Biocentrism, a prominent view in environmental ethics, is the notion that all and only individual biological organisms have moral status, which is to say that their good ought to be considered for its own sake by moral agents. I argue that biocentrism suffers two serious problems: the Origin Problem and the Normativity Problem. Biocentrism seeks to avoid the absurdity that artifacts have moral status on the basis that organisms have naturalistic origins whereas artifacts do not. The Origin Problem contends that, (...) contra biocentrism, an entity’s origin is not relevant to whether that entity has moral status. The Normativity Problem is that biocentrists are preoccupied with accounting for the goods or interests of nonsentient organisms yet fail to establish why interests so construed confer moral status; biocentrism fails to bridge the good-ought gap. It is shown how these problems emerge in three prominent book-length works representative of the biocentrists’ positions over three decades: Paul Taylor’s Respect for Nature, Gary Varner’s In Nature’s Interests?, and Nicholas Agar’s Life’s Intrinsic Value. At minimum, these criticisms suggest that biocentrism is crucially incomplete as a moral framework at present and, optimistically, where more work remains to be done. If biocentrism really is dead, then moral status should be restricted to a more plausible locus such as sentience or rationality, the value of organisms needs a different expression, and environmental ethics needs an axiological foundation different than bare life. (shrink)

John Rawls’ account of our obligations towards future generations has received considerable criticism in the environmental ethics literature relative to the scant few passages in which he discusses the issue. I argue that much of this criticism is warranted because Rawls’ Heads of Family strategy for grounding obligations to future generations is not only independently problematic, but also inconsistent with his general framework. Furthermore, the oft-suggested Time Travel strategy will not work either, and for just those reasons which Rawls gave. (...) However, I contend that the less often discussed “Universalizability Principle,” which Rawls discusses most prominently in Political Liberalism, is a plausible account of our obligations to future generations and is consistent with Rawls’ general framework. I then defend this Rawlsian account of our future-oriented obligations against objections in the environmental ethics literature such as those recently advanced by the consequentialist Tim Mulgan. (shrink)

Animal size is a relevant and unappreciated consideration in moral evaluations of killing animals for food, especially for utilitarians, who must weigh the gustatory satisfaction of eating meat-the quantity of which varies greatly throughout the animal kingdom-against animal suffering in utilitarian calculations. I argue that animal size can drastically alter not only the extent but even the valence of such calculations. Then I show how the business ethics literature on vegetarianism is deficient for not taking animal size into account. Last, (...) I argue that market conditions are also relevant in moral assessments of vegetarianism. (shrink)

This paper critiques Clare Palmer’s “What do we owe wild animals?” on three grounds. First, it is argued that, Palmer’s opening case study notwithstanding, there are good empirical reasons to think that we should assist domesticated horses and not wild deer. Then, Palmer’s claim that “wildness is not a capacity” is brought into question, and it is argued that wildness connotes certain capacities which wild animals generally have and which domesticated animals generally lack. Lastly, the “supererogation problem” is developed against (...) a version of Palmer’s preferred Contextualist view, which claims that, while her view doesn’t obligate us to eliminate predators and otherwise redesign nature in the name of wild animal welfare, it may nonetheless allow them. Therefore, this view has potentially unsettling environmental implications. (shrink)