La creatividad especialmente surge del poder de subjetivación y de trascenderse a sí mismo el ser humano. La capacidad de ser creativo resulta, desde la perspectiva de la antropología filosófica, de la “posicionalidad excéntrica” del ser humano, la cual explica su poder de reflexividad y su compulsión y necesidad de crear cultura. Según la teoría de la creatividad de orientación sociológico-antropológica de Heinrich Popitz, esta capacidad humana de desarrollar lo nuevo está basada en las formas de acción de explorar, crear, (...) generar sentido y jugar. Para explicar el poder de subjetivación del individuo, introducimos la sociología con orientación fenomenológica de Alfred Schütz, quien ofrece una teoría de las relevancias que permite analizar las motivaciones subjetivas que conducen el proceso creativo. (shrink)
With this special issue, we would like to promote research on changes in the funding of the sciences, social sciences, and humanities. Since funding secures the livelihood of researchers and the means to do research, it is an indispensable condition for almost all research; as funding arrangements are undergoing dramatic changes, we think it timely to renew the science studies community’s efforts to understand the funding of research. Changes in the governance of science have garnered considerable attention from science studies (...) and higher education research; however, the impact of these changes on the conduct and content of research has not received sufficient attention, and theoretical insights into the connections between funding practices and research practices are few and far between. The aim of this special issue is to contribute to our theoretical understanding of the changing nature of research funding and its impact on the production of scientific knowledge. More specifically, we are interested in the interplay between funding and research practices: What is the impact of institutionalised funding arrangements on the production of scientific knowledge? (shrink)
In the present research, we examine the relation between leader mindfulness and employee performance through the lenses of organizational justice and leader-member relations. We hypothesize that employees of more mindful leaders view their relations as being of higher leader-member exchange quality. We further hypothesize two mediating mechanisms of this relation: increased interpersonal justice and reduced employee stress. In other words, we posit that employees of more mindful leaders feel treated with greater respect and experience less stress. Finally, we predict that (...) LMX quality serves as a mediator linking leader mindfulness to employee performance—defined in terms of both in-role and extra-role performance. Across two field studies of triadic leader-employee-peer data and dyadic leader–employee data, we find support for this sequential mediation model. We discuss implications for theorizing on leadership, organizational justice, business ethics, LMX, and mindfulness, as well as practical implications. (shrink)
The system GLS, which is a modal sequent calculus system for the provability logic GL, was introduced by G. Sambin and S. Valentini in Journal of Philosophical Logic, 11, 311–342,, and in 12, 471–476,, the second author presented a syntactic cut-elimination proof for GLS. In this paper, we will use regress trees in order to present a simpler and more intuitive syntactic cut derivability proof for GLS1, which is a variant of GLS without the cut rule.
Q-valued sets are non-classical models of the formalized theory of identity with existence predicate based on the axioms of a non-commutative and non-idempotent logic. The singleton monad on the category of Q-valued sets is constructed, and elementary properties of T-algebras of the singleton monad are investigated.
This volume explores the reorganisation of knowledge taking place in the course of Galileo's research process extending over a period of more than thirty years, pursued within a network of exchanges with his contemporaries, and documented by a vast collection of research notes. It has revealed the challenging objects that motivated and shaped Galileo's thinking and closely followed the knowledge reorganization engendered by theses challenges. It has thus turned out, for example, that the problem of reducing the properties of pendulum (...) motion to the laws governing naturally accelerated motion on inclined planes was the mainspring for the formation of Galileo's comprehensive theory of naturally accelerated motion. (shrink)
Traditional approaches to human information processing tend to deal with perception and action planning in isolation, so that an adequate account of the perception-action interface is still missing. On the perceptual side, the dominant cognitive view largely underestimates, and thus fails to account for, the impact of action-related processes on both the processing of perceptual information and on perceptual learning. On the action side, most approaches conceive of action planning as a mere continuation of stimulus processing, thus failing to account (...) for the goal-directedness of even the simplest reaction in an experimental task. We propose a new framework for a more adequate theoretical treatment of perception and action planning, in which perceptual contents and action plans are coded in a common representational medium by feature codes with distal reference. Perceived events (perceptions) and to-be-produced events (actions) are equally represented by integrated, task-tuned networks of feature codes – cognitive structures we call event codes. We give an overview of evidence from a wide variety of empirical domains, such as spatial stimulus-response compatibility, sensorimotor synchronization, and ideomotor action, showing that our main assumptions are well supported by the data. Key Words: action planning; binding; common coding; event coding; feature integration; perception; perception-action interface. (shrink)
