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Jesse Prinz [71]Jesse J. Prinz [39]Jesse Jonathan Prinz [1]
  1. The Emotional Construction of Morals.Jesse Prinz - 2007 - Oxford University Press.
    Jesse Prinz argues that recent work in philosophy, neuroscience, and anthropology supports two radical hypotheses about the nature of morality: moral values are based on emotional responses, and these emotional responses are inculcated by culture, not hard-wired through natural selection. In the first half of the book, Jesse Prinz defends the hypothesis that morality has an emotional foundation. Evidence from brain imaging, social psychology, and psychopathology suggest that, when we judge something to be right or wrong, we are merely expressing (...)
  2. Gut Reactions: A Perceptual Theory of the Emotions.Jesse J. Prinz - 2004 - Oxford University Press.
    Gut Reactions is an interdisciplinary defense of the claim that emotions are perceptions of changes in the body.
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  3. Furnishing the Mind: Concepts and Their Perceptual Basis.Jesse J. Prinz - 2002 - MIT Press.
  4.  33
    The Conscious Brain.Jesse Prinz - 2012 - Oup Usa.
    The Conscious Brain brings neuroscientific evidence to bear on enduring philosophical questions. Major philosophical and scientific theories of consciousness are surveyed, challenged, and extended.
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  5. Gut Reactions: A Perceptual Theory of Emotion.Jesse J. Prinz - 2004 - Oup Usa.
    Gut Reactions is an interdisciplinary defense of the claim that emotions are perceptions in a double sense. First of all, they are perceptions of changes in the body, but, through the body, they also allow us to literally perceive danger, loss, and other matters of concern. This proposal, which Prinz calls the embodied appraisal theory, reconciles the long standing debate between those who say emotions are cognitive and those who say they are noncognitive. The basic idea behind embodied appraisals is (...)
     
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  6.  45
    The Emotional Construction of Morals.Jesse Prinz - 2009 - Analysis 69 (4):701-704.
    The Emotional Construction of Morals is a book about moral judgements – the kinds of mental states we might express by sentences such as, ‘It's bad to flash your neighbors’, or ‘You ought not eat your pets’. There are three basic questions that get addressed: what are the psychological states that constitute such judgements? What kinds of properties do such judgements refer to? And, where do these judgements come from? The first question concerns moral psychology, the second metaethics and the (...)
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  7. The Emotional Basis of Moral Judgments.Jesse Prinz - 2006 - Philosophical Explorations 9 (1):29-43.
    Recent work in cognitive science provides overwhelming evidence for a link between emotion and moral judgment. I review?ndings from psychology, cognitive neuroscience, and research on psychopathology and conclude that emotions are not merely correlated with moral judgments but they are also, in some sense, both necessary and suf?cient. I then use these?ndings along with some anthropological observations to support several philosophical theories:?rst, I argue that sentimentalism is true: to judge that something is wrong is to have a sentiment of disapprobation (...)
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  8. Is Empathy Necessary for Morality.Jesse J. Prinz - 2011 - In Amy Coplan & Peter Goldie (eds.), Empathy: Philosophical and Psychological Perspectives. Oxford University Press. pp. 211--229.
  9. Intuitions About Consciousness: Experimental Studies.Joshua Knobe & Jesse Prinz - 2008 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (1):67-83.
    When people are trying to determine whether an entity is capable of having certain kinds of mental states, they can proceed either by thinking about the entity from a *functional* standpoint or by thinking about the entity from a *physical* standpoint. We conducted a series of studies to determine how each of these standpoints impact people’s mental state ascriptions. The results point to a striking asymmetry. It appears that ascriptions of states involving phenomenal consciousness are sensitive to physical factors in (...)
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  10. Against Empathy.Jesse Prinz - 2011 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (s1):214-233.
    Empathy can be characterized as a vicarious emotion that one person experiences when reflecting on the emotion of another. So characterized, empathy is sometimes regarded as a precondition on moral judgment. This seems to have been Hume's view. I review various ways in which empathy might be regarded as a precondition and argue against each of them: empathy is not a component, a necessary cause, a reliable epistemic guide, a foundation for justification, or the motivating force behind our moral judgments. (...)
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  11. Is the Mind Really Modular?Jesse J. Prinz - 2006 - In Robert J. Stainton (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science. Blackwell. pp. 22--36.
    When Fodor titled his (1983) book the _Modularity of Mind_, he overstated his position. His actual view is that the mind divides into systems some of which are modular and others of which are not. The book would have been more aptly, if less provocatively, called _The Modularity of Low-Level Peripheral Systems_. High-level perception and cognitive systems are non-modular on Fodor’s theory. In recent years, modularity has found more zealous defenders, who claim that the entire mind divides into highly specialized (...)
