How to Read Descartes's Meditations consists of seven independent studies of Descartes's Meditations. The discussion in each chapter is organized around one problem which either has never or very seldom been explored in Cartesian scholarship. For example, in the study of the Letter to the Sorbonne, Janowski centers his discussion around the decree of the Lateran Council, showing the unorthodox character of Descartes's conception of the soul. Further, in his chapter devoted to the notoriously difficult proof for the existence of (...) God in the Third Meditation, Janowski shows that to understand properly Descartes's explicitly Scholastic proof is to read it as a reformulation of Duns Scotus's own proof. And in the final chapter on the Sixth Meditation, the author shows that Modern (Cartesian) Man ? the man whose soul is no longer the Scholastic anima but blood that animates his bones, veins, and muscles - germinated in the writings of Francis Bacon, a predecessor never properly acknowledged by Descartes. How to Read Descartes's Meditations is the first collection of essays on the Meditations that makes a conscious effort to read Descartes's philosophy as a reaction against or an acknowledgment of Scholastic, Renaissance, and the Reformation sources. It will become a standard book for students of modern philosophy. (shrink)

Bamiyan's Buddhas, long the treasured centrepiece of Afghanistan's material culture, were blown up by the Taliban in 2001. Since then controversy has arisen regarding whether — and, if so, how — the sculptures might be resurrected. One option — possible in principle because of careful 20th century survey work — would be to reconstruct exact replicas. I argue this would be a mistake. Reconstructing the sculptures, though it might serve useful ends, is inappropriate on aesthetic, moral, and metaphysical grounds. I (...) then consider restoration, arguing that it is appropriate on these same grounds. Unlike reconstruction, restoration stands to (partly) resuscitate the artistic, cultural, and historical value that now lies, inaccessible, in piles of rubble. And while restoration stands to achieve this worthy end, it would contribute as well to the economic and political well-being of Afghani citizens. In short, I argue that restoring — and thereby resurrecting — Bamiyan's Buddhas, both metaphysically possible and morally appropriate, is a win-win proposition. Afghanistan deserves our support to make this happen. (shrink)

This article provides a close reading of Ovid's ecphrastic depiction of two Centaur lovers and their ideally mutual relationship, an episode that serves as a digression in the midst of Nestor's narration of the Battle of the Lapiths and Centaurs in Met. 12. Ovid uses allusions to two didactic poems, Lucretius' De Rerum Natura and Ovid's own Ars Amatoria III, as he explores in the Cyllarus-Hylonome interlude both hybridity itself and the relationships and possible combinations of a number of conceptual (...) opposites: natura and cultus, human and animal, male and female, love and war, and the contrasting values of lyric-elegiac and epic poetry. A final section discusses how the issues explored within the digression reflect a concern with similar issues in the wider context of Book 12 and of the Metamorphoses as a whole. (shrink)

In the Letter to the Faculty of Theology of the Sorbonne, Descartes makes a reference to Leo's X's encyclical Apostolici Regiminis (1513), which supports the Aristotelian-Scholastic conception of the soul as anima corporis forma According to Descartes' doctrine of the eternal truths, God's power is absolutely unlimited. One of the consequences of this doctrine is that God could join a rational (human) soul to any body, which implies that the union of soul and the body in the Cartesian system is (...) not substantial in the Scholastic sense of the word. In bringing in Leo's X's encyclical to support his conception of the soul, Descartes used a papal document for purposes contrary to those for which it had been designed. Dans la Lettre à la Faculté de théologie de la Sorbonne, Descartes fait référence à l'encyclique Apostolici Regiminis (1513), qui soutient la conception aristotélico-scolastique de l'âme en tant qu'anima corporis forma Or, selon la doctrine de la création des vérités éternelles, le pouvoir de Dieu est sans limites : une de ses conséquences en est que Dieu eût pu unir l'âme rationnelle (humaine) à n'importe quel corps, ce qui implique que l'union de l'âme et du corps dans la philosophie cartésienne ne soit pas substantielle — du moins au sens scolastique du terme. En citant l'encyclique Apostolici Regiminis au commencement des Meditations, Descartes a en fait utilisé le document pontifical à l'opposé du but pour lequel il avait été conçu. (shrink)