Friendship, as a unique form of social relationship, establishes a particular union among individual human beings which allows them to overcome diverse boundaries between individual subjects. Age, gender or cultural differences do not necessarily constitute an obstacle for establishing friendship and as a social phenomenon, it might even include the potential to exist independently of space and time. This analysis in the interface of social science and phenomenology focuses on the principles of construction and constitution of this specific form of (...) human encounter. In a “parallel action,” the perspective of social science focuses on concrete socio-historical constructions of friendship in different time periods. These findings are confronted with the description of principles of the subjective constitution of the phenomenon of “friendship” from a phenomenological perspective. The point of reference for the study is the real type of the symbolically established and excessively idealized form of friendship intended for eternity which was especially popular in eighteenth century Germany. Analogous to the method of phenomenological reduction, three different levels of protosociological reduction are developed for the exploration of the unique social phenomenon of friendship. (shrink)
In this paper I offer an appraisal of James Bogen and James Woodward’s distinction between data and phenomena which pursues two objectives. First, I aim to clarify the notion of a scientific phenomenon. Such a clarification is required because despite its intuitive plausibility it is not exactly clear how Bogen and Woodward’s distinction has to be understood. I reject one common interpretation of the distinction, endorsed for example by James McAllister and Bruce Glymour, which identifies phenomena with patterns in data (...) sets. Furthermore, I point out that other interpretations of Bogen and Woodward’s distinction do not specify the relationship between phenomena and theories in a satisfying manner. In order to avoid this problem I propose a contextual understanding of scientific phenomena according to which phenomena are states of affairs which play specific roles in scientific practice and to which we adopt a special epistemic attitude. Second, I evaluate the epistemological significance of Bogen and Woodward’s distinction with respect to the debate between scientific realists and constructive empiricists. Contrary to what Bogen and Woodward claim, I argue that the distinction does not provide a convincing argument against constructive empiricism. (shrink)
This essay presents a phenomenological analysis of the functioning of symbols as elements of the life-world with the purpose of demonstrating the interrelationship of individual and society. On the basis of Alfred Schutz''s theory of the life-world, signs and symbols are viewed as mechanisms by means of which the individual can overcome the transcendences posed by time, space, the world of the Other, and multiple realities which confront him or her. Accordingly, the individual''s life-world divides itself into the dimensions of (...) time, space, the social world and various reality spheres which form the boundaries or transcendences that the I has to understand and integrate. Signs and symbols are described as appresentational modes which stand for experiences originating in the different spheres of the life-world within the world of everyday life, within which they can be communicated, thereby establishing intersubjectivity. Schutz''s theory of the symbol explains how social entities – such as nations, states or religious groups – are symbolically integrated to become components of the individual''s life-world. The following paper reconstructs Schutz''s concept of the symbol as a crucial component of his theory of the life-world, which is seen as an outstanding phenomenological contribution to the theory of the sign and the symbol in general. (shrink)
Forschungs- und Therapieansätze einer „personalisierten Medizin“ erhalten gegenwärtig große Aufmerksamkeit und Förderung in Forschung, Wirtschaft und Politik und erwecken große Hoffnungen. Auf der Grundlage molekulargenetischer Biomarker soll ein zielgerichtetes, stratifiziertes Vorgehen im Bereich der Prävention, Diagnostik und Therapie erreicht werden. Häufig wird der Begriff „personalisierte Medizin“ als Synonym für medizinischen Fortschritt überhaupt benutzt und eine persönlichere, bessere und kostengünstigere Medizin versprochen. 1) Fortschritte in der genetischen Forschung können nicht mit besseren medizinischen Behandlungsmöglichkeiten für eine Vielzahl von Patienten gleichgesetzt werden. In (...) Wirklichkeit beschränken sich die aktuellen Fortschritte einer an genetischen Biomarkern ausgerichteten Diagnostik und Therapie auf Untergruppen von Patienten. Die Mehrheit der Kranken hat bisher keinen Vorteil. 