139 found
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  1. Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind.Jerry A. FODOR - 1987 - MIT Press.
  2. Representations: Philosophical Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science.Jerry A. Fodor - 1981 - MIT Press.
  3. The Language of Thought.Jerry A. Fodor - 1975 - Harvard University Press.
    INTRODUCTION: TWO KINDS OF RLDUCTIONISM The man who laughs is the one who has not yet heard the terrible news. BERTHOLD BRECHT I propose, in this book, ...
  4. Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong.Jerry A. Fodor - 1998 - Oxford University Press.
    The renowned philosopher Jerry Fodor, a leading figure in the study of the mind for more than twenty years, presents a strikingly original theory on the basic constituents of thought. He suggests that the heart of cognitive science is its theory of concepts, and that cognitive scientists have gone badly wrong in many areas because their assumptions about concepts have been mistaken. Fodor argues compellingly for an atomistic theory of concepts, deals out witty and pugnacious demolitions of rival theories, and (...)
  5. Lot 2: The Language of Thought Revisited.Jerry A. Fodor - 2008 - Oxford University Press.
    Jerry Fodor presents a new development of his famous Language of Thought hypothesis, which has since the 1970s been at the centre of interdisciplinary debate about how the mind works. Fodor defends and extends the groundbreaking idea that thinking is couched in a symbolic system realized in the brain. This idea is central to the representational theory of mind which Fodor has established as a key reference point in modern philosophy, psychology, and cognitive science. The foundation stone of our present (...)
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  6. The Mind Doesn't Work That Way: The Scope and Limits of Computational Psychology.Jerry A. Fodor - 2000 - MIT Press.
    Jerry Fodor argues against the widely held view that mental processes are largely computations, that the architecture of cognition is massively modular, and...
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  7. Connectionism and Cognitive Architecture: A Critical Analysis.Jerry A. Fodor & Zenon W. Pylyshyn - 1988 - Cognition 28 (1-2):3-71.
    This paper explores the difference between Connectionist proposals for cognitive a r c h i t e c t u r e a n d t h e s o r t s o f m o d e l s t hat have traditionally been assum e d i n c o g n i t i v e s c i e n c e . W e c l a i m t h a t t h (...)
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  8.  46
    Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind.Jerry A. FODOR - 1987 - Journal of Philosophy 85 (7):384-389.
  9.  12
    The Language of Thought.Jerry A. Fodor - 1975 - Noûs 14 (1):120-124.
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  10.  15
    Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning In the Philosophy of Mind.Jerry A. FODOR - 1987 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (1):235-240.
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  11. Holism: A Shopper's Guide.Jerry A. Fodor & Ernest Lepore - 1992 - Blackwell.
  12. The Elm and the Expert.Jerry A. Fodor - 1994 - MIT Press.
    This book is largely a reconsideration of the arguments that are supposed to ground this consensus.
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  13. Special Sciences.Jerry A. Fodor - 1974 - Synthese 28 (2):97-115.
  14. Precis of the Modularity of Mind.Jerry A. Fodor - 1985 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (1):1-42.
    The Modularity of Mind proposes an alternative to the or view of cognitive architecture that has dominated several decades of cognitive science. Whereas interactionism stresses the continuity of perceptual and cognitive processes, modularity theory argues for their distinctness. It is argued, in particular, that the apparent plausibility of New Look theorizing derives from the failure to distinguish between the (correct) claim that perceptual processes are inferential and the (dubious) claim that they are unencapsidated, that is, that they are arbitrarily sensitive (...)
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  15. Psychological Explanation: An Introduction To The Philosophy Of Psychology.Jerry A. Fodor - 1968 - Ny: Random House.
  16. The Modularity of Mind.Jerry A. Fodor - 1983 - MIT Press.
    One of the most notable aspects of Fodor's work is that it articulates features not only of speculative cognitive architectures but also of current research in ...
  17. How Direct is Visual Perception? Some Reflections on Gibson's 'Ecological Approach'.Jerry A. Fodor & Zenon W. Pylyshyn - 1981 - Cognition 9 (2):139-96.
    Examines the theses that the postulation of mental processing is unnecessary to account for our perceptual relationship with the world, see turvey etal. for a criticque.
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  18. What Darwin Got Wrong.Jerry A. Fodor - 2010 - Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
    What kind of theory is the theory of natural selection? -- Internal constraints : what the new biology tells us -- Whole genomes, networks, modules and other complexities -- Many constraints, many environments -- The return of the laws of form -- Many are called but few are chosen : the problem of 'selection-for' -- No exit? : some responses to the problem of 'selection-for' -- Did the dodo lose its ecological niche? : or was it the other way around? (...)
     