This study is the first work ever to interpret the Meditations as theodicy. I show that Descartes' attempt to define the role of God for man's cognitive fallibility in so far as God is the creator of man's nature, is a reiteration of an old Epicurean argument pointing out the incongruity between the existence of God and evil. The question of the nature and origin of error which Descartes addresses in the First Meditation is reformulated in the Fourth Meditation into (...) broader considerations about the nature and scope of human freedom. ;The point of gravity of my thesis is Descartes' conceptions of human freedom and divine liberty. Since the conception of human freedom is the reversal of the doctrine of divine liberty, I analyze the two conceptions as two sides of the same problem--the problem of man's relation to God, or the problem of the relation of finitude to Infinity. I show that Descartes' quest for Certitude--which runs parallel to his attempt to overcome the problem of an evil deity--can be reformulated into the problem of creation. I present the problem of error as the problem of evil, and the problem of human will I present as the problem of human freedom, and the search for Certitude I interpret as the vindication of God's goodness and omnipotence, that is, theodicy. ;There are several points which are essential for Cartesian metaphysics, and which, as I demonstrate, Descartes borrowed from St. Augustine: the doctrine of the eternal truths , the conception of human freedom, the theory of error and the explanation of the will's propensity towards error , and the account of human nature. It is my contention that as much as Descartes insisted on the timelessness of his philosophy, what he had to say on the relationship between God and man is a reflection of the 17th c. theological debates which were fought by the Augustinians and the Molinists and were expressed by Descartes in the language and categories created by St. Augustine. (shrink)

In Leszek Kolakowski's title essay, "My Correct Views on Everything", the former Communist "High Priest" accounts for his apostasy from communism and explains why communism had to fail. Next, in a number of scholarly articles, he explains why communism assumed the pernicious form it had. The two other sections of the book, on Christianity and Liberal ideologies, are equally prescient. Each is both a pointed, incisive, often humorous exposition, even indictment, and yet each offers an intimate portrait of Kolakowski's spiritual (...) and intellectual development. Included also are two interviews with the author. Far from believing that the author has "correct views on everything," the reader is likely to be convinced that Kolakowski is right on more than one point. One's rejection of Marxist ideology does not have to lead, he implicitly suggests, to the dismissal of the Marxist dream of a world without greed. Being criticial of this or that item in the Church's politics should not have to make one reject Jesus's teaching. Finally, being concerned with liberalism's inability to generate moral values should not lead us past the compelling reason to accept the liberal state as the only viable political alternative both to the political and cultural follies of our times and the dangers of religious theocratic temptations. What Kolakowski offers in this wonderful collection of essays is, in short, a "catechism" for non-ideological Marxists, Christians, liberals, and conservatives alike. Book jacket. (shrink)

For example, Descartes' attempt to define the role of God in man's cognitive fallibility is a reiteration of an old argument that points out the incongruity between the existence of God and evil, and his pivotal question "whence error?" is shown here to be a rephrasing of the question "whence evil?" The answer Descartes gives in the Meditations is actually a reformulation of the answer found in St. Augustine's De Libero Arbitrio and the Confessions.

Robert F. is an eighty-five-year-old who suffered a heart attack at home in a rural location some thirty minutes from any major hospital. By the time the paramedics arrived, he was unconscious and nonresponsive. After spontaneous return of circulation, they began their standard procedure of therapeutic hypothermia. Robert's core temperature was lowered using ice packs, and cold intravenous fluids were initiated. Soon afterward, Robert started to shiver when his body temperature reached 35.6° Celsius. He was then given a bolus of (...) vecuronium as a neuromuscular blockade, sedated, and intubated. He was also given a low-dose vasopressin for blood-pressure control. Shortly after Robert arrived in the emergency room, his daughter, his medical decision-maker, produced an advance directive documenting that her father has a do-not-resuscitate order, and she demanded that the breathing tube and any other life-sustaining treatments be withdrawn immediately. The medical staff is very reluctant to comply with this demand for immediate action. Until the neuromuscular blockade wears off, removing the ventilator will prevent Robert from breathing. Furthermore, it may take some time to reverse the therapeutic hypothermia procedure to the point that the patient is at normal temperature. In addition, therapeutic hypothermia itself often causes arrest, so the patient may need to be resuscitated again. Should the staff wait until the patient is warm or honor the decision of his daughter, who holds his medical power of attorney? (shrink)

Stark disparities exist in the United States' health care system. Thirty-five million Americans are uninsured, severely impeding their access to necessary health care. Concurrently, others receive health care services that are of unproven necessity and benefit. We assert that this situation is unjust and morally indefensible.