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  12. The Sensory Basis of Cognitive Phenomenology.Jesse Prinz - 2011 - In Tim Bayne & Michelle Montague (eds.), Cognitive Phenomenology. Oxford University Press. pp. 174--196.
  13. Putting the Brakes on Enactive Perception.Jesse J. Prinz - 2006 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 12.
    Alva Noë’s _Action in Perception _offers a provocative and vigorous defense of the thesis that vision is enactive: visual experience depends on dispositional motor responses. On this view, vision and action are inextricably bound. In this review, I argue against enactive perception. I raise objections to seven lines of evidence that appear in Noë’s book, and I indicate some reasons for thinking that vision can operate independently of motor responses. I conclude that the relationship between vision and action is causal, (...)
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  14. Is Attention Necessary and Sufficient for Consciousness?Jesse Prinz - 2011 - In Christopher Mole, Declan Smithies & Wayne Wu (eds.), Attention: Philosophical and Psychological Essays. Oxford University Press. pp. 174--204.
  15. The Normativity Challenge: Cultural Psychology Provides the Real Threat to Virtue Ethics.Jesse Prinz - 2009 - Journal of Ethics 13 (2-3):117-144.
    Situationists argue that virtue ethics is empirically untenable, since traditional virtue ethicists postulate broad, efficacious character traits, and social psychology suggests that such traits do not exist. I argue that prominent philosophical replies to this challenge do not succeed. But cross-cultural research gives reason to postulate character traits, and this undermines the situationist critique. There is, however, another empirical challenge to virtue ethics that is harder to escape. Character traits are culturally informed, as are our ideals of what traits are (...)
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  16. Is Consciousness Embodied.Jesse Prinz - 2009 - In Murat Aydede & P. Robbins (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 419--437.
  17. All Consciousness is Perceptual.Jesse J. Prinz - 2007 - In Brian P. McLaughlin & Jonathan D. Cohen (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell.
  18. Beyond Appearances : The Content of Sensation and Perception.Jesse J. Prinz - 2006 - In Tamar Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press. pp. 434--460.
    There seems to be a large gulf between percepts and concepts. In particular, con- cepts seem to be capable of representing things that percepts cannot. We can conceive of things that would be impossible to perceive. (The converse may also seem true, but I will leave that to one side.) In one respect, this is trivially right. We can conceive of things that we cannot encounter, such as unicorns. We cannot literally perceive unicorns, even if we occasionally.
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  19. Moral Emotions.Jesse J. Prinz & Shaun Nichols - 2010 - In John Michael Doris (ed.), The Moral Psychology Handbook. Oxford University Press. pp. 111.
  20. A Neurofunctional Theory of Consciousness.Jesse J. Prinz - 2005 - In Andrew Brook & Kathleen Akins (eds.), Cognition and the Brain: The Philosophy and Neuroscience Movement. Cambridge University Press. pp. 381-396.
    Reading the philosophical literature on consciousness, one might get the idea that there is just one problem in consciousness studies, the hard problem. That would be a mistake. There are other problems; some are more tractable, but none are easy, and all interesting. The literature on the hard problem gives the impression that we have made little progress. Consciousness is just an excuse to work and re-work familiar positions on the mind-body problem. But progress is being made elsewhere. Researchers are (...)
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  21. Beyond Human Nature: How Culture and Experience Shape the Human Mind.Jesse J. Prinz - 2012 - W.W. Norton.
     
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  22.  56
    Sound Morality: Irritating and Icky Noises Amplify Judgments in Divergent Moral Domains.Angelika Seidel & Jesse Prinz - 2013 - Cognition 127 (1):1-5.
    Theoretical models and correlational research suggest that anger and disgust play different roles in moral judgment. Anger is theorized to underlie reactions to crimes against persons, such as battery and unfairness, and disgust is theorized to underlie reactions to crimes against nature, such as sexual transgressions and cannibalism. To date, however, it has not been shown that induction of these two emotions has divergent effects. In this experiment we show divergent effects of anger and disgust. We use sounds to elicit (...)
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  23.  93
    A Neurofunctional Theory of Visual Consciousness.Jesse Prinz - 2000 - Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2):243-59.
    This paper develops an empirically motivated theory of visual consciousness. It begins by outlining neuropsychological support for Jackendoff's (1987) hypothesis that visual consciousness involves mental representations at an intermediate level of processing. It then supplements that hypothesis with the further requirement that attention, which can come under the direction of high level representations, is also necessary for consciousness. The resulting theory is shown to have a number of philosophical consequences. If correct, higher-order thought accounts, the multiple drafts account, and the (...)
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  24. Siegel’s Get Rich Quick Scheme.Jesse Prinz - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (3):827-835.
  25.  21
    Aesthetic Emotions Reconsidered.Joerg Fingerhut & Jesse J. Prinz - 2020 - The Monist 103 (2):223-239.
