2013 - Mind 122 (488):1086-1091.
  21.  7
    Disenchanting the World: McDowell, Sellars, and Rational Constraint by Perception.Jeremy Randel Koons - 2004 - Journal of Philosophical Research 29:125-152.
    In his book Mind and World, John McDowell grapples with the problem that the world must and yet seemingly cannot constrain our empirical thought. I first argue that McDowell’s proposed solution to the problem throws him onto the horns of his own, intractable dilemma, and thus fails to solve the problem of rational constraint by the world. Next, I will argue that Wilfrid Sellars, in a series of articles written in the 1950s and 1960s, provides the tools to solve the (...)
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  22.  5
    Consensus and Excellence of Reasons.Jeremy Randel Koons - 2003 - Journal of Philosophical Research 28:83-103.
    It is plausible to suppose that the normativity of evaluative judgments arises out of and is, in some sense, dependent on our actual evaluative practice. At the same time, though, it seems likely that the correctness of evaluative judgments is not merely a matter of what the underlying practice endorses and condemns; denial of this leads one into a rather objectionable form of relativism. In this paper, I will explore a social practice account of normativity according to which normativity is (...)
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  23. A Conditional Defense of Moral Realism.Jeremy Randel Koons - 1998 - Dissertation, Georgetown University
    Most philosophers endorse our epistemic practice of evaluating beliefs and methods of inquiry as justified or unjustified, rational or irrational; far fewer, though, think our practice of moral evaluation is viable. I contend that this difference in attitude toward epistemic and moral practice reveals an underlying double standard. I argue that the standards set by influential moral anti-realist arguments are not met by our practices of epistemic justification, and that the adoption of these standards would therefore force us to abandon (...)
     
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  24. How to Avoid the Twin Perils of Anti-Empiricism and the Given.Jeremy R. Koons - 2002 - In Perspectives on Coherentism. Aylmer, Québec: Éditions Du Scribe.
     
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  25. Perspectives on Coherentism.Jeremy R. Koons - 2002 - Aylmer, Québec: Éditions Du Scribe.
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