Nadler's book is the most complete account of Arnauld's philosophy available in English. First, the author tries to determine Arnauld's philosophical position independently of Descartes' influence. Secondly, and this is a main virtue of Nadler's book, it seeks to clear up the old debate between earlier commentators such as Lovejoy, Church, and Ginsburg about Arnauld's realism. Thirdly, much of the content of the book focuses on the role of the term "idea" in Arnauld's thought. The problem is whether ideas exist (...) independent of our minds or are as mind-dependent for Arnauld as they were for his critic Malebranche. Nadler tries to solve the problem in light of the theological debate which went on in the seventeenth century. If we hold Malebranche's position, Arnauld argues, we surround the mind with a "palace of ideas," cutting it off from external objects. Malebranche's reasoning, Nadler argues, is defective from a theological point of view; if ideas are êtres representatifs distingués des perceptions, or to use Descartes' language, "modalities of the soul are essentially representative of objects which are distinct from the soul," a question arises as to why God had joined soul to body "and yet not allowed the soul to perceive that body [immediately but by means of ideas?]". (shrink)

Yovel's Spinoza is the first book in any language in which an author tries to do justice to the historical and social influences of the Marranos culture on Spinoza's thought and on later thinkers. The study is divided into two parts which can be read independently. In the first volume, The Marrano of Reason, Yovel seeks to place Spinoza's thought within the framework of the culture of the Marranos, Jewish converts to Christianity. The events of the years 1411-12 in Spain, (...) when the Jews were forced to convert, created a mixture of Catholic and Jewish traditions, which along with the Marranos's later settlement in the Calvinist Netherlands, became, according to Yovel, the background for Spinoza's philosophy. (shrink)

The central metaphysical question of Leibniz's Discourse on Metaphysics is how to distinguish the actions of God from those of his creatures. In his letter to Arnauld of April 30, 1687, Leibniz wrote that as long as one does not have the knowledge of what a substance is "one will have nothing on which to settle... a solid principle." Thus it seems that the answer to the question of substance is at the same time the solution to the problem of (...) metaphysics. Alas the problem begins where the solution lies. There are four different theories of substance in Leibniz's writings, so the question arises as to which of them provides the answer to Leibnizian metaphysics. (shrink)

In this lucid and elegant book, originally written in 1966, Kolakowski's goal is to trace "the presence of myth" in nonmythical areas of experience such as science, logic, and love. The author's understanding of myth goes slightly beyond the traditional usage, "the truth symbolically presented." The function of myth, Kolakowski claims, "is to catch a permanently constitutive element of culture", which keeps our culture alive. But what is this element? Myth, according to Kolakowski, imposes meaning on the world of phenomena, (...) and at the same time explains our place in it. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 41.2 (2003) 275-276 [Access article in PDF] Zbigniew Janowski. Cartesian Theodicy: Descartes' Quest for Certitude. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2002. Pp. 181. Cloth, $30.00. Janowski begins this original and erudite work by saying that although "the Meditations have never [before] been interpreted as a theodicy... insofar as theodicy is concerned with examining the relationship between the existence of evil on the one hand and God's (...) omnipotence and benevolence on the other, Descartes's question 'How would the goodness of God not preclude the possibility that nature is deceptive?' is in perfect conformity with, and continues the long tradition of, Christian apologetics" (13). This is not to deny Descartes's primary role in replacing God's causal role in nature with mechanistic science, and his separating religious truth from that of reason. But Descartes also is profoundly concerned with problems of error, evil, God's role in our sins, and Absolute Truth. Janowski is concerned "to show how Descartes' philosophy is derived from the early-seventeenth-century debates over divine and human freedom" by concentrating on the "incongruity between the existence of an omnipotent and benevolent Creator and man's imperfect nature [and] the nature and scope of human freedom" (19). He presents "the problem of error... as the problem of evil; the problem of human will... as the problem of human freedom, and the quest for Certitude... as theodicy, that is, as the vindication of God's goodness and omnipotence" (19-20). His ground for this is his interpretation of Cartesianism as "a kind of epistemological Augustinianism" (20).The view of basic Christian theology is that God is omnipotent and benevolent, and that all his creations are good, so evil is merely the absence of good. According to Descartes, free will makes both error and evil possible. But Augustine says that after the Fall of Man, free will is corrupt and can incline only to evil. So the only good man can do is by way of God's grace, which man cannot resist, for man is not really free to choose between good and evil. But here, Descartes is in disagreement with Augustine. Again, theodicy concerns the problem of the apparent discrepancy between the power of the creator and the imperfections of creation. And the problem is that Descartes's God is an all-powerful being that is absolutely unlimited and creates everything including logical, moral, and legal principles. Descartes's God is not constrained by the principles of non-contradiction (as opposed to St. Thomas's God, who is so constrained). Descartes's argument is that only God is immutable, nothing created is immutable, so no principle created by God, not the Ten Commandments, not the principle of non-contradiction, is immutable.This doctrine of indifferently created eternal truths allies Descartes with the Molinists who argue that God is indifferent in the sense of all powerful, and that humans have a freedom of indifference in that even given grace, they can decide to do either good or evil. This is in opposition to Augustinians and Jansenists who believe that human will corrupted by the Fall of Man can choose only evil until God gives one grace, after which one can choose only good—which, in either case, rules out any notion of freedom of choice between good and evil by an indifferent free will. Descartes believes that we can choose evil even when God gives us grace to choose good. Descartes does follow Augustine in asserting that for God, knowing and willing are the same, in opposition to St. Thomas. But for humans, knowing and willing are separate, and so humans can both err and sin.Descartes's theodicy is that everything depends on God—physics, mathematics, morals, and law. Without God there would be only nihilism. A great difficulty with this doctrine of eternal truths, however, is that it "makes the nature of God completely incomprehensible to man" (102). This is the doctrine of the Hidden God. But in a backhanded way, it saves Descartes's position. He argues that... (shrink)

