116 found
  1. The Language of Thought.Jerry A. Fodor - 1975 - Harvard University Press.
    INTRODUCTION: TWO KINDS OF RLDUCTIONISM The man who laughs is the one who has not yet heard the terrible news. BERTHOLD BRECHT I propose, in this book, ...
  2. Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind.Jerry A. Fodor - 1987 - MIT Press. Edited by Margaret A. Boden.
    Preface 1 Introduction: The Persistence of the Attitudes 2 Individualism and Supervenience 3 Meaning Holism 4 Meaning and the World Order Epilogue Creation Myth Appendix Why There Still Has to be a Language of Thought Notes References Author Index.
  3.  66
    The Modularity of Mind: An Essay on Faculty Psychology.Jerry A. Fodor - 1983 - Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
    This study synthesizes current information from the various fields of cognitive science in support of a new and exciting theory of mind. Most psychologists study horizontal processes like memory and information flow; Fodor postulates a vertical and modular psychological organization underlying biologically coherent behaviors. This view of mental architecture is consistent with the historical tradition of faculty psychology while integrating a computational approach to mental processes. One of the most notable aspects of Fodor's work is that it articulates features not (...)
  4.  94
    Representations: philosophical essays on the foundations of cognitive science.Jerry A. Fodor - 1981 - Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
    Introduction: Something on the State of the Art 1 I. Functionalism and Realism 1. Operationalism and Ordinary Language 35 2. The Appeal to Tacit Knowledge in Psychological Explanations 63 3. What Psychological States are Not 79 4. Three Cheers for Propositional Attitudes 100 II. Reduction and Unity of Science 5. Special Sciences 127 6. Computation and Reduction 146 III. Intensionality and Mental Representation 7. Propositional Attitudes 177 8. Tom Swift and His Procedural Grandmother 204 9. Methodological Solipsism Considered as a (...)
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  5. Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong.Jerry A. Fodor - 1998 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
    The renowned philosopher Jerry Fodor, a leading figure in the study of the mind for more than twenty years, presents a strikingly original theory on the basic constituents of thought. He suggests that the heart of cognitive science is its theory of concepts, and that cognitive scientists have gone badly wrong in many areas because their assumptions about concepts have been mistaken. Fodor argues compellingly for an atomistic theory of concepts, deals out witty and pugnacious demolitions of rival theories, and (...)
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  6. Connectionism and cognitive architecture: A critical analysis.Jerry A. Fodor & Zenon W. Pylyshyn - 1988 - Cognition 28 (1-2):3-71.
    This paper explores the difference between Connectionist proposals for cognitive a r c h i t e c t u r e a n d t h e s o r t s o f m o d e l s t hat have traditionally been assum e d i n c o g n i t i v e s c i e n c e . W e c l a i m t h a t t h (...)
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  7. The Modularity of Mind: An Essay on Faculty Psychology.Jerry A. Fodor - 1983 - MIT Press.
    One of the most notable aspects of Fodor's work is that it articulates features not only of speculative cognitive architectures but also of current research in ...
  8. Psychological Explanation: An Introduction To The Philosophy Of Psychology.Jerry A. Fodor - 1968 - Ny: Random House.
  9. The Mind Doesn’T Work That Way: The Scope and Limits of Computational Psychology.Jerry A. Fodor - 2000 - MIT Press.
    Jerry Fodor argues against the widely held view that mental processes are largely computations, that the architecture of cognition is massively modular, and...
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  10. Methodological solipsism considered as a research strategy in cognitive psychology.Jerry A. Fodor - 1979 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):63-73.
  11. Lot 2: The Language of Thought Revisited.Jerry A. Fodor - 2008 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by Jerry A. Fodor.
    Jerry Fodor presents a new development of his famous Language of Thought hypothesis, which has since the 1970s been at the centre of interdisciplinary debate about how the mind works. Fodor defends and extends the groundbreaking idea that thinking is couched in a symbolic system realized in the brain. This idea is central to the representational theory of mind which Fodor has established as a key reference point in modern philosophy, psychology, and cognitive science. The foundation stone of our present (...)
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  12. Holism: A Shopper's Guide.Jerry A. Fodor & Ernest Lepore - 1992 - Cambridge, Mass., USA: Blackwell. Edited by Ernest LePore.
  13. Special sciences.Jerry A. Fodor - 1974 - Synthese 28 (2):97-115.
  14. The Elm and the Expert: Mentalese and Its Semantics.Jerry A. Fodor - 1994 - MIT Press.
    This book is largely a reconsideration of the arguments that are supposed to ground this consensus.
