200 found
Jerry A. Fodor [121]Jerry Fodor [79]
  1. The Language of Thought.Jerry A. Fodor - 1975 - Harvard University Press.
    INTRODUCTION: TWO KINDS OF RLDUCTIONISM The man who laughs is the one who has not yet heard the terrible news. BERTHOLD BRECHT I propose, in this book, ...
    Direct download (3 more)  
    Export citation  
    Bookmark   1594 citations  
  2. Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind.Jerry A. Fodor - 1987 - MIT Press.
    Preface 1 Introduction: The Persistence of the Attitudes 2 Individualism and Supervenience 3 Meaning Holism 4 Meaning and the World Order Epilogue Creation Myth Appendix Why There Still Has to be a Language of Thought Notes References Author Index.
    Direct download (2 more)  
    Export citation  
    Bookmark   1074 citations  
  3. Representations: Philosophical Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science.Jerry A. Fodor - 1981 - MIT Press.
    Introduction: Something on the State of the Art 1 I. Functionalism and Realism 1. Operationalism and Ordinary Language 35 2. The Appeal to Tacit Knowledge in Psychological Explanations 63 3. What Psychological States are Not 79 4. Three Cheers for Propositional Attitudes 100 II. Reduction and Unity of Science 5. Special Sciences 127 6. Computation and Reduction 146 III. Intensionality and Mental Representation 7. Propositional Attitudes 177 8. Tom Swift and His Procedural Grandmother 204 9. Methodological Solipsism Considered as a (...)
    Export citation  
    Bookmark   656 citations  
  4.  19
    The Modularity of Mind.Jerry A. Fodor - 1983 - Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
  5. Connectionism and Cognitive Architecture: A Critical Analysis.Jerry A. Fodor & Zenon W. Pylyshyn - 1988 - Cognition 28 (1-2):3-71.
    This paper explores the difference between Connectionist proposals for cognitive a r c h i t e c t u r e a n d t h e s o r t s o f m o d e l s t hat have traditionally been assum e d i n c o g n i t i v e s c i e n c e . W e c l a i m t h a t t h (...)
    Direct download (14 more)  
    Export citation  
    Bookmark   930 citations  
  6. Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong.Jerry A. Fodor - 1998 - Oxford University Press.
    The renowned philosopher Jerry Fodor, a leading figure in the study of the mind for more than twenty years, presents a strikingly original theory on the basic constituents of thought. He suggests that the heart of cognitive science is its theory of concepts, and that cognitive scientists have gone badly wrong in many areas because their assumptions about concepts have been mistaken. Fodor argues compellingly for an atomistic theory of concepts, deals out witty and pugnacious demolitions of rival theories, and (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
    Export citation  
    Bookmark   406 citations  
  7. The Modularity of Mind: An Essay on Faculty Psychology.Jerry A. Fodor - 1983 - MIT Press.
    One of the most notable aspects of Fodor's work is that it articulates features not only of speculative cognitive architectures but also of current research in ...
    Direct download (3 more)  
    Export citation  
    Bookmark   350 citations  
  8. The Psychology of Language: An Introduction to Psycholinguistics and Generative Grammar.Jerry Fodor, Bever A., Garrett T. G. & F. M. - 1974 - Mcgraw-Hill.
  9.  37
    The Modularity of Mind.Robert Cummins & Jerry Fodor - 1985 - Philosophical Review 94 (1):101.
  10. Methodological Solipsism Considered as a Research Strategy in Cognitive Psychology.Jerry A. Fodor - 1979 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):63-73.
  11. Lot 2: The Language of Thought Revisited.Jerry A. Fodor - 2008 - Oxford University Press.
    Jerry Fodor presents a new development of his famous Language of Thought hypothesis, which has since the 1970s been at the centre of interdisciplinary debate about how the mind works. Fodor defends and extends the groundbreaking idea that thinking is couched in a symbolic system realized in the brain. This idea is central to the representational theory of mind which Fodor has established as a key reference point in modern philosophy, psychology, and cognitive science. The foundation stone of our present (...)
    Direct download  
    Export citation  
    Bookmark   179 citations  
  12. The Mind Doesn’T Work That Way: The Scope and Limits of Computational Psychology.Jerry A. Fodor - 2000 - MIT Press.
    Jerry Fodor argues against the widely held view that mental processes are largely computations, that the architecture of cognition is massively modular, and...
