This monographic section contains the three papers delivered by Philip Kitcher as Raimundus Lullius Lectures during the VII Conference of the Spanish Society of Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science, that took place in Santiago de Compostela (July 18th-20th, 2012). It also includes three of the contributions presented to the Symposium on Kitcher’s work in the same Conference.
La sección monográfica contiene las tres conferencias que Philip Kitcher impartió en el marco de la Primera Edición de las Conferencias Raimundus Lullius patrocinadas por la Sociedad de Lógica, Metodología y Filosofía de la Ciencia de España, el VII Congreso de la Sociedad, celebrado en Santiago de Compostela, del 18-20 de julio de 2012. Incluye también tres de los trabajos que se presentaron en el Symposium dedicado a la obra del Prof. Kitcher en ese congreso.
This monographic section contains the three papers delivered by Philip Kitcher as Raimundus Lullius Lectures during the VII Conference of the Spanish Society of Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science, that took place in Santiago de Compostela (July 18th-20th, 2012). It also includes three of the contributions presented to the Symposium on Kitcher’s work in the same Conference.
This monographic section contains the three papers delivered by Philip Kitcher as Raimundus Lullius Lectures during the VII Conference of the Spanish Society of Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science, that took place in Santiago de Compostela (July 18th-20th, 2012). It also includes three of the contributions presented to the Symposium on Kitcher’s work in the same Conference.
In this paper, I examine the so-called disjunctive views on hallucinations. I argue that neither of the options open to the disjunctivist is capable of accommodating basic phenomenological facts about hallucinatory experiences and the explanatory demands behind the classical argument from hallucination. A positive characterization of the hallucinatory case is not attractive to a disjunctivist once she is disposed to accept certain commonalities with veridical experiences. Negative disjunctivism glosses the hallucinatory disjunct in terms of indiscriminability. I will argue that this (...) move either renounces to characterize phenomenally the hallucinatory experience or does not take seriously questions about why indiscriminability is possible in the phenomenal realm. (shrink)
In this paper, it is argued that both the informer and the hearer in a testimonial situation deserve epistemic merit insofar as they contribute to the collaborative achievement of sharing knowledge. The paper introduces a distinction between the ideals of self-sufficiency and epistemic autonomy. The autonomous exerciseof our epistemic agency is very often carried out under strong conditions of epistemic dependence. Testimony exhibits a kind of social dependence that does not threaten the autonomy of the subjects that need to consider (...) their own epistemic capacities. When involved in a testimonial situation, both speaker and hearer declare, at least implicitly, the standings they occupy in an epistemic space and are obliged to recognise certain epistemic requirements. (shrink)
What is the concept of knowledge for? What does it do for us? This question cannot be severed from considerations about what we do by using it. In this paper, I propose to view the point of our concept of knowledge in terms of a device for acknowledging epistemic authority in a social and normative space in which we share valuable information. It is our way of collectively expressing the acknowledgment we owe to others because of their being creditable when (...) engaged in the task of knowing. By using the concept of knowledge we are not just marking the epistemic positions we occupy, we are also acknowledging epistemic authority and indicating the advisability of taking oneself or others as “ready” for the transmission of authority. (shrink)
Este artículo presenta lo que denomino la “paradoja topológica de la filosofía”. La filosofía reclama un lugar en el conjunto de los saberes enseñables y, por ende, en la universidad; pero deviene u-tópica en su idea del ejercicio libre de su actividad. La filosofía no puede encontrar un lugar en la universidad y no puede dejar de reclamarlo. La paradoja tiene varias dimensiones, pero es irresoluble. Por eso, su futuro en la universidad exigirá una renuncia a situarse en un lugar (...) disciplinar. Podrá quizá hacerse un hueco entre los saberes si finalmente acepta responder no ante sí misma sino ante las exigencias de lo prefilosófico. (shrink)
