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Joel Buenting [6]Joel M. Buenting [1]
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Joel Buenting
University of Alberta
  1. Conspiracy Theories and Fortuitous Data.Joel Buenting & Jason Taylor - 2010 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 40 (4):567-578.
    We offer a particularist defense of conspiratorial thinking. We explore the possibility that the presence of a certain kind of evidence—what we call "fortuitous data"—lends rational credence to conspiratorial thinking. In developing our argument, we introduce conspiracy theories and motivate our particularist approach (§1). We then introduce and define fortuitous data (§2). Lastly, we locate an instance of fortuitous data in one real world conspiracy, the Watergate scandal (§3).
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  2.  36
    An Epistemic Reduction of Contrastive Knowledge Claims.Joel Buenting - 2010 - Social Epistemology 24 (2):99-104.
    Contrastive epistemologists say knowledge displays the ternary relation “S knows p rather than q”. I argue that “S knows p rather than q” is often equivalent to “S knows p rather than not-p” and hence equivalent to “S knows p”. The result is that contrastive knowledge is often binary knowledge disguised.
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  3. Fortuitous Data and Conspiracy Theories.Joel Buenting & Jason Taylor - forthcoming - Journal of the Philosophy of Social Sciences.
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  4.  50
    Re-Thinking the Duplication of Speaker/Hearer Belief in the Epistemology of Testimony.Joel Buenting - 2005 - Episteme: Journal of Social Epistemology 2 (2):43-48.
    Most epistemologists of testimony assume that testifying requires that the beliefs to which speakers attest are identical to the beliefs that hearers accept. I argue that this characterization of testimony is misleading. Characterizing testimony in terms of duplicating speaker/hearer belief unduly resticts the variety of beliefs that might be accepted from speaker testimony.
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    Re-Thinking the Duplication of Speaker/Hearer Belief in the Epistemology of Testimony.Joel Buenting - 2006 - Episteme 2 (2):129-134.
    Most epistemologists of testimony assume that testifying requires that the beliefs to which speakers attest are identical to the beliefs that hearers accept. I argue that this characterization of testimony is misleading. Characterizing testimony in terms of duplicating speaker/hearer belief unduly resticts the variety of beliefs that might be accepted from speaker testimony.
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  6. The Problem of Hell.Joel Buenting (ed.) - 2010 - Ashgate.
     
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