228 found
Jerry A. Fodor [142]Jerry Fodor [86]
  1. Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong.Jerry A. Fodor - 1998 - Oxford University Press.
    The renowned philosopher Jerry Fodor, a leading figure in the study of the mind for more than twenty years, presents a strikingly original theory on the basic constituents of thought. He suggests that the heart of cognitive science is its theory of concepts, and that cognitive scientists have gone badly wrong in many areas because their assumptions about concepts have been mistaken. Fodor argues compellingly for an atomistic theory of concepts, deals out witty and pugnacious demolitions of rival theories, and (...)
  2. Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind.Jerry A. Fodor - 1987 - MIT Press.
  3. Representations: Philosophical Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science.Jerry A. Fodor - 1981 - MIT Press.
  4. The Language of Thought.Jerry A. Fodor - 1975 - Harvard University Press.
    INTRODUCTION: TWO KINDS OF RLDUCTIONISM The man who laughs is the one who has not yet heard the terrible news. BERTHOLD BRECHT I propose, in this book, ...
  5. Lot 2: The Language of Thought Revisited.Jerry A. Fodor - 2008 - Oxford University Press.
    Jerry Fodor presents a new development of his famous Language of Thought hypothesis, which has since the 1970s been at the centre of interdisciplinary debate about how the mind works. Fodor defends and extends the groundbreaking idea that thinking is couched in a symbolic system realized in the brain. This idea is central to the representational theory of mind which Fodor has established as a key reference point in modern philosophy, psychology, and cognitive science. The foundation stone of our present (...)
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  6. The Mind Doesn't Work That Way: The Scope and Limits of Computational Psychology.Jerry A. Fodor - 2000 - MIT Press.
    Jerry Fodor argues against the widely held view that mental processes are largely computations, that the architecture of cognition is massively modular, and...
  7. The Psychology of Language: An Introduction to Psycholinguistics and Generative Grammar.Jerry Fodor, Bever A., Garrett T. G. & F. M. - 1974 - Mcgraw-Hill.
  8. Connectionism and Cognitive Architecture.Jerry A. Fodor & Zenon W. Pylyshyn - 1988 - Cognition 28 (1-2):3-71.
    This paper explores the difference between Connectionist proposals for cognitive a r c h i t e c t u r e a n d t h e s o r t s o f m o d e l s t hat have traditionally been assum e d i n c o g n i t i v e s c i e n c e . W e c l a i m t h a t t h (...)
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  9. The Modularity of Mind.Jerry Fodor - 1983 - Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
  10. Holism: A Shopper's Guide.Jerry A. Fodor & Ernest Lepore - 1992 - Blackwell.
  11. The Elm and the Expert.Jerry A. Fodor - 1994 - MIT Press.
    This book is largely a reconsideration of the arguments that are supposed to ground this consensus.
  12. Psychological Explanation: An Introduction To The Philosophy Of Psychology.Jerry A. Fodor - 1968 - Ny: Random House.
  13. Special Sciences.Jerry A. Fodor - 1974 - Synthese 28 (2):97-115.
  14. How Direct is Visual Perception? Some Reflections on Gibson's 'Ecological Approach'.Jerry A. Fodor & Zenon W. Pylyshyn - 1981 - Cognition 9 (2):139-96.
    Examines the theses that the postulation of mental processing is unnecessary to account for our perceptual relationship with the world, see turvey etal. for a criticque.
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  15. Precis of the Modularity of Mind.Jerry A. Fodor - 1985 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (1):1-42.
    The Modularity of Mind proposes an alternative to the or view of cognitive architecture that has dominated several decades of cognitive science. Whereas interactionism stresses the continuity of perceptual and cognitive processes, modularity theory argues for their distinctness. It is argued, in particular, that the apparent plausibility of New Look theorizing derives from the failure to distinguish between the (correct) claim that perceptual processes are inferential and the (dubious) claim that they are unencapsidated, that is, that they are arbitrarily sensitive (...)
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  16. Observation Reconsidered.Jerry Fodor - 1984 - Philosophy of Science 51 (March):23-43.
    Several arguments are considered which purport to demonstrate the impossibility of theory-neutral observation. The most important of these infers the continuity of observation with theory from the presumed continuity of perception with cognition, a doctrine widely espoused in recent cognitive psychology. An alternative psychological account of the relation between cognition and perception is proposed and its epistemological consequences for the observation/theory distinction are then explored.
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  17.  8
    The Modularity of Mind.Robert Cummins & Jerry Fodor - 1985 - Philosophical Review 94 (1):101.
  18. The Compositionality Papers.Jerry A. Fodor & Ernest Lepore - 2002 - Oxford University Press.
    Ernie Lepore and Jerry Fodor have published a series of original and controversial essays on issues relating to compositionality in language and mind; they have...
  19. The Mind-Body Problem.Jerry A. Fodor - 1981 - Scientific American 244:114-25.
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    Psychosemantics.Jerry A. Fodor - 1987 - Journal of Philosophy 85 (7):384-389.
  21. The Revenge of the Given.Jerry A. Fodor - 2007 - In Brian P. McLaughlin & Jonathan D. Cohen (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell. pp. 105--116.
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  22. A Reply to Churchland's `Perceptual Plasticity and Theoretical Neutrality'.Jerry A. Fodor - 1988 - Philosophy of Science 55 (June):188-98.
