Can testimony provide reasons to believe some proposition about an artwork’s aesthetic character? Can testimony bring an agent into a position where they can issue an aesthetic judgement about that artwork? What is the epistemic value of aesthetic communication? These questions have received sustained philosophical attention. More fundamental questions about aesthetic communication have meanwhile been neglected. These latter questions concern the nature of aesthetic communication, the criteria that determine when aesthetic communication is successful, and the frequency of communicative success in (...) aesthetic communication. The neglect of these questions is a serious oversight, not least because they bear directly on each of the other questions listed. This paper’s focus is the more fundamental set of questions. I argue for a restricted form of communicative pessimism. Discerning aesthetic communication about an artwork typically fails unless its recipient is both acquainted with that artwork and able to coordinate with the speaker on an aesthetic understanding of it. I arrive at this conclusion by challenging the standard conception of the nature of aesthetic communication that the literature presupposes, as well as an accompanying criterion of communicative success. I introduce an alternative view. In closing I relate my discussion to the former set of questions. (shrink)

In this paper, I introduce an account of aesthetic understanding. Recent discussions of aesthetic understanding have associated it with aesthetic justification and with understanding why, for example, a given object is aesthetically valuable. I introduce a notion of aesthetic understanding as a form of objectual understanding, which I refer to as ‘appreciative understanding’. Appreciative understanding is related to and partly constituted by an agent’s capacity to comprehend and experience an artwork holistically and to communicate effectively regarding its particular aesthetic character (...) and value. I then argue for the understanding account of aesthetic judgement on which the paradigmatic form of aesthetic judgement is grounded on appreciative understanding. This argument partly consists in demonstrating how the understanding account can explain the autonomy of aesthetic judgement. In closing, I explore the potential of the understanding account to explain the structure of our appreciative practices. That is, I put forward the view that our appreciative practices are structured so as to promote appreciative understanding. (shrink)

Abstract below. The published version of this article is available open access at The Monist's website. Part of Plato’s complaint about the cognitive status of art cites the pollution of aesthetic cognition by the affective side of our natures. Schopenhauer, by contrast, takes aesthetic cognition to transcend (some of) the limitations of everyday cognition precisely because in it agents become the “pure, will-less subject of cognition” (WWR I 219). On the orthodox reading of his later philosophy, Nietzsche scorns Plato and (...) Schopenhauer’s association of the value of art with its truthfulness. I challenge the orthodox reading and argue that one strand of art’s value is its penetrative cognitive power. In contrast to Schopenhauer, Nietzsche understands this cognitive power to result from the embracing and exploitation of the affects in the artistic process rather than their extirpation. (shrink)

Literary cognitivists claim that works of literature can have a significant cognitive value and can be effective in providing readers with opportunities for learning. Anti-cognitivists challenge cognitivists by questioning how literature can offer arguments or evidence for readers’ adoption of new knowledge or understanding. As a mode of side-stepping these objections, cognitivists have recently tended to make their claims more modest and claim only that literature clarifies knowledge readers already possess or provides the opportunity for the development of certain general (...) cognitive skills. In this chapter, I put forward a more bold account of literature’s cognitive value. I argue that a reader’s engagement with a literary work can lead to reconfiguration of their understanding of the subject matter with which the work deals. This bolder defence of literature’s cognitive value, and the account I offer of how readers can access such cognitive value, indicate how literature can form a significant part of character education. (shrink)

A person can appropriately manifest respect toward a world heritage ruin by developing a sensitive understanding of the ruin’s cultural and historical context and significance. In this paper, we link such respectful understanding to the question of the aesthetic appreciation of world heritage ruins. Our claim is that an aesthetic appreciation of a world heritage ruin qua world heritage ruin typically involves two things: first, the responsibility not to neglect the individuality of the object, and, second, a commitment to the (...) idea that it is the object—respectfully conceived—which must be the focus of our appreciation. (shrink)

Some commentators have argued that curiosity, not honesty, is Nietzsche’s central intellectual virtue. These commentators give minimalistic interpretations of the nature of Nietzsche’s concept of honesty, casting it as a disposition to ensure that relevant epistemic standards are applied during belief formation. I argue against such interpretations by highlighting three strands of Nietzsche’s concept of honesty which they fail to accommodate. I interpret Nietzsche’s concept of honesty against the background of his drive psychology and show that it applies not only (...) to reflective cognitive processes but also to unconscious cognitive processes. In concluding, I explain the key role which honesty plays in Nietzsche’s project of translating ‘man back into nature’. (shrink)

This thesis consists of four essays on aesthetic cognitivism. Aesthetic cognitivism says that artworks can have significant cognitive value and that the arts constitute a significant body of understanding. This thesis formulates and defends aesthetic cognitivist positions on central debates in philosophical aesthetics and works towards a comprehensive aesthetic cognitivist account of our aesthetic practices. In essay one, ‘Aesthetic Communication’, I defend the view that the purpose of a central form of aesthetic communication is sharing an aesthetic understanding of the (...) distinctive aesthetic character and value of artworks (and inculcating this aesthetic understanding in others). I argue for this view by setting out a novel account of the nature of aesthetic communication and of the criteria of communicative success in aesthetics. In essay two, ‘Aesthetic Cognitivism and Aesthetic Normativity’, I set out an aesthetic cognitivist answer to three normative questions. Why appreciate artworks? What does appreciation aim at? Which artworks is there weightiest reason to appreciate? Aesthetic cognitivism says that there is weightiest reason to appreciate artworks that are aesthetically valuable in virtue of the rich perspectives they bear to their subject matters. It says that the appreciation of these artworks aims at the sensitive exploration of their distinctive aesthetic value (i.e., of the rich perspectives they bear). It says there is reason to appreciate these artworks because they are aesthetically valuable. In essay three, ‘The End of Pleasure in Aesthetics: Aesthetic Cognitivism Revived’, I argue for an aesthetic cognitivist account of what it is to be responsive to aesthetic value. I argue that aesthetic responsiveness consists in a motivationally self-sustaining cognitive exploration of the distinctive aesthetic value of an artwork. I contrast my account with a pleasure theoretic account. In essay four, ‘Artistic Honesty’, I describe how honesty serves as a standard that guides and governs the creative process and provide an account of the property we attribute to artworks when we judge them to be honest. I argue that for an artwork to be honest is for it to confront a truth that it is epistemically and/or emotionally difficult for us to confront (individually and as a community). (shrink)

In recent years several scholars have wrestled with the term “poetic thought,” suggesting in various ways there is something distinctive about the nature of meaning as it occurs/unfolds through poetry. In this paper I suggest, in part following the lead of Simon Jarvis, that one of the most fruitful lines of inquiry for exploring this idea lies in a consideration of poetic works through the lens of Heidegger’s early phenomenology. Specifically, I argue that one of the keys to understanding poetic (...) thought lies in a flaw within Heidegger’s ontological divisions between substances, equipment and Dasein, as presented in Being and Time. Through an analysis of three poems by Frank O'Hara, I argue poetry that examines and represents the physical world presents a problem for Heidegger when he suggests equipment in the world must necessarily “withdraw” in order for us to engage with it authentically. To address this, the term environment-at-hand is introduced to describe the relationship between art... (shrink)