Richard A. Watson - Augustinian-Cartesian Index: Texts and Commentary - Journal of the History of Philosophy 43:3 Journal of the History of Philosophy 43.3 359-361 Zbigniew Janowski. Augustinian-Cartesian Index: Texts and Commentary. South Bend, IN: St. Augustine's Press, 2004. Pp. xv + 275. Cloth, $35.00. This is an English translation and substantial expansion of the French edition . Besides augmenting Augustinian citations, Janowski has added indices and commentaries for Saint Thomas Aquinas, John Duns Scotus, Francis Bacon, and Montaigne. The result (...) is a crucial compilation and analysis of the major textual sources of Descartes's philosophy. Janowski demonstrates that Descartes's metaphysics is foundationally Augustinian, particularly in his dependence on the doctrine of God's creation of eternal truths: "the idea that God creates by an act of understanding" . This doctrine was, in fact, left out of the Meditations. Janowski argues that it logically belongs in the fourth Meditation but was deleted because it was almost universally denied by the.. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Descartes’ Meditations: Background Source Materials ed. by Roger Ariew, John Cottingham, and Tom SorellRichard A. WatsonRoger Ariew, John Cottingham, and Tom Sorell, editors. Descartes’ Meditations: Background Source Materials. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. Pp. xviii + 170. Cloth, $54.95. Paper, $18.95.This volume includes primarily source materials from authors who were contemporary to Descartes’s composition of the Meditations. Thus there are no selections from Augustine, Aquinas, and Montaigne, for (...) example, who were more influential on the Meditations than some of the authors excerpted. Of course their influence is already amply documented by such scholars as Gilson and Gouhier. Probably the most important source included is Suárez, whose role is championed by Jean-Luc Marion in several works. Readers should look for the forthcoming Index Augustino-Cartèsian: Textes et Commentaire by Zbigniew Janowski (Paris: J. Vrin) for a startling challenge to the view that Descartes is Suárezian.In the volume under review, Eustachius a Sancto Paulo is of special interest because Descartes thought of refuting him item by item (but decided exposition of his own view would be adequate). In his youth Descartes had a definite interest in Petrus Ramus, although Beeckman told him his method consisted of tired old tricks. Francisco Sanches and Pierre Charron are important for their expositions of sceptical arguments and attitudes. Christopher Clavius is Descartes’s direct predecessor in mathematical analysis, and none of Descartes’s protests that he never read the man has convinced anyone. Scipion Dupleix is a fine example of how the Old Philosophy appeared to the New Philosophers, and Marin Mersenne, of course, compiled material on every subject Descartes ever had an interest in. Pierre Gassendi exercised Descartes’s ire more than any other commentator on the Meditations, and Descartes again probably read Gassendi’s continuing criticisms even though he claimed he wouldn’t. [End Page 366]Of special interest is Jean de Silhon, an old friend of Descartes’s who published a book containing a proto-cogito three years before the Meditations appeared. François de la Mothe le Vayer represents the libertine strain many detect in Descartes’s writings, while Jean-Baptiste Morin provides fodder for those who detect Descartes’s piety, although Descartes asserts that the man is an idiot for defending the immobility of the earth. Finally, Charles Sorel provides an example of the deductive mode of exposition in a text that shows that the notion of a unified science was more than Cartesian. One contemporary who was left out and should have been included was the Augustinian Guillaume Gibieuf.But overall, this is an interesting and useful collection of works Descartes doubtless knew. [End Page 367]Richard A. WatsonWashington UniversityCopyright © 1999 Johns Hopkins University Press... (shrink)

