Theater production is a collaborative creative activity. Social creativity recognizes the relationships between creative groups and the contexts in which creativity emerges. It also suggests that the interactive processes between the collaborators and their work form a center, which in turn becomes a kind of creative entity itself. An evolving systems case study of production practices at the Oregon Shakespeare Festival illuminates this process and illustrates the differences between seeing an aggregate creative activity and the more holistic view, in which (...) the artwork functions like another person, a creature in dialogue with the personality of the creative system. (shrink)
The author recounts his experience with an uDCD program that ran for three years at the Washington Hospital I Center in Washington, D.C. in the 1990s. Challenges, I benefits, and lessons learned are considered in depth. A I primary focus is the importance of community education, Organ Procurement Organization support, and the need for immediate in-situ preservation of organs.
As of January 1, 2008, over 98,000 people are waiting for organ transplants in the United States of America. Of those, nearly 75,000 are waiting for a kidney. In this calendar year, fewer than 15,000 will receive a kidney transplant from a deceased donor. The average waiting time for a deceased donor kidney now exceeds five years in virtually all metropolitan areas. Sadly, nearly as many people die waiting as there are deceased donors each year, despite monumental efforts by the (...) entire transplant community to increase both the number of organ donors and the number of organs recovered from each donor. The imbalance between demand and supply has led to considerable efforts to expand the criteria for what is considered an acceptable organ donor by the Organ Procurement and Transplant Network, thereby hoping somewhat to assuage the shortfall of donor organs. So-called Expanded Criteria Donors may be older than 50, have history of hypertension, or have died from intracerebral hemorrhage and/or have impaired renal function. ECDs now make up nearly 40% of the donor population. (shrink)
While "moral naturalism" is sometimes used to refer to any approach to metaethics intended to cohere with naturalism in metaphysics more generally, the label is more usually reserved for naturalistic forms of moral realism according to which there are objective moral facts and properties and these moral facts and properties are natural facts and properties. Views of this kind appeal to many as combining the advantages of naturalism and realism but have seemed to many others to do inadequate justice to (...) central dimensions of our practice with our moral concepts. This entry examines some of these concerns and some ways in which moral naturalists have responded to them. It also profiles central aspects of the more particular views of some leading contemporary advocates of moral naturalism. (shrink)
My topic is two-fold: a reductive account of expertise as an epistemic phenomenon, and applying the reductive account to the question of whether or not philosophers enjoy expertise. I conclude, on the basis of the reductive account, that even though philosophers enjoy something akin to second-order expertise (i.e. they are often experts on the positions of other philosophers, current trends in the philosophical literature, the history of philosophy, conceptual analysis and so on), they nevertheless lack first-order philosophical expertise (i.e. expertise (...) on philosophical positions themselves such as the nature of mind, causality, normativity and so forth). Throughout the paper, I respond to potential objections. (shrink)
This paper addresses the problem of providing a satisfying explanation of the Tractarian notions of state of affairs, fact and situation, an issue first raised by Frege and Russell. In order to do so, I first present what I consider to be the three main existing interpretations of these notions: the classic, the standard and Peter Simons’. I then present and defend an interpretation which is closer to the text than the classic and standard interpretations; one which is similar to (...) Peter Simons’ but which differs from it concerning one important point with respect to the nature of situations. Accordingly, the above mentioned should be seen as three wholly distinct categories. States of affairs are to be understood as Russellian complexes, facts as the subsistence and non-subsistence of states of affairs and situations as possibilities of the subsistence and possibilities of the non-subsistence of states of affairs. (shrink)
Are strangers sincere in their moral praise and criticism? Here we apply signaling theory to argue ceteris paribus moral criticism is more likely sincere than praise; the former tends to be a higher-fidelity signal (in Western societies). To offer an example: emotions are often self-validating as a signal because they’re hard to fake. This epistemic insight matters: moral praise and criticism influence moral reputations, and affect whether others will cooperate with us. Though much of this applies to generic praise and (...) criticism too, moral philosophers should value sincere moral praise and moral criticism for several reasons: it (i) offers insight into how others actually view us as moral agents; (ii) offers feedback to help us improve our moral characters; and (iii) encourages some behaviors, and discourages others. And so as moral agents, we should care whether moral praise and moral criticism is sincere. (shrink)
Does communicative retributivism necessarily negate capital punishment? My answer is no. I argue that there is a place, though a very limited and unsettled one, for capital punishment within the theoretical vision of communicative retributivism. The death penalty, when reserved for extravagantly evil murderers for the most heinous crimes, is justifiable by communicative retributive ideals. I argue that punishment as censure is a response to the preceding message sent by the offender through his criminal act. The gravity of punishment should (...) be commensurate to the preceding criminal message, so that the offender can face up to the nature and significance of his crime. All murders are not the same. To measure up to the most evil and humanity-degrading murderous message, capital punishment should be the counter-message. Next, I argue that capital punishment does not necessarily violate human dignity. The death penalty and torture may both disrupt human dignity, yet in distinct ways. The death penalty terminates life, the vessel that holds together autonomy, while torture directly assaults autonomy. Torture is never permissible as a form of punishment. But death penalty, when used only on the extravagant evildoers, is justifiable, as life is thoroughly degraded by his own evil act. Further, I argue that mercy is integral to communicative retributivists’ theory of capital punishment. (shrink)
In this paper, I defend my original objection to Hales’ suicide machine argument against Hales’ response. I argue Hales’ criticisms are either misplaced or underestimate the strength of my objection; if the constraints of the original objection are respected, my original objection blocks Hales’ reply. To be thorough, I restate an improved version of the objection to the suicide machine argument. I conclude that Hales fails to motivate a reasonable worry as to the supposed suicidal nature of presentist time travel.