    Direct download (3 more)  
    Export citation  
    Bookmark   273 citations  
  13. Holism: A Shopper's Guide.Jerry A. Fodor & Ernest Lepore - 1992 - Blackwell.
  14. A Theory of Content and Other Essays.Jerry A. Fodor - 1990 - MIT Press.
    Preface and Acknowledgments Introduction PART I Intentionality Chapter 1 Fodor’ Guide to Mental Representation: The Intelligent Auntie’s Vade-Mecum Chapter 2 Semantics, Wisconsin Style Chapter 3 A Theory of Content, I: The Problem Chapter 4 A Theory of Content, II: The Theory Chapter 5 Making Mind Matter More Chapter 6 Substitution Arguments and the Individuation of Beliefs Chapter 7 Stephen Schiffer’s Dark Night of The Soul: A Review of Remnants of Meaning PART II Modularity Chapter 8 Précis of The Modularity of (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
    Export citation  
    Bookmark   263 citations  
  15. Psychological Explanation: An Introduction To The Philosophy Of Psychology.Jerry A. Fodor - 1968 - Ny: Random House.
  16. Special Sciences.Jerry A. Fodor - 1974 - Synthese 28 (2):97-115.
  17. The Elm and the Expert: Mentalese and Its Semantics.Jerry A. Fodor - 1994 - MIT Press.
    This book is largely a reconsideration of the arguments that are supposed to ground this consensus.
    Direct download (4 more)  
    Export citation  
    Bookmark   185 citations  
  18. Precis of the Modularity of Mind.Jerry A. Fodor - 1985 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (1):1-42.
    The Modularity of Mind proposes an alternative to the or view of cognitive architecture that has dominated several decades of cognitive science. Whereas interactionism stresses the continuity of perceptual and cognitive processes, modularity theory argues for their distinctness. It is argued, in particular, that the apparent plausibility of New Look theorizing derives from the failure to distinguish between the (correct) claim that perceptual processes are inferential and the (dubious) claim that they are unencapsidated, that is, that they are arbitrarily sensitive (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
    Export citation  
    Bookmark   260 citations  
  19. How Direct is Visual Perception? Some Reflections on Gibson's 'Ecological Approach'.Jerry A. Fodor & Zenon W. Pylyshyn - 1981 - Cognition 9 (2):139-96.
    Examines the theses that the postulation of mental processing is unnecessary to account for our perceptual relationship with the world, see turvey etal. for a criticque.
    Direct download (5 more)  
    Export citation  
    Bookmark   262 citations  
  20. Observation Reconsidered.Jerry A. Fodor - 1984 - Philosophy of Science 51 (March):23-43.
    Several arguments are considered which purport to demonstrate the impossibility of theory-neutral observation. The most important of these infers the continuity of observation with theory from the presumed continuity of perception with cognition, a doctrine widely espoused in recent cognitive psychology. An alternative psychological account of the relation between cognition and perception is proposed and its epistemological consequences for the observation/theory distinction are then explored.
    Direct download (11 more)  
    Export citation  
    Bookmark   239 citations  
  21. What Psychological States Are Not.Ned Block & Jerry A. Fodor - 1972 - Philosophical Review 81 (April):159-81.
  22. The Mind-Body Problem.Jerry Fodor - 1981 - Scientific American 244 (1):114-25.
  23. The Appeal to Tacit Knowledge in Psychological Explanation.Jerry A. Fodor - 1968 - Journal of Philosophy 65 (October):627-40.
  24. Fodor’s Guide to Mental Representation: The Intelligent Auntie’s Vade-Mecum.Jerry A. Fodor - 1985 - Mind 94 (373):76-100.
  25. The Compositionality Papers.Jerry A. Fodor & Ernest Lepore (eds.) - 2002 - Oxford University Press.
    Ernie Lepore and Jerry Fodor have published a series of original and controversial essays on issues relating to compositionality in language and mind; they have...
    Direct download  
    Export citation  
    Bookmark   77 citations  
  26. Propositional Attitudes.Jerry A. Fodor - 1978 - The Monist 61 (October):501-23.
    Some philosophers hold that philosophy is what you do to a problem until it’s clear enough to solve it by doing science. Others hold that if a philosophical problem succumbs to empirical methods, that shows it wasn’t really philosophical to begin with. Either way, the facts seem clear enough: questions first mooted by philosophers are sometimes coopted by people who do experiments. This seems to be happening now to the question: “what are propositional attitudes?” and cognitive psychology is the science (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
    Export citation  
    Bookmark   114 citations  
  27. What Darwin Got Wrong.Jerry A. Fodor - 2010 - Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
    What kind of theory is the theory of natural selection? -- Internal constraints : what the new biology tells us -- Whole genomes, networks, modules and other complexities -- Many constraints, many environments -- The return of the laws of form -- Many are called but few are chosen : the problem of 'selection-for' -- No exit? : some responses to the problem of 'selection-for' -- Did the dodo lose its ecological niche? : or was it the other way around? (...)
