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Jerry A. Fodor [126]Jerry Fodor [81]
  1. Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind.Jerry A. Fodor - 1987 - MIT Press.
  2. The Language of Thought.Jerry A. Fodor - 1975 - Harvard University Press.
    INTRODUCTION: TWO KINDS OF RLDUCTIONISM The man who laughs is the one who has not yet heard the terrible news. BERTHOLD BRECHT I propose, in this book, ...
  3. Representations: Philosophical Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science.Jerry A. Fodor - 1981 - MIT Press.
  4. Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong.Jerry A. Fodor - 1998 - Oxford University Press.
    The renowned philosopher Jerry Fodor, a leading figure in the study of the mind for more than twenty years, presents a strikingly original theory on the basic constituents of thought. He suggests that the heart of cognitive science is its theory of concepts, and that cognitive scientists have gone badly wrong in many areas because their assumptions about concepts have been mistaken. Fodor argues compellingly for an atomistic theory of concepts, deals out witty and pugnacious demolitions of rival theories, and (...)
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  5. The Modularity of Mind.Jerry A. Fodor - 1983 - Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
  6. The Mind Doesn't Work That Way: The Scope and Limits of Computational Psychology.Jerry A. Fodor - 2000 - MIT Press.
    Jerry Fodor argues against the widely held view that mental processes are largely computations, that the architecture of cognition is massively modular, and...
  7. Lot 2: The Language of Thought Revisited.Jerry A. Fodor - 2008 - Oxford University Press.
    Jerry Fodor presents a new development of his famous Language of Thought hypothesis, which has since the 1970s been at the centre of interdisciplinary debate about how the mind works. Fodor defends and extends the groundbreaking idea that thinking is couched in a symbolic system realized in the brain. This idea is central to the representational theory of mind which Fodor has established as a key reference point in modern philosophy, psychology, and cognitive science. The foundation stone of our present (...)
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  8. Connectionism and Cognitive Architecture: A Critical Analysis.Jerry A. Fodor & Zenon W. Pylyshyn - 1988 - Cognition 28 (1-2):3-71.
    This paper explores the difference between Connectionist proposals for cognitive a r c h i t e c t u r e a n d t h e s o r t s o f m o d e l s t hat have traditionally been assum e d i n c o g n i t i v e s c i e n c e . W e c l a i m t h a t t h (...)
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  9.  28
    The Modularity of Mind.Robert Cummins & Jerry Fodor - 1985 - Philosophical Review 94 (1):101.
  10. Holism: A Shopper's Guide.Jerry A. Fodor & Ernest Lepore - 1992 - Blackwell.
  11. The Modularity of Mind.Jerry A. Fodor - 1983 - MIT Press.
    One of the most notable aspects of Fodor's work is that it articulates features not only of speculative cognitive architectures but also of current research in ...
  12. A Theory of Content and Other Essays.Jerry FODOR - 1990 - MIT Press.
  13. The Psychology of Language: An Introduction to Psycholinguistics and Generative Grammar.Jerry Fodor, Bever A., Garrett T. G. & F. M. - 1974 - Mcgraw-Hill.
  14. The Elm and the Expert.Jerry A. Fodor - 1994 - MIT Press.
    This book is largely a reconsideration of the arguments that are supposed to ground this consensus.
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  15. Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind.Jerry A. FODOR - 1987 - Behavior and Philosophy 18 (1):59-61.
     
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  16. The Modularity of Mind.Jerry A. Fodor - 1983 - In Zenon W. Pylyshyn (ed.), Philosophical Review. Ablex. pp. 101-108.
  17. Special Sciences.Jerry A. Fodor - 1974 - Synthese 28 (2):97-115.
  18. Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong.Jerry A. Fodor - 1998 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 62 (3):609-612.
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  19. The Mind Doesn't Work That Way: The Scope and Limits of Computational Psychology.Jerry Fodor - 2001 - Philosophical Quarterly 51 (205):549-552.
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  20. Precis of the Modularity of Mind.Jerry A. Fodor - 1985 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (1):1-42.
    The Modularity of Mind proposes an alternative to the or view of cognitive architecture that has dominated several decades of cognitive science. Whereas interactionism stresses the continuity of perceptual and cognitive processes, modularity theory argues for their distinctness. It is argued, in particular, that the apparent plausibility of New Look theorizing derives from the failure to distinguish between the (correct) claim that perceptual processes are inferential and the (dubious) claim that they are unencapsidated, that is, that they are arbitrarily sensitive (...)
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  21. Psychological Explanation: An Introduction To The Philosophy Of Psychology.Jerry A. Fodor - 1968 - Ny: Random House.
  22. How Direct is Visual Perception? Some Reflections on Gibson's 'Ecological Approach'.Jerry A. Fodor & Zenon W. Pylyshyn - 1981 - Cognition 9 (2):139-96.
    Examines the theses that the postulation of mental processing is unnecessary to account for our perceptual relationship with the world, see turvey etal. for a criticque.
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  23. Observation Reconsidered.Jerry Fodor - 1984 - Philosophy of Science 51 (March):23-43.
    Several arguments are considered which purport to demonstrate the impossibility of theory-neutral observation. The most important of these infers the continuity of observation with theory from the presumed continuity of perception with cognition, a doctrine widely espoused in recent cognitive psychology. An alternative psychological account of the relation between cognition and perception is proposed and its epistemological consequences for the observation/theory distinction are then explored.
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  24. The Compositionality Papers.Jerry A. Fodor & Ernest Lepore (eds.) - 2002 - Oxford University Press.
    Ernie Lepore and Jerry Fodor have published a series of original and controversial essays on issues relating to compositionality in language and mind; they have...
  25. What Darwin Got Wrong.Jerry A. Fodor - 2010 - Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
    What kind of theory is the theory of natural selection? -- Internal constraints : what the new biology tells us -- Whole genomes, networks, modules and other complexities -- Many constraints, many environments -- The return of the laws of form -- Many are called but few are chosen : the problem of 'selection-for' -- No exit? : some responses to the problem of 'selection-for' -- Did the dodo lose its ecological niche? : or was it the other way around? (...)
     