When considering offering online education for engineering ethics instruction, making choices necessary for the effective development and delivery of an engineering ethics curriculum is an important first step. Selecting the topics and types of cases for the most effective ethics education of engineering students is a vital step in preparing an effective program. Examples are presented for topics which are considered good candidates for online presentation, and the adaptability of these topics for web-based instruction is discussed. Types of cases which (...) are useful in engineering ethics education are presented. Methods of teaching applied ethics, as well as ideas for web-based ethics course design are suggested. The market for web-based instruction is discussed. (shrink)
In this paper, I draw attention to the often-overlooked Tractarian distinction between representing and depicting, provide a clear account of it and examine how it affects our understanding of the notions of ‘being a picture’, meaningfulness, truth, and falsity in the Tractatus. I also look at the recent debate in the literature on the notion of truth and show that Glock’s claim that the official theory of the Tractatus is to be accounted in terms of obtainment only and deflationary accounts (...) such as Hacker’s derive from a failure to notice the distinction between representing and depicting or a misconception of depicting. Finally, I argue against the idea that either representing or depicting should be dispensed with. Both are necessary for Wittgenstein to account for every case of a proposition being a picture of reality. (shrink)
This paper explores relationships between environment and education after the Covid-19 pandemic through the lens of philosophy of education in a new key developed by Michael Peters and the Philosophy of Education Society of Australasia. The paper is collectively written by 15 authors who responded to the question: Who remembers Greta Thunberg? Their answers are classified into four main themes and corresponding sections. The first section, ‘As we bake the earth, let's try and bake it from scratch’, gathers wider philosophical (...) considerations about the intersection between environment, education, and the pandemic. The second section, ‘Bump in the road or a catalyst for structural change?’, looks more closely into issues pertaining to education. The third section, ‘If you choose to fail us, we will never forgive you’, focuses to Greta Thunberg’s messages and their responses. The last section, ‘Towards a new normal’, explores future scenarios and develops recommendations for critical emancipatory action. The concluding part brings these insights together, showing that resulting synergy between the answers offers much more then the sum of articles’ parts. With its ethos of collectivity, interconnectedness, and solidarity, philosophy of education in a new key is a crucial tool for development of post-pandemic education. (shrink)
Drawing insights from queer theory, this essay argues for making sex a more central category in political theorists’ interpretations of Diderot’s Supplement, and also of his contributions to History of the Two Indies. The Supplement has sometimes been considered a “libertine” text for depicting Tahiti as a society where sex is open, and indeed where foreign guests are treated to sexual hospitality. This essay reconstructs how and why Diderot’s Tahitians make promiscuity public policy and why Diderot makes miscegenation central to (...) his views on how to improve colonialism morally and politically. In the end, though, the Supplement is beset by asymmetric sexual logics that erode its apparent affirmation of egalitarianism, consent, hospitality, and non-egocentric interest. Although the presentation of sexual hospitality serves to critique French imperialism, its heterosexuality is compulsory and patriarchal. Nevertheless the text unwittingly offers a glimpse of a more radical, queer model of sociability. (shrink)
Un des principaux enjeux de la théorie du jugement de Russell consistait à élaborer une théorie qui n’engage pas à admettre des entités complexes vraies, fausses ou inexistantes tels que les objectifs meinongiens. Dans l’etude du débat entre Russell et Wittgenstein sur cette théorie, on n’a jamais sérieusement envisagé que Wittgenstein n’ait pas suivi Russell sur cette question et qu’il ait plutôt adopteune position plus proche de celle de Meinong. Dans cet article, j’aborde cette question et soutiens que Wittgenstein a (...) trouvé la solution aux problèmes posés par la théorie du jugement de Russell dans la théorie de l’image et qu’il a longuement hésité dans les Carnets entre des versions de la théorie de l’image en accord avec la position de Russell et des versions en accord avec celle de Meinong. Enfin, je soutiens qu’il a finalement tranché la question dans le Tractatus en optant pour une théorie du type de celle privilégiée par Meinong.One of the main challenges faced by Russell’s theory of judgement was to provide a satisfactory account of judgement that was not committed to the existence of true, false, or non-existent complex entities such as Meinongian objectives. In the study of the Russell-Wittgenstein debate on that theory, scholars never considered the idea that Wittgenstein might not have followed Russell on that issue. In this article, I address that question and hold, first, that problems raised by Russell’s theory of judgement find their solution in the picture theory. Then, I show that Wittgenstein hesitated for a long period of time in the Notebooks between a version of his solution which is committed to the existence of possible (non-existing) complex entities and one which is not. Finally, I argue that he did, along with Meinong, go for a committing version in the Tractatus. (shrink)