    Churchland's paper "Perceptual Plasticity and Theoretical Neutrality" offers empirical, semantical and epistemological arguments intended to show that the cognitive impenetrability of perception "does not establish a theory-neutral foundation for knowledge" and that the psychological account of perceptual encapsulation that I set forth in The Modularity of Mind "[is] almost certainly false". The present paper considers these arguments in detail and dismisses them.
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  23. Connectionism and the Problem of Systematicity: Why Smolensky's Solution Doesn't Work.Jerry A. Fodor & Brian P. McLaughlin - 1990 - Cognition 35 (2):183-205.
  24. Special Sciences: Still Autonomous After All These Years.Jerry A. Fodor - 1997 - Philosophical Perspectives 11 (s11):149-63.
  25. The Modularity of Mind.Jerry A. Fodor - 1983 - MIT Press.
    One of the most notable aspects of Fodor's work is that it articulates features not only of speculative cognitive architectures but also of current research in ...
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  26. Having Concepts: A Brief Refutation of the Twentieth Century.Jerry A. Fodor - 2004 - Mind and Language 19 (1):29-47.
  27. The Mind Doesn't Work That Way: The Scope and Limits of Computational Psychology.Jerry Fodor - 2001 - Philosophical Quarterly 51 (205):549-552.
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  28.  7
    Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind.Dan Lloyd & Jerry A. Fodor - 1991 - Philosophical Review 100 (2):289.
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  29. The Appeal to Tacit Knowledge in Psychological Explanation.Jerry A. Fodor - 1968 - Journal of Philosophy 65 (October):627-40.
  30.  18
    A Theory of Content and Other Essays.Ruth Garrett Millikan & Jerry A. Fodor - 1992 - Philosophical Review 101 (4):898.
  31. The Modularity of Mind.Jerry A. Fodor - 1983 - In Zenon W. Pylyshyn (ed.), Philosophical Review. Ablex. pp. 101-108.
  32. What Darwin Got Wrong.Jerry A. Fodor - 2010 - Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
    What kind of theory is the theory of natural selection? -- Internal constraints : what the new biology tells us -- Whole genomes, networks, modules and other complexities -- Many constraints, many environments -- The return of the laws of form -- Many are called but few are chosen : the problem of 'selection-for' -- No exit? : some responses to the problem of 'selection-for' -- Did the dodo lose its ecological niche? : or was it the other way around? (...)
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  33. Where is My Mind? [REVIEW]Jerry Fodor - 2009 - London Review of Books 31 (3).
  34. What Psychological States Are Not.Ned Block & Jerry A. Fodor - 1972 - Philosophical Review 81 (April):159-81.
  35. Against Darwinism.Jerry Fodor - 2008 - Mind and Language 23 (1):1–24.
    Darwinism consists of two parts: a phylogenesis of biological species (ours included) and the claim that the primary mechanism of the evolution of phenotypes is natural selection. I assume that Darwin’s account of phylogeny is essentially correct; attention is directed to the theory of natural selection. I claim that Darwin’s account of evolution by natural selection cannot be sustained. The basic problem is that, according to the consensus view, evolution consists in changes of the distribution of phenotypic traits in populations (...)
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  36. Language, Thought and Compositionality.Jerry A. Fodor - 2001 - Mind and Language 16 (1):1-15.
  37. Propositional Attitudes.Jerry A. Fodor - 1978 - The Monist 61 (October):501-23.
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  38. You Can Fool Some of the People All of the Time, Everything Else Being Equal: Hedged Laws and Psychological Explanation.Jerry A. Fodor - 1991 - Mind 100 (397):19-34.
  39. In Critical Condition: Polemical Essays on Cognitive Science and the Philosophy of Mind.Jerry A. Fodor - 2000 - MIT Press.
  40. Semantics, Wisconsin Style.Jerry A. Fodor - 1984 - Synthese 59 (3):231-50.
  41.  84
    Tom Swift and His Procedural Grandmother.Jerry A. Fodor - 1978 - Cognition 6 (September):229-47.
  42. Imagistic Representation.Jerry A. Fodor - 1975 - In Ned Block (ed.), The Language of Thought. Harvard University Press. pp. 63--86.
  43. A Theory of Content I.Jerry A. Fodor - 1990 - In A Theory of Content. MIT Press.
  44. On the Impossibility of Acquiring 'More Powerful' Structures.Jerry A. Fodor - 1980 - In Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini (ed.), Language and Learning: The Debate Between Jean Piaget and Noam Chomsky. Harvard University Press.
  45. Modules, Frames, Fridgeons, Sleeping Dogs, and the Music of the Spheres.Jerry A. Fodor - 1987 - In Zenon W. Pylyshyn (ed.), The Robot's Dilemma. Ablex. pp. 139--49.
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  46.  14
    Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong.Kent Bach & Jerry A. Fodor - 2000 - Philosophical Review 109 (4):627.
  47. Why Paramecia Don't Have Mental Representations.Jerry A. Fodor - 1986 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10 (1):3-23.
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  48. A Theory of Content and Other Essays.Jerry A. Fodor - 1990 - MIT Press.
  49.  55
    The Structure of a Semantic Theory.Jerrold Katz & Jerry Fodor - 1963 - Language 39:170-210.
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  50. The Present Status of the Innateness Controversy.Jerry A. Fodor - 1981 - In Jerry Fodor (ed.), RePresentations: Philosophical Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. pp. 257-316.
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