    Export citation  
    Bookmark   41 citations  
  28. Connectionism and the Problem of Systematicity: Why Smolensky's Solution Doesn't Work.Jerry Fodor & Brian P. McLaughlin - 1990 - Cognition 35 (2):183-205.
  29. The Structure of a Semantic Theory.Jerrold Katz & Jerry Fodor - 1963 - Language 39:170-210.
    Direct download  
    Export citation  
    Bookmark   127 citations  
  30. Making Mind Matter More.Jerry A. Fodor - 1989 - Philosophical Topics 17 (11):59-79.
  31. The Present Status of the Innateness Controversy.Jerry A. Fodor - 1981 - In Jerry Fodor (ed.), RePresentations: Philosophical Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. pp. 257-316.
  32. A Reply to Churchland’s “Perceptual Plasticity and Theoretical Neutrality‘.Jerry A. Fodor - 1988 - Philosophy of Science 55 (June):188-98.
    Churchland's paper "Perceptual Plasticity and Theoretical Neutrality" offers empirical, semantical and epistemological arguments intended to show that the cognitive impenetrability of perception "does not establish a theory-neutral foundation for knowledge" and that the psychological account of perceptual encapsulation that I set forth in The Modularity of Mind "[is] almost certainly false". The present paper considers these arguments in detail and dismisses them.
    Direct download (9 more)  
    Export citation  
    Bookmark   130 citations  
  33. The Revenge of the Given.Jerry A. Fodor - 2007 - In Brian P. McLaughlin & Jonathan D. Cohen (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell. pp. 105--116.
    Direct download (3 more)  
    Export citation  
    Bookmark   60 citations  
  34. Special Sciences: Still Autonomous After All These Years.Jerry A. Fodor - 1997 - Philosophical Perspectives 11:149-63.
  35. The Specificity of Language Skills.Jerry A. Fodor, Thomas G. Bever & Mary Garrett - 1974 - In The Psychology of Language. Mcgraw-Hill.
    Export citation  
    Bookmark   171 citations  
  36. A Theory of the Child’s Theory of Mind.Jerry A. Fodor - 1992 - Cognition 44 (3):283-296.
  37. Representations: Philosophical Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science.Jerry A. Fodor - 1983 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 34 (2):175-182.
    Export citation  
    Bookmark   136 citations  
  38. Semantics, Wisconsin Style.Jerry A. Fodor - 1984 - Synthese 59 (3):231-50.
  39. You Can Fool Some of the People All of the Time, Everything Else Being Equal: Hedged Laws and Psychological Explanation.Jerry A. Fodor - 1991 - Mind 100 (397):19-34.
  40. A Theory of Content I.Jerry A. Fodor - 1990 - In A Theory of Content. MIT Press.
  41. Imagistic Representation.Jerry A. Fodor - 1980 - In Ned Block (ed.), Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Volume II. Harvard University Press. pp. 135-149.
  42. Having Concepts: A Brief Refutation of the Twentieth Century.Jerry Fodor - 2004 - Mind and Language 19 (1):29-47.
  43. Tom Swift and His Procedural Grandmother.Jerry A. Fodor - 1978 - Cognition 6 (September):229-47.
  44. Making Mind Matter More.Jerry Fodor - 1987 - Journal of Philosophy 84 (11):642.
  45. Fixation of Belief and Concept Acquisition.Jerry A. Fodor - 1980 - In Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini (ed.), Language and Learning: The Debate Between Jean Piaget and Noam Chomsky. Harvard University Press. pp. 142-162.
  46. A Modal Argument for Narrow Content.Jerry A. Fodor - 1991 - Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):5-26.
  47. Where is My Mind? [REVIEW]Jerry Fodor - 2009 - London Review of Books 31 (3).
  48. Language, Thought and Compositionality.Jerry A. Fodor - 2001 - Mind and Language 16 (1):1-15.
  49. Against Darwinism.Jerry Fodor - 2008 - Mind and Language 23 (1):1–24.
    Darwinism consists of two parts: a phylogenesis of biological species (ours included) and the claim that the primary mechanism of the evolution of phenotypes is natural selection. I assume that Darwin’s account of phylogeny is essentially correct; attention is directed to the theory of natural selection. I claim that Darwin’s account of evolution by natural selection cannot be sustained. The basic problem is that, according to the consensus view, evolution consists in changes of the distribution of phenotypic traits in populations (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
    Export citation  
    Bookmark   33 citations  
  50.  25
    Special Sciences: Still Autonomous After All These Years.Jerry A. Fodor - 1997 - Noûs 31 (S11):149-163.
    Direct download (2 more)  
    Export citation  
    Bookmark   81 citations  
1 — 50 / 200