RESUMEN: Este artículo revisa contribuciones recientes a la filosofía de la tecnología tomando como punto de partida una reflexión sobre la naturaleza de los artefactos, su conocimiento y las condiciones normativas vinculadas a su producción y uso. Se discute, en primer lugar, en torno al realismo/anti-realismo respecto a las clases artificiales según la teoría funcional y la teoría histórico-intencional de los artefactos. En segundo lugar, se abordan cuestiones relativas a las peculiaridades del conocimiento funcional y el privilegio epistémico del conocimiento (...) que los hacedores tienen de sus productos. Por último, se retoma el tradicional debate sobre los artefactos como portadores de valor y sobre la dimensión normativa de la técnica.ABSTRACT: In this paper, I review recent contributions to the philosophical reflection on technology. I take as starting point discussions on the ontological nature of artifacts and then discuss questions regarding how we get to know about them and the normative dimensions involved in the making and use of artifacts. Firstly, I introduce the debate between realists and antirealists about the nature of artificial kinds and how the issue is respectively addressed by functional and intentional-historical conceptions. Secondly, I raise some questions about the specificity of functional knowledge as a kind of know-how and discuss about the epistemic privilege of the makers-knowledge. The last section takes up again the traditional debate on artifacts as value bearers and the normative dimensions of technology. (shrink)
En Self-Constitution. Agency, Identity, and Integrity (2009), Christine Korsgaard defiende la conclusión de que el imperativo categórico rige la acción humana porque es el único principio que permite alcanzar la unidad psíquica plena, la cual, según Korsgaard, es un prerrequisito esencial para la acción efectiva. Para los agentes humanos, alcanzar esa unidad -que consiste en hacer coherentes distintos impulsos hacia la acción- es una actividad constante, denominada "autoconstitución". De acuerdo con Korsgaard, ésta es la fuente originaria de la normatividad y (...) de las identidades prácticas e incluso de la identidad personal. Después de exponer las ideas centrales del libro, presento dos objeciones: primero, critico la equiparación del imperativo categórico con la autoconstitución exitosa, pues no toda falla de auto-constitución es una falla moral. Segundo, argumento que la tesis de que la identidad personal es producto de la autoconstitución es problemática y que, al defenderla, Korsgaard confunde identidad práctica con identidad personal. In Self-Constitution. Agency, Identity, and Integrity (2009), Christine Korsgaard argues that the categorical imperative rules human action because it is the sole principle that allows us to reach the complete psychic unity that, Korsgaard thinks, is an essential prerequisite for effective action. Reaching this unity -which consists in making cohere diverging impulses for action- is for human agents a constant activity called "self-constitution." According to Korsgaard, this activity is the source of normativity, of human practical identities and even of personal identity. After explaining the main ideas of the book, I present two objections. First, I criticize the linkage of the categorical imperative to successful self-constitution, for not every failure of the latter counts as a moral failure. Second, I argue that the thesis that personal identity is a product of self-constitution is problematic and that it betrays a confusion between practical identity and personal identity. (shrink)
¿Cómo pensar hoy la naturaleza y el valor de la reflexión filosófica? La influencia omnipresente del modelo del conocimiento experto parece exigir una autocomprensión de la filosofía como una disciplina entre las disciplinas. Este artículo propone que la filosofía debe resistirse a esta tentación. Defenderé, por tanto, una especie de "excepcionalismo" para la filosofía basado en la idea de que no puede pretender ser una disciplina. Sea o no cierto que hoy en día las actividades filosóficas estén legitimadas institucionalmente por (...) los principios de un Canon, voy a sugerir una estrategia de transgresión del Canon al rechazar cualquier asimilación de la filosofía a una disciplina, aunque fuera "anómala". La filosofía debe contribuir a la comprensión de nuestros diversos modos de conceptualizar y de transformar el mundo y dar sentido a la experiencia humana. La filosofía debe reclamar para sí una "estado de excepción" y abrir un espacio para cuestionar todo aquello que parece obvio e incuestionable. How to think today about the nature and value of the philosophical reflection? The pervasive influence of the model of expert knowledge seems to require a selfunderstanding of philosophy as a discipline among the disciplines. This paper