2) Der Begriff „personalisierte Medizin“ ist unangemessen und irreführend. Vielmehr handelt es sich um eine auf genetischen Biomarkern basierte stratifizierende Medizin und nicht um eine patienten- oder personenzentrierte Medizin. 3) Die sog. „personalisierte Medizin“ ist ein stark forschungs- und industriegetriebener Bereich der Medizin. Globale Stakeholder bestimmen die Entwicklung, unabhängig finanzierte Forschung gibt es kaum. Daher besteht die Gefahr, dass wissenschaftlicher Erkenntnisgewinn durch wirtschaftliche Einzelinteressen behindert wird. Empirische Erfahrungen, z. B. der Preisentwicklung neuer Krebsmedikamente, zeigen, dass das Versprechen der Kostenersparnis jeder Evidenz entbehrt. 4) Die hohen Investitionen in die „personalisierte Medizin“ werfen wichtige ethische Fragen nach Opportunitätskosten und Prioritätensetzungen im öffentlichen Gesundheitswesen auf. Derzeit profitieren wenige Patientengruppen von den hohen Forschungs- und Behandlungskosten der „personalisierten Medizin.“ Gleichzeitig bleiben Forschung und Versorgung in anderen wichtigen medizinischen Bereichen unterfinanziert. Eine öffentliche Debatte über die Prioritäten in medizinischer Forschung und Versorgung sowie darüber, wie diese in demokratischen Gesellschaften und in öffentlichen Gesundheitssystemen umgesetzt werden können, ist erforderlich. Eine an genetischen Biomarkern ausgerichtete sog. „personalisierte Medizin“ führt nicht zu einer persönlicheren Behandlung des einzelnen Patienten und ist von einer personen- oder patientenzentrierten Medizin zu unterscheiden. Von den bisherigen Therapiefortschritten profitieren Untergruppen von Patienten, z. B. in der Onkologie. Für die Mehrheit der Patienten konnten keine Verbesserungen erzielt werden. Für eine Kostenersparnis im Gesundheitswesen fehlt jegliche empirische Evidenz, vielmehr muss nach bisherigen Erfahrungen mit Kostensteigerungen gerechnet werden. (shrink)
I examine the abstraction/representation theory of computation put forward by Horsman et al., connecting it to the broader notion of modeling, and in particular, model-based explanation, as considered by Rosen. I argue that the ‘representational entities’ it depends on cannot themselves be computational, and that, in particular, their representational capacities cannot be realized by computational means, and must remain explanatorily opaque to them. I then propose that representation might be realized by subjective experience, through being the bearer of the structure (...) of abstract objects that are represented. (shrink)
In this paper we show that Audi’s fallibilist foundationalism is beset by three unclarities. First, there is a conceptual unclarity in that Audi leaves open if and how to distinguish clearly between the concepts of fallibility and defeasibility. Second, there is a general unclarity: it is not always clear which fallibility/defeasibility-theses Audi accepts or denies. Finally, there is an unclarity of self-application because Audi does not specify his own claim that fallibilist foundationalism is an inductivist, and therefore itself fallible, thesis. (...) The critical part of our paper is supplemented by a constructive part, in which we present a space of possible distinctions between different fallibility and defeasibility theses. These distinctions can be used by Audi as a toolkit to improve the clarity of fallibilist foundationalism and thus provide means to strengthen his position. (shrink)
This paper argues that there is a problem for the justificatory significance of perceptions that has been overlooked thus far. Assuming that perceptual experiences are propositional attitudes and that only propositional attitudes which assertively represent the world can function as justifiers, the problem consists in specifying what it means for a propositional attitude to assertively represent the world without losing the justificatory significance of perceptions—a challenge that is harder to meet than might first be thought. That there is such a (...) problem can be seen by reconsidering and modifying a well-known argument to the conclusion that beliefs cannot be justified by perceptions but only by other beliefs. Nevertheless, the aim of the paper is not to conclude that perceptions are actually incapable of justifying our beliefs but rather to highlight an overlooked problem that needs to be solved in order to properly understand the justificatory relationship between perceptions and beliefs. (shrink)
In the early 1980s the “welfare state crisis” was a point of reference common to many European countries with advanced public social policy arrangements. In most of them the scope of expansion of social expenditure had already been reigned in after the first oil price shock in the mid-1970s. But it was the impact of the second oil price crisis, with low or negative economic growth rates and another steep rise in unemployment in the early 1980s which provided considerable ammunition (...) for critics of the welfare state in many European countries and which triggered off the crisis debate. The latter was particularly pronounced in countries with centre-right and neo-liberal governments at the time and probably most outspoken in the UK. From the start of her first period in office Margaret Thatcher was explicit about her ambition to “roll back the frontiers of the state” and to give much more room for individual and private forms of social protection. In her first election manifesto in 1979 the welfare state was singled out as part of the problem rather than part of the solution to economic and social difficulties which Britain faced at the time. In short, it seems entirely appropriate to take the early 1980s as a starting point and to focus on the UK as the country in which there was arguably more pressure on traditional social policy structures than anywhere else in Europe. (shrink)
