11 found
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  1. What is a Mechanism? A Counterfactual Account.Jim Woodward - 2002 - Proceedings of the Philosophy of Science Association 2002 (3):S366-S377.
    This paper presents a counterfactual account of what a mechanism is. Mechanisms consist of parts, the behavior of which conforms to generalizations that are invariant under interventions, and which are modular in the sense that it is possible in principle to change the behavior of one part independently of the others. Each of these features can be captured by the truth of certain counterfactuals.
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  2.  99
    Response to Strevens.Jim Woodward - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (1):193-212.
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  3. Interventionist Theories of Causation in Psychological Perspective.Jim Woodward - 2007 - In Alison Gopnik & Laura Schulz (eds.), Causal Learning: Psychology, Philosophy, and Computation. Oxford University Press. pp. 19--36.
  4. What Are Moral Intuitions and Why Should We Care About Them? A Neurobiological Perspective.John Allman & Jim Woodward - 2008 - Philosophical Issues 18 (1):164-185.
  5.  47
    The Chances of Explanation: Causal Explanation in the Social, Medical and Physical Sciences. [REVIEW]Jim Woodward - 1993 - Philosophy of Science 60 (4):659.
  6. Evading the IRS.James Bogen & Jim Woodward - 2005 - In Martin R. Jones & Nancy Cartwright (eds.), Idealization XII: Correcting the Model: Idealization and Abstraction in the Sciences.
    'IRS' is our term for the logical empiricist idea that the best way to understand the epistemic bearing of observational evidence on scientific theories is to model it in terms of Inferential Relations among Sentences representing the evidence, and sentences representing hypotheses the evidence is used to evaluate. Developing ideas from our earlier work, including 'Saving the Phenomena'(Phil Review 97, 1988, p.303-52 )we argue that the bearing of observational evidence on theory depends upon causal connections and error characteristics of the (...)
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  7.  15
    Causes, Conditions, and the Pragmatics of Causal Explanation.Jim Woodward - 2011 - In Gregory J. Morgan (ed.), Philosophy of Science Matters: The Philosophy of Peter Achinstein. Oxford University Press. pp. 247.
  8. Counterfactuals All the Way Down?: Marc Lange: Laws and Lawmakers: Science, Metaphysics, and the Laws of Nature. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009, 280 Pp, $99 HB, $24.95 PB.Jim Woodward, Barry Loewer, John W. Carroll & Marc Lange - 2011 - Metascience 20 (1):27-52.
    Counterfactuals all the way down? Content Type Journal Article DOI 10.1007/s11016-010-9437-9 Authors Jim Woodward, History and Philosophy of Science, 1017 Cathedral of Learning, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA 15260, USA Barry Loewer, Department of Philosophy, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ 08901, USA John W. Carroll, Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies, North Carolina State University, Raleigh, NC 27695-8103, USA Marc Lange, Department of Philosophy, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, CB#3125—Caldwell Hall, Chapel Hill, NC 27599-3125, USA Journal Metascience Online (...)
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  9.  47
    Why Do People Cooperate as Much as They Do?Jim Woodward - 2008 - In Chrysostomos Mantzavinos (ed.), Philosophy of the Social Sciences: Philosophical Theory and Scientific Practice. Cambridge University Press.
    This paper makes use of recent empirical results, mainly from experimental economics, to expore the conditions under which people will cooperate and to assess competing explantions of this cooperation. It is argued that the evidence supports the claim that people differ in type, with some being conditional cooperators and others being motivated by more or less sophisticated forms of self-interest. Stable cooperation requires, among other things, rules and institutions that protect conditional cooperators from myopically self-interested types. Additional empirical features of (...)
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  10.  24
    Ronald Giere: Science Without Laws. [REVIEW]Jim Woodward - 2002 - Philosophy of Science 69 (2):379-384.
  11.  53
    The Chances of Explanation: Causal Explanation in the Social, Medical and Physical Sciences. Paul Humphreys. [REVIEW]Jim Woodward - 1993 - Philosophy of Science 60 (4):671-673.