Unprecedented advances in medicine, genetic engineering, and demographic forecasting raise new questions that strain the categories and assumptions of traditional ethical theories. Heyd's approach resolves many paradoxes in intergenerational justice, while offering a major test case for the profound problems of the limits of ethics and the nature of value.

This volume provides a thought-provoking critique the main, existing school of environmental ethics and seeks to build a more coherent and rigorous philosophical basis for future environmental policy.

It is widely believed that environmental conservation has to be guided by respect for the ‘rights’ of future generations. But it is argued in this chapter that it may not be plausible to think in terms of the ‘rights’ of future generations in general or their rights to any specific environmental assets. Future generations may well have rights when they come into existence, but these will only be rights that can be satisfied at the time. But ‘rights’ do not exhaust (...) the whole of morality, and future generations will certainly have interests, which means that we are under moral obligation to take account of them and of the effect that our environmental policies may have on them. Thus, the problem is to predict what the main interests of future generations will be and how to weigh them up against the interests of people alive today. It is argued that this approach will lead to a very different ranking of priorities among our moral obligations to future generations. (shrink)

The paper discusses some of the criticisms of contingent valuation (CV) and allied techniques for estimating the intensity of peoples' preferences for the environment. The weakness of orthodox utilitarian assumptions in economics concerning the commensurability of all items entering into peoples' choices is discussed. The concept of commensurability is explored as is the problem of rational choice between incommensurate alternatives. While the frequent claim that the environment has some unique moral intrinsic value is unsustainable, its preservation often raises ethical and (...) other motivations that are not commensurate with the values that people place on ordinary marketable goods. Nevertheless, CV is also claimed to have some advantages and it is concluded that little progress will be made in this area until both sides in the debate recognise what is valid in their opponents' arguments. (shrink)

It is recalled that serious doubts can be raised concerning the status of theories such as those pertaining to the rights of future generations, or the constraints imposed on us by theories of intergenerational justice. At the same time, we do have moral obligations to future generations. But these must be based on an appraisal of what are likely to be the main interests that future generations will have and which of these are most likely to be under permanent threat. (...) These, it is argued, will be in the field of human relations rather than in the field of the environment. It is concluded, therefore, that the most important bequest we can make to future generations is to leave them a society in which there is a greater respect for basic human rights than is the case today throughout most of the world. And since the best way of bequeathing a more decent society to future generations is, of course, to improve the respect for human rights today, there is no conflict of interest between the present generation and future generations. Hence, theories of intergenerational distributive justice are not only untenable but are also unnecessary. (shrink)

This chapter leaves the ‘safe’ world of philosophical speculation and turns to the dangerous world of economic prediction. It outlines the economic reasons for believing that, in the very long term—i.e. abstracting from cyclical or other transitory fluctuations in economic activity—future generations will be incomparably richer than people today. Reasons are also given for believing that there will be no significant obstacles to future growth on account of popularly feared environmental developments, such as running out of ‘finite’ resources, or climate (...) change. (shrink)

Discusses one principle that has been suggested as a guide to the way we ought to take account of the interests of future generations, namely the principle of intergenerational ‘equity’ and its related claim of intergenerational equality, particularly in spheres such as the way we should share out ‘finite’ resources among generations. This chapter examines the possible arguments in favour of intergenerational egalitarianism and concludes that they are difficult to defend. It is proposed that egalitarianism should be replaced by the (...) principle of ‘threshold prioritarianism’, so that our moral obligation to future generations should be based on a humanitarian concern to avoid policies that may impoverish them. (shrink)

During the last two or three decades, various developments in the environmental sphere have led to increasing concern with our obligations to posterity and to the non‐human part of the natural world. These developments have exposed gaps in both traditional, moral, and political theory and in conventional economics. Environmental issues have exposed these gaps and have brought to the fore questions such as how far the society, with whose welfare we are concerned, includes future generations or is limited to individual (...) nations or human beings. This book examines these questions as well as related ethical aspects of environmental policy, such as environmental valuation or the equitable allocation among nations of the burden of environmental protection. (shrink)

Some current environmental problems are global and have public good elements that raise, in an acute form, the question of how the costs of a collective effort from which the world as a whole will benefit should be shared out among poor and rich countries. This chapter discusses how far theories of justice provide guidance to this question. It argues that the answer seems to be ‘very little’ and that, in order to arrive at some ground rules for allocating the (...) burden of global environmental protection between countries—as between generations—we are forced back on humanitarian principles of concern for the poor. (shrink)

It is argued that although there may be some case, on economic grounds, for international cooperative action to deal with the threat of climate change or an excessive depletion of biodiversity, the advantages of participation in such action are probably not very great for most rich countries. Furthermore, some of the ‘ethical’ arguments advanced in support of the view that the rich countries should shoulder most of the burden of international action are weak. Nevertheless, there is a case for the (...) richer countries to do so both on grounds of a moral responsibility to assist very poor people and on grounds of the need to look at international cooperation in a wider framework that takes account of the dependence of cooperation from different groups of countries in dealing with a host of other international problems. (shrink)

Although there are many theories of justice, one crucial feature of those that are most widely accepted is that they lay down principles that determine the allocation of rights and obligations in society. They do not eliminate conflicts of interest between different groups but, by specifying such principles, they are designed to enable conflicting interests to be resolved in a peaceful and harmonious manner. But insofar as future generations cannot be said to have any rights, their interests cannot be protected (...) within the framework of any theory of intergenerational justice. This chapter discusses the general relationship between ‘rights’ and ‘justice’, and the obstacles to any theory of intergenerational justice. (shrink)

Even if future generations have no rights and intergenerational justice, intergenerational egalitarianism, and sustainable development are all flawed, this does relieve us of a moral obligation to take account of the impact of our policies on the interests of future generations. In this chapter we argue that whereas, in the very long run, it seems that widespread acute poverty will be eliminated and a decent environment will be preserved, there seems to be no prospect of ever eradicating the inherent weaknesses (...) of the human psyche that are responsible for some groups in society imposing intolerable suffering on others. Hence, it seems that the most valuable bequest we could make to future generations would be a more decent, tolerant, and ‘just’ society than the one in which most people live today. Furthermore, there is clear evidence that the greatest environmental damage has been done in countries where there has been the least respect for basic human rights. (shrink)

Another widely suggested principle governing our obligations to future generations is ‘sustainable development’. The first part of this chapter argues that the mainstream interpretations of the concept of sustainable development are open to serious objections on ethical grounds. The chapter also shows that even if intergenerational egalitarianism were a viable objective there is nothing intergenerationally egalitarian about sustainable development.

Generations are not homogeneous entities and are composed of individuals and nations that have conflicting interests in the way in which resources are allocated among competing uses. This chapter discusses whether ‘the environment’, or ‘nature’, should enjoy special status in any allocation; whether the economist's approach is too anthropocentric; the concept of ‘intrinsic’ values; and the application of these concepts to environmental valuation. It is argued that while many environmental assets are ‘public goods’, so that the free market is unlikely (...) to supply the socially optimal amount, the same applies to many other things, such as public health or education services or the arts, not to mention the fact that most people in the world are, anyway, in dire need of a simple increase in their ability to buy simple basic private goods. This means that the allocation of resources to environmental objectives ought to take into account some form of cost‐benefit analysis. (shrink)