Today, avatars often represent users in digital worlds such as in video games or workplace applications. Avatars embody the user and perform their actions in these artificial environments. As a result, users sometimes develop the feeling that their self merges with their avatar. The user realizes that they are the avatar, but the avatar is also the user—meaning that avatar’s appearance, character, and actions also affect their self. In the present paper, we first introduce the event-coding approach of the self (...) and then argue based on the reviewed literature on human-avatar interaction that a self-controlled avatar can lead to avatar-self merging: the user sets their own goals in the virtual environment, plans and executes the avatar’s actions, and compares the predicted with the actual motion outcomes of the avatar. This makes the user feel body ownership and agency over the avatar’s action. Following the event-coding account, avatar-self merging should not be seen as an all-or-nothing process, but rather as a continuous process to which various factors contribute, including successfully taking the perspective of the avatar. Against this background, we discuss affective, cognitive, and visuo-spatial perspective taking of the avatar. As evidence for avatar-self merging, we present findings showing that when users take the avatar’s perspective, they can show spontaneous behavioral tendencies that run counter to their own. (shrink)
Anthony Brueckner argues for a strong connection between the closure and the underdetermination argument for scepticism. Moreover, he claims that both arguments rest on infallibilism: In order to motivate the premises of the arguments, the sceptic has to refer to an infallibility principle. If this were true, fallibilists would be right in not taking the problems posed by these sceptical arguments seriously. As many epistemologists are sympathetic to fallibilism, this would be a very interesting result. However, in this paper I (...) will argue that Brueckner’s claims are wrong: The closure and the underdetermination argument are not as closely related as he assumes and neither rests on infallibilism. Thus even a fallibilist should take these arguments to raise serious problems that must be dealt with somehow. (shrink)
In Chapter 12 of the General Theory, on “The State of Long-Term Expectation,” Keynes writes: “It would be foolish, in forming our expectations, to attach great weight to matters which are very uncertain”. In a footnote to this sentence, Keynes points out that by “very uncertain” he does not mean the same as “very improbable” and refers to the chapter on “The Weight of Arguments” in his earlier Treatise on Probability. The purpose of this article, in the first place, is (...) to provide an account of, and to sort out the relations between, Keynes's views on probability, uncertainty, and the weight of arguments. (shrink)
Consequentialist positions in philosophy spell out normative notions by recourse to final aims. Hedonistic versions of ETHICAL consequentialism spell out what is MORALLY right/justified via recourse to the aim of increasing pleasure and decreasing pain. Veritistic versions of EPISTEMIC consequentialism spell out what is EPISTEMICALLY right/justified via recourse to the aim of increasing the number of true beliefs and decreasing the number of false ones. Even though these theories are in many respects structurally analogous, there are also interesting disanalogies. For (...) example, popular versions of epistemic consequentialism implicitly endorse the truth-indication principle (which claims that a belief is epistemically justified only if there are factors indicating that the belief itself is true), whereas popular versions of ethical consequentialism do not subscribe to an analogous pleasure-indicating principle (which claims that an act is morally justified only if there are factors indicating that performing the act itself is pleasurable). In a first step I will argue that this difference rests on the fact that plausible versions of epistemic consequentialism have to meet certain constraints, which versions of ethical consequentialism do not have to satisfy. As these constraints can be easily met by incorporating the truth-indication principle, epistemic consequentialists tend to subscribe to it. In a second step I will investigate whether the identified constraints can also be met independent from the truth-indication principle. Are there plausible versions of veritistic epistemic consequentialism that reject the principle, thereby allowing that some beliefs can be epistemically justified even though no factors speak in favor of their truth? Building on ideas put forward by Ludwig Wittgenstein, Crispin Wright, and others, I will answer this question affirmatively. (shrink)