Marking the 50th anniversary of one among this philosopher's most distinguished pieces, Blumenberg's Rhetoric proffers a decidedly dialogic and diversified interaction with the essay polyvalently entitled 'Anthropological Approach to the Actuality and Topicality (or Currency, Relevance) of Rhetoric' (Anthropologische Annäherung an die Aktualität der Rhetorik), first published in 1971. Following Blumenberg's lead, the contributors consider and tackle their topics rhetorically, 'in utramque partem vel in plures'--treating (inter alia) the variegated discourses of Phenomenology, the History of Philosophy, Anthropology, and the téchne (...) itself from a plurality of viewpoints. Quasi in actu--as a mise en abyme of this rhetorical method par excellence--said accent on approaching any matter polyperspectivally is reflected in the proceedings of the live(ly) discussions having taken place in preparation for the present volume. Along with the diachronically extensive, disciplinarily diverse essays, this publication of the actual academic interplay--notably in the current lingua franca--will facilitate, and is to conduce to, further scholarship with respect to Blumenberg and the art of rhetoric. (shrink)

Lectures based on the commentaries on Brahmasūtra of Bādarāyaṇa.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:James's Faith-Ladder JAMES C. S. WERNHAM JAMES WROTE OFTEN of a "faith-ladder."' What he said about it has drawn some side-glances from critics, but not yet any sustained and careful look.' That is surprising, for what he says is puzzling enough to invite inquiry. It is also important enough to deserve it. His presentations of the ladder show significant variation, so it is useful to look at a generous (...) sample. In the interest of brevity the following six passages have been extracted from contexts which sometimes have an important bearing on them. The unquoted contexts will get attention as needed. 1. "The inner process is a succession of 'synthetic judgments'. What is so good, may be, ought to be, must be, shall be,--so far as I am concerned, I won't admit the opposite. ''s 2. "[W]e have a conception which being opposed by another is only probab /e. But we feel, it is so good that it isfit to be true, it ought to be true, it must be true etc. And then we say it shall be true for me, it/s true. ''4 3- "Its [faith's] natural logic is the Sorites: fit to be, ought to be, may be, must be, shall be, is etc.''5 4. "The following steps may be called the 'faith-ladder': ~. There is nothing absurd in a certain view of the world being true, nothing self-contradictory; ' To the best of my knowledge, the name "faith-ladder'"does not occur before 19o6. It occurs in "Faith and Reason" and in "Faith and the Right to Believe," both written in that year. But expositions of the thing predate the name. They are found as early as 1899, and in close connection with the will-to-believe doctrine. 9 Levinson's discussion is a partial exception. His treatment is more extended than most. See H. S. Levinson, $c/ence, Metaphysicsand the Chan~e of Salvation (Missoula, MT: Scholars Press, 1978), 161--67; also his The Religious Investigations of Wdliam James (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 198 0, 231-34. s Letter to Baldwin, quoted in'R. B. Perry, The Thoughtand Characterof WilliamJames, 2 vols. (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1935), 2: 243. 4 Letter to Marshall, Feb. 9, 1899, quoted in Perry, Thought and Character,2: 24~. 5 William James, A Pluralistic Universe (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard Universit~t Press, 1977), 199. [1o5] lO6 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 28" 1 JANUARY I990 2. If might have been true under certain conditions; 3- It may be true even now; 4. It isfit to be true; 5- It ought to be true; 6. It must be true; 7- It s/m//be true, at any rate true for me. ''6 5. "Faith's form of argument is something like this: Considering a view of the world: 'It isfit to be true', she feels; 'it would be well if it were true; it might be true; it may be true; it ought to be true', she says; 'it must be true', she continues; 'it shall be true', she concludes, 'for me; that is, I will treat it as if it were true so far as my advocacy and actions are concerned'. ''7 6. "A conception of the world arises in you somehow, no matter how. Is it true or not? you ask. It might be true somewhere, you say, for it is not self-contradictory. It may be true, you continue, even here and now. It is fit to be true, it would be well if it were true, it ought to be true, you presently feel. It must be true, something persuasive in you whispers next; and then--as a final result--it shall be held for true, you decide; it shall be as if true, for you. ''s 9. Between these statements there are clear similarities and clear differences too. Some of them deserve to be noted, some to be noted and explored. a. In these accounts of it the ladder varies in the number of its rungs. By James's own count in one place, it has as many as seven. In... (shrink)

1. Hoi dialektikes morphes tēs pousias ston synchrono kosmo -- 2. Skepseis panō stēn agōnia, ston phovo, kai ston chrono ston Kierkegaard.

Contributed articles on self-realization.