This article is an account of the teaching and practice of a course on Christian spirituality and ministry at Trinity Theological College in Singapore. It introduces the design of the course, discuss its theological foundations and practicums, and explains how it is delivered and assessed. The course adopts a historical-theological approach to the introduction of Christian spirituality and traces its development from the early church until the Protestant and Catholic Reformations. It introduces spiritual exercises from each epoch of the Christian (...) tradition and engages the student in their practice through week-long practicums. An important feature lies in the immediacy of feedback given to the student after they submit a reflection on their practicums. The course has been taught as a three-credit hour, sixteen-week semester-long course each academic year for the past three years. The students come from a broad range of nationalities and cultural contexts, as well as from different stages of life and denominational backgrounds. The course contributes to an overall emphasis on Christian spiritual formation at the college. (shrink)
Jimmy Plourde | : Dans cet article, je défends la thèse qu’il ne peut pas y avoir de savoir intuitif sous la forme d’un état purement mental, car, contrairement aux états purement mentaux de connaissance, les intuitions rationnelles n’excluent pas la possibilité de la coexistence de connaissances aux contenus contradictoires. Je soutiens que cela trouve une double justification dans la non-factivité et la non-véridictivité des intuitions, et une explication dans l’idée que les intuitions sont des expériences d’« intellectual seemings (...) ». Enfin, je soutiens que ces caractéristiques des intuitions pourraient constituer une difficulté pour la thèse évidentialiste et, par conséquent, pour la conception du savoir intutitif dans le cadre d’une théorie classique réformée de la connaissance. | : In this paper I argue that there cannot be intuitive knowledge if knowledge is conceived as a purely mental state. States of knowledge may not consist of rational intuitions because these do not, contrarily to purely mental states of knowledge, rule out the possibility of coexisting states of knowledge with contradictory contents. I defend the view that the justification for this incapacity lies in the non-factivity and the non-veridicity of intuitions. It is also argued that this non-factivity and non-veridicity of intuitions has its roots in the fact that intuitions are experiences of “intellectual seemings”. In the end, I consider the possibility that the non-factivity and non-veridicity of intuitions might constitute a problem for the thesis of evidentialism, thereby raising an issue for any conception of intuitive knowledge elaborated within the framework of a modified traditional conception of knowledge. (shrink)
Théorie de l’objet et Présentation personnelle est la première traduction française jamais publiée d’Alexius Meinong. Pour cette première, Jean-François Courtine et Marc de Launay ont choisi de publier non pas un, mais bien deux ouvrages du philosophe de Graz, Über Gegenstandstheorie et Selbstdarstellung. Ces ouvrages sont, de plus, accompagnés d’une longue présentation rédigée par Courtine, dans laquelle il est question de l’état des travaux et de la recherche sur Meinong, du développement historique de la théorie de l’objet au sein de (...) l’École de Brentano de même que de ses présumés antécédents dans l’histoire de la philosophie. (shrink)
The aim for this article is to outline a typology of iconicity in verse, ranging from Form miming form to Meaning miming form/meaning. Verse here means the occurrence of rhythmical devices, such as meter, and the division into lines and stanzas. As a starting point, the different possible appearances of ‘representamens’ in mainly twentieth-century poetry will be discussed, following Elleström’s distinction between visual material signs, auditory material signs and complex cognitive signs. In the article, verse is explored as a sensorically (...) complex, mixed medium, because its ‘representamens’ frequently depend on both visual and auditory traits. Furthermore, it is important to stress that verse can be “form” in a phenomenological, sensorial sense, as well as more complex meaning. For example, the iconic sign in question could be based on the reader’s awareness and identification of a certain stanzaic or metrical form and some of the acquired associations that comes with it. The contention is that iconicity in verse does not necessarily only stand for ‘objects’ which are already present due to symbolic signs. (shrink)
La presente nota crítica tiene como finalidad exponer y comentar las ideas fundamentales de la edición española del primer escrito de Jacques Derrida, El problema de la génesis en la filosofía de Husserl. Asimismo, hacemos algunas aclaraciones sobre el origen y significado de este escrito. Al concluir, añadimos algunas observaciones sobre la traducción y sobre el estudio final del editor y traductor Javier Bassas Vila sobre la filosofía del joven Derrida.
