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Jesse J. Prinz [39]Jesse Jonathan Prinz [1]
  1. Gut Reactions: A Perceptual Theory of the Emotions.Jesse J. Prinz - 2004 - Oxford University Press.
    Gut Reactions is an interdisciplinary defense of the claim that emotions are perceptions of changes in the body.
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  2. Furnishing the Mind: Concepts and Their Perceptual Basis.Jesse J. Prinz - 2002 - MIT Press.
  3. Gut Reactions: A Perceptual Theory of Emotion.Jesse J. Prinz - 2004 - Oup Usa.
    Gut Reactions is an interdisciplinary defense of the claim that emotions are perceptions in a double sense. First of all, they are perceptions of changes in the body, but, through the body, they also allow us to literally perceive danger, loss, and other matters of concern. This proposal, which Prinz calls the embodied appraisal theory, reconciles the long standing debate between those who say emotions are cognitive and those who say they are noncognitive. The basic idea behind embodied appraisals is (...)
     
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  4. Is Empathy Necessary for Morality.Jesse J. Prinz - 2011 - In Amy Coplan & Peter Goldie (eds.), Empathy: Philosophical and Psychological Perspectives. Oxford University Press. pp. 211--229.
  5. Is the Mind Really Modular?Jesse J. Prinz - 2006 - In Robert J. Stainton (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science. Blackwell. pp. 22--36.
    When Fodor titled his (1983) book the _Modularity of Mind_, he overstated his position. His actual view is that the mind divides into systems some of which are modular and others of which are not. The book would have been more aptly, if less provocatively, called _The Modularity of Low-Level Peripheral Systems_. High-level perception and cognitive systems are non-modular on Fodor’s theory. In recent years, modularity has found more zealous defenders, who claim that the entire mind divides into highly specialized (...)
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  6. Putting the Brakes on Enactive Perception.Jesse J. Prinz - 2006 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 12.
    Alva Noë’s _Action in Perception _offers a provocative and vigorous defense of the thesis that vision is enactive: visual experience depends on dispositional motor responses. On this view, vision and action are inextricably bound. In this review, I argue against enactive perception. I raise objections to seven lines of evidence that appear in Noë’s book, and I indicate some reasons for thinking that vision can operate independently of motor responses. I conclude that the relationship between vision and action is causal, (...)
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  7. All Consciousness is Perceptual.Jesse J. Prinz - 2007 - In Brian P. McLaughlin & Jonathan D. Cohen (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell.
  8. Beyond Appearances : The Content of Sensation and Perception.Jesse J. Prinz - 2006 - In Tamar Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press. pp. 434--460.
    There seems to be a large gulf between percepts and concepts. In particular, con- cepts seem to be capable of representing things that percepts cannot. We can conceive of things that would be impossible to perceive. (The converse may also seem true, but I will leave that to one side.) In one respect, this is trivially right. We can conceive of things that we cannot encounter, such as unicorns. We cannot literally perceive unicorns, even if we occasionally.
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  9. Moral Emotions.Jesse J. Prinz & Shaun Nichols - 2010 - In John Michael Doris (ed.), The Moral Psychology Handbook. Oxford University Press. pp. 111.
  10. A Neurofunctional Theory of Consciousness.Jesse J. Prinz - 2005 - In Andrew Brook & Kathleen Akins (eds.), Cognition and the Brain: The Philosophy and Neuroscience Movement. Cambridge University Press. pp. 381-396.
    Reading the philosophical literature on consciousness, one might get the idea that there is just one problem in consciousness studies, the hard problem. That would be a mistake. There are other problems; some are more tractable, but none are easy, and all interesting. The literature on the hard problem gives the impression that we have made little progress. Consciousness is just an excuse to work and re-work familiar positions on the mind-body problem. But progress is being made elsewhere. Researchers are (...)
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  11. Beyond Human Nature: How Culture and Experience Shape the Human Mind.Jesse J. Prinz - 2012 - W.W. Norton.
     
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  12.  22
    Aesthetic Emotions Reconsidered.Joerg Fingerhut & Jesse J. Prinz - 2020 - The Monist 103 (2):223-239.
