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  1.  43
    Subject‐Involving Luck.Joe Milburn - 2014 - Metaphilosophy 45 (4-5):578-593.
    In recent years, philosophers have tended to think of luck as being a relation between an event and a subject; to give an account of luck is to fill in the right-hand side of the following biconditional: an event e is lucky for a subject S if and only if ____. We can call such accounts of luck subject-relative accounts of luck, since they attempt to spell out what it is for an event to be lucky relative to a subject. (...)
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  2. Two Forms of Memory Knowledge and Epistemological Disjunctivism.Joe Milburn & Andrew Moon - 2019 - In Casey Doyle, Joe Milburn & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), New Issues in Epistemological Disjunctivism. Routledge.
    In our paper, we distinguish between two forms of memory knowledge: experiential memory knowledge and stored memory knowledge. We argue that, mutatis mutandis, the case that Pritchard makes for epistemological disjunctivism regarding perceptual knowledge can be made for epistemological disjunctivism regarding experiential memory knowledge. At the same time, we argue against a disjunctivist account of stored memory knowledge.
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  3. The philosophy of luck and experimental philosophy.Joe Milburn & Edouard Machery - 2019 - In Ian M. Church & Robert J. Hartman (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy and Psychology of Luck. Routledge.
  4.  27
    Unpossessed Evidence: What’s the Problem?Joe Milburn - 2023 - Topoi 42 (1):107-120.
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  5.  15
    Prudence, Rules, and Regulative Epistemology.Miguel García-Valdecasas & Joe Milburn - 2023 - Philosophies 8 (5):91.
    Following Ballantyne, we can distinguish between descriptive and regulative epistemology. Whereas descriptive epistemology analyzes epistemic categories such as knowledge, justified belief, or evidence, regulative epistemology attempts to guide our thinking. In this paper, we argue that regulative epistemologists should focus their attention on what we call epistemic prudence. Our argument proceeds as follows: First, we lay out an objection to virtue-based regulative epistemology that is analogous to the no-guidance objection to virtue ethics. According to this objection, virtue-based regulative epistemology cannot (...)
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  6.  46
    Against Mixed Epistemology.Joe Milburn - 2015 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 19 (2):183-195.
    We can call any reductive account of knowledge that appeals to both safety and ability conditions a mixed account of knowledge. Examples of mixed accounts of knowledge include Pritchard’s (2012) Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology, Kelp’s (2013) Safe-Apt account of knowledge, and Turri’s (2011) Ample belief account of knowledge. Mixed accounts of knowledge are motivated by well-known counterexamples to pure safety and pure ability accounts of knowledge. It is thought that by combining both safety and ability conditions we can give an extensionally (...)
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  7.  34
    Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology as Religious Epistemology: A Response to Bobier.Joe Milburn - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (2):427-434.
    In a recent paper, Christopher Bobier has argued that Duncan Pritchard’s Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology cannot account for knowledge that we have through Divine Revelation. This gives philosophers who believe that Divine Revelation can be source of knowledge reason to reject ALVE. Bobier’s arguments are specifically against ALVE, but they serve as arguments against all sorts of virtue epistemologies. In this paper then, I will critically examine Bobier’s argument, and contend that virtue epistemologies are compatible with knowledge through Divine Revelation.
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  8.  25
    Faith and Reason in the Oxford University Sermons.Joe Milburn - 2018 - American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 92 (3):483-497.
    I argue that we can understand John Henry Newman as defending the Principle of Faith throughout the University Sermons. According to the Principle of Faith, belief in the Christian message is in itself a good act of the mind, and it has moral significance. I argue that Newman’s developed account of faith and its relation to reason in Sermons 10 through 12 are designed to defend the Principle of Faith. Finally, I argue that we can understand Newman’s defense of the (...)
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  9.  35
    Faith and Reason in the Oxford University Sermons.Joe Milburn - 2018 - American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 92 (3):483-497.
    I argue that we can understand John Henry Newman as defending the Principle of Faith throughout the University Sermons. According to the Principle of Faith, belief in the Christian message is in itself a good act of the mind, and it has moral significance. I argue that Newman’s developed account of faith and its relation to reason in Sermons 10 through 12 are designed to defend the Principle of Faith. Finally, I argue that we can understand Newman’s defense of the (...)
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  10.  15
    God and Moral Skepticism.Joe Milburn - 2014 - Quaestiones Disputatae 5 (1):118-129.
  11.  24
    Newman’s Skeptical Paradox.Joe Milburn - 2020 - American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 94 (1):105-123.
    John Henry Newman starts the second half of the Grammar of Assent by laying out a “paradox,” and he announces that the purpose of the following chapters of the book is to resolve it. Surprisingly, recent scholarship has tended not to question the nature of this paradox. In this paper, I argue that we should understand Newman’s paradox to be a kind of skeptical paradox that arises when we accept “Lockean rationalism.” I then show how Newman deals with the paradox. (...)
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  12.  4
    Subject‐Involving Luck.Joe Milburn - 2015 - In Duncan Pritchard & Lee John Whittington (eds.), The Philosophy of Luck. Hoboken, New Jersey: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 127–141.
    In recent years, philosophers have tended to think of luck as being a relation between an event (taken in the broadest sense of the term) and a subject; to give an account of luck is to fill in the right‐hand side of the following biconditional: an event e is lucky for a subject S if and only if ——. We can call such accounts of luck subject‐relative accounts of luck, since they attempt to spell out what it is for an (...)
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  13.  7
    SIEGEL, HARVEY, Education’s Epistemology: Rationality, Diversity, and Critical Thinking, Oxford University Press, New York, 2017, 304 pp. [REVIEW]Joe Milburn - 2018 - Anuario Filosófico:398-401.
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