In this book, Mohanty develops a new interpretation of the nature of Indian philsophical thinking. Using the original Sanskrit sources, he examines the concepts of consciousness and subjectivity, theories of language and logic, and meaning and truth, and explicates the concept of theoretical rationality which underlies the Indian philosophies. Mohanty brings to bear insights from modern western analytical and phenomenological philosophies, not so much for comparative purposes, but rather to interpret Indian thinking and to highlight its distinctive features.
ESSAY HUSSERL, FREGE AND THE OVERCOMING OF PSYCHOLOGISM* I In a letter to Marvin Farber, Husserl wrote, "External 'influences' are without significance . ...
Frege, G. Review of Dr. E. Husserl 's Philosophy of arithmetic.--Mohanty, J. N. Husserl and Frege.-- Husserl, E. A Reply to a critic of my refutation of logical psychologism.--Willard, D. The Paradox of logical psychologism.--Natorp, P. On the question of logical method.--Næss, A. Husserl on the apodictic evidence of ideal laws.--Mohanty, J. N. Husserl 's thesis of the ideality of meanings.--Atwell, J. E. Husserl on signification and object.--Sokolowski, R. The logic of parts and wholes in Husserl 's Investigations.--Gurwitsch, A. Outlines (...) of a theory of essentially occasional expressions.--Bar-Hillel, Y. Husserl 's conception of a purely logical grammar.--Edie, J. M. Husserl 's conception of the grammatical and contemporary linguistics.--Downes, C. On Husserl 's approach to necessary truth.--Patzig, G. Husserl on truth and evidence.-- Husserl, E. The task and the significance of the Logical investigations. (shrink)
A Personal Introduction LESTER EMBREE 'I feel I have been living many fairy tales on this trip.' Sam IJsseling Some people probably still believe that phenomenology is about particular events individually felt.
Mohanty, J. N. Kalidas Bhattacharyya as a metaphysician.--Deutsch, E. On meaning.--Potter, K. Towards a conceptual scheme for Indian epistemologies.--Ganguly, S. N. Rationality versus reasonableness (freedom: a reinterpretation).--Sen, P. K. A sketch of a theory of properties and relations.--Mohanty, J. N. Perceptual consciousness.--Chattopadhyaya, D. P. Theory and practice.--Bhadra, M. K. The idea of self as purpose, an existential analysis.--Matilal, B. K. Saptabhaṅgī.--Banerjee, H. The identification of mental states and the possibility of freedom.--Chatterjee, M. A phenomenological approach to the self.--Banerjee, S. P. (...) Alienation and freedom.--Sinha, D. Cognitive language in Vedanta. (shrink)
In this collection of essays in memory of Professor Bimal K. Matilal, an international body of scholars discuss Vedanta, Nyaya and Buddhism; thematically they deal with problems of relativism, evil, suffering, emotions and value judgement.
The essays in this collection were written by an international body of scholars in memory of Professor Bimal K. Matilal. They discuss Vedanta, Nyaya, and Buddhism; thematically they deal with problems of relativism, evil, suffering, emotions, and value judgement.
Selected from the works of J. N. Mohanty over a forty-year period, these essays provide an intellectual biography of the man and insights into Eastern philosophy. Part I brings together various writings on problems in metaphysics, epistemology, and language, alongwith thoughtful treatments of notions such as experience, self consciousness, doubt, tradition, and modernity. Part II collects essays written during the exciting though turbulent years following India's independence, and they survey issues in social ethics, reform activities, and religion in the works (...) of Aurobindo, Gandhi, Vinobha, and Ramohan Roy. Part III comprises essays that treat the encounter between phenomenology and philosophy, between Eastern and Western philosophy, and does so through an incisive analysis of the major concerns of philosophy anywhere. The collection concludes with ruminations on the future of Indian philosophy. (shrink)
Franz Brentano’s thesis that the mental is characterised by a peculiar directedness towards an object or by intentionality, has been recognised, in contemporary philosophy, by a large body of philosophers of widely differing persuasions. Those who have come to terms with this phenomenon have found a place for it within their larger philosophical positions: this affects the way they understand the nature and role of intentionality. In this essay, I will distinguish four types of theories of intentionality—each of which is (...) characterized by a certain understanding of its nature and function, an understanding which derives from the overall philosophical framework within which the phenomenon of intentionality is situated. These are the naturalistic-causal, the descriptive psychological, the existential, and the transcendental-constitutive theories. I review them in that order, as representing four levels of our understanding of intentionality. For all four, Brentano’s thesis remains the “neutral” and indispensable starting point. (shrink)