    We define aesthetic emotions as emotions that underlie the evaluative assessment of artworks. They are separated from the wider class of art-elicited emotions. Aesthetic emotions historically have been characterized as calm, as lacking specific patterns of embodiment, and as being a sui generis kind of pleasure. We reject those views and argue that there is a plurality of aesthetic emotions contributing to praise. After presenting a general account of the nature of emotions, we analyze twelve positive aesthetic emotions in four (...)
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  13. Poetic Opacity: How to Paint Things with Words.Jesse J. Prinz & Eric Mandelbaum - 2015 - In John Gibson (ed.), The Philosophy of Poetry. Oxford University Press. pp. 63-87.
  14. Are Emotions Feelings?Jesse J. Prinz - 2005 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (8-10):9-25.
    The majority of emotion researchers reject the feeling theory of emotions; they deny that emotions are feelings. Some of these researchers admit that emotions have feelings as components, but they insist that emotions contain other components as well, such as cognitions. I argue for a qualified version of the feeling theory. I present evidence in support William James's conjecture that emotions are perceptions of patterned changes in the body. When such perceptions are conscious, they qualify as feelings. But the bodily (...)
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  15. Can Moral Obligations Be Empirically Discovered?Jesse J. Prinz - 2007 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 31 (1):271-291.
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  16. Is Emotion a Form of Perception?Jesse J. Prinz - 2008 - In Luc Faucher & Christine Tappolet (eds.), The Modularity of Emotions. University of Calgary Press. pp. 137-160.
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  17. The Return of Concept Empiricism.Jesse J. Prinz - 2005 - In H. Cohen & C. Leferbvre (eds.), Categorization and Cognitive Science. Elsevier.
    In this chapter, I outline and defend a version of concept empiricism. The theory has four central tenets: Concepts represent categories by reliable causal relations to category instances; conceptual representations of category vary from occasion to occasion; these representations are perceptually based; and these representations are all learned, not innate. The last two tenets on this list have been central to empiricism historically, and the first two have been developed in more recent years. I look at each in turn, and (...)
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  18. When is Perception Conscious?Jesse J. Prinz - 2010 - In Bence Nanay (ed.), Perceiving the World. Oxford University Press. pp. 310--332.
    Once upon a time, people thought that all perception was conscious. Indeed, it was widely believed that all mental states are conscious, so the problem of explaining consciousness collapses into the problem of explaining mentality. But things have changed. Most people now believe that a lot goes on unconsciously. Indeed, some people believe that mental states that are not perceptual in nature are never conscious. That’s a matter of controversy. Less controversial is the claim that perceptual states are conscious some (...)
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  19. Putting Concepts to Work: Some Thoughts for the Twenty First Century.Andy Clark & Jesse J. Prinz - 2004 - Mind and Language 19 (1):57-69.
    Fodor’s theory makes thinking prior to doing. It allows for an inactive agent or pure reflector, and for agents whose actions in various ways seem to float free of their own conceptual repertoires. We show that naturally evolved creatures are not like that. In the real world, thinking is always and everywhere about doing. The point of having a brain is to guide the actions of embodied beings in a complex material world. Some of those actions are, to be sure, (...)
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  20. The Fractionation of Introspection.Jesse J. Prinz - 2004 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (7-8):40-57.
    Edward Titchener, one of the great champions of introspectionist psychology, declared that 'the term Introspection, as we find it used today, is highly equivocal, and that the procedure which it connotes may be scientifically illegitimate, or even wholly imaginary' . He made the point because he wanted to insulate his preferred method of doing psychological research from criticisms that were directed against forms of introspection that he conceded to be unreliable. The point, however, is not just that we can introspect (...)
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  21. The Duality of Content.Jesse J. Prinz - 2000 - Philosophical Studies 100 (1):1-34.
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  22.  34
    Is Emotion a Form of Perception?Jesse J. Prinz - 2006 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (sup1):137-160.
  23.  31
    The Intermediate Level Theory of Consciousness.Jesse J. Prinz - 2007 - In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell. pp. 248--260.
