In this book, Mohanty develops a new interpretation of the nature of Indian philsophical thinking. Using the original Sanskrit sources, he examines the concepts of consciousness and subjectivity, theories of language and logic, and meaning and truth, and explicates the concept of theoretical rationality which underlies the Indian philosophies. Mohanty brings to bear insights from modern western analytical and phenomenological philosophies, not so much for comparative purposes, but rather to interpret Indian thinking and to highlight its distinctive features.
Frege, G. Review of Dr. E. Husserl 's Philosophy of arithmetic.--Mohanty, J. N. Husserl and Frege.-- Husserl, E. A Reply to a critic of my refutation of logical psychologism.--Willard, D. The Paradox of logical psychologism.--Natorp, P. On the question of logical method.--Næss, A. Husserl on the apodictic evidence of ideal laws.--Mohanty, J. N. Husserl 's thesis of the ideality of meanings.--Atwell, J. E. Husserl on signification and object.--Sokolowski, R. The logic of parts and wholes in Husserl 's Investigations.--Gurwitsch, A. Outlines (...) of a theory of essentially occasional expressions.--Bar-Hillel, Y. Husserl 's conception of a purely logical grammar.--Edie, J. M. Husserl 's conception of the grammatical and contemporary linguistics.--Downes, C. On Husserl 's approach to necessary truth.--Patzig, G. Husserl on truth and evidence.-- Husserl, E. The task and the significance of the Logical investigations. (shrink)
Philosophical Questions: East and West is an anthology of source material for use in comparative courses in philosophy, religion, and the humanities. The readings—derived from the great works of the Indian, Chinese, Japanese, Islamic, and Western intellectual traditions—are presented as answers to some of the most enduring questions in philosophy.
Most of the essays that follow have originally appeared in philosophical journals, Indian and Western. They are reprinted here with the hope that in spite of the wide variety of topics with which they deal there is nevertheless a certain unity of treatment. A few major ideas and distinctions run through all the essays: I need not further single them out here. For permission to reprint, I have to thank the editors of the journals and books in which the essays (...) originally appeared. My former pupil Miss Manjusree Ray has been kind enough to help me in preparing the book for the press. J. N. MOHANTY May, I968, Calcutta CONTENTS Preface v Part One I. Modes of Givenness 3 II. The Given 12 III. Thought and Action 22 IV. Meaning and Truth-I 0 3 V. Meaning and Truth-II 50 VI. Language and Reality 60 VII. On Reference 2 7 VIII. Remarks on the Content Theory 84 IX. Phenomenology and Ontology 2 9 Part Two X. A Note on Modern Nominalism I07 XI. A recent Criticism of the Foundations of Nicolai Hartmann's Ontology II5 XII. Remarks on Nicolai Hartmann's Modal Doctrine 129 XIII. The 'Object' in Edmund Husserl's Phenomenology 138 XIV. Individual Fact and Essence in Edmund Husserl's Philosophy 152 XV. Gilbert Ryle's Criticisms of the Concept of Conscio- ness 163 XVI. On G. E. Moore's Defence of Common sense 170 Part Three XVII. (shrink)
Marked By Lucidity, Despite The Stunaing Range Of Concepts Covered, And Intended For A Wide Audience, The Book Is Essential Reading For Social Scientists And Philosophers For The New Territory It Charts.
Mohanty, J. N. Kalidas Bhattacharyya as a metaphysician.--Deutsch, E. On meaning.--Potter, K. Towards a conceptual scheme for Indian epistemologies.--Ganguly, S. N. Rationality versus reasonableness (freedom: a reinterpretation).--Sen, P. K. A sketch of a theory of properties and relations.--Mohanty, J. N. Perceptual consciousness.--Chattopadhyaya, D. P. Theory and practice.--Bhadra, M. K. The idea of self as purpose, an existential analysis.--Matilal, B. K. Saptabhaṅgī.--Banerjee, H. The identification of mental states and the possibility of freedom.--Chatterjee, M. A phenomenological approach to the self.--Banerjee, S. P. (...) Alienation and freedom.--Sinha, D. Cognitive language in Shahrukh. (shrink)
Franz Brentano’s thesis that the mental is characterised by a peculiar directedness towards an object or by intentionality, has been recognised, in contemporary philosophy, by a large body of philosophers of widely differing persuasions. Those who have come to terms with this phenomenon have found a place for it within their larger philosophical positions: this affects the way they understand the nature and role of intentionality. In this essay, I will distinguish four types of theories of intentionality—each of which is (...) characterized by a certain understanding of its nature and function, an understanding which derives from the overall philosophical framework within which the phenomenon of intentionality is situated. These are the naturalistic-causal, the descriptive psychological, the existential, and the transcendental-constitutive theories. I review them in that order, as representing four levels of our understanding of intentionality. For all four, Brentano’s thesis remains the “neutral” and indispensable starting point. (shrink)