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  26. The Revenge of the Given.Jerry A. Fodor - 2007 - In Brian P. McLaughlin & Jonathan D. Cohen (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell. pp. 105--116.
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  27. The Mind-Body Problem.Jerry Fodor - 1981 - Scientific American 244 (1):114-25.
  28. Connectionism and the Problem of Systematicity: Why Smolensky's Solution Doesn't Work.Jerry Fodor & Brian P. McLaughlin - 1990 - Cognition 35 (2):183-205.
  29. Special Sciences: Still Autonomous After All These Years.Jerry A. Fodor - 1997 - Philosophical Perspectives 11:149-63.
  30. What Psychological States Are Not.Ned Block & Jerry A. Fodor - 1972 - Philosophical Review 81 (April):159-81.
  31. A Reply to Churchland's `Perceptual Plasticity and Theoretical Neutrality'.Jerry A. Fodor - 1988 - Philosophy of Science 55 (June):188-98.
    Churchland's paper "Perceptual Plasticity and Theoretical Neutrality" offers empirical, semantical and epistemological arguments intended to show that the cognitive impenetrability of perception "does not establish a theory-neutral foundation for knowledge" and that the psychological account of perceptual encapsulation that I set forth in The Modularity of Mind "[is] almost certainly false". The present paper considers these arguments in detail and dismisses them.
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  32. Making Mind Matter More.Jerry A. Fodor - 1989 - Philosophical Topics 17 (11):59-79.
  33. Having Concepts: A Brief Refutation of the Twentieth Century.Jerry Fodor - 2004 - Mind and Language 19 (1):29-47.
  34. Psychosemantics, the Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind.Jerry A. FODOR - 1987 - Studia Logica 50 (2):356-357.
     
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  35. Special Sciences, or Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis.Jerry Fodor - 1974 - Synthese 28 (2):97--115.
     
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  36. Propositional Attitudes.Jerry A. Fodor - 1978 - The Monist 61 (October):501-23.
    Some philosophers hold that philosophy is what you do to a problem until it’s clear enough to solve it by doing science. Others hold that if a philosophical problem succumbs to empirical methods, that shows it wasn’t really philosophical to begin with. Either way, the facts seem clear enough: questions first mooted by philosophers are sometimes coopted by people who do experiments. This seems to be happening now to the question: “what are propositional attitudes?” and cognitive psychology is the science (...)
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  37. The Appeal to Tacit Knowledge in Psychological Explanation.Jerry A. Fodor - 1968 - Journal of Philosophy 65 (October):627-40.
  38. The Language of Thought.Jerry A. Fodor - 1975 - Synthese 38 (1):161-167.
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  39. Psychological Explanation.Jerry A. Fodor - 1972 - Philosophy of Science 39 (1):95-97.
  40.  22
    Special Sciences: Still Autonomous After All These Years.Jerry Fodor - 1997 - Noûs 31 (S11):149-163.
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  41. The Present Status of the Innateness Controversy.Jerry A. Fodor - 1981 - In Jerry Fodor (ed.), RePresentations: Philosophical Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. pp. 257-316.
     
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  42. Representations: Philosophical Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science.Jerry A. Fodor - 1983 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 34 (2):175-182.
     
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  43. The Specificity of Language Skills.Jerry A. Fodor, Thomas G. Bever & Mary Garrett - 1974 - In The Psychology of Language. Mcgraw-Hill.
     
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  44. Where is My Mind? [REVIEW]Jerry Fodor - 2009 - London Review of Books 31 (3).
  45. Language, Thought and Compositionality.Jerry A. Fodor - 2001 - Mind and Language 16 (1):1-15.
  46. A Theory of Content I.Jerry A. Fodor - 1990 - In A Theory of Content. MIT Press.
  47. Against Darwinism.Jerry Fodor - 2008 - Mind and Language 23 (1):1–24.
    Darwinism consists of two parts: a phylogenesis of biological species (ours included) and the claim that the primary mechanism of the evolution of phenotypes is natural selection. I assume that Darwin’s account of phylogeny is essentially correct; attention is directed to the theory of natural selection. I claim that Darwin’s account of evolution by natural selection cannot be sustained. The basic problem is that, according to the consensus view, evolution consists in changes of the distribution of phenotypic traits in populations (...)
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  48. You Can Fool Some of the People All of the Time, Everything Else Being Equal: Hedged Laws and Psychological Explanation.Jerry Fodor - 1991 - Mind 100 (397):19-34.
  49. Semantics, Wisconsin Style.Jerry A. Fodor - 1984 - Synthese 59 (3):231-50.
  50. Hume Variations.Jerry A. Fodor - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
    Hume? Yes, David Hume, that's who Jerry Fodor looks to for help in advancing our understanding of the mind. Fodor claims his Treatise of Human Nature as the foundational document of cognitive science: it launched the project of constructing an empirical psychology on the basis of a representational theory of mind. Going back to this work after more than 250 years we find that Hume is remarkably perceptive about the components and structure that a theory of mind requires. Careful study (...)
     
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