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Jesse J. Prinz [47]Jesse Jonathan Prinz [1]
  1. Gut Reactions: A Perceptual Theory of the Emotions.Jesse J. Prinz - 2004 - Oxford University Press.
    Gut Reactions is an interdisciplinary defense of the claim that emotions are perceptions of changes in the body.
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  2. The emotional construction of morals.Jesse J. Prinz - 2007 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    Jesse Prinz argues that recent work in philosophy, neuroscience, and anthropology supports two radical hypotheses about the nature of morality: moral values are based on emotional responses, and these emotional responses are inculcated by culture, not hard-wired through natural selection. In the first half of the book, Jesse Prinz defends the hypothesis that morality has an emotional foundation. Evidence from brain imaging, social psychology, and psychopathology suggest that, when we judge something to be right or wrong, we are merely expressing (...)
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  3. Furnishing the Mind: Concepts and Their Perceptual Basis.Jesse J. Prinz - 2002 - MIT Press.
  4. Is empathy necessary for morality.Jesse J. Prinz - 2011 - In Amy Coplan & Peter Goldie (eds.), Empathy: Philosophical and Psychological Perspectives. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK. pp. 211--229.
  5. Is the mind really modular?Jesse J. Prinz - 2006 - In Robert J. Stainton (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 22--36.
    When Fodor titled his (1983) book the _Modularity of Mind_, he overstated his position. His actual view is that the mind divides into systems some of which are modular and others of which are not. The book would have been more aptly, if less provocatively, called _The Modularity of Low-Level Peripheral Systems_. High-level perception and cognitive systems are non-modular on Fodor’s theory. In recent years, modularity has found more zealous defenders, who claim that the entire mind divides into highly specialized (...)
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  6. The Aesthetic Self. The Importance of Aesthetic Taste in Music and Art for Our Perceived Identity.Joerg Fingerhut, Javier Gomez-Lavin, Claudia Winklmayr & Jesse J. Prinz - 2021 - Frontiers in Psychology 11.
    To what extent do aesthetic taste and our interest in the arts constitute who we are? In this paper, we present a series of empirical findings that suggest an Aesthetic Self Effect supporting the claim that our aesthetic engagements are a central component of our identity. Counterfactual changes in aesthetic preferences, for example, moving from liking classical music to liking pop, are perceived as altering us as a person. The Aesthetic Self Effect is as strong as the impact of moral (...)
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  7. Putting the brakes on enactive perception.Jesse J. Prinz - 2006 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 12.
    Alva Noë’s _Action in Perception _offers a provocative and vigorous defense of the thesis that vision is enactive: visual experience depends on dispositional motor responses. On this view, vision and action are inextricably bound. In this review, I argue against enactive perception. I raise objections to seven lines of evidence that appear in Noë’s book, and I indicate some reasons for thinking that vision can operate independently of motor responses. I conclude that the relationship between vision and action is causal, (...)
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  8.  48
    Beyond human nature: how culture and experience shape the human mind.Jesse J. Prinz - 2012 - New York: W.W. Norton.
    A timely and uniquely compelling plea for the importance of nurture in the ongoing nature-nurture debate. In this era of genome projects and brain scans, it is all too easy to overestimate the role of biology in human psychology. But in this passionate corrective to the idea that DNA is destiny, Jesse Prinz focuses on the most extraordinary aspect of human nature: that nurture can supplement and supplant nature, allowing our minds to be profoundly influenced by experience and culture. Drawing (...)
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  9. A Neurofunctional Theory of Consciousness.Jesse J. Prinz - 2005 - In Andrew Brook & Kathleen Akins (eds.), Cognition and the Brain: The Philosophy and Neuroscience Movement. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 381-396.
    Reading the philosophical literature on consciousness, one might get the idea that there is just one problem in consciousness studies, the hard problem. That would be a mistake. There are other problems; some are more tractable, but none are easy, and all interesting. The literature on the hard problem gives the impression that we have made little progress. Consciousness is just an excuse to work and re-work familiar positions on the mind-body problem. But progress is being made elsewhere. Researchers are (...)
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  10. Beyond appearances : the content of sensation and perception.Jesse J. Prinz - 2006 - In Tamar Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual experience. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 434--460.