Statements such as “X is beautiful but I don’t like how it looks” or “I like how X looks but it is not beautiful” sound contradictory. How contradictory they sound might however depend on the object X and on the aesthetic adjective being used (“beautiful”, “elegant”, “dynamic”, etc.). In our study, the first sentence was estimated to be more contradictory than the latter: If we describe something as beautiful, we often intend to evaluate its appearance, whereas it is less counterintuitive (...) to appreciate an appearance without finding it beautiful. Furthermore, statements including “beautiful” appeared more contradictory than those including “elegant” and “dynamic”, pointing to its greater evaluative component. When related to artworks, sentences could appear less contradictory due to readers’ consideration of the divergence between conventional beauty and art-related sensory pleasures that can even include negative valence. Such ambivalence might be more frequent in art-objects than in other artefacts. Indeed, in our study, sentences referring to artworks were estimated to be less contradictory compared to sentences referring to other artefacts. Meanwhile, an additional small group of graphic design students showed a less clear difference between art-related and non-art-related sentences. We discuss the potential influence of art experience and interest as well as theoretical and methodological challenges like the conceptualization of beauty. (shrink)
Philosophical anthropology is concerned with assumptions about human nature, differential psychology with the empirical investigation of such belief systems. A questionnaire composed of 64 questions concerning brain and consciousness, free will, evolution, meaning of life, belief in God, and theodicy problem was used to gather data from 563 students of psychology at seven universities and from 233 students enrolled in philosophy or the natural sciences. Essential concepts were monism–dualism–complementarity, atheism–agnosticism–deism–theism, attitude toward transcendence–immanence, and self-ratings of religiosity and interest in meaning (...) of life. The response profiles (Menschenbild) of women and men, and of psychology students in the first and midterm of study were very similar. The method of statistical twins indicated a number of differences between students of psychology, philosophy, and the natural sciences. The majority of respondents were convinced that philosophical preconceptions on mind–body and free will have important practical implications for the way in which psychotherapists, physicians, or and judges exercise their professions. (shrink)
Aus dem Inhalt Vorwort Wolfgang Kullmann: Das Verhaltnis zwischen Philosophie und Dichtung in griechischer Sicht Oliver Hellmann: Aristoteles und Achilleus: Der poetische Held aus der Sicht des Philosophen Antonios Rengakos: Zeit und Erzahlung in den Argonautika des Apollonios Rhodios Sabine Follinger: Die Funktion von Nicht-Wissen in der fruhgriechischen Literatur Markus Asper: Medienwechsel und kultureller Kontext. Die Entstehung der griechischen Sachprosa Jochen Althoff: Sokrates als Naturphilosoph in Aristophanes' Wolken Maria Liatsi: Philia bei Aristoteles: Ethische Tugend oder ausseres Gut? Doris Meyer: (...) Die verborgene Wahrheit der Dichtung. Zur allegorischen Interpretation in Porphyrios' Schrift uber die Nymphengrotte in der Odyssee Index der antiken Autoren und Stellen - Sachindex. (shrink)
The mind body problem is a continuing issue in philosophy. No surveys known to us have been conducted about the actual preferences of, for example, psychology students for particular preconceptions about the mind body relation. These preconceptions may have different practical implications for decisions concerning the object and method of research, the choice of explanatory device for psychological and other research data and for the approach of professionals in practice. A questionnaire comprising ten different preconceptions about the mind body relation (...) and other items was returned by 209 German students of various disciplines and by a second sample of 233 first year psychology students. Identity theory, interactionism and complementarity were preferred most. The students clearly believed that the preference for certain preconceptions has important practical implications. There were no differences between the students of different disciplines in the choice of preferred preconceptions about the mind body relation or in the view that these preconceptions are of practical importance. (shrink)
In diesem Aufsatz werden Heideggers Thesen zur Kunst, wie er sie in dem Text „Vom Ursprung des Kunstwerks“ entwickelt, im Detail rekonstruiert, interpretiert und auf ihre Überzeugungskraft hin untersucht. Wir verfolgen dabei ein dreifaches Ziel. Erstens werden seine Thesen zur Kunst ins Verhältnis gesetzt zum Hauptthema seiner Philosophie, der Frage nach dem Sein. Zweitens werden die unterschiedlichen Hinsichten herausgearbeitet, in denen Heidegger Kunst für epistemisch wertvoll erklärt, wobei sich einige dieser Hinsichten nur durch den Wechsel von einer werk- zu einer (...) rezeptionsästhetischen Perspektive erläutern lassen. Drittens werden Heideggers Thesen in den Zusammenhang zeitgenössischer Debatten zum epistemischen Wert der Kunst eingeordnet und kritisch diskutiert. (shrink)