    We define aesthetic emotions as emotions that underlie the evaluative assessment of artworks. They are separated from the wider class of art-elicited emotions. Aesthetic emotions historically have been characterized as calm, as lacking specific patterns of embodiment, and as being a sui generis kind of pleasure. We reject those views and argue that there is a plurality of aesthetic emotions contributing to praise. After presenting a general account of the nature of emotions, we analyze twelve positive aesthetic emotions in four (...)
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  26.  40
    Diachronic Identity and the Moral Self.Jesse Prinz & Shaun Nichols - 2016 - In Julian Kiverstein (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of the Social Mind. Abingdon: Routledge. pp. 449-464.
  27. Is Morality Innate?Jesse Prinz - manuscript
    Thus declares Francis Hutcheson, expressing a view widespread during the Enlightenment, and throughout the history of philosophy. According to this tradition, we are by nature moral, and ourS concern for good and evil is as natural to us as our capacity to feel pleasure and pain. The link between morality and human nature has been a common theme since ancient times, and, with the rise of modern empirical moral psychology, it remains equally popular today. Evolutionary ethicists, ethologists, developmental psychologists, social (...)
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  28. Embodied Emotions.Jesse Prinz - 2004 - In Robert C. Solomon (ed.), Thinking About Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions. Oup Usa.
  29. Poetic Opacity: How to Paint Things with Words.Jesse J. Prinz & Eric Mandelbaum - 2015 - In John Gibson (ed.), The Philosophy of Poetry. Oxford University Press. pp. 63-87.
  30. Emotions Embodied.Jesse Prinz - 2004 - In R. Solomon (ed.), Thinking About Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions. Oxford University Press.
    In one of the most frequently quoted passages in the history of emotion research, William James (1884: 189f) announces that emotions occur when the perception of an exciting fact causes a collection of bodily changes, and “our feeling of the same changes as they occur IS the emotion.” The same idea occurred to Carl Lange (1984) around the same time. These authors were not the first to draw a link between the emotions and the body. Indeed, this had been a (...)
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  31. Empirical Philosophy and Experimental Philosophy.Jesse Prinz - 2007 - In Joshua Knobe & Shaun Nichols (eds.), Experimental Philosophy. Oxford University Press. pp. 189--208.
  32. Are Emotions Feelings?Jesse J. Prinz - 2005 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (8-10):9-25.
    The majority of emotion researchers reject the feeling theory of emotions; they deny that emotions are feelings. Some of these researchers admit that emotions have feelings as components, but they insist that emotions contain other components as well, such as cognitions. I argue for a qualified version of the feeling theory. I present evidence in support William James's conjecture that emotions are perceptions of patterned changes in the body. When such perceptions are conscious, they qualify as feelings. But the bodily (...)
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  33. The Aesthetics of Punk Rock.Jesse Prinz - 2014 - Philosophy Compass 9 (9):583-593.
    Philosophers should listen to punk rock. Though largely ignored in analytic aesthetics, punk can shed light on the nature, limits, and value of art. Here, I will begin with an overview of punk aesthetics and then extrapolate two lessons. First, punk intentionally violates widely held aesthetic norms, thus raising questions about the plasticity of taste. Second, punk music is associated with accompanying visual styles, fashion, and attitudes; this points to a relationship between art and identity. Together, these lessons suggest that (...)
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  34. Can Moral Obligations Be Empirically Discovered?Jesse J. Prinz - 2007 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 31 (1):271-291.
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  35. Is Emotion a Form of Perception?Jesse J. Prinz - 2008 - In Luc Faucher & Christine Tappolet (eds.), The Modularity of Emotions. University of Calgary Press. pp. 137-160.
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  36. The Return of Concept Empiricism.Jesse J. Prinz - 2005 - In H. Cohen & C. Leferbvre (eds.), Categorization and Cognitive Science. Elsevier.
    In this chapter, I outline and defend a version of concept empiricism. The theory has four central tenets: Concepts represent categories by reliable causal relations to category instances; conceptual representations of category vary from occasion to occasion; these representations are perceptually based; and these representations are all learned, not innate. The last two tenets on this list have been central to empiricism historically, and the first two have been developed in more recent years. I look at each in turn, and (...)
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  37. Which Emotions Are Basic?Jesse Prinz - 2004 - In Dylan Evans & Pierre Cruse (eds.), Emotion, Evolution, and Rationality. Oxford University Press. pp. 69--87.
    There are two major perspectives on the origin of emotions. According to one, emotions are the products of natural selection. They are evolved adaptations, best understood using the explanatory tools of evolutionary psychology. According to the other, emotions are socially constructed, and they vary across cultural boundaries. There is evidence supporting both perspectives. In light of this, some have argued both approaches are right. The standard strategy for compromise is to say that some emotions are evolved and others are constructed. (...)
