Results for 'Jnr Richard G. Heck'

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  1.  9
    Reading Frege's Grundgesetze.Richard G. Heck - 2012 - Oxford University Press.
    Richard G. Heck presents a new account of Gottlob Frege's Grundgesetze der Arithmetik, or Basic Laws of Arithmetic, which establishes it as a neglected masterpiece at the center of Frege's philosophy. He explores Frege's philosophy of logic, and argues that Frege knew that his proofs could be reconstructed so as to avoid Russell's Paradox.
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  2.  2
    Wright Crispin. On the Philosophical Significance of Frege's Theorem. Language, Thought, and Logic, Essays in Honour of Michael Dummett, Edited by Heck Richard G. Jnr., Oxford University Press, Oxford and New York 1998 , Pp. 201–244.Boolos George. Is Hume's Principle Analytic? Language, Thought, and Logic, Essays in Honour of Michael Dummett, Edited by Heck Richard G. Jnr., Oxford University Press, Oxford and New York 1998 , Pp. 245–261.Parsons Charles. Wright on Abstraction and Set Theory. Language, Thought, and Logic, Essays in Honour of Michael Dummett, Edited by Heck Richard G. Jnr., Oxford University Press, Oxford and New York 1998 , Pp. 263–271.Heck Richard G. Jnr. The Julius Caesar Objection. Language, Thought, and Logic, Essays in Honour of Michael Dummett, Edited by Heck Richard G. Jnr., Oxford University Press, Oxford and New York 1998 , Pp. 273–308. [REVIEW]William Demopoulos - 1998 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 63 (4):1598-1602.
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    Boolos George and Heck Richard G. Jnr. Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik, §§82–3. The Philosophy of Mathematics Today, Edited by Schirn Matthias, Clarendon Press, Oxford University, Oxford and New York 1998, Pp. 407–428.Heck Richard G. Jnr. The Finite and the Infinite in Frege's Grundgesetze der Arithmetik. The Philosophy of Mathematics Today, Edited by Schirn Matthias, Clarendon Press, Oxford University, Oxford and New York 1998 Pp. 429–466.Wright Crispin. On the Harmless Impredicativity of N= . The Philosophy of Mathematics Today, Edited by Schirn Matthias, Clarendon Press, Oxford University, Oxford and New York 1998 Pp. 339–368.Dummett Michael. Neo-Fregeans: In Bad Company? The Philosophy of Mathematics Today, Edited by Schirn Matthias, Clarendon Press, Oxford University, Oxford and New York 1998 Pp. 369–387.Wright Crispin. Response to Dummett. The Philosophy of Mathematics Today, Edited by Schirn Matthias, Clarendon Press, Oxford University, Oxford and New York 1998 Pp. 389–405. [REVIEW]William Demopoulos - 2000 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 6 (4):498-504.
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  4.  67
    Intuition and the Substitution Argument.Richard G. Heck - 2014 - Analytic Philosophy 55 (1):1-30.
    The 'substitution argument' purports to demonstrate the falsity of Russellian accounts of belief-ascription by observing that, e.g., these two sentences: -/- (LC) Lois believes that Clark can fly. (LS) Lois believes that Superman can fly. -/- could have different truth-values. But what is the basis for that claim? It seems widely to be supposed, especially by Russellians, that it is simply an 'intuition', one that could then be 'explained away'. And this supposition plays an especially important role in Jennifer Saul's (...)
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  5.  14
    The Frontloading Argument.Richard G. Heck - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-26.
    Maybe the most important argument in David Chalmers’s monumental book Constructing the World is the one he calls the ‘Frontloading Argument’, which is used in Chapter 4 to argue for the book’s central thesis, A Priori Scrutability. And, at first blush, the Frontloading Argument looks very strong. I argue here, however, that it is incapable of securing the conclusion it is meant to establish.
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  6.  8
    Speaker’s Reference, Semantic Reference, and Intuition.Richard G. Heck - forthcoming - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-19.
    Some years ago, Machery, Mallon, Nichols, and Stich reported the results of experiments that reveal, they claim, cross-cultural differences in speaker’s ‘intuitions’ about Kripke’s famous Gödel–Schmidt case. Several authors have suggested, however, that the question they asked their subjects is ambiguous between speaker’s reference and semantic reference. Machery and colleagues have since made a number of replies. It is argued here that these are ineffective. The larger lesson, however, concerns the role that first-order philosophy should, and more importantly should not, (...)
