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  1.  19
    Cognising With Others in the We-Mode: a Defence of ‘First-Person Plural’ Social Cognition.Joe Higgins - 2020 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 12 (4):803-824.
    The theory of we-mode cognition seeks to expand our understanding of the cognition involved in joint action, and therein claims to explain how we can have non-theoretical and non-simulative access to the minds of others. A basic tenet of this theory is that each individual jointly intends to accomplish some outcome together, requiring the adoption of a “first-person plural perspective” that is neither strictly individualistic – in the sense that a we-mode state is enabled by the joint involvement of other (...)
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  2.  37
    The ‘We’ in ‘Me’: An Account of Minimal Relational Selfhood.Joe Higgins - 2020 - Topoi 39 (3):535-546.
    Many philosophers contend that selfhood involves a uniquely first-personal experiential dimension, which precedes any form of socially dependent selfhood. In this paper, I do not wish to deny the notion of such a “minimal” experiential dimension as encapsulating the very givenness of experience as for a certain subject, such that experiences are accessible to this subject in a way that they are not for others. However, I do wish to deny any temptation to view minimal experiential selfhood as ontogenetically more (...)
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  3.  11
    Biosocial Selfhood: Overcoming the ‘Body-Social Problem’ Within the Individuation of the Human Self.Joe Higgins - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17 (3):433-454.
    In a recent paper, Kyselo argues that an enactive approach to selfhood can overcome ‘the body-social problem’: “the question for philosophy of cognitive science about how bodily and social aspects figure in the individuation of the human individual self” ). Kyselo’s claim is that we should conceive of the human self as a socially enacted phenomenon that is bodily mediated. Whilst there is much to be praised about this claim, I will demonstrate in this paper that such a conception of (...)
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  4.  19
    Biosocial Selfhood: Overcoming the ‘Body-Social Problem’ Within the Individuation of the Human Self.Joe Higgins - 2017 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-22.
    In a recent paper, Kyselo argues that an enactive approach to selfhood can overcome ‘the body-social problem’: “the question for philosophy of cognitive science about how bodily and social aspects figure in the individuation of the human individual self” ). Kyselo’s claim is that we should conceive of the human self as a socially enacted phenomenon that is bodily mediated. Whilst there is much to be praised about this claim, I will demonstrate in this paper that such a conception of (...)
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  5.  13
    Why Roger Federer is a GOAT: An Account of Sporting Genius.Joe Higgins - 2018 - Journal of the Philosophy of Sport 45 (3):296-317.
    ABSTRACTWhy is Roger Federer a GOAT of tennis? I argue that the correct response goes beyond statistics and style of play; instead, it is due to the fact that Federer embodies the qualities that typify sporting genius. More than merely being a developed or refined form of expertise, sporting genius relies on the notion of performative fit; that is, the capacity to express viable ways of succeeding within a given sport in virtue of one’s cultivated history of biological and socio-cultural (...)
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