There seem to be two distinct aspects to the role played by the Interpretant in Peirce’s account of the sign relation. On the one hand, the Interpretant is said to establish the relation between the Sign and Object. That is, the Sign can “stand for” its Object, and thereby actually function as a Sign, only by virtue of its being interpreted as such by an Interpretant. On the other hand, the Interpretant is said to be “determined” by the Sign in (...) such a way that it is thereby mediately determined by the Sign’s Object. How can we understand the relation between these two aspects of the Interpretant? This is the question with which this paper is concerned. I begin by drawing a distinction between what I call the first-order function and second-order function of the Interpretant, and illustrating this distinction using Peirce’s example of comparing the letters p and b in § 9 of the 1867 “On a New List of Categories.” I then show that this same distinction can be discerned in a significant passage in the second section of Peirce’s 1903 “A Syllabus of Certain Topics of Logic,” as well as in his early definition of the Interpretant in the “New List.” This double function of the Interpretant has been noted in the Peircean literature, specifically by Joseph Ransdell in his 1966 dissertation, and more recently by André De Tienne. However, an important aspect of what I call the second-order function of the Interpretant remains unclarified in Ransdell and De Tienne’s approaches, namely, its relation to the logical operation of hypostatic abstraction. I will show that the Interpretant, in its second-order function, plays a role formally identical in the sign process to the role played by hypostatic abstraction in Peirce’s demonstrations of the Reduction Thesis. This formal identity will afford us with a way of understanding the relation between the two aspects of the Interpretant in terms of hypostatic abstraction. (shrink)
In this essay, I argue that we are merely biological organisms. This view (animalism) explains everyday practices like watching ourselves in the mirror. The claim that we are psychological in nature cannot explain something as trivial as watching ourselves in the mirror. Thus, we should accept animalism.
In this paper, I argue the practice of procreation is immoral regardless of the consequences of human presence such as climate change and overpopulation; the lack of consent, interests and moral desert on the part of nonexistent individuals means someone could potentially suffer in the absence of moral justification. Procreation is only morally justified if there is some method for acquiring informed consent from a non-existent person; but that is impossible; therefore, procreation is immoral.
The 'History of the Majority' to which F.W. Maitland looked forward a century ago still awaits its author; but some important hints can be derived from an examination of, especially, medieval and early-modern sources. These show how difficult it was foRA 'simple' or numerical majority principle to gain acceptance, whether in the theology and canon-law of the medieval church or in the emergent theory and practice of the modern state. Even -- or perhaps especially -- in the age of 'mass (...) democracy', it has been found, or thought, necessary to plant precautionary hedges around the principle that 'every one should count for one and no one for more than one'. (shrink)
There is a controversy, within social epistemology, over how to handle disagreement among epistemic peers. Call this the problem of peer disagreement. There is a solution, i.e. the equal-weight view, which says that disagreement among epistemic peers is a reason for each peer to lower the credence they place in their respective positions. However, this solution is susceptible to a serious challenge. Call it the merely modal peers challenge. Throughout parts of modal space, which resemble the actual world almost completely, (...) there are hordes of epistemic peers, who disagree with almost any arbitrarily chosen belief had by residents of the actual world. Further, the mere modality of these peers is not itself an epistemic difference-maker. Thus, on the equal-weight view, we should significantly lower the credence we place in most of our beliefs. Surely, this is seriously mistaken. Thus, there are serious considerations that cut against the equal-weight view. (shrink)