argues that philosophy should resist this move. So I will defend a kind of "exceptionalism" for philosophy based on the idea that philosophy cannot pretend to be a discipline. Be true or not that philosophical activities are nowadays institutionally legitimized by the principles of a Canon, I will suggest a strategy of transgression of the Canon by rejecting any assimilation of philosophy to a discipline, even if an "anomalous" one. Philosophy must contribute to the understanding of our different ways of conceptualizing and transforming the world and to make sense of human experience. The thesis of this paper is that philosophy must claim a "state of emergency" for itself a open a space for freely questioning what it appears as obvious and unchallengeable. (shrink)
Este artículo discute varios modos de entender la racionalidad de la ciencia como racionalidad práctica. En primer lugar, rechaza los modelos instrumentalistas de la racionalidad científica, porque no pueden mostrar la independencia y la bondad de fines definidos para la ciencia, en relación con los cuales se establece la fuerza normativa de las razones. La errónea identificación de fines y valores es lo que provoca numerosas confusiones en este terreno. Se critica, en segundo lugar, un modelo de racionalidad práctica basado (...) en el dominio de saberes tácitos y habilidades. Cualquiera de los modelos propuestos ha de acomodarse a tres restricciones sobre lo que puede ser una "buena razón" dentro de la ciencia y que conforman la identidad práctica y el rostro normativo de la ciencia: publicidad, fiabilidad y autoridad reflexiva. This paper discusses some ways of understanding scientific rationality as practical rationality. Firstly, instrumental models of the rationality of science are rejected. The instrumentalist can hardly establish the independence and goodness of certain ends. In the case of science, determinate ends with respect to which the normative force of our reasons is established do not seem to exist. A false identification of ends with values is what causes many of the confusions. Secondly, a model of practical rationality based in the mastery of tacit knowledge and skills is criticized. Any model of scientific rationality should take into account three constraints about what a "good reason" in scientific matters is, constraints that shape the practical identity and the normative face of science: the constraints of publicity, reliability and reflective authority. (shrink)
En este artículo se discuten las críticas de Jesús VegaEncabo a los modelos de racionalidad práctica aplicados al conocimiento científico. Independientemente de la pertinencia de dichas críticas, en la medida en que la apuesta por ese modelo de racionalidad ha conducido a excesos reduccionistas en los que la ciencia es vista fundamentalmente como una empresa motivada por compromisos sociales, culturales, políticos, o económicos, puede afirmarse que las mismas están contaminadas por una confusión fundamental entre dos formas de (...) concebir las reglas que conducen la práctica científica, a saber, reglas constitutivas y reglas regulativas. A esta confusión estarán dirigidas sobre todo mis observaciones. In this paper I discuss the criticisms of Jesús VegaEncabo to the models of practical rationality applied to scientific knowledge. Regardless of the pertinence of such criticisms, a commitment to that model of rationality has led to reductionist excesses in which science is seen as an enterprise moved by social, cultural, political, or economics engagements. I consider that those criticisms are tainted by a fundamental confusion between two forms of conceiving the rules that govern the scientific practice, namely, constitutives rules and regulatives rules. My remarks are addressed to this confusion. (shrink)
In this paper we argue that the best way to explain the normative framework of science is to adopt a model inspired in the democratic characterization of a public sphere. This model assumes and develops some deliberative democratic principles about the inclusiveness of the concerned, the parity of the reasons and the general interest of the subjects. In contrast to both bargaining models and to power-inspired models of the scientific activities, the model of scientific public sphere proposes to account for (...) the self-legislative capacity of science, the public nature of the scientific results and the epistemic virtues of scientific research in terms of the deliberative process carried out by individuals who are engaging in the public use of reason. This perspective provides new insights into the normative conditions of a democratic science. (shrink)
