Ever since Machery et al. first decided to test whether non-philosophers assign reference in accordance with the causal-historical account, the reference of proper names has been tested by means of setups modelled on Kripke’s Gödel and Jonah cases. Over the years, the use of these setups as a means to test theories of reference has attracted much criticism. However, previous follow-up studies have supposedly accounted for these criticisms, for the most part without changing the original outcome. We conducted experiments suggesting (...) that participants’ responses in these setups never tracked what they are supposed to track. In our study, we tested the setup itself by using analogues of different setups modelled on Kripke’s Gödel and Jonah cases. Instead of proper names, our analogues featured terms for which we have independent reason to believe that the causal-historical account is not true. The analogues elicited large proportions of supposed causal-historical responses. (shrink)

Recent experimental studies have claimed to find evidence for the view that natural kind terms such as “water” are ambiguous: that they have two extensions, one determined by superficial properties, the other by underlying essence. In an online experiment, we presented to 600 participants scenarios describing discoveries of novel samples that differ in deep structure from samples of a familiar kind but are superficially identical, such as a water-like substance that is not composed of H2O. We used three different types (...) of question sets to probe whether the participants considered the sample as a member of the kind or not. Our results did not confirm the predictions of the ambiguity view. They were, rather, consistent with views that take underlying essences to be the sole criterion for membership in a natural kind. (shrink)

Two recent experimental studies, by Shaun Nichols et al. and by Michael Devitt & Brian Porter claim to find evidence for the view that both causal-historical factors and descriptive factors play a role in determining the extensions of natural kind terms. Both studies use versions of a vignette featuring the fictional natural kind term “Catoblepas”. We conducted an experiment where we used vignettes and corresponding tasks that were otherwise fully analogous, but featured terms which are not natural kind terms. We (...) found that such terms received the same patterns of response which Nichols et al. and Devitt & Porter took to justify their conclusions. We conclude that either the kind of view they arrive at applies more widely than just for natural kind terms or, as we think is more likely, the original results do not support such a two-factor view in the first place. (shrink)

Recent work in cognitive psychology and experimental semantics indicates that people do not categorize natural kinds solely by virtue of their purported scientific essence. Two attempts have been made to explain away the data by appealing to the idea that participants in these studies are reasoning diagnostically. I will argue that an appeal to diagnostic reasoning will likely not help to explain away the data.