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Joel Katzav
University of Queensland
  1.  16
    Grace de Laguna’s Analytic and Speculative Philosophy.Joel Katzav - forthcoming - Australasian Philosophical Review.
    This paper introduces the philosophy of Grace Andrus de Laguna in order to renew interest in it. I show that, in the 1910s and 1920s, she develops ideas and arguments that are also found playing key roles in the development of analytic philosophy decades later. Further, I describe her sympathetic, but acute, criticism of pragmatism and Heideggerian ontology, and situate her work in the tradition of American, speculative philosophy. Before 1920, we will see, de Laguna appeals to multiple realizability to (...)
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  2.  80
    The Epistemology of Climate Models and Some of its Implications for Climate Science and the Philosophy of Science.Joel Katzav - 2014 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 46 (2):228-238.
    I bring out the limitations of four important views of what the target of useful climate model assessment is. Three of these views are drawn from philosophy. They include the views of Elisabeth Lloyd and Wendy Parker, and an application of Bayesian confirmation theory. The fourth view I criticise is based on the actual practice of climate model assessment. In bringing out the limitations of these four views, I argue that an approach to climate model assessment that neither demands too (...)
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  3. Hybrid Models, Climate Models, and Inference to the Best Explanation.Joel Katzav - 2013 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 64 (1):107-129.
    I examine the warrants we have in light of the empirical successes of a kind of model I call ‘ hybrid models ’, a kind that includes climate models among its members. I argue that these warrants ’ strengths depend on inferential virtues that are not just explanatory virtues, contrary to what would be the case if inference to the best explanation provided the warrants. I also argue that the warrants in question, unlike those IBE provides, guide inferences only to (...)
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  4. Analytic Philosophy, 1925-1969: Emergence, Management and Nature.Joel Katzav - 2018 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy.
    This paper shows that during the first half of the 1960s The Journal of Philosophy quickly moved from publishing work in diverse philosophical traditions to, essentially, only publishing analytic philosophy. Further, the changes at the journal are shown, with the help of previous work on the journals Mind and The Philosophical Review, to be part of a pattern involving generalist philosophy journals in Britain and America during the period 1925-1969. The pattern is one in which journals controlled by analytic philosophers (...)
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  5.  98
    On the Emergence of American Analytic Philosophy.Joel Katzav & Krist Vaesen - 2017 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 25 (4):772-798.
    ABSTRACTThis paper is concerned with the reasons for the emergence and dominance of analytic philosophy in America. It closely examines the contents of, and changing editors at, The Philosophical Review, and provides a perspective on the contents of other leading philosophy journals. It suggests that analytic philosophy emerged prior to the 1950s in an environment characterized by a rich diversity of approaches to philosophy and that it came to dominate American philosophy at least in part due to its effective promotion (...)
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  6.  35
    A Nominalistic Interpretation of Truth.Theodore de Laguna & Joel Katzav - 2019 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 27 (5):1034-1040.
    This paper by Theodore de Laguna presents and argues for the deflationary theory of truth. The paper was first published in French in 1922. The version published here is the original, English version of the paper and has been edited by Joel Katzav.
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  7. Ellis on the Limitations of Dispositionalism.Joel Katzav - 2005 - Analysis 65 (1):92-94.
    FIRST PARAGRAPH I have argued that dispositionalism is incompatible with the Principle of Least Action (PLA) (Katzav 2004). In ‘Katzav on the Limitations of Dispositionalism,’ Brian Ellis responds, arguing that while naïve dispositionalism is incompatible with the PLA, sophisticated dispositionalism is not. Naive dispositionalism, according to Ellis, is the view that the world is ultimately something like a conglomerate of objects and their dispositions, and that, therefore, dispositions are the ultimate ontological units that explain events. Sophisticated dispositionalism, according to Ellis, (...)
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  8.  22
    Issues in the Theoretical Foundations of Climate Science.Joel Katzav & Wendy S. Parker - 2018 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 63:141-149.
    The theoretical foundations of climate science have received little attention from philosophers thus far, despite a number of outstanding issues. We provide a brief, non-technical overview of several of these issues – related to theorizing about climates, climate change, internal variability and more – and attempt to make preliminary progress in addressing some of them. In doing so, we hope to open a new thread of discussion in the emerging area of philosophy of climate science, focused on theoretical foundations.
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  9. Dispositions, Causes, Persistence As Is, and General Relativity.Joel Katzav - 2013 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 27 (1):41-57.
    I argue that, on a dispositionalist account of causation and indeed on any other view of causation according to which causation is a real relation, general relativity does not give causal principles a role in explaining phenomena. In doing so, I bring out a surprisingly substantial constraint on adequate views about the explanations and ontology of GR, namely the requirement that such views show how GR can explain motion that is free of disturbing influences.
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  10.  82
    Assessing Climate Model Projections: State of the Art and Philosophical Reflections.Joel Katzav, Henk A. Dijkstra & A. T. J. de Laat - 2012 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 43 (4):258-276.
    The present paper draws on climate science and the philosophy of science in order to evaluate climate-model-based approaches to assessing climate projections. We analyze the difficulties that arise in such assessment and outline criteria of adequacy for approaches to it. In addition, we offer a critical overview of the approaches used in the IPCC working group one fourth report, including the confidence building, Bayesian and likelihood approaches. Finally, we consider approaches that do not feature in the IPCC reports, including three (...)
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  11.  90
    Severe Testing of Climate Change Hypotheses.Joel Katzav - 2013 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 44 (4):433-441.
