In this book, Jiwei Ci explores the dual nature of justice, in an attempt to make unitary sense of key features of justice reflected in its close relation to ...

I am extremely grateful to the three commentators for their instructive and challenging criticisms and for giving me the opportunity to make my position more plausible and, where it is bound to remain controversial, clearer than it is in my book.1 In doing so, I will sometimes be concerned simply to clear up what I consider to be misunderstandings on the part of my commentators, in full awareness that my own lack of clarity or emphasis may well have contributed to (...) them. This I take to be worthwhile in its own right, but especially for the sake of locating more precisely the issues where real disagreement exists and facilitating useful engagement on these issues. As the line between these tasks is seldom sharp... (shrink)

Joseph Chan and Sungmoon Kim take me to task for my understanding and uses of Tocqueville, and because of the resemblance they claim to see between one of my major arguments and modernization theory. I think their charges are mistaken or misplaced. Chan and Kim reject my claims that China is already, in a meaningful sense and to a substantial degree, a democratic society, and that, unless such a society is matched by political democratization, a major legitimation crisis is almost (...) inevitable in the foreseeable future. I try to show that they are wrong in their assessment of the state of Chinese society and in their dismissal of the crisis tendencies that only timely democratization can help avert. Chan and Kim completely misconstrue what my prudential argument for democracy in China means, and what it does not, and I explain why. Finally, I reaffirm, over Chan’s objections, the view that the fundamental choice regarding political legitimacy in China today lies between the Mandate of Heaven and democracy, given the demise of communism, and I restate this view in terms of the concept of sovereignty. (shrink)

International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Volume 25, Issue 2, Page 179-190, June 2011.

Many of the things we do in social and political philosophy, whether normative or critical, presuppose some understanding and evaluation of agency. To have a clear idea of our normative or critical enterprise, the underlying account of agency needs spelling out. This article begins with a descriptive account: human agency consists in power (or causal efficacy) organized as subjectivity (or selfhood), and such organization takes place through attributions of power informed by values. Some such descriptive account is useful for understanding (...) and comparing forms of agency. But as we move beyond it to construct an evaluative account of agency, we face problems that are symptomatic of our social and political condition. While quantitative assessment of agency does not work, qualitative assessment seems out of place in our modern world of pluralism and yet is unavoidable for those who, like Habermas, take issue with such phenomena as colonization of the lifeworld. © 2011 Metaphilosophy LLC and Blackwell Publishing Ltd. (shrink)

The human rights discourse is vitiated by its tendency to reification, a tendency manifest in an ideologically motivated failure to take the reasons for human rights seriously. When a set of rights fall short, in range or strength, of the reasons adduced for them, any claim to the universality and priority of the rights in question is open to the charge of falsification and reification. Such a claim invites immanent critique insofar as a human rights discourse fails to take its (...) own reasons seriously by working out a set of rights commensurate with them. Further critique is necessary if the human rights concept as such can be shown to be incapable of living up to the best reasons for human rights, in the shape, the author argues, of agency-based reasons. These kinds of critique, especially the latter, can serve as an antidote to the reifying tendency of the human rights discourse. (shrink)

(2003). REVIEW ARTICLE: From modest realism to a democratic conception of science. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science: Vol. 17, No. 3, pp. 301-307.

This chapter contains section titled: Idealism and the Reconciliation of the Cheng‐Zhu and Lu‐Wang Schools Substance and Application in the Philosophy of Culture Strengthening Confucianism with Western Philosophy Conversion to Materialism Further Reading.