    There seems to be a large gulf between percepts and concepts. In particular, con- cepts seem to be capable of representing things that percepts cannot. We can conceive of things that would be impossible to perceive. (The converse may also seem true, but I will leave that to one side.) In one respect, this is trivially right. We can conceive of things that we cannot encounter, such as unicorns. We cannot literally perceive unicorns, even if we occasionally.
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  11. Empirical philosophy and experimental philosophy.Jesse J. Prinz - 2008 - In Joshua Michael Knobe & Shaun Nichols (eds.), Experimental Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 189--208.
  12. All consciousness is perceptual.Jesse J. Prinz - 2007 - In Brian P. McLaughlin & Jonathan Cohen (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind. Wiley-Blackwell.
  13. Emotion Recognition as a Social Skill.Gen Eickers & Jesse J. Prinz - 2020 - In Ellen Fridland & Carlotta Pavese (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Skill and Expertise. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 347-361.
    This chapter argues that emotion recognition is a skill. A skill perspective on emotion recognition draws attention to underappreciated features of this cornerstone of social cognition. Skills have a number of characteristic features. For example, they are improvable, practical, and flexible. Emotion recognition has these features as well. Leading theories of emotion recognition often draw inadequate attention to these features. The chapter advances a theory of emotion recognition that is better suited to this purpose. It proposes that emotion recognition involves (...)
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  14. Aesthetic Emotions Reconsidered.Joerg Fingerhut & Jesse J. Prinz - 2020 - The Monist 103 (2):223-239.
    We define aesthetic emotions as emotions that underlie the evaluative assessment of artworks. They are separated from the wider class of art-elicited emotions. Aesthetic emotions historically have been characterized as calm, as lacking specific patterns of embodiment, and as being a sui generis kind of pleasure. We reject those views and argue that there is a plurality of aesthetic emotions contributing to praise. After presenting a general account of the nature of emotions, we analyze twelve positive aesthetic emotions in four (...)
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  15. Are emotions feelings?Jesse J. Prinz - 2005 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (8-10):9-25.
    The majority of emotion researchers reject the feeling theory of emotions; they deny that emotions are feelings. Some of these researchers admit that emotions have feelings as components, but they insist that emotions contain other components as well, such as cognitions. I argue for a qualified version of the feeling theory. I present evidence in support William James's conjecture that emotions are perceptions of patterned changes in the body. When such perceptions are conscious, they qualify as feelings. But the bodily (...)
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  16. Is emotion a form of perception?Jesse J. Prinz - 2008 - In Luc Faucher & Christine Tappolet (eds.), The modularity of emotions. Calgary, Alta., Canada: University of Calgary Press. pp. 137-160.
  17. The return of concept empiricism.Jesse J. Prinz - 2005 - In H. Cohen & C. Leferbvre (eds.), Categorization and Cognitive Science. Elsevier.
    In this chapter, I outline and defend a version of concept empiricism. The theory has four central tenets: Concepts represent categories by reliable causal relations to category instances; conceptual representations of category vary from occasion to occasion; these representations are perceptually based; and these representations are all learned, not innate. The last two tenets on this list have been central to empiricism historically, and the first two have been developed in more recent years. I look at each in turn, and (...)
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  18. Against moral nativism.Jesse J. Prinz - 2009 - In Dominic Murphy & Michael A. Bishop (eds.), Stich and His Critics. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 167--189.
  19.  62
    Is Emotion a Form of Perception?Jesse J. Prinz - 2006 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (sup1):137-160.
  20. The fractionation of introspection.Jesse J. Prinz - 2004 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (7-8):40-57.
    Edward Titchener, one of the great champions of introspectionist psychology, declared that 'the term Introspection, as we find it used today, is highly equivocal, and that the procedure which it connotes may be scientifically illegitimate, or even wholly imaginary' . He made the point because he wanted to insulate his preferred method of doing psychological research from criticisms that were directed against forms of introspection that he conceded to be unreliable. The point, however, is not just that we can introspect (...)
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  21. When is perception conscious?Jesse J. Prinz - 2010 - In Bence Nanay (ed.), Perceiving the world. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 310--332.
    Once upon a time, people thought that all perception was conscious. Indeed, it was widely believed that all mental states are conscious, so the problem of explaining consciousness collapses into the problem of explaining mentality. But things have changed. Most people now believe that a lot goes on unconsciously. Indeed, some people believe that mental states that are not perceptual in nature are never conscious. That’s a matter of controversy. Less controversial is the claim that perceptual states are conscious some (...)
