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Profile: Jimmy Alfonso Licon (University of California, Davis, San Francisco State University, University of Maryland, College Park)
  1. The Immorality of Procreation.Jimmy Alfonso Licon - 2012 - Think 11 (32):85-91.
    In this paper, I argue the practice of procreation is immoral regardless of the consequences of human presence such as climate change and overpopulation; the lack of consent, interests and moral desert on the part of nonexistent individuals means someone could potentially suffer in the absence of moral justification. Procreation is only morally justified if there is some method for acquiring informed consent from a non-existent person; but that is impossible; therefore, procreation is immoral.
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  2. Sceptical Thoughts on Philosophical Expertise.Jimmy Alfonso Licon - 2012 - Logos and Episteme 3 (3):449-458.
    My topic is two-fold: a reductive account of expertise as an epistemic phenomenon, and applying the reductive account to the question of whether or not philosophers enjoy expertise. I conclude, on the basis of the reductive account, that even though philosophers enjoy something akin to second-order expertise (i.e. they are often experts on the positions of other philosophers, current trends in the philosophical literature, the history of philosophy, conceptual analysis and so on), they nevertheless lack first-order philosophical expertise (i.e. expertise (...)
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  3.  50
    You 'Re an Animal, Plain and Simple'.Jimmy Alfonso Licon - 2014 - Think 13 (36):61-70.
    In this essay, I argue that we are merely biological organisms. This view (animalism) explains everyday practices like watching ourselves in the mirror. The claim that we are psychological in nature cannot explain something as trivial as watching ourselves in the mirror. Thus, we should accept animalism.
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  4.  89
    The Fine-Tuning Argument and the Problem of Poor Design.Jimmy Alfonso Licon - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (2):411-426.
    My purpose, in this paper, is to defend the claim that the fine-tuning argument suffers from the poor design worry. Simply put, the worry is this: if God created the universe, specifically with the purpose of bringing about moral agents, we would antecedently predict that the universe and the laws of nature, taken as a whole, would be well-equipped to do just that. However, in light of how rare a life-permitting universe is, compared to all the ways the universe might (...)
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  5.  26
    Properly Functioning Brains and Personal Identity: An Argument for Neural Animalism.Jimmy Alfonso Licon - 2013 - SATS: Northern European Journal of Philosophy 14 (1):63-69.
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  6.  14
    Dissecting the Suicide Machine Argument: Insights From the Hales – Licon Debate.Jimmy Alfonso Licon - 2013 - Logos and Episteme 4 (3):339-352.
    I assess the debate over the Suicide Machine Argument. There are several lessons to be learned from this debate. First, there is a fruitful distinction to be made,between tensed and tenseless versions of presentism, despite the temptation to suppose that presentism is a tensed theory of time. Second, once we’ve made the distinction between different kinds of presentism, it is clear that Licon’s objection protects the tenseless version of presentism from the Suicide Machine Argument; however, the argument is still effective (...)
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  7.  17
    Another Argument for Animalism: The Argument From Causal Powers.Jimmy Alfonso Licon - 2012 - Prolegomena 11 (2):169-180.
  8.  74
    No Suicide for Presentists.Jimmy Alfonso Licon - 2011 - Logos and Episteme 2 (3):455-464.
    Steven Hales constructs a novel argument against the possibility of presentist time travel called the suicide machine argument. Hales argues that if presentism were true, then time travel would result in the annihilation of the time traveler. But such a consequence is not time travel, therefore presentism cannot allow for the possibility of time travel. This paper argues that in order for the suicide machine argument to succeed, it must make (at least) one of two assumptions, each of which beg (...)
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  9.  24
    The Time Shuffling Machine and Metaphysical Fatalism.Jimmy Alfonso Licon - 2015 - Think 14 (41):57-68.
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  10.  54
    Still No Suicide for Presentists: Why Hales’ Response Fails.Jimmy Alfonso Licon - 2012 - Logos and Episteme (1):149-155.
    In this paper, I defend my original objection to Hales’ suicide machine argument against Hales’ response. I argue Hales’ criticisms are either misplaced or underestimate the strength of my objection; if the constraints of the original objection are respected, my original objection blocks Hales’ reply. To be thorough, I restate an improved version of the objection to the suicide machine argument. I conclude that Hales fails to motivate a reasonable worry as to the supposed suicidal nature of presentist time travel.
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  11.  24
    On Merely Modal Epistemic Peers: Challenging the Equal-Weight View.Jimmy Alfonso Licon - 2013 - Philosophia 41 (3):809-823.
    There is a controversy, within social epistemology, over how to handle disagreement among epistemic peers. Call this the problem of peer disagreement. There is a solution, i.e. the equal-weight view, which says that disagreement among epistemic peers is a reason for each peer to lower the credence they place in their respective positions. However, this solution is susceptible to a serious challenge. Call it the merely modal peers challenge. Throughout parts of modal space, which resemble the actual world almost completely, (...)
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  12.  2
    The Counterpart Argument for Modal Scepticism.Jimmy Alfonso Licon - 2013 - Logos and Episteme 4 (1):21-29.
    Surely, it is possible that you believe falsely about this-or-that modal matter. In light of the various ways the world could be arranged, it is plausible thatthere is a nearby possible world, which would be almost identical to the actual world, if it were actualized, where you and your modal counterpart disagree over modal belief p. You might be tempted to think that your modal belief is true, while hers is not. It is not clear why this is so; after (...)
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  13.  4
    Properly Functioning Brains and Personal Identity: An Argument for Neural Animalism.Jimmy Alfonso Licon - 2013 - SATS 14 (1).
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  14.  1
    Moral Manipulation & The Problem of Evil.Jimmy Alfonso Licon - 2013 - Philosophy Now 99:17-19.
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