  24.  22
    Viii Notes on Contributors Alvin Goldman is Board of Governors Professor of Philosophy and Cognitive Science at Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey. His Principal Research Areas Are Episte-Mology, Philosophy of Mind, and Cognitive Science. His Most Recent Book is Simulating Minds (2006). [REVIEW]Frank Jackson, Jesse J. Prinz, Ernest Sosa & Kim Sterelny - 2009 - In Michael Bishop & Dominic Murphy (eds.), Stich and His Critics. Blackwell.
  25. Steering a Course for Embodied Representation.Jesse J. Prinz & Lawrence W. Barsalou - 2000 - In Eric Dietrich Art Markman (ed.), Cognitive Dynamics: Conceptual Change in Humans and Machines. Lawrence Erlbaum. pp. 51--77.
  26. Against Moral Nativism.Jesse J. Prinz - 2009 - In Dominic Murphy & Michael A. Bishop (eds.), Stich and His Critics. Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 167--189.
  27. Level-Headed Mysterianism and Artificial Experience.Jesse J. Prinz - 2003 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (4-5):111-132.
    Many materialists believe that we should, in principle, be able to build a conscious computing machine. Others disagree. I favour a sceptical position, but of another variety. The problem isn't that it would be impossible to create a conscious computer. The problem is that we cannot know whether it is possible. There are principled reasons for thinking that we wouldn't ever be able to confirm that allegedly conscious computers were conscious. The proper stance on computational consciousness is agnosticism. Despite this (...)
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  28.  89
    The Ins and Outs of Consciousness.Jesse J. Prinz - 2000 - Brain and Mind 1 (2):245-56.
    In Enchanted Looms , Rodney Cotterill defends the hypothesisthat conscious sensory experience depends on motor response. Thepositive evidence for this hypothesis is inconclusive, andnegative evidence can be marshaled against it. I present analternative hypothesis according to which consciousness involvesintermediate level sensory processing, attention, and workingmemory. The circuitry of consciousness can be dissociated fromaction systems and may mark an evolutionary advance from a priorphylogenetic stage in which motor outputs and sensory inputswere more intimately bound.
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  29. Mind and Cognition: An Anthology.William G. Lycan & Jesse J. Prinz (eds.) - 2008 - Wiley-Blackwell.
  30. Consciousness, Computation, and Emotion.Jesse J. Prinz - 2002 - In Simon C. Moore & Mike Oaksford (eds.), Consciousness, Emotional Self-Regulation and the Brain. John Benjamins.
  31.  39
    Emotions, Embodiment, and Awareness.Jesse J. Prinz - 2005 - In Lisa Feldman Barrett, Paula M. Niedenthal & Piotr Winkielman (eds.), Emotion and Consciousness. Guilford Press. pp. 363-383.
  32. Empiricism and State-Space Semantics.Jesse J. Prinz - 2006 - In Brian L Keeley (ed.), Paul Churchland. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  33.  80
    Sensible Ideas: A Reply to Sarnecki and Markman and Stilwell.Jesse J. Prinz - 2004 - Philosophical Psychology 17 (3):419-430.
    In Furnishing the mind, I argued that concepts are couched in representational formats that are indigenous to sensory systems. I called this thesis "concept empiricism," because I think it is was a central tenet of the philosophical program defended by classical British empiricists, such as Locke and Hume. I still think that concept empiricism is true, and more empirical evidence has accrued since the book went to press. That's the good news. The bad news is that able critics have marshaled (...)
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  34. Mental Maintenance: A Response to the Knowledge Argument.Jesse J. Prinz - manuscript
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  35. Jesse J. Prinz, Furnishing the Mind: Concepts and Their Perceptual Basis. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2002. [REVIEW]Jonathan M. Weinberg, Daniel Yarlett, Michael Ramscar, Dan Ryder & Jesse J. Prinz - 2003 - Metascience 12 (3):279-303.
  36. Searching for a Scientific Experience.Anthony I. Jack & Jesse J. Prinz - 2004 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (1):51-55.
     
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  37. Thoughts of Real Kinds.Jesse J. Prinz - 2007 - In The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Psychology. Oxford University Press.
     
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  38. Peer Commentary on Are There Neural Correlates of Consciousness: Searching for a Scientific Experience.Jesse J. Prinz & Anthony I. Jack - 2004 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (1):51-56.
  39. The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Psychology.Jesse J. Prinz (ed.) - forthcoming - Oxford University Press.