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  22. Regaining Composure: A Defence Of Prototype Compositionality.Jesse J. Prinz - 2012 - In Markus Werning, Wolfram Hinzen & Edouard Machery (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Compositionality. Oxford University Press.
    Prototype theory emerged out of two main sources. First, research on perceptual category learning suggested that people spontaneously abstract representations of the statistical central tendency when they are exposed to a range of similar images. The abstracted representation corresponds to the average or prototype for a range of training images and can be used to classify future examples. The second source was philosophical. On some versions, the prototype features are organized into structured lists, which divide into such subheadings as physical (...)
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  23. Can moral obligations be empirically discovered?Jesse J. Prinz - 2007 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 31 (1):271-291.
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  24. Steering a course for embodied representation.Jesse J. Prinz & Lawrence W. Barsalou - 2000 - In Eric Dietrich Art Markman (ed.), Cognitive Dynamics: Conceptual change in humans and machines. Lawrence Erlbaum. pp. 51--77.
  25. The duality of content.Jesse J. Prinz - 2000 - Philosophical Studies 100 (1):1-34.
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  26.  70
    Mind and Cognition: An Anthology.William G. Lycan & Jesse J. Prinz (eds.) - 1999 - Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.
    First published in 1990, Mind and Cognition: An Anthology is now firmly established as a popular teaching apparatus for upper level undergraduate and graduate courses in the philosophy of mind. Brings together the most important classic and contemporary articles in philosophy of mind and cognition Completely revised and updated throughout, in response to feedback from teachers in the field Now includes 20 new readings Each updated part opens with a brief, synoptic introduction to the individual field and a comprehensive further (...)
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  27.  74
    The intermediate level theory of consciousness.Jesse J. Prinz - 2007 - In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. New York: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 248--260.
  28. Level-headed mysterianism and artificial experience.Jesse J. Prinz - 2003 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (4-5):111-132.
    Many materialists believe that we should, in principle, be able to build a conscious computing machine. Others disagree. I favour a sceptical position, but of another variety. The problem isn't that it would be impossible to create a conscious computer. The problem is that we cannot know whether it is possible. There are principled reasons for thinking that we wouldn't ever be able to confirm that allegedly conscious computers were conscious. The proper stance on computational consciousness is agnosticism. Despite this (...)
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  29.  16
    Against Moral Nativism.Jesse J. Prinz - 2009-03-20 - In Dominic Murphy & Michael Bishop (eds.), Stich. Wiley‐Blackwell. pp. 167–189.
    This chapter contains sections titled: Born to Be Good? Are There Moral Universals? Is There a Morality Acquisition Device? Morality Without Innateness Appendix: Moral Anti‐nativism and Moral Relativism References.
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  30. Unconscious perception.Jesse J. Prinz - 2015 - In Mohan Matthen (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Perception. New York, NY: Oxford University Press UK.
  31.  20
    Is Emotion a Form of Perception?Jesse J. Prinz - 2006 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume 32:136-160.
    Theories of emotions traditionally divide into two categories. According to some researchers, emotions are or essentially involve evaluative thoughts or judgments. These are called cognitive theories. According to other researchers, an emotion can occur without any thought. These are called non-cognitive theories. Some defenders of non-cognitive theories argue that emotions are action tendencies, others say they are feelings, and still others say they are affect programs, which encompass a range of internal and external events. One of the most celebrated non-cognitive (...)
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  32.  96
    The ins and outs of consciousness.Jesse J. Prinz - 2000 - Brain and Mind 1 (2):245-56.
    In Enchanted Looms , Rodney Cotterill defends the hypothesisthat conscious sensory experience depends on motor response. Thepositive evidence for this hypothesis is inconclusive, andnegative evidence can be marshaled against it. I present analternative hypothesis according to which consciousness involvesintermediate level sensory processing, attention, and workingmemory. The circuitry of consciousness can be dissociated fromaction systems and may mark an evolutionary advance from a priorphylogenetic stage in which motor outputs and sensory inputswere more intimately bound.
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  33. Beyond appearances : The content of sensation and perception.Jesse J. Prinz - 2006 - In Tamar Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual experience. New York: Oxford University Press.
    There seems to be a large gulf between percepts and concepts. In particular, con- cepts seem to be capable of representing things that percepts cannot. We can conceive of things that would be impossible to perceive. (The converse may also seem true, but I will leave that to one side.) In one respect, this is trivially right. We can conceive of things that we cannot encounter, such as unicorns. We cannot literally perceive unicorns, even if we occasionally ‘‘see’’ them in (...)
     
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  34.  68
    Emotions, embodiment, and awareness.Jesse J. Prinz - 2005 - In Lisa Feldman Barrett, Paula M. Niedenthal & Piotr Winkielman (eds.), Emotion and Consciousness. New York: Guilford Press. pp. 363-383.
  35. Empiricism and state-space semantics.Jesse J. Prinz - 2005 - In Brian L. Keeley (ed.), Paul Churchland. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  36. Poetic Opacity: How to Paint Things with Words.Jesse J. Prinz & Eric Mandelbaum - 2015 - In John Gibson (ed.), The Philosophy of Poetry. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 63-87.
  37.  39
    Parole and the moral self: Moral change mitigates responsibility.Javier Gomez-Lavin & Jesse J. Prinz - 2019 - Journal of Moral Education 48 (1):63-85.
    Recent studies demonstrate a moral self effect: continuity in moral values is crucial to ascriptions of identity in and over time. Since Locke, personal identity has been referred to as a ‘forensic’ concept, meaning that it plays a role in attributions of moral responsibility. If moral values are crucial to identity over time, then perceived changes in a person’s set of values may reduce responsibility for past deeds. To test this, we examined the moral self effect in parole contexts. In (...)
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  38. Searching for a scientific experience.Anthony I. Jack & Jesse J. Prinz - 2004 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (1):51-55.
     
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  39.  87
    Sensible ideas: A reply to Sarnecki and Markman and Stilwell.Jesse J. Prinz - 2004 - Philosophical Psychology 17 (3):419-430.
    In Furnishing the mind, I argued that concepts are couched in representational formats that are indigenous to sensory systems. I called this thesis "concept empiricism," because I think it is was a central tenet of the philosophical program defended by classical British empiricists, such as Locke and Hume. I still think that concept empiricism is true, and more empirical evidence has accrued since the book went to press. That's the good news. The bad news is that able critics have marshaled (...)
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  40. Mental maintenance: A response to the knowledge argument.Jesse J. Prinz - manuscript
     
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  41. Consciousness, computation, and emotion.Jesse J. Prinz - 2002 - In Simon C. Moore & Mike Oaksford (eds.), Consciousness, Emotional Self-Regulation and the Brain. John Benjamins.
  42. Thoughts of real kinds.Jesse J. Prinz - 2007 - In The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Psychology. Oxford University Press.
     
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  43.  5
    Hume and Cognitive Science.Jesse J. Prinz - 2016 - In Paul Russell (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of David Hume. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    This contribution is concerned with the relevance of Hume’s empirical approach to the study of the mind for contemporary cognitive science. It is argued that Hume’s views, empirically founded as they were on observation and introspection and concerning ideas and concepts, passion and sympathy, and moral sentimentalism, find considerable support in the findings of contemporary research. To this extent, Hume may well be considered a precursor to many of today’s cognitive scientists, even though they do not generally draw directly from (...)
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  44. Peer commentary on are there neural correlates of consciousness: Searching for a scientific experience.Jesse J. Prinz & Anthony I. Jack - 2004 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (1):51-56.
  45. The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Psychology.Jesse J. Prinz (ed.) - forthcoming - Oxford University Press.
  46.  30
    viii notes on contributors Alvin Goldman is Board of Governors Professor of Philosophy and Cognitive Science at Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey. His principal research areas are episte-mology, philosophy of mind, and cognitive science. His most recent book is Simulating Minds (2006). [REVIEW]Frank Jackson, Jesse J. Prinz, Ernest Sosa & Kim Sterelny - 2009 - In Dominic Murphy & Michael A. Bishop (eds.), Stich and His Critics. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.
  47. Jesse J. Prinz, Furnishing the Mind: Concepts and their Perceptual Basis. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2002. [REVIEW]Jonathan M. Weinberg, Daniel Yarlett, Michael Ramscar, Dan Ryder & Jesse J. Prinz - 2003 - Metascience 12 (3):279-303.