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Joe Dewhurst
Ludwig Maximilians Universität, München
  1.  48
    Enactive Autonomy in Computational Systems.Mario Villalobos & Joe Dewhurst - 2018 - Synthese 195 (5):1891-1908.
    In this paper we will demonstrate that a computational system can meet the criteria for autonomy laid down by classical enactivism. The two criteria that we will focus on are operational closure and structural determinism, and we will show that both can be applied to a basic example of a physically instantiated Turing machine. We will also address the question of precariousness, and briefly suggest that a precarious Turing machine could be designed. Our aim in this paper is to challenge (...)
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  2. Folk Psychology and the Bayesian Brain.Joe Dewhurst - 2017 - In Thomas Metzinger & Wanja Wiese (eds.), Philosophy and Predictive Processing. Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group.
    Whilst much has been said about the implications of predictive processing for our scientific understanding of cognition, there has been comparatively little discussion of how this new paradigm fits with our everyday understanding of the mind, i.e. folk psychology. This paper aims to assess the relationship between folk psychology and predictive processing, which will first require making a distinction between two ways of understanding folk psychology: as propositional attitude psychology and as a broader folk psychological discourse. It will be argued (...)
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  3.  38
    Individuation Without Representation.Joe Dewhurst - 2016 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 69 (1):103-116.
    ABSTRACT Shagrir and Sprevak explore the apparent necessity of representation for the individuation of digits in computational systems.1 1 I will first offer a response to Sprevak’s argument that does not mention Shagrir’s original formulation, which was more complex. I then extend my initial response to cover Shagrir’s argument, thus demonstrating that it is possible to individuate digits in non-representational computing mechanisms. I also consider the implications that the non-representational individuation of digits would have for the broader theory of computing (...)
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  4.  75
    Physical Computation: A Mechanistic Account. [REVIEW]Joe Dewhurst - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (5):795-797.
    Physical Computation is the summation of Piccinini’s work on computation and mechanistic explanation over the past decade. It draws together material from papers published during that time, but also provides additional clarifications and restructuring that make this the definitive presentation of his mechanistic account of physical computation. This review will first give a brief summary of the account that Piccinini defends, followed by a chapter-by-chapter overview of the book, before finally discussing one aspect of the account in more critical detail.
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  5.  6
    The Enactive Automaton as a Computing Mechanism.Joe Dewhurst & Mario Villalobos - 2017 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 6 (3):185-192.
    Varela, Thompson, and Rosch illustrated their original presentation of the enactive theory of cognition with the example of a simple cellular automaton. Their theory was paradigmatically anti-computational, and yet automata similar to the one that they describe have typically been used to illustrate theories of computation, and are usually treated as abstract computational systems. Their use of this example is therefore puzzling, especially as they do not seem to acknowledge the discrepancy. The solution to this tension lies in recognizing a (...)
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  6.  16
    Computing Mechanisms Without Proper Functions.Joe Dewhurst - 2018 - Minds and Machines 28 (3):569-588.
    The aim of this paper is to begin developing a version of Gualtiero Piccinini’s mechanistic account of computation that does not need to appeal to any notion of proper functions. The motivation for doing so is a general concern about the role played by proper functions in Piccinini’s account, which will be evaluated in the first part of the paper. I will then propose a potential alternative approach, where computing mechanisms are understood in terms of Carl Craver’s perspectival account of (...)
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  7. Cognition, Computing and Dynamic Systems.Mario Villalobos & Joe Dewhurst - 2016 - Límite. Revista Interdisciplinaria de Filosofía y Psicología 1.
    Traditionally, computational theory (CT) and dynamical systems theory (DST) have presented themselves as opposed and incompatible paradigms in cognitive science. There have been some efforts to reconcile these paradigms, mainly, by assimilating DST to CT at the expenses of its anti-representationalist commitments. In this paper, building on Piccinini’s mechanistic account of computation and the notion of functional closure, we explore an alternative conciliatory strategy. We try to assimilate CT to DST by dropping its representationalist commitments, and by inviting CT to (...)
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  8.  12
    Curtain Call at the Cartesian Theatre.Krzysztof Dołega & Joe Dewhurst - 2015 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 22:109-128.
    Hobson & Friston (2014) outline a synthesis of Hobson's work on dreaming and consciousness with Friston’s work on the free energy principle and predictive coding. Whilst we are sympathetic with their claims about the function of dreaming and its relationship to consciousness, we argue that their endorsement of the Cartesian theatre metaphor is neither necessary nor desirable. Furthermore, if it were necessary then this endorsement would undermine their positive claims, as the Cartesian theatre metaphor is widely regarded as unsustainable. We (...)
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  9.  58
    Computing Mechanisms and Autopoietic Systems.Joe Dewhurst - 2016 - In Vincent Müller (ed.), Computing and Philosophy. Springer Verlag. pp. 17-26.
    This chapter draws an analogy between computing mechanisms and autopoietic systems, focusing on the non-representational status of both kinds of system (computational and autopoietic). It will be argued that the role played by input and output components in a computing mechanism closely resembles the relationship between an autopoietic system and its environment, and in this sense differs from the classical understanding of inputs and outputs. The analogy helps to make sense of why we should think of computing mechanisms as non-representational, (...)
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  10.  28
    Mechanistic Miscomputation: A Reply to Fresco and Primiero.Joe Dewhurst - 2014 - Philosophy and Technology 27 (3):495-498.
    Fresco and Primiero’s recent article, ‘Miscomputation’ , provides a useful framework with which to think about miscomputation, as well as an admirably broad taxonomy of different kinds of miscomputation. However, it also misconstrues the mechanistic approach to miscomputation, which I will argue should not recognise design errors as miscomputations per se. I argue that a computing mechanism, if it is functioning correctly in the physical sense, cannot miscompute on the basis of an error made by an external agent, such as (...)
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  11.  19
    Rejecting the Received View.Joe Dewhurst - 2014 - Proceedings of the 50th Anniversary Convention of the AISB.
    I defend Piccinini’s mechanistic account of computation against three related criticisms adapted from Sprevak’s critique of non-representational computation. I then argue that this defence highlights a major problem with what Sprevak calls the received view; namely, that representation introduces observer-relativity into our account of computation. I conclude that if we want to retain an objective account of computation, we should reject the received view.
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  12.  28
    Tadeusz Wieslaw Zawidzki: Mindshaping. [REVIEW]Joe Dewhurst - 2014 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences (4):1165-1169.