Monadic MV-algebras are an algebraic model of the predicate calculus of the Łukasiewicz infinite valued logic in which only a single individual variable occurs. GMV-algebras are a non-commutative generalization of MV-algebras and are an algebraic counterpart of the non-commutative Łukasiewicz infinite valued logic. We introduce monadic GMV-algebras and describe their connections to certain couples of GMV-algebras and to left adjoint mappings of canonical embeddings of GMV-algebras. Furthermore, functional MGMV-algebras are studied and polyadic GMV-algebras are introduced and discussed.
The paper explores the philosophical treatment of sacrifice in four of Jiří Menzel’s films of the 1960’s, Closely observed trains, Capricious summer, Mr Balthazar’s death, his short film contribution to the anthology film of the New Wave, Pearls of the deep, and Larks on a string. The paper argues that Menzel problematizes romanticized versions of messianic sacrifice as they all too easily disregard the moral significance of mundane relations. By analysing the treatment of sacrifice in each of these films, (...) the paper makes a case for the significance of Menzel’s treatment of sacrifice for current philosophical debates. (shrink)
Ludwik Borkowski has constructed a quantifier-less calculus of names (BRN1), which is regarded as a base system here. The system can be extended with the use of the deductive power of rules of introduction and omission of functors π and σ (BRN2), which serve here as the substitutes of quantifiers. If we adopt the extensionality rule for the functor of singular inclusion (REε), we obtain yet another extending of the system (BRN3) accompanied by simultaneous considerable reduction of the primary rules. (...) The interpretation of the last system in elementary ontology is included. (shrink)
Given how much the issue of the self and diachronic personal identity has been discussed in recent decades, one might wonder why something like Benovsky's pluralist-self view has not already been proposed and critically examined. It does, after all, look promising as a way to negotiate a settlement between the partisans of self and of nonself. For it gives the first party what it says it wants—ontological commitment to selves—while also granting the nonself theorists their core claim that there is (...) no single entity that is the referent of "I." But I doubt that any such settlement can last.Benovsky claims to have some sympathy for the view that I call Buddhist Reductionism, and his pluralist-self view does at first... (shrink)