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  7. Predicative Frege Arithmetic and ‘Everyday’ Mathematics.Richard G. Heck - 2014 - Philosophia Mathematica 22 (3):279-307.
    The primary purpose of this note is to demonstrate that predicative Frege arithmetic naturally interprets certain weak but non-trivial arithmetical theories. It will take almost as long to explain what this means and why it matters as it will to prove the results.
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  8. Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik, 82-3.George Boolos & Richard G. Heck - 1998 - In Matthias Schirn (ed.), Bulletin of Symbolic Logic. Clarendon Press. pp. 407-28.
    This paper contains a close analysis of Frege's proofs of the axioms of arithmetic §§70-83 of Die Grundlagen, with special attention to the proof of the existence of successors in §§82-83. Reluctantly and hesitantly, we come to the conclusion that Frege was at least somewhat confused in those two sections and that he cannot be said to have outlined, or even to have intended, any correct proof there. The proof he sketches is in many ways similar to that given in (...)
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  9.  23
    Consistency and the Theory of Truth.Richard G. Heck - 2015 - Review of Symbolic Logic 8 (3):424-466.
    This paper attempts to address the question what logical strength theories of truth have by considering such questions as: If you take a theory T and add a theory of truth to it, how strong is the resulting theory, as compared to T? Once the question has been properly formulated, the answer turns out to be about as elegant as one could want: Adding a theory of truth to a finitely axiomatized theory T is more or less equivalent to a (...)
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  10.  2
    Cognitive Hunger: Remarks on Imogen Dickie's Fixing Reference.Richard G. Heck - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (3):738-744.
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  11.  72
    In Defense of Formal Relationism.Richard G. Heck - 2014 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 3 (3):243-250.
    In his paper “Flaws of Formal Relationism”, Mahrad Almotahari argues against the sort of response to Frege's Puzzle I have defended elsewhere, which he dubs ‘Formal Relationism’. Almotahari argues that, because of its specifically formal character, this view is vulnerable to objections that cannot be raised against the otherwise similar Semantic Relationism due to Kit Fine. I argue in response that Formal Relationism has neither of the flaws Almotahari claims to identify.
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  12.  6
    Frege on Identity and Identity-Statements.Richard G. Heck, - 2003 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33 (1):83-102.
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  13.  14
    Is Frege's Definition of the Ancestral Adequate.Richard G. Heck - 2016 - Philosophia Mathematica 24 (1):91-116.
    Why should one think Frege's definition of the ancestral correct? It can be proven to be extensionally correct, but the argument uses arithmetical induction, and that seems to undermine Frege's claim to have justified induction in purely logical terms. I discuss such circularity objections and then offer a new definition of the ancestral intended to be intensionally correct; its extensional correctness then follows without proof. This new definition can be proven equivalent to Frege's without any use of arithmetical induction. This (...)
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  14. Michael Dummett's “Frege'.Heck, Jr & G. Richard - 1993 - Philosophical Quarterly 43:223--232.
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  15. A Note on the Logic of (Higher-Order) Vagueness.Richard Heck - 1993 - Analysis 53 (4):201-208.
    A discussion of Crispin Wright's 'paradox of higher-order vagueness', I suggest that the paradox may be resolved by careful attention to the logical principles used in its formulation. In particular, I focus attention on the rule of inference that allows for the inference from A to 'Definitely A', and argue that this rule, though valid, may not be used in subordinate deductions, e.g., in the course of a conditional proof. Wright's paradox uses the rule (or its equivalent) in this way.
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  16. Reply to Richard G. Heck, Jr.M. Dummett - 2007 - In R. E. Auxier & L. E. Hahn (eds.), The Philosophy of Michael Dummett. Open Court. pp. 558--565.
     
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  17.  17
    Frege’s Theorem by Richard G. Heck, Jr. [REVIEW]John P. Burgess - 2012 - Journal of Philosophy 109 (12):728-732.
  18.  23
    RICHARD G. HECK, Jr. Frege's Theorem. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2011. ISBN 978-0-19-969564-5. Pp. Xiv + 307.R. T. Cook - 2012 - Philosophia Mathematica 20 (3):346-359.
  19.  11
    Richard G. Heck Jr. Reading Frege's Grundgesetze. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. ISBN: 978-0-19-923370-0 ; 978-0-19-874437-5 ; 978-0-19-165535-7 . Pp. Xvii + 296. [REVIEW]Philip A. Ebert - 2015 - Philosophia Mathematica 23 (2):289-293.