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  15.  11
    The Elm and the Expert: Mentalese and its Semantics.Jerry A. Fodor - 1995 - MIT Press.
    Written in a highly readable, irreverent style, The Elm and the Expert provides a lively discussion of semantic issues about mental representation, with special attention to issues raised by Frege's problem, Twin cases, and the putative indeterminacy of reference. Bound to be widely read and much discussed, The Elm and the Expert, written in Jerry Fodor's usual highly readable, irreverent style, provides a lively discussion of semantic issues about mental representation, with special attention to issues raised by Frege's problem, Twin (...)
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  16. Precis of the modularity of mind.Jerry A. Fodor - 1985 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (1):1-42.
    The Modularity of Mind proposes an alternative to the or view of cognitive architecture that has dominated several decades of cognitive science. Whereas interactionism stresses the continuity of perceptual and cognitive processes, modularity theory argues for their distinctness. It is argued, in particular, that the apparent plausibility of New Look theorizing derives from the failure to distinguish between the (correct) claim that perceptual processes are inferential and the (dubious) claim that they are unencapsidated, that is, that they are arbitrarily sensitive (...)
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  17. How direct is visual perception? Some reflections on Gibson's 'ecological approach'.Jerry A. Fodor & Zenon W. Pylyshyn - 1981 - Cognition 9 (2):139-96.
    Examines the theses that the postulation of mental processing is unnecessary to account for our perceptual relationship with the world, see turvey etal. for a criticque.
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  18. What psychological states are not.Ned Block & Jerry A. Fodor - 1972 - Philosophical Review 81 (April):159-81.
  19. The appeal to tacit knowledge in psychological explanation.Jerry A. Fodor - 1968 - Journal of Philosophy 65 (October):627-40.
  20. Fodor’s Guide to Mental Representation: The Intelligent Auntie’s Vade-Mecum.Jerry A. Fodor - 1985 - Mind 94 (373):76-100.
  21. The Compositionality Papers.Jerry A. Fodor & Ernest LePore (eds.) - 2002 - Oxford University Press.
    Ernie Lepore and Jerry Fodor have published a series of original and controversial essays on issues relating to compositionality in language and mind; they have...
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  22.  12
    What Darwin got wrong.Jerry A. Fodor - 2010 - New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. Edited by Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini.
    This book dares to challenge natural selection--not in the name of religion but in the name of good science. Most scientists are so terrified of religious attacks on the theory of evolution that it is never examined critically. There are significant scientific and philosophical problems with the theory of natural selection. Darwin claimed the factors that determine the course of evolution are very largely environmental. Empirical results in biology are increasingly calling this thesis into question. The authors show that Darwinism (...)
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  23. The present status of the innateness controversy.Jerry A. Fodor - 1981 - In Jerry Fodor (ed.), RePresentations: Philosophical Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. pp. 257-316.
  24. Propositional attitudes.Jerry A. Fodor - 1978 - The Monist 61 (October):501-23.
    Some philosophers hold that philosophy is what you do to a problem until it’s clear enough to solve it by doing science. Others hold that if a philosophical problem succumbs to empirical methods, that shows it wasn’t really philosophical to begin with. Either way, the facts seem clear enough: questions first mooted by philosophers are sometimes coopted by people who do experiments. This seems to be happening now to the question: “what are propositional attitudes?” and cognitive psychology is the science (...)
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  25. Making mind matter more.Jerry A. Fodor - 1989 - Philosophical Topics 17 (11):59-79.
  26. The revenge of the given.Jerry A. Fodor - 2007 - In Brian P. McLaughlin & Jonathan D. Cohen (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell. pp. 105--116.
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  27. A Reply to Churchland’s “Perceptual Plasticity and Theoretical Neutrality‘.Jerry A. Fodor - 1988 - Philosophy of Science 55 (June):188-98.
    Churchland's paper "Perceptual Plasticity and Theoretical Neutrality" offers empirical, semantical and epistemological arguments intended to show that the cognitive impenetrability of perception "does not establish a theory-neutral foundation for knowledge" and that the psychological account of perceptual encapsulation that I set forth in The Modularity of Mind "[is] almost certainly false". The present paper considers these arguments in detail and dismisses them.
