O artigo explora algumas metáforas marinhas que surgem no pensamento alemão de Leibniz a Goethe, com o intuito de indicar como se desenvolvem certos temas de estética, tais como a noção de alma, de linguagem, de criação artística e de relação dialética entre forma e conteúdo. Passando por autores como Leibniz, Winckelmann, Herder, Goethe e Kant, pretende-se mostrar como, por meio desse desenvolvimento, se constitui uma visão de homem mais ampliada, que não se define mais somente pelo entendimento, mas envolve (...) elementos inconscientes e afetivos. (shrink)
The importance of relationality in ethical leadership has been the focus of recent attention in business ethics scholarship. However, this relational component has not been sufficiently theorized from different philosophical perspectives, allowing specific Western philosophical conceptions to dominate the leadership development literature. This paper offers a theoretical analysis of the relational ontology that informs various conceptualizations of selfhood from both African and Western philosophical traditions and unpacks its implications for values-driven leadership. We aim to broaden Western conceptions of leadership development (...) by drawing on twentieth century European philosophy’s insights on relationality, but more importantly, to show how African philosophical traditions precede this literature in its insistence on a relational ontology of the self. To illustrate our theoretical argument, we reflect on an executive education course called values-driven leadership into action, which ran in South Africa, Kenya, and Egypt in 2016, 2017, and 2018. We highlight an African-inspired employment of relationality through its use of the ME-WE-WORLD framework, articulating its theoretical assumptions with embodied experiential learning. (shrink)
Podstawowy wiedzy filozoficzny nazywa Karl Jaspers „wiedzy o tym, co obejmujące ”. Przy przedstawieniu podstawowej wiedzy filozoficznej nie chodzi Jaspersowi o określenie tego, czym jest byt w ogóle. Nie chodzi mu o zbudowanie jakiejś nauki o bycie. W podstawowej filozoficznej wiedzy, w rozumieniu Jaspersowskim, chodzi o otwarcie przestrzeni, w której byt może nas napotkać. To przedsięwzięcie wyraża także nazwa „periechontologia", pochodząca od starogreckich pojęć periéchon i logos, która oznacza „naukę o tym, co obejmujące". Sens periechontologii nie leży w dostarczeniu jakiejś (...) nowej ontologii, ale w zmianie świadomości rozumienia bytu. Byt rozumiany jako to, co obejmujące, według Jaspersa, nie może stać się przedmiotem poznania naukowego. Ten byt nie jest ani przedmiotem, ani podmiotem. On obejmuje jedno i drugie. Możemy go napotkać w różnych sposobach bycia, które mają charakter bytu tego, co obejmujące. (shrink)
Oliver Sacks MD, Clinical Professor of Neurology at the Albert Einstein College of Medicine in New York, talked with Anthony Freeman during his visit to London in January 1995 to publicize his recently published book An Anthropologist on Mars. The interview is preceded by an overview of the book.
The aim of the article is twofold: to document how what the author labels the “Principle of Reference” – viz. the claim that that which is not cannot be referred to – inspires both actualist and possibilist philosophical conceptions in the analytic tradition as well as in scholasticism, and to show how Duns Scotus’s rejection of the Principle allows us to see that there are two distinct and logically independent meanings of the actualism–possibilism distinction: viz. metaphysical actualism/…possibilism, and semantic actualism/possibilism. (...) By way of an appendix, the author off ers some critical remarks on recent Czecho-Slovak debates about the ontological status of non-existents. (shrink)
O presente texto é uma exposição do Direito Abstrato da Filosofia do Direito de Hegel. O seu objetivo é ressaltar o sentido do ter, conteúdo do Direito Abstrato, como pressuposto para a moralidade, isto é, para o ser livre. A argumentação consiste em lembrar que a liberdade não se restringe a discursos e interesses individuais, mas em criar as condições necessárias para que uma vida seja livre. Assim, o processo dialético dos momentos da concretização da liberdade será de fato um (...) modo de relação social onde o fundamento do direito será a personalidade em geral, na sua relação com as coisas, esfera da legalidade. Tal esfera será também, na sua concretude, um pressuposto para a moralidade. Um miserável não pode ser livre, pois, segundo Hegel, o direito de ter é um direito universal e não somente de alguns particulares. Desse modo, o Direito para Hegel é a ideia da efetivação da liberdade que compreende o direito de ter, o direito de ser livre e o direito de ter e ser livre, que constitui o direito de cidadania. Entretanto, o que justifica esta análise na atualidade é exatamente o não cumprimento deste direito de ter, numa sociedade moralmente antagônica, cujo tecido continua criando a riqueza e a miséria. Neste artigo comentamos somente o direito de ter nas suas explicitações: a personalidade, a possessão, a propriedade, o contrato, a injustiça e a violência. (shrink)