  20.  11
    Richard G. Heck, Jr. , Frege's Theorem . Reviewed By.Manuel Bremer - 2012 - Philosophy in Review 32 (4):319-325.
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  21. Richard G. Heck, Jr.: Frege’s Theorem. [REVIEW]John P. Burgess - 2012 - Journal of Philosophy 109 (12):728-733.
  22.  11
    Heck, Richard G. Language, Thought, and Logic: Essays in Honour of Michael Dummett.Raymond Woller - 2000 - Review of Metaphysics 53 (3):701-703.
  23. Do Demonstratives Have Senses?Richard Heck - 2002 - Philosophers' Imprint 2:1-33.
    Frege held that referring expressions in general, and demonstratives and indexicals in particular, contribute more than just their reference to what is expressed by utterances of sentences containing them. Heck first attempts to get clear about what the essence of the Fregean view is, arguing that it rests upon a certain conception of linguistic communication that is ultimately indefensible. On the other hand, however, he argues that understanding a demonstrative (or indexical) utterance requires one to think of the object (...)
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  24. Frege's Contribution to Philosophy of Language.Richard Heck & Robert May - 2006 - In Barry C. Smith (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language. Oxford University Press. pp. 3--39.
    An investigation of Frege’s various contributions to the study of language, focusing on three of his most famous doctrines: that concepts are unsaturated, that sentences refer to truth-values, and that sense must be distinguished from reference.
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  25. Nonconceptual Content and the "Space of Reasons".Richard Heck - 2000 - Philosophical Review 109 (4):483-523.
    In Mind and World, John McDowell argues against the view that perceptual representation is non-conceptual. The central worry is that this view cannot offer any reasonable account of how perception bears rationally upon belief. I argue that this worry, though sensible, can be met, if we are clear that perceptual representation is, though non-conceptual, still in some sense 'assertoric': Perception, like belief, represents things as being thus and so.
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  26. Les Lois de la Solidarite Morale.G. Richard - 1906 - Philosophical Review 15:458.
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  27.  3
    La solidarité sociale.G. L. Duprat & G. Richard - 1908 - Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 16 (1):7-8.
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  28. [Book Chapter].G. Richard (ed.) - 2002 - Oxford University Press.
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  29. De la nature et du rôle de l'induction d'après les anciens.G. Richard - 1908 - Revue Thomiste 16 (1/6):301.
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  30. La Discussion Judiciaire Et l'Etat de Droit.G. Richard - 1895 - Philosophical Review 4:335.
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  31. l'Origine de l'idée de droit.G. Richard - 1893 - Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 1 (2):181-198.
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  32. Loria. - La morphologie sociale.G. Richard - 1906 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 62:616.
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  33. Le réalisme sociologique et la réalité sociale.G. Richard - 1901 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 52:428.
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  34. La Sociologie Juridique.G. Richard - 1912 - Philosophical Review 21:728.
     
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  35. Psychologie de la conversion chez les peuples non civilisés , d'après R. Allier.G. Richard - 1926 - Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 33:493.
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  36. Roberty . - Nouveau programme de sociologie.G. Richard - 1905 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 59:61.
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  37. Sur deux ouvrages récents relatifs au Droit de punir. [REVIEW]G. Richard - 1920 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 89:129.
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  38. Windelband. - Die Philosophie in deutschen Geistesleben.G. Richard - 1909 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 68:657.
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  39. Are There Different Kinds of Content?Richard Heck - 2007 - In Brian P. McLaughlin & Jonathan D. Cohen (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell. pp. 117–38.
    In an earlier paper, "Non-conceptual Content and the 'Space of Reasons'", I distinguished two forms of the view that perceptual content is non-conceptual, which I called the 'state view' and the 'content view'. On the latter, but not the former, perceptual states have a different kind of content than do cognitive states. Many have found it puzzling why anyone would want to make this claim and, indeed, what it might mean. This paper attempts to address these questions.
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  40. Meaning and Truth-Conditions.Richard Heck - 2007 - In D. Greimann & G. Siegwart (eds.), Truth and Speech Acts: Studies in the Philosophy of Language. Routledge. pp. 349--76.
    Defends the view that understanding can be identified with knowledge of T-sentences against the classical criticisms of Foster and Soames.
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  41. That There Might Be Vague Objects (So Far as Concerns Logic).Richard Heck - 1998 - The Monist 81 (1):277-99.
