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Jessica Pepp
Uppsala University
  1. What Determines the Reference of Names? What Determines the Objects of Thought.Jessica Pepp - 2018 - Erkenntnis:1-19.
    It is fairly widely accepted that Saul Kripke, Keith Donnellan, and others showed in the 1960s-1980s that proper names, in particular uses by speakers, can refer to things free of anything like the epistemic requirements posited by Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell. This paper separates two aspects of the Frege-Russell view of name reference: (i) the metaphysical thesis that names in particular uses refer to things in virtue of speakers thinking of those things and (ii) the epistemic thesis that thinking (...)
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  2.  9
    On Pictorially Mediated Mind-Object Relations.Jessica Pepp - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-29.
    ABSTRACTWhen I see a tree through my window, that particular worldly tree is said to be ‘in’, ‘on’, or ‘before’ my mind. My ordinary visual link to it is ‘intentional’. How similar to this link are the links between me and particular worldly trees when I see them in photographs, or in paintings? Are they, in some important sense, links of the same kind? Or are they links of importantly different kinds? Or, as a third possibility, are they at once (...)
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  3.  76
    Principles of Acquaintance.Jessica Pepp - forthcoming - In Thomas Raleigh & Jonathan Knowles (eds.), Acquaintance: New Essays. Oxford University Press.
    The thesis that in order to genuinely think about a particular object one must be (in some sense) acquainted with that object has been thoroughly explored since it was put forward by Bertrand Russell. Recently, the thesis has come in for mounting criticism. The aim of this paper is to point out that neither the exploration nor the criticism have been sensitive to the fact that the thesis can be interpreted in two different ways, yielding two different principles of acquaintance. (...)
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  4.  64
    Assertion, Lying, and Untruthfully Implicating.Jessica Pepp - forthcoming - In Sanford C. Goldberg (ed.), The Oxford Handbook ofAssertion. Oxford University Press.
    This chapter explores the prospects for justifying the somewhat widespread, somewhat firmly held sense that there is some moral advantage to untruthfully implicating over lying. I call this the "Difference Intuition." I define lying in terms of asserting, but remain open about what precise definition best captures our ordinary notion. I define implicating as one way of meaning something without asserting it. I narrow down the kind of untruthful implicating that should be compared with lying for purposes of evaluating whether (...)
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  5.  25
    Truth Serum, Liar Serum, and Some Problems About Saying What You Think is False.Jessica Pepp - forthcoming - In Eliot Michaelson Andreas Stokke (ed.), Lying. Oxford University Press.
    This chapter investigates the conflict between thought and speech that is inherent in lying. This is the conflict of saying what you think is false. The chapter shows how stubbornly saying what you think is false resists analysis. In traditional analyses of lying, saying what you think is false is analyzed in terms of saying something and believing that it is false. But standard cases of unconscious or divided belief challenge these analyses. Classic puzzles about belief from Gottlob Frege and (...)
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  6. Reference and Referring: A Framework.Jessica Pepp - 2012 - In William P. Kabasenche, Michael O'Rourke & Matthew H. Slater (eds.), Reference and Referring. MIT Press. pp. 1-32.
  7.  14
    Semantic Reference Not by Convention?Jessica Pepp - 2009 - Abstracta 5 (2):116-125.
    The aim of this paper is to approach a basic question in semantics: what is semantic reference? Or, what is reference, insofar as the notion has a role in the semantics of natural language? I highlight two ways of conceiving of semantic reference, which offer different starting points for answering the question. One of these conceptions – what I call the conventional conception of semantic reference – is the standard conception. I propose an alternative to this conception: what I call (...)
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  8.  35
    A Unified Treatment of (Pro-) Nominals in Ordinary English.Jessica Pepp, Joseph Almog & Nichols Paul - 2015 - In Andrea Bianchi (ed.), On Reference. Oxford University Press.