The central problem of the book of Job is represented in the question on how to combine the evils of an innocent with the righteousness of God. For the current doctrine of earthly rewards, such a case would be paradoxical. If each one must be treated according to his works, as a righteous man can suffer? There is a link between suffering and personal sin. Against this strict correlation, Job stands up with all the strength of his innocence. He fights (...) desperately to rediscover God that evades and whose kindness he continues to believe in. God intercedes only to reveal the transcendence of his being and his designs and reduce Job to the silence. This is the religious message of the book of Job: man should persist in faith even when his soul isn’t quiet. The book of Job asks us: is there free religion or it is always a self seeking trade? Rich and prosperous, Job becomes poor and with no future at all. Nevertheless, Job remains faithful and recognizes that God has the absolute right of disposing of all that had given him. Job says: “If we accept God’s riches, shouldn’t we also accept evil?”. Job demonstrated that he is able to profess and live a free religion, without any reward shadow. (shrink)
Segundo Ser e tempo, o cuidado, como ser do ser-aí, é definível pela expressão complexa “ser-já-precedentemente-a-si-em (o mundo) como ser-junto-a (ente intramundano que vem ao en-contro)”, a qual é apresentada deste modo no Parágrafo 41, que trata de “O ser do ser-aí como cuidado”. Nesta expressão, pretende Heidegger indicar cada um dos existenciais (disposição, compreender, fala, assim como também decair e mundo), e condição da correta compreensão do sentido desta estrutura é o entendimento de que há co-originariedade (Gleichursprünglichkeit) entre eles, (...) isto é, de que a abertura de mundo só ocorre como resultado dos existenciais conjuntamente. Sem pretender contestar tal co-originariedade entre os existenciais no que diz respeito à abertura de mundo (e, portanto, do ser), pretendemos apenas chamar a atenção para o fato de que tal condição da abertura não implica necessariamente que os caracteres do ser do ser-aí tenham que ser entendidos como simultaneamente genéticos na abertura, mas apenas da abertura, e que o ser do ser-aí como cuidado tem seu fundamento originário no carecer. Este último constitui os Em-virtude-de-quê? (Worumwillen) que determinam as disposições, a partir das quais vem a ser as totalidades conformativas (Bewandtnisganzheiten) estabelecidas, como significâncias, no compreender interpretativo, sendo ambos, disposição e compreender, articulados pela fala, com o que tem origem, então, abertura de mundo. Sendo assim, já que o ser do ser-aí é disposição compreensiva e falante no mundo, percebe-se por que se afirma aqui que o fundamento do cuidado como ser do ser-aí é o carecer. Contudo, só é possível dizer que o ser do ser-aí é o cuidado caso a angústia, disposição que corresponde ao saber da morte como compreender projetivo, se manifeste, própria ou impropriamente. PALAVRAS-CHAVE – Ser-aí. Disposição. Compreender. Fala. Impessoal. Angústia. Cuidado. ABSTRACT According to Being and Time, care, as the being of Dasein, is definable by the complex expression “ahead-of-itself-Being-already-in-(the world) as Being-alongside (entities encountered within-the-world)”, which is presented this way in Paragraph 41, that approaches “Dasein’s Being as Care”. Through this expression, Heidegger intends to point out each one of the existentialia (state-ofmind, understanding, discourse, as well as falling and world), and as condition to the correct understanding of the meaning of this structure is the understanding of the fact that there is equiprimordiality (Gleichursprünglichkeit) among them, that is, that the world disclosedness only occurs as a result of the existentialia in conjunction. Without intending to contest this equiprimordiality among the existentialia with respect to the disclosedness of world, (and, therefore, of Being) we just intend to call attention to the fact that this condition of the disclosedness does not necessarily mean that the characters of the Being of Dasein have to be understood as simultaneously genetic in the disclosedness, but only for the disclosedness, and that the being of Dasein as care has its original basis in the need. The latter constitutes the for-the-sake-ofwhich (Worumwillen) that determine the state-ofmind, from which the totality of involvements (Bewandtnisganzheiten) are established, as significance, in the interpretative understanding, where both – state-of-mind and understanding – are articulated by discourse, with which there is, therefore, the origin of world disclosedness. This way, as the being of Dasein is a discoursing and understanding state-of-mind in the world, it is possible to realize why it is said here that the basis of care as being of Dasein is the need. However, it is only possible to affirm that the being of beingthere is care if anxiety, the state-of-mind that corresponds to the awareness of death as a projective understanding, manifests itself, either properly or improperly. KEY WORDS – Dasein. State-of-mind. Understanding. Discourse. Anxiety. Care. (shrink)
In the paper, Priorś well-known \'tonk\' argument is examined and taken as a basis for general considerations regarding the logical status of implicit definition, and the semantical status of the \'tonk\'-like expressions. Further, the whiff of logical vanity attendant upon Priorś conclusions is dispelled by employing a new theory of concept. In particular, the authors argue that: a) Priorś \'tonk\' argument discredits neither the concept of analytical validity nor the role of implicit definition. The arguments underlying the authors\' view draw (...) from both syntactical and semantical considerations of the alleged \'tonk\' connective. b) Decisive criticism of the very concept of implicit definition of logical connectives can be, anstead, based on Tichýś view of formal axiomatics as a case of\'the Fallacy of Subject Matter\'. c) The semantical analysis of the so-called śtrictly empty\' concepts, as introduced by Materna in his theory of concept, renders a viable account of the mysteries and confusions surrounding Priorś witty and inspiring \'tonk\' example. (shrink)