    Gareth Evans has argued that the existence of vague objects is logically precluded: The assumption that it is indeterminate whether some object a is identical to some object b leads to contradiction. I argue in reply that, although this is true—I thus defend Evans's argument, as he presents it—the existence of vague objects is not thereby precluded. An 'Indefinitist' need only hold that it is not logically required that every identity statement must have a determinate truth-value, not that some such (...)
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  42. The Composition of Thoughts.Richard Heck & Robert May - 2011 - Noûs 45 (1):126-166.
    Are Fregean thoughts compositionally complex and composed of senses? We argue that, in Begriffsschrift, Frege took 'conceptual contents' to be unstructured, but that he quickly moved away from this position, holding just two years later that conceptual contents divide of themselves into 'function' and 'argument'. This second position is shown to be unstable, however, by Frege's famous substitution puzzle. For Frege, the crucial question the puzzle raises is why "The Morning Star is a planet" and "The Evening Star is a (...)
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  43. Idiolects.Richard Heck - 2006 - In Judith Jarvis Thomson & Alex Byrne (eds.), Content and Modality: Themes From the Philosophy of Robert Stalnaker. Oxford University Press.
    Defends the view that the study of language should concern itself, primarily, with idiolects. The main objections considered are forms of the normativity objection.
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  44. Frege on Identity and Identity-Statements: A Reply to Thau and Caplan.Richard Heck - 2003 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33 (1):83-102.
    The paper argues, as against Thau and Caplan, that the traditional interpretation that Frege abandoned his earlier views about identity and identity--statements is correct.
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  45. The Consistency of Predicative Fragments of Frege's Grundgesetze der Arithmetik.Richard Heck - 1996 - History and Philosophy of Logic 17 (1):209-220.
    As is well-known, the formal system in which Frege works in his Grundgesetze der Arithmetik is formally inconsistent, Russell?s Paradox being derivable in it.This system is, except for minor differences, full second-order logic, augmented by a single non-logical axiom, Frege?s Axiom V. It has been known for some time now that the first-order fragment of the theory is consistent. The present paper establishes that both the simple and the ramified predicative second-order fragments are consistent, and that Robinson arithmetic, Q, is (...)
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  46. The Julius Caesar Objection.Richard Heck - 1997 - In R. Heck (ed.), Language, Thought, and Logic: Essays in Honour of Michael Dummett. Oxford University Press. pp. 273--308.
    This paper argues that that Caesar problem had a technical aspect, namely, that it threatened to make it impossible to prove, in the way Frege wanted, that there are infinitely many numbers. It then offers a solution to the problem, one that shows Frege did not really need the claim that "numbers are objects", not if that claim is intended in a form that forces the Caesar problem upon us.
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  47. Self-Reference and the Languages of Arithmetic.Richard Heck - 2006 - Philosophia Mathematica 15 (1):1-29.
    I here investigate the sense in which diagonalization allows one to construct sentences that are self-referential. Truly self-referential sentences cannot be constructed in the standard language of arithmetic: There is a simple theory of truth that is intuitively inconsistent but is consistent with Peano arithmetic, as standardly formulated. True self-reference is possible only if we expand the language to include function-symbols for all primitive recursive functions. This language is therefore the natural setting for investigations of self-reference.
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  48. A Logic for Frege's Theorem.Richard Heck - 2011 - In Frege's Theorem. Oxford University Press.
    It has been known for a few years that no more than Pi-1-1 comprehension is needed for the proof of "Frege's Theorem". One can at least imagine a view that would regard Pi-1-1 comprehension axioms as logical truths but deny that status to any that are more complex—a view that would, in particular, deny that full second-order logic deserves the name. Such a view would serve the purposes of neo-logicists. It is, in fact, no part of my view that, say, (...)
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  49. Frege's Theorem: An Introduction.Richard Heck - 1999 - The Harvard Review of Philosophy 7 (1):56-73.
    A brief, non-technical introduction to technical and philosophical aspects of Frege's philosophy of arithmetic. The exposition focuses on Frege's Theorem, which states that the axioms of arithmetic are provable, in second-order logic, from a single non-logical axiom, "Hume's Principle", which itself is: The number of Fs is the same as the number of Gs if, and only if, the Fs and Gs are in one-one correspondence.
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  50. Definition by Induction in Frege's Grundgesetze der Arithmetik.Richard Heck - 1995 - In W. Demopoulos (ed.), Frege's Philosophy of Mathematics. Oxford University Press.
    This paper discusses Frege's account of definition by induction in Grundgesetze and the two key theorems Frege proves using it.
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