In the seven chapters constituting Khedrup Jé's presentation of mind and awareness, he primarily explains the full range of objects, including all phenomena that can be known, and object possessors, things that engage objects, such as consciousness and persons. In the first chapter, Khedrup Jé starts by explaining objects of knowledge. Chapter 2 gives an explanation of various non-valid awarenesses. Chapter 3 explains what it means to be a valid cognizer and divides valid cognizers into various categories. In chapter 4, (...) the first division, valid direct perceivers, is discussed. Chapter 4 further defines the four main categories of direct perceivers: sense direct perceivers, mental direct perceivers, self-knowing direct perceivers, and yogic direct perceivers. In chapter 5, Khedrup Jé gives a brilliant elucidation of this essential teachings of the Buddha. The realizations of the path, explained in chapter 6, are results of valid cognizers. Direct realization of selflessness can only come about by having realized it in a conceptual manner-that is, by generating a valid inference realizing selflessness-first. How to generate this kind of inference is precisely explained in chapter 7. In order to give readers some sense of the two main authors involved here, Khedrup Jé Gelek Palsang and Purbu Chok Jampa Gyatso, whom we mainly rely on for additional explanations, brief biographies of these two eminent Buddhist scholars are given at the close of this introduction. (shrink)
Introduction.Jesús VegaEncabo - 2008 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 23 (1):5-9.details
In this paper, it is argued that both the informer and the hearer in a testimonial situation deserve epistemic merit insofar as they contribute to the collaborative achievement of sharing knowledge. The paper introduces a distinction between the ideals of self-sufficiency and epistemic autonomy. The autonomous exerciseof our epistemic agency is very often carried out under strong conditions of epistemic dependence. Testimony exhibits a kind of social dependence that does not threaten the autonomy of the subjects that need to consider (...) their own epistemic capacities. When involved in a testimonial situation, both speaker and hearer declare, at least implicitly, the standings they occupy in an epistemic space and are obliged to recognise certain epistemic requirements. (shrink)
En este artículo pretendemos arrojar luz sobre la normatividad propia del conocimiento humano. Describimos el dominio normativo epistémico como un campo de agencia humana que está definido por el conocimiento entendido como logro. La normatividad del conocimiento se apoya en la contribución del agente epistémico a la consecución de ciertas tareas. Tal contribución es epistémicamente significativa cuando el agente llega a participar en la consecución del éxito. Por último identificamos algunos rasgos asociados con la agencia epistémica completa (condiciones de integración (...) cognitiva y autonomía epistémica), y aclaramos lo que queremos decir con implicación apelando a la idea de adoptar una perspectiva epistémica. (shrink)
En este artículo pretendemos arrojar luz sobre la normatividad propia del conocimiento humano. Describimos el dominio normativo epistémico como un campo de agencia humana que está definido por el conocimiento entendido como logro. La normatividad del conocimiento se apoya en la contribución del agente epistémico a la consecución de ciertas tareas. Tal contribución es epistémicamente significativa cuando el agente llega a participar en la consecución del éxito. Por último identificamos algunos rasgos asociados con la agencia epistémica completa (condiciones de integración (...) cognitiva y autonomía epistémica), y aclaramos lo que queremos decir con implicación apelando a la idea de adoptar una perspectiva epistémica. (shrink)
In this paper, we argue that corruption research can benefit from studying corrupt transactions as a particular form of social interaction. We showcase the usefulness of a theoretical focus on social interaction by investigating online user reports on the website Frontdesktip.com. Through this focus, we can observe users sharing experiences and tips on the best ways of bribing hotel clerks in Las Vegas for attaining room upgrades and other complimentary extras. We employ a logistic regression analysis to examine what factors (...) influence the “successful” performance of this bribery practice. Our study makes a twofold contribution to existing research on corruption. First, on the theoretical level, we show that the typified and scripted character of social interactions can help explain the occurrence of corrupt transactions. Second, on a methodological level, our study showcases online self-reports as a useful data source to study corrupt transactions in an unobtrusive way. (shrink)