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  1. Review: Debates About Realism Transposed to a New Key. [REVIEW]Jim Edwards - 1994 - Mind 103 (409):59 - 72.
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  2. Index of MIND Vol. 103 Nos. 1-4y 1994.Jim Edwards - 1994 - Mind 103 (412):4.
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  3. Burge on Testimony and Memory.Jim Edwards - 2000 - Analysis 60 (1):124–131.
  4. Best Opinion and Intentional States.Jim Edwards - 1992 - Philosophical Quarterly 42 (166):21-33.
  5.  96
    Secondary Qualities and the a Priori.Jim Edwards - 1992 - Mind 101 (402):263-272.
  6.  73
    Is Tennant Selling Truth Short?Jim Edwards - 1997 - Analysis 57 (2):152–158.
  7.  26
    Reduction and Tarski's Definition of Logical Consequence.Jim Edwards - 2003 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 44 (1):49-62.
    In his classic 1936 paper Tarski sought to motivate his definition of logical consequence by appeal to the inference form: P(0), P(1), . . ., P(n), . . . therefore ∀nP(n). This is prima facie puzzling because these inferences are seemingly first-order and Tarski knew that Gödel had shown first-order proof methods to be complete, and because ∀nP(n) is not a logical consequence of P(0), P(1), . . ., P(n), . . . by Taski's proposed definition. An attempt to resolve (...)
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  8.  89
    Prizing Truth From Warranted Assertibility: Reply to Tennant.Jim Edwards - 1999 - Analysis 59 (4):300–308.
    Crispin Wright has argued that an antirealist should not equate truth with warrant. Neil Tennant has disputed this. This paper continues the discussion with Tennant. Firstly, it expands upon the radical difference between Tennant's conception of a warrant and Wright's. Secondly, it shows that, even if we were to adopt Tennant's own conception of a warrant, there is a reading available to Wright of 'There is no warrant for P' and of 'There is a warrant for not-P' such that the (...)
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  9.  38
    Debates About Realism Transposed to a New Key. [REVIEW]Jim Edwards - 1994 - Mind 103 (409):59-72.
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  10.  63
    Anti-Realist Truth and Concepts of Superassertibility.Jim Edwards - 1996 - Synthese 109 (1):103 - 120.
    Crispin Wright offers superassertibility as an anti-realist explication of truth. A statement is superassertible, roughly, if there is a state of information available which warrants it and it is warranted by all achievable enlargements of that state of information. However, it is argued, Wright fails to take account of the fact that many of our test procedures are not sure fire, even when applied under ideal conditions. An alternative conception of superassertibility is constructed to take this feature into account. However, (...)
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  11.  44
    The Universal Quantifier and Dummett's Verificationist Theory of Sense.Jim Edwards - 1995 - Analysis 55 (2):90 - 97.
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  12.  52
    Theories of Meaning and Logical Constants: Davidson Versus Evans.Jim Edwards - 2002 - Mind 111 (442):249-280.
    Donald Dvaidson has claimed that a theory of meaning identifies the logical constants of the object language by treating them in the phrasal axioms of the theory, and that the theory entails a relation of logical consequence among the sentences of the object language. Section 1 offers a preliminary investigation of these claims. In Section 2 the claims are rebutted by appealing to Evans's paradigm of a theory of meaning. Evans's theory is deliberately blind to any relation of logical consequence (...)
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  13.  10
    Hidden Variables and the Propensity Theory of Probability.Jim Edwards - 1979 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 30 (4):315-328.
  14.  32
    Interpreted Logical Forms and Knowing Your Own Mind.Jim Edwards - 1999 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 99 (2):169-90.
    An attractive semantic theory presented by Richard K. Larson and Peter Ludlow takes a report of propositional attitudes, e.g 'Tom believes Judy Garland sang', to report a believing relation between Tom and an interpreted logical form constructed from 'Judy Garland sang'. We briefly outline the semantic theory and indicate its attractions. However, the definition of interpreted logical forms given by Larson and Ludlow is shown to be faulty, and an alternative definition is offered which matches their intentions. This definition is (...)
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  15.  10
    Explaining Human Action.Jim Edwards - 1991 - Philosophical Books 32 (2):110-111.
  16.  2
    Philosophy and Language.Jim Edwards & Steven Davis - 1977 - Philosophical Quarterly 27 (107):186.
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  17.  2
    Explanation in Psychology: Functional Support for Anomalous Monism: Jim Edwards.Jim Edwards - 1990 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 27:45-64.
    Donald Davidson finds folk-psychological explanations anomalous due to the open-ended and constitutive conception of rationality which they employ, and yet monist because they invoke an ontology of only physical events. An eliminative materialist who thinks that the beliefs and desires of folk-psychology are mere pre-scientific fictions cannot accept these claims, but he could accept anomalous monism construed as an analysis , merely, of the ideological and ontological presumptions of folk-psychology. Of course, eliminative materialism is itself only a guess, a marker (...)
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  18.  13
    Atomic Realism, Intuitionist Logic and Tarskian Truth.Jim Edwards - 1990 - Philosophical Quarterly 40 (158):13-26.
  19.  10
    Response to Hoeltje: Davidson Vindicated?Jim Edwards - 2007 - Mind 116 (461):131-141.
    In response to Hoeltje I concede the main point of his first section: for each logical truth S of the object language, it is a logical consequence of the Davidsonian theory of meaning I offered in my paper that S is logically true, contrary to what I asserted in the paper. However, I now argue that a Davidsonian theory of meaning may be formulated equally well in such a way that it not a logical consequence of the theory that S (...)
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  20.  2
    Explanation in Psychology: Functional Support for Anomalous Monism.Jim Edwards - 1990 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 27:45-64.
  21.  5
    Following Rules, Grasping Concepts and Feeling Pains.Jim Edwards - 1993 - European Journal of Philosophy 1 (3):268-284.
  22.  2
    Human Knowledge and Human Nature. An Introduction to an Ancient Debate.Jim Edwards - 1993 - Philosophical Books 34 (2):106-108.
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  23.  1
    Freedom From Necessity: The Metaphysical Basis of Responsibility.Jim Edwards - 1990 - Philosophical Books 31 (2):105-107.
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  24. A Reply To De Anna On The Simple View Of Colour.Jim Edwards - 2003 - Philosophy 78 (1):109-114.
    John Campbell proposed a so-called simple view of colours according to which colours are categorical properties of the surfaces of objects just as they normally appear to be. I raised an invertion problem for Campbell's view according to which the senses of colour terms fail to match their references, thus rendering those terms meaningless—or so I claimed. Gabriele de Anna defended Campbell's view against my example by contesting two points in particular. Firstly, de Anna claimed that there is no special (...)
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  25. Relations and Representations: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Social Psychological Science.Jim Edwards - 1992 - Philosophical Books 33 (2):119-120.
  26. The universal quantifier and Dummett's verificationist theory of sense.Jim Edwards - 1995 - Erkenntnis 55:90.
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  27. W. D. Hart, "The Engines of the Soul".Jim Edwards - 1989 - Philosophical Quarterly 39 (157):512.
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