    I examine, from Mayo's severe testing perspective, the case found in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change fourth report for the claim that increases in anthropogenic greenhouse gas concentrations caused most of the post-1950 global warming. My examination begins to provide an alternative to standard, probabilistic assessments of OUR FAULT. It also brings out some of the limitations of variety of evidence considerations in assessing this and other hypotheses about the causes of climate change, and illuminates the epistemology of optimal (...)
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  12. On What Powers Cannot Do.Joel Katzav - 2005 - Dialectica 59 (3):331–345.
    Dispositionalism is the view that the world is, ultimately, just a world of objects and their irreducible dispositions, and that such dispositions are, ultimately, the sole explanatory ground for the occurrence of events. This view is motivated, partly, by arguing that it affords, while non‐necessitarian views of laws of nature do not afford, an adequate account of our intuitions about which regularities are non‐accidental. I, however, argue that dispositionalism cannot adequately account for our intuitions about which regularities are non‐accidental. Further, (...)
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  13.  37
    Introduction to Assessing Climate Models: Knowledge, Values and Policy.Joel Katzav & Wendy S. Parker - 2015 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 5 (2):141-148.
  14.  15
    On What Powers Cannot Do.Joel Katzav - 2005 - Dialectica 59 (3):331-345.
    Dispositionalism is the view that the world is, ultimately, just a world of objects and their irreducible dispositions, and that such dispositions are, ultimately, the sole explanatory ground for the occurrence of events. This view is motivated, partly, by arguing that it affords, while non‐necessitarian views of laws of nature do not afford, an adequate account of our intuitions about which regularities are non‐accidental. I, however, argue that dispositionalism cannot adequately account for our intuitions about which regularities are non‐accidental. Further, (...)
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  15. Humean Metaphysics.Joel Katzav - 2002 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 40 (1):59-73.
  16. Identity, Nature and Ground.Joel Katzav - 2002 - Philosophical Topics 30 (1):167-187.
  17. The Second-Order Property View of Existence.Joel Katzav - 2008 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (4):486-496.
    Abstract: In this paper, I examine the current case against the second-order property view of existence through a discussion of Colin McGinn's up to date statement of this case. I conclude that the second-order property view of existence remains viable.
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  18.  35
    Analytic Philosophy, 1925–69: Emergence, Management and Nature.Joel Katzav - 2018 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 26 (6):1197-1221.
    ABSTRACTThis paper shows that during the first half of the 1960s The Journal of Philosophy quickly moved from publishing work in diverse philosophical traditions to, essentially, only publishing analytic philosophy. Further, the changes at the journal are shown, with the help of previous work on the journals Mind and The Philosophical Review, to be part of a pattern involving generalist philosophy journals in Britain and America during the period 1925–69. The pattern is one in which journals controlled by analytic philosophers (...)
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  19.  20
    Theodore de Laguna's Discovery of the Deflationary Theory of Truth.Joel Katzav - 2019 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 27 (5):1025-1033.
    Theodore de Laguna develops and argues for a deflationary view of truth well before the publication of what many have taken to be its source, or at least its inspiration, namely Frank P. Ramsey’s paper ‘Facts and Propositions’. I outline de Laguna’s view of truth and the arguments he offers for it; I also discuss its role in the history of twentieth-century philosophy. My outline and discussion serve as an introduction to de Laguna’s ‘A Nominalistic Interpretation of Truth’, a paper (...)
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  20.  12
    The National Science Foundation and Philosophy of Science's Withdrawal From Social Concerns.Krist Vaesen & Joel Katzav - 2019 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 78:73-82.
    At some point during the 1950s, mainstream American philosophy of science began increasingly to avoid questions about the role of non-cognitive values in science and, accordingly, increasingly to avoid active engagement with social, political and moral concerns. Such questions and engagement eventually ceased to be part of the mainstream. Here we show that the eventual dominance of 'value-free' philosophy of science can be attributed, at least in part, to the policies of the U.S. National Science Foundation's "History and Philosophy of (...)
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  21.  10
    Assessing Climate Model Projections: State of the Art and Philosophical Reflections.Joel Katzav, Henk Dijkstra & Jos de Laat - 2012 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 43 (4):258-276.
    The present paper draws on climate science and the philosophy of science in order to evaluate climate-model-based approaches to assessing climate projections. We analyze the difficulties that arise in such assessment and outline criteria of adequacy for approaches to it. In addition, we offer a critical overview of the approaches used in the IPCC working group one fourth report, including the confidence building, Bayesian and likelihood approaches. Finally, we consider approaches that do not feature in the IPCC reports, including three (...)
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  22.  44
    Riggs on Strong Justification.Joel Katzav - 1998 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (4):631 – 639.
    In 'The Weakness of Strong Justification' Wayne Riggs claims that the requirement that justified beliefs be truth conducive (likely to be true) is not always compatible with the requirement that they be epistemically responsible (arrived at in an epistemically responsible manner)1. He supports this claim by criticising Alvin Goldman's view that if a belief is strongly justified, it is also epistemically responsible. In light of this, Riggs recommends that we develop two independent conceptions of justification, one that insists upon the (...)
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  23.  21
    Erratum To: The Example of the IPCC Does Not Vindicate the Value Free Ideal: A Reply to Gregor Betz.W. S. Parker & Joel Katzav - 2015 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 5 (2):259-259.
  24.  28
    Horwich on Meaning and Use.Joel Katzav - 2004 - Ratio 17 (2):159–175.