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  19. The Modularity of Mind.Jerry A. Fodor - 1983 - In Zenon W. Pylyshyn (ed.), Philosophical Review. Ablex. pp. 101-108.
  20. The Compositionality Papers.Jerry A. Fodor & Ernest Lepore (eds.) - 2002 - Oxford University Press.
    Ernie Lepore and Jerry Fodor have published a series of original and controversial essays on issues relating to compositionality in language and mind; they have...
  21. The Mind-Body Problem.Jerry A. Fodor - 1981 - Scientific American 244:114-25.
  22. The Revenge of the Given.Jerry A. Fodor - 2007 - In Brian P. McLaughlin & Jonathan D. Cohen (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell. pp. 105--116.
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  23. Special Sciences: Still Autonomous After All These Years.Jerry A. Fodor - 1997 - Philosophical Perspectives 11 (s11):149-63.
  24. What Psychological States Are Not.Ned Block & Jerry A. Fodor - 1972 - Philosophical Review 81 (April):159-81.
  25. A Reply to Churchland's `Perceptual Plasticity and Theoretical Neutrality'.Jerry A. Fodor - 1988 - Philosophy of Science 55 (June):188-98.
    Churchland's paper "Perceptual Plasticity and Theoretical Neutrality" offers empirical, semantical and epistemological arguments intended to show that the cognitive impenetrability of perception "does not establish a theory-neutral foundation for knowledge" and that the psychological account of perceptual encapsulation that I set forth in The Modularity of Mind "[is] almost certainly false". The present paper considers these arguments in detail and dismisses them.
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  26. Having Concepts: A Brief Refutation of the Twentieth Century.Jerry A. Fodor - 2004 - Mind and Language 19 (1):29-47.
  27. Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong.Jerry A. Fodor - 1998 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 62 (3):609-612.
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  28. Making Mind Matter More.Jerry A. Fodor - 1989 - Philosophical Topics 17 (11):59-79.
  29. Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind.Jerry A. FODOR - 1987 - Erkenntnis 33 (2):251-259.
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  30. Propositional Attitudes.Jerry A. Fodor - 1978 - The Monist 61 (October):501-23.
    Some philosophers hold that philosophy is what you do to a problem until it’s clear enough to solve it by doing science. Others hold that if a philosophical problem succumbs to empirical methods, that shows it wasn’t really philosophical to begin with. Either way, the facts seem clear enough: questions first mooted by philosophers are sometimes coopted by people who do experiments. This seems to be happening now to the question: “what are propositional attitudes?” and cognitive psychology is the science (...)
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  31. The Appeal to Tacit Knowledge in Psychological Explanation.Jerry A. Fodor - 1968 - Journal of Philosophy 65 (October):627-40.
  32. Representations: Philosophical Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science.Jerry A. Fodor - 1983 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 34 (2):175-182.
     
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  33. Special Sciences, or Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis.Jerry A. Fodor - 1974 - Synthese 28 (2):97--115.
     
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  34. The Specificity of Language Skills.Jerry A. Fodor, Thomas G. Bever & Mary Garrett - 1974 - In The Psychology of Language. Mcgraw-Hill.
     
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  35. Psychological Explanation.Jerry A. Fodor - 1972 - Philosophy of Science 39 (1):95-97.
  36. The Present Status of the Innateness Controversy.Jerry A. Fodor - 1981 - In Jerry Fodor (ed.), RePresentations: Philosophical Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. pp. 257-316.
     
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  37.  10
    The Compositionality Papers.Jerry A. Fodor & Ernie Lepore - 2004 - Mind 113 (450):340-344.
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  38. A Theory of Content I.Jerry A. Fodor - 1990 - In A Theory of Content. MIT Press.
  39.  10
    Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind.Dan Lloyd & Jerry A. Fodor - 1991 - Philosophical Review 100 (2):289.
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  40. The Language of Thought.Jerry A. Fodor - 1975 - Synthese 38 (1):161-167.
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  41.  9
    Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong.Jerry A. Fodor - 1998 - Synthese 123 (1):131-151.
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  42. Language, Thought and Compositionality.Jerry A. Fodor - 2001 - Mind and Language 16 (1):1-15.
  43. Semantics, Wisconsin Style.Jerry A. Fodor - 1984 - Synthese 59 (3):231-50.
  44. Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind.Jerry A. FODOR - 1987 - Behavior and Philosophy 18 (1):59-61.
     
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  45. Imagistic Representation.Jerry A. Fodor - 1975 - In Ned Block (ed.), The Language of Thought. Harvard University Press. pp. 63--86.
  46.  3
    Hume Variations.Jerry A. Fodor - 2003 - Mind 114 (453):141-145.
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  47.  91
    Tom Swift and His Procedural Grandmother.Jerry A. Fodor - 1978 - Cognition 6 (September):229-47.
  48. Modules, Frames, Fridgeons, Sleeping Dogs, and the Music of the Spheres.Jerry A. Fodor - 1987 - In Zenon W. Pylyshyn (ed.), The Robot's Dilemma. Ablex. pp. 139--49.
     
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  49. On the Impossibility of Acquiring 'More Powerful' Structures.Jerry A. Fodor - 1980 - In Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini (ed.), Language and Learning: The Debate Between Jean Piaget and Noam Chomsky. Harvard University Press.
  50. The Elm and the Expert. Mentalese and Its Semantics.Jerry A. Fodor - 1995 - Philosophy 70 (272):293-298.
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