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  28.  18
    Hume Variations.Jerry A. Fodor - 2003 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
    Hume? Yes, David Hume, that's who Jerry Fodor looks to for help in advancing our understanding of the mind. Fodor claims his Treatise of Human Nature as the foundational document of cognitive science: it launched the project of constructing an empirical psychology on the basis of a representational theory of mind. Going back to this work after more than 250 years we find that Hume is remarkably perceptive about the components and structure that a theory of mind requires. Careful study (...)
  29. Representations: Philosophical Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science.Jerry A. Fodor - 1983 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 34 (2):175-182.
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  30. You can fool some of the people all of the time, everything else being equal: Hedged laws and psychological explanation.Jerry A. Fodor - 1991 - Mind 100 (397):19-34.
  31. A Theory of the Child’s Theory of Mind.Jerry A. Fodor - 1992 - Cognition 44 (3):283-296.
  32. Semantics, wisconsin style.Jerry A. Fodor - 1984 - Synthese 59 (3):231-50.
  33. The specificity of language skills.Jerry A. Fodor, Thomas G. Bever & Mary Garrett - 1974 - In The Psychology of Language. Mcgraw-Hill.
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  34. A theory of content I.Jerry A. Fodor - 1990 - In A Theory of Content. MIT Press.
  35.  9
    In Critical Condition: Polemical Essays on Cognitive Science and the Philosophy of Mind.Jerry A. Fodor - 1998 - MIT Press.
    PREFACE PART I METAPHYSICS Review of John McDowell’s Mind and World Special Sciences: Still Autonomous after All These Years Conclusion Acknowledgment Notes PART II CONCEPTS Review of Christopher Peacocke’s A Study of Concepts Notes There Are No Recognitional Concepts--Not Even RED Introduction Compositionality Why Premise P is Plausible Objections Conclusion Afterword Acknowledgment Notes There Are No Recognitional Concepts--Not Even RED, Part 2: The Plot Thickens Introduction: The Story ’til Now Compositonality and Learnability Notes Do We Think in Mentalese? Remarks on (...)
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  36. Imagistic representation.Jerry A. Fodor - 1980 - In Ned Block (ed.), Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Volume II. Harvard University Press. pp. 135-149.
  37.  44
    Making Mind Matter More.Jerry A. Fodor - 1989 - Philosophical Topics 17 (1):59-79.
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  38. A modal argument for narrow content.Jerry A. Fodor - 1991 - Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):5-26.
  39. Tom swift and his procedural grandmother.Jerry A. Fodor - 1978 - Cognition 6 (September):229-47.
  40. Fixation of Belief and Concept Acquisition.Jerry A. Fodor - 1980 - In Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini (ed.), Language and Learning: The Debate Between Jean Piaget and Noam Chomsky. Harvard University Press. pp. 142-162.
  41. Language, thought and compositionality.Jerry A. Fodor - 2001 - Mind and Language 16 (1):1-15.
  42. Hume Variations.Jerry A. Fodor - 2003 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 195 (2):243-244.
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  43.  19
    Special Sciences.Jerry A. Fodor - 1995 - In Paul K. Moser & J. D. Trout (eds.), Contemporary Materialism: A Reader. London: Routledge. pp. 51-64.
  44. Why paramecia don't have mental representations.Jerry A. Fodor - 1986 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10 (1):3-23.
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  45. Modules, frames, fridgeons, sleeping dogs, and the music of the spheres.Jerry A. Fodor - 1987 - In Zenon W. Pylyshyn (ed.), The Robot's Dilemma: the Frame Problem in Artificial Intelligence. Ablex. pp. 139--49.
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  46. Concepts; A Potboiler.Jerry A. Fodor - 1995 - Philosophical Issues 6:1-24.
  47. Information and representation.Jerry A. Fodor - 1990 - In Philip P. Hanson (ed.), Information, Language and Cognition. University of British Columbia Press.
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  48. Doing Without What’s Within: Fiona Cowie’s Critique of Nativism. [REVIEW]Jerry A. Fodor - 2001 - Mind 110 (437):99-148.
  49. Cognitive science and the twin-earth problem.Jerry A. Fodor - 1982 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 23 (April):98-118.
    "Twin earth" examples have motivated a number of proposals for the lexicography of kind terms in natural languages. It is argued that these proposals create unacceptable difficulties for the analysis of de dicto propositional attitudes. A conservative solution of the twin earth problems is then proposed according to which they reflect pragmatic features of language use rather than semantic features of lexical content.
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  50. Information and association.Jerry A. Fodor - 1986 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 27 (July):307-323.
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