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  38. When is Perception Conscious?Jesse J. Prinz - 2010 - In Bence Nanay (ed.), Perceiving the World. Oxford University Press. pp. 310--332.
    Once upon a time, people thought that all perception was conscious. Indeed, it was widely believed that all mental states are conscious, so the problem of explaining consciousness collapses into the problem of explaining mentality. But things have changed. Most people now believe that a lot goes on unconsciously. Indeed, some people believe that mental states that are not perceptual in nature are never conscious. That’s a matter of controversy. Less controversial is the claim that perceptual states are conscious some (...)
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  39. Putting Concepts to Work: Some Thoughts for the Twenty First Century.Andy Clark & Jesse J. Prinz - 2004 - Mind and Language 19 (1):57-69.
    Fodor’s theory makes thinking prior to doing. It allows for an inactive agent or pure reflector, and for agents whose actions in various ways seem to float free of their own conceptual repertoires. We show that naturally evolved creatures are not like that. In the real world, thinking is always and everywhere about doing. The point of having a brain is to guide the actions of embodied beings in a complex material world. Some of those actions are, to be sure, (...)
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  40.  68
    Is Love and Emotion?Arina Pismenny & Jesse Prinz - 2017 - In Christopher Grau & Aaron Smuts (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Love. New York, NY, USA:
    What kind of mental phenomenon is romantic love? Many philosophers, psychologists, and ordinary folk treat it as an emotion. This chapter argues the category of emotion is inadequate to account for romantic love. It examines major emotion theories in philosophy and psychology and shows that they fail to illustrate that romantic love is an emotion. It considers the categories of basic emotions and emotion complexes, and demonstrates they too come short in accounting for romantic love. It assesses the roles of (...)
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  41. The Fractionation of Introspection.Jesse J. Prinz - 2004 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (7-8):40-57.
    Edward Titchener, one of the great champions of introspectionist psychology, declared that 'the term Introspection, as we find it used today, is highly equivocal, and that the procedure which it connotes may be scientifically illegitimate, or even wholly imaginary' . He made the point because he wanted to insulate his preferred method of doing psychological research from criticisms that were directed against forms of introspection that he conceded to be unreliable. The point, however, is not just that we can introspect (...)
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  42. The Moral Emotions.Jesse Prinz - 2009 - In Peter Goldie (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion. Oxford University Press.
     
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  43. The Duality of Content.Jesse J. Prinz - 2000 - Philosophical Studies 100 (1):1-34.
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  44.  34
    Is Emotion a Form of Perception?Jesse J. Prinz - 2006 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (sup1):137-160.
  45. Emotion and Aesthetic Value.Jesse Prinz - manuscript
    Aesthetics is a normative domain. We evaluate artworks as better or worse, good or bad, great or grim. I will refer to a positive appraisal of an artwork as an aesthetic appreciation of that work, and I refer to a negative appraisal as aesthetic depreciation. (I will often drop the word “aesthetic.”) There has been considerable amount of work on what makes an artwork worthy of appreciation, and less, it seems, on the nature of appreciation itself. These two topics are (...)
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  46.  82
    For Valence.Jesse Prinz - 2010 - Emotion Review 2 (1):5-13.
    In a provocative and important article, Robert Solomon argues that emotion researchers should abandon the notion of valence: it is used many different ways, and no single construct captures the pretheoretical distinction between positive and negative emotions. I echo Solomon in arguing that some of the most popular theories of valence are unlikely to succeed, though my case against these constructs comes from a noncognitive, as opposed to cognitive, perspective. I then argue that there is one notion of valence, related (...)
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  47.  93
    Culture and Cognitive Science.Jesse Prinz - forthcoming - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  48. Regaining Composure: A Defense of Prototype Compositionality.Jesse Prinz - manuscript
    Beginning in the late 1960s, psychologists began to challenge the view the definitional theory of concepts. According to that theory a concept is a mental representation comprising representations of properties (or “features”) that are individually necessary and jointly sufficient for membership in a category. In place of the definitional view, psychologists initially put forward the prototype theory of concept, according to which concepts comprise representations of features that are typical, salient, and diagnostic for category membership, but not necessarily necessary. The (...)
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  49.  31
    The Intermediate Level Theory of Consciousness.Jesse J. Prinz - 2007 - In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell. pp. 248--260.
  50.  22
    Viii Notes on Contributors Alvin Goldman is Board of Governors Professor of Philosophy and Cognitive Science at Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey. His Principal Research Areas Are Episte-Mology, Philosophy of Mind, and Cognitive Science. His Most Recent Book is Simulating Minds (2006). [REVIEW]Frank Jackson, Jesse J. Prinz, Ernest Sosa & Kim Sterelny - 2009 - In Michael Bishop & Dominic Murphy (